Paz v. Hayden

Case: 24-20226 Document: 53-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/01/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________ United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 24-20226

FILED

April 1, 2025

____________

Lyle W. Cayce

Richard Allen Paz, Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Constable Precinct 4 Kenneth Hayden; Constable

Precinct 4, Name Unknown; Constable Precinct 4, Name

Unknown; Constable Precinct 4, Name Unknown;

Constable Precinct 4, Name Unknown; Deputy Rickey

Ford; Deputy Ronald Hamlet; Deputy Christopher

Taylor,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:22-CV-1898

______________________________

Before Haynes, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: *

Richard Paz sued several police officers following an allegedly illegal

search. The officers asserted qualified immunity in their motion for

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*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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No. 24-20226

summary judgment. By failing to respond, Paz did not carry his burden of

negating qualified immunity. We thus AFFIRM the district court, although

we modify the dismissal of the requested injunction to reflect that it is

without prejudice.

I. Background

Because this case comes to us on the officers’ motion for summary

judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to Paz. See Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).

After receiving a tip regarding the purported location of a felon named

Callie, police officers decided to pay Callie a visit. The tipster told officers

that Callie was in a house where Paz rented a room. Armed with an arrest

warrant, the officers arrived at the house and took position around the

property. Paz and his housemate heard a noise outside, so they opened the

side door and saw officers prying wooden slats off the fence surrounding the

backyard. Paz asserts that the officers lied about seeing a shotgun in the

house to justify the entry into the backyard. 1 With guns drawn, the officers

ordered Paz out of the house and asked where Callie was. Paz denied

knowing a Callie. The officers then asked Paz if the cameras on the property

worked; Paz said yes, and then the officers took down the cameras pursuant

to a search warrant. After running Paz’s fingerprints, the officers learned

that Paz had outstanding arrest warrants, so the officers arrested him.

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1

The officers present evidence that, through a broken slat in the fence, they saw a

man sitting just inside the open side door with a shotgun next to him. Then, after seeing

him near the gun, they pried slats off the fence. This evidence conflicts with Paz’s evidence

that he heard a noise outside, then opened the door to see the officers prying slats off the

fence. In other words, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the officers saw the gun

before prying slats off the fence. Because this appeal comes to us on the officers’ motion

for summary judgment, we assume Paz’s evidence is accurate.

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No. 24-20226

Paz sued the officers for the allegedly illegal search, seeking

compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages, as well as injunctive relief.

The officers filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting qualified

immunity. Paz did not respond to the motion. The district court granted

summary judgment, concluding that “[w]hile fact questions exist as to

whether the search was valid, the defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on [the illegal search] claim because Paz has not show[n] that he

suffered a cognizable injury as a result of the search.” 2 Paz appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review summary judgments de novo. Louisiana ex rel. La. Dep’t of

Wildlife & Fisheries v. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., 70 F.4th 872, 878

(5th Cir. 2023).

III. Standing

The extent to which the district court’s dismissal rested on standing

instead of the merits is debatable; 3 regardless, we must independently assure

ourselves of our jurisdiction. See Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of Gulf Coast,

Inc., 301 F.3d 329, 331–32 (5th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff must demonstrate three

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2

The district court also adjudged other claims, but Paz appeals only the illegal

search claim.

3

The district court dismissed the illegal search claim “because Paz ha[d] not

show[n] that he suffered a cognizable injury as a result of the search,” suggesting that its

analysis rested on standing. The district court also dismissed Paz’s request for property

damage, concluding that Paz did not have standing to seek compensation for the harm to

the house or fence given that Paz had no duty to fix the damage. However, the district

court dismissed all claims with prejudice, even though dismissal for lack of standing should

be without prejudice. See Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, 969 F.3d 460,

468 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“Ordinarily, when a complaint is dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction, including lack of standing, it should be without prejudice.” (quotation

omitted)).

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elements to establish standing: injury in fact, traceability, and redressability.

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).

A plaintiff has standing if he alleges a violation of a constitutional right

that, if proved, would entitle him to at least nominal damages. Green v.

McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Woods, 848

F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[A] party who proves a violation of his

constitutional rights is entitled to nominal damages even when there is no

actual injury.”). Intangible harms, like illegal searches, can be concrete

injuries sufficient to confer standing. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S.

413, 425 (2021) (“Various intangible harms can also be concrete. Chief

among them are injuries with a close relationship to harms traditionally

recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts. . . . And

those traditional harms may also include harms specified by the Constitution

itself.”). Illegal searches have long been recognized as a legal harm

sufficiently concrete under Article III. See id. See generally United States v.

Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence

was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th

century.”). 4 We thus conclude that Paz has standing to pursue his claim of

an illegal search.

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4

In evaluating standing, we are careful to avoid conflating the issue of redressability

for standing with whether Paz would ultimately establish damages at trial. See Ariz. State

Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 800 (2015) (“[O]ne must not

‘confus[e] weakness on the merits with absence of Article III standing.’” (second

alteration in original) (quotation omitted)). This is especially so for a fact-intensive issue

typically left to the jury, such as damages. See Greyhound Corp. v. Dewey, 240 F.2d 899, 904

(5th Cir. 1957). Accordingly, Paz has standing to pursue his damages claims. See

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 292 (2021) (“[A] request for nominal damages

satisfies the redressability element of standing where a plaintiff’s claim is based on a

completed violation of a legal right.”); Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851, 855 (8th Cir.

1981) (en banc) (“[V]iolations of certain substantive constitutional rights are redressible by

substantial compensatory awards independent of actual injury.”); Williams v. Kaufman

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IV. Qualified Immunity

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is “no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the facts in the light most favorable

to Paz and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378.

The district court did not consider qualified immunity, but we may

affirm on any basis supported by the record. See Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth.,

827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016). “Qualified immunity protects officers

from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional

right.” Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). Once a

defendant asserts qualified immunity, “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of

negating qualified immunity.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir.

2010). Paz must meet two requirements: First, he must show that, viewing

the facts in the light most favorable to him, the officers violated a federal

right. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655–56 (2014) (per curiam). Second,

he must show that the right “was clearly established at the time of the

violation.” Id. at 656 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

By failing to brief the matter before the district court and not having

any evidence of clearly established law at the time of violation, Paz did not

meet his burden to defeat qualified immunity. See Cunningham v. Castloo,

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Cnty., 352 F.3d 994, 1015 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Just as nominal damages are allowed without

proof of injury, ‘a punitive award may stand in the absence of actual damages where there

has been a constitutional violation.’” (quotation omitted)); Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d

1311, 1320 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming award of punitive damages for illegal search); Fifth

Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) § 10.13 (2020)

(permitting emotional distress damages in § 1983 actions). However, because Paz does not

present evidence that the officers will continue to engage in the conduct underlying this

suit, Paz does not have standing to seek injunctive relief. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983). We thus dismiss that requested relief without prejudice.

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983 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2020) (“All told, [plaintiff] has failed to cite

adequate authority at a sufficiently high level of specificity to put [the

defendant] on notice that his conduct [was] definitively unlawful. [Plaintiff]

therefore failed to satisfy her burden of defeating [the defendant’s] claim of

qualified immunity.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see

also Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 733 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)

(explaining that plaintiffs failed to argue that the constitutional right was

clearly established and thus failed to overcome qualified immunity).

Accordingly, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Paz asserts that summary judgment cannot be granted for failure to

respond. See Hibernia Nat’l Bank v. Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima,

776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985) (“A motion for summary judgment

cannot be granted simply because there is no opposition . . . .”). However,

we are not granting it solely for the failure to respond. Instead, the officers

raised and briefed qualified immunity below, which put the burden on Paz to

defeat the defense. See, e.g., McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323

(5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam). Paz did not meet his burden, so we

AFFIRM.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons above, we modify dismissal of the requested injunctive

relief to reflect that it is without prejudice, but we otherwise AFFIRM the

district court.

6