DH v. Scranton School District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DH, et al.,

Plaintiffs CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-334

v. (MEHALCHICK, J.)

SCRANTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Scranton School District

(“the District”), Teacher Erica Stolan (“Stolan”), Principal of South Scranton Intermediate

School Daniel Gilroy (“Gilroy”), Vice Principal of South Scranton Intermediate School

Joseph Lalli (“Lalli”), and Director of Special Education Services Ann Genett (“Genett”)

(collectively, with Stolan, Gilroy, and Lalli, “Individual Defendants”) (Individual Defendants

collectively with the School District, “Defendants”) on April 26, 2024. (Doc. 7). On February

27, 2024, Plaintiffs Courtny Roberts (“Roberts”), Matthew Hartzell (“Hartzell”), as parents

and natural guardians of D.H. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), initiated this action by filing a

complaint pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section

504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and various state law claims. (Doc. 1). For the

following reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss shall be DENIED in part and GRANTED

in part. (Doc. 7).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following background is taken from the complaint (Doc. 1). On February 27,

2024, Plaintiffs filed the complaint against Defendants. (Doc. 1). In the complaint, Plaintiffs

allege that D.H. is a thirteen-year-old disabled child with special needs who has been

diagnosed with autism, disruptive behavior disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

(ADHD), emotional disturbance, speech and language impairment, and a secondary other

health impairment (OHI). (Doc. 1, ¶ 8). D.H. began attending South Scranton Intermediate

School within the District during the 2021-2022 school year as a fifth grader. (Doc. 1, ¶ 20).

D.H. was placed in a special education classroom with Stolan as his teacher, where he was

meant to receive special education services as provided by the IDEA. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 2, 10, 20).

The events giving rise to this action are as follows: Plaintiffs allege that between August

2021 and January 2023, various District personnel and employees of outside agencies

employed by the District witnessed Stolan’s abusive conduct towards D.H. and other special

education students in her class. (Doc. 1, ¶ 22). During this time period, D.H.’s mother

repeatedly spoke to Gilroy and Lalli to complain about the abusive behavior of Stolan and

request that D.H. be removed from her classroom due to Stolan’s behavior. (Doc. 1, ¶ 23).

D.H.’s mother also spoke with Stolan, who stated that she was not equipped for her job. (Doc.

1, ¶ 24). On December 6, 2022, D.H.’s mother attended an Individualized Education Plan

(“IEP”) meeting and again “pleaded with those in attendance,” which included Stolan,

Gilroy, and Genett, to move D.H. out of Stolan’s classroom “due to Stolan’s abusive behavior

in the past.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 26). Despite these conversations and the December 6, 2022 IEP

meeting request, the District did not remove D.H. from Stolan’s classroom until January 4,

2023, after two particularly abusive episodes that occurred on January 2, 2023 and January

3, 2023. (Doc. 1, ¶ 25).

On January 2, 2023, D.H. was sitting in a chair in his class in Stolan’s special

education classroom when Stolan began intentionally spraying a liquid foreign substance into

D.H.’s face. (Doc. 1, ¶ 28). This occurred in front of D.H.’s behavior support professional,

Ciara Fulton (“Fulton”). (Doc. 1, ¶ 28). As Stolan sprayed the liquid substance into D.H.’s

face, she stated “. . .This should wake him up” and “. . .This worked before in waking him

up,” implying that she had done this before. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 28-29). The following day, on January

3, 2023, Stolan approached the seat where D.H. was sitting in a chair with other special

education students and “intentionally shoved him with her body out of his chair causing him

to fall to the floor.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 32). After D.H. fell, Stolan began “directing and encouraging

other special education students in her classroom to forcibly remove [D.H.] from the

classroom and, in the process, directing and allowing the classmates of [D.H.] to forcibly

strike and hit him as he was dragged feet first out of the classroom.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 32). D.H.’s

mother learned about the incident from Fulton, and when she asked to speak with Gilroy, he

refused. (Doc. 1, ¶ 42). Plaintiffs contend that this type of behavior by Stolan directed at D.H.

and other special education students was “open, widespread and known by the staff and

administrators of the [] District as well as the staff and administrators of other outside agencies

serving students within the [] District.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 33-34). Plaintiffs allege a number of

abusive behaviors that Stolen engaged in, including but not limited to “using abusive

language,” “yelling and screaming in [D.H.’s] face with the intent of initiating inappropriate

behavior from [D.H.],” “spraying liquid solution into [D.H.’s] face,” “pushing [D.H.] out of

his classroom chair,” “allowing other students to strike [D.H.],” “aggressively grabbing the

desk of [D.H.],” and “placing a shield/curtain up and around [D.H.].” (Doc. 1, ¶ 35).

Fulton ultimately reported Stolan’s behavior to the District and provided a

handwritten note to Gilroy detailing the incident. (Doc. 1, ¶ 36). On January 4, 2023, a Child

Line Report that originated from the District reported two incidents of assaults on D.H. and

identified Stolan as “becoming more aggressive with the children.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 37-38). That

day, the District removed Stolan from D.H.’s classroom. (Doc. 1, ¶ 39). On January 13, 2023,

a Report of Suspected Child Abuse was made to law enforcement, and the Scranton Police

Department initiated an investigation. (Doc. 1, ¶ 40). According to the complaint, the District

provided no communication, outreach, or support to Plaintiffs or other special education

students or parents/guardians, and instead allowed Stolan to return to work at South

Scranton Intermediate School in the Spring of 2023. (Doc. 1, ¶ 41). After these incidents,

Gilroy was removed from his position as Principal at South Scranton Intermediate School

and was placed in another administrative position with the District. (Doc. 1, ¶ 43). Lalli

remains Vice-Principal, Genett remains Director of Special Education, and Stolan remains a

special education teacher at Charles Sumner School in the District. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 44-46).

Plaintiffs contend that the District had a policy or custom of ignoring signs of abuse, failing

to investigate inappropriate conduct by teachers, discouraging reporting abuse, and retaliating

against those who did. (Doc. 1, ¶ 49). Plaintiffs aver that the District thus acted with deliberate

indifference towards D.H.’s disability. (Doc. 1, ¶ 47). As a result, Plaintiffs contend that D.H.

was injured. (Doc. 1, ¶ 31).

Plaintiffs’ complaint raises thirteen state and federal claims related to alleged

constitutional violations by Defendants: (1) Count I – 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Violation of IDEA,

20 U.S.C. § 1440, et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment against all Defendants; (2) Count

II – 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Violation of Fourteenth Amendment against all Defendants; (3) Count

III – Violation of IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1440, et seq., against all Defendants; (4) Count IV –

Violation of ADA against the District; (5) Count V – Violation of Section 504 of the RA

against the District; (6) Count VI – Monell claim for failure to train/supervise under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against the District; (7) Count VII – Vicarious Liability against all Defendants; (8)

Count VIII – Assault and Battery against Stolan; (9) Count IX – Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distress (“IIED”) against Stolan; (10) Count X – Breach of Fiduciary Duty against

Stolan; (11) Count XI – Negligence against all Defendants; (12) Count XII – Punitive

Damages against all Defendants; (13) Count XIII – Demand for Attorney’s Fees.1 (Doc. 1, at

18-50). As relief, Plaintiffs request compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s

fees. (Doc. 1, at 50-51).

On April 26, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, and on May 10,

2024, they filed a brief in support. (Doc. 7; Doc. 8). Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition on

May 23, 2024. (Doc. 9). No reply brief was timely filed. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss

has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. (Doc. 7; Doc. 8; Doc. 9).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. 12(B)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “When a party

moves to dismiss under more than one Rule 12 ground, the Court must first consider the Rule

12(b)(1) challenge, ‘because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter

1 Defendants argue that Count XIII of the complaint, titled “Demand for Attorney’s

Fees” should be dismissed, as claims for attorney’s fees “do not constitute independence [sic]

causes of action.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 168-171; Doc. 8, at 14). 42 U.S.C. § 1988 governs attorney’s

fees awards. Section 1988 does not confer an independent cause of action but rather

authorizes the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party in cases brought under sections

1981, 1983, and 1985. See Carpenter v. Ashby, 351 F. App'x 684, 687 (3d Cir. 2009). Thus, such

a demand for attorney’s fees must not be asserted as an individual cause of action, but instead

as a demand for relief. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count XIII is thus GRANTED. (Doc.

7). Count XIII is DISMISSED. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs may include their demand for attorney’s

fees outside of an independent count in the complaint.

jurisdiction, all other defenses and objections become moot.’” A.D. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of

Educ., 90 F.Supp.3d 326, 334 (D.N.J. 2015), aff'd, 833 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation

omitted). “A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the jurisdiction of the court to

address the merits of the plaintiff's complaint.” Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537

(M.D. Pa. 2002). The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a jurisdictional issue and

the appropriate device to raise this issue is a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). See

Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2014). A Rule 12(b)(1)

dismissal is not a judgment on the merits, but only a determination that the court lacks the

authority to hear the case. Swope v. Central York Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 2d 592, 599 (M.D. Pa.

2011).

Rule 12(b)(1) challenges may be “facial” or “factual.” See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. &

Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). A facial attack challenges whether jurisdiction

has been properly pled and requires the court to “only consider the allegations of the

complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing

Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.) Conversely, when a defendant sets forth a factual attack on

subject-matter jurisdiction, “the Court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself whether

it has power to hear the case ... ‘no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations,

and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating

for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.’” Carpet Group Int'l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass'n,

Inc., 227 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

In this case, Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to exhaust administrative

remedies and, thus, present a factual attack on subject-matter jurisdiction. See Rohrbaugh by &

through Rohrbaugh v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit, 255 F.Supp.3d 589, 592 (M.D. Pa. 2017). As a

result, the Court will weigh the allegations in the complaint without presuming truthfulness

in order to determine the merits of the jurisdictional claim.

B. 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first

take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions

that are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint’s

factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch

v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents

incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial

notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements that make up the legal claim, a court should

“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff

must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’. . . ”

Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat

Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need a court assume that a

plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v.

Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to

a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals

Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in

the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d

1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for

which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v.

President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading

requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.

C. 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983

Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress for violations of

federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute

states, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means through

which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.” See Pappas v. City of

Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S.

273, 284-85 (2002)). To state a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that:

(1) the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of state law; and

(2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005)

(quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss the claims raised in Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1) and (6). (Doc. 7; Doc. 8). Specifically, Defendants argue that (1) the Court lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction over Counts I and III; (2) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the

ADA or RA in Counts IV and V; (3) Plaintiffs fail to establish Monell liability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 in Counts I and VI; (4) Counts VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI are barred by the Political

Subdivision Tort Claims Act; (5) Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages; and (6)

Individual Defendants are shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity. (Doc. 8).

A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER COUNTS I AND III

In Counts I and III of the complaint, Plaintiffs allege a claim for “Violation of Civil

Rights” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the IDEA and “Individuals With Disability Education

Act 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq.” respectively. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 50-69, 77-70). The parties do not

dispute that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA for

Counts I and III of the complaint. According to Section 1415, “[B]efore the filing of a civil

action under [other] laws seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the [IDEA’s

administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had

the action been brought under [the IDEA].” Defendants argue that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs failed

to exhaust their administrative remedies available for a failure to provide a free appropriate

public education (“FAPE”) under the IDEA, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction for

Counts I and III.” (Doc. 8, at 5). In response, Plaintiffs contend that they were not required

to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA because “the gravamen of the complaint

involves claims that the plaintiff does not relate to plaintiff student’s FAPE,” and further

because the complaint seeks damages, which are not available under the IDEA, and as such,

“recourse to the IDEA’s administrative remedies is effectively futile.” (Doc. 9, at 6-8).

The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., ensures that all children with disabilities receive a

FAPE. Section 1415(l) of the IDEA provides that “[n]othing in [the IDEA] shall be construed

to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the

[ADA], Title V of the Rehabilitation Act, or other Federal laws.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).

However, Section 1415(l) also requires plaintiffs to first exhaust the IDEA's administrative

procedures before suing under the ADA or Section 504. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).

In the seminal case Fry v. Napolean Community Schools, the Supreme Court stated that

“exhaustion is not necessary when the gravamen of the plaintiff's suit is something other than

the denial of the IDEA's core guarantee—what the [IDEA] calls a ‘free appropriate public

education.’” 580 U.S. 154 (2017). The Third Circuit has interpreted “gravamen” to mean that

“a court must review both the entire complaint and each claim to determine if the plaintiff

seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE.” Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 125, 133 (3d

Cir. 2017) (dismissing case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the student’s claims

were subject to exhaustion). Whether a complaint uses particular terms or labels, such as

FAPE or IEP, is not material. Fry, 580 U.S. at 169. Rather, Section 1415(l) “requires

exhaustion when the gravamen of a complaint seeks redress for a school's failure to provide a

FAPE, even if not phrased or framed in precisely that way.” Fry, 580 U.S. at 169.

The Supreme Court provided two instructive hypothetical questions to guide the

inquiry into whether the gravamen of the complaint concerns the denial of a FAPE or a

disability-based discrimination claim:

First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged

conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school—say, a public

theater or library? And second, could an adult at the school—say, an employee

or visitor—have pressed essentially the same grievance? When the answer to

those questions is yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial of

a FAPE is also unlikely to be truly about that subject; after all, in those other

situations there is no FAPE obligation and yet the same basic suit could go

forward. But when the answer is no, then the complaint probably does concern

a FAPE, even if it does not explicitly say so; for the FAPE requirement is all

that explains why only a child in the school setting (not an adult in that setting

or child in some other) has a viable claim.

Fry, 580 U.S. at 176.

The Supreme Court illustrated a situation that is instructive in this case: a teacher, “acting out

of animus or frustration, strikes a student with a disability.” Fry, 580 U.S. at 176 n.9. While

a lawsuit under a statute other than the IDEA could relate to the student's education, “the

substance of the plaintiff's claim is unlikely to involve the adequacy of special education—

and thus is unlikely to require exhaustion.” Fry, 580 U.S. at 176 n.9. In that situation, a child

or adult could file the same type of suit if the action took place in a different public facility.

Fry, 580 U.S. at 176 n.9

In this case, Counts I and III of the complaint assert that Defendants’ failure to provide

accommodations tailored to D.H.’s needs, such as a proper behavior management plan,

violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the IDEA.2 (Doc. 1, at 18-22, 24). Thus, Counts I

and III “comprise [of claims] that [seek] relief under the IDEA, as opposed to the sort of

claim[s] that a student could bring against a public facility that was not a school or that a

nonstudent could bring for alleged wrongs in a school setting.” S.D. by A.D. v. Haddon Heights

Bd. of Educ., 722 F. App'x 119, 126 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding exhaustion is required in cases

where the substance of plaintiffs’ discrimination claims concerns the denial of a FAPE to

students and where Defendants allegedly failed to provide instruction tailored to meet

student’s special needs resulting from his disability); see also Doe v. Austin, No. CV 23-3287,

2024 WL 871336 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2024) (explaining that that under Third Circuit precedent,

individuals cannot subvert the demands of the IDEA by bringing related claims under

different statutes). Here, Plaintiffs would be unable to bring the claims asserted in Count I and

Count III against a non-educational public facility because such facility would not be

obligated to provide D.H. with the education-related accommodations he seeks. Thus, for the

claims asserted in Counts I and III, Plaintiffs are subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion

requirement. See Wellman, 877 F.3d at 133.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that if the Court finds that the IDEA exhaustion

requirements do apply, an exception should be applied because exhaustion would be futile in

this case. (Doc. 9, at 7). The Third Circuit found a party may be exempt from the IDEA’s

exhaustion requirement where “exhaustion would be futile or inadequate.” D.E. v. Cent.

Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 275 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778).

2 In Counts II, IV, and V, Plaintiffs also make allegations regarding Defendants’ failure

to provide D.H. and other special needs students with a FAPE, potentially implicating

exhaustion requirements. (Doc. 1, at 18-30). Because Defendants do not move to dismiss

Counts II, IV, and V on the basis of exhaustion, the Court will only analyze Counts I and III

in this section. (Doc. 8, at 5-6).

Exhaustion is understood to be futile when a plaintiff “‘allege[s] systemic legal deficiencies

and, correspondingly, request[s] system-wide relief that cannot be provided (or even

addressed) through the administrative process.’” D.A. v. Pleasantville Sch. Dist., No. 07-CV-

4341, 2009 WL 972605, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2009) (quoting Beth V. by Yvonne V. v. Carroll,

87 F.3d 80, 89 (3d Cir. 1996)). In determining that the exhaustion requirement is futile, courts

must consider whether enforcing the exhaustion requirement would serve the requirement’s

purpose, namely “developing the record for review on appeal, encouraging parents and the

local school district to work together . . . , and allowing the education agencies to apply their

expertise and correct their own errors.” Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 275 (internal citations omitted).

Despite Plaintiffs’ assertions otherwise, the fact that they seek compensatory and

punitive damages -- which are not available under the IDEA -- for IDEA-related claims does

not permit Plaintiffs to circumvent administrative exhaustion requirements and is not a basis

for deeming exhaustion futile. In an unreported case addressing this exact argument, the

Third Circuit has explained:

[T]he inability of a hearing officer to award monetary damages does not render

the administrative process futile. We realize, of course, that a claimant may

avoid the IDEA's exhaustion requirement when “exhaustion would be futile or

inadequate.” However, we have held that the mere inclusion of monetary

damages in a claim for relief does not necessarily establish the futility that

would avoid the IDEA's exhaustion requirement. Moreover, a contrary

holding would allow any plaintiff seeking relief pursuant to the IDEA to avoid

the statute's exhaustion requirement merely by adding a claim for monetary

relief, thus creating an exception that would eliminate the exhaustion rule.

F. S. by & through Scarano v. Crestwood Sch. Dist., No. 20-3321, 2021 WL

6101356, at *3 (3d Cir. Dec. 21, 2021) (citations omitted).

This considered, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ inclusion of a claim for damages does not

render exhaustion “futile” in this case such that they are absolved from the demands of

Section 1415. Count I and III will therefore be DISMISSED without prejudice on the basis

of exhaustion. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 50-69, 77-79).

B. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER THE ADA OR RA FOR COUNT IV AND V

In Count IV and V of the complaint, Plaintiffs allege violations of ADA and Section

504 of the RA. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 80-104). Defendants next argue these claims must be dismissed for

failure to state a claim “[b]ecause Plaintiffs fail to establish that Student’s disability was the

cause of the denial of benefits[.]” (Doc. 8, at 7). According to Defendants, Plaintiffs’ claims

provide “no support that the denial of services is directly related to [D.H.’s] disability”

because allegations that Defendants failed to provide him with an appropriate placement and

education services “function as a standard IDEA violation – not an ADA or Section 504

violation.”3 (Doc. 8, at 8-9). Plaintiffs do not directly respond to Defendants’ ADA and RA

arguments in their brief in opposition. (Doc. 9).

The ADA provides, in relevant part, that “no qualified individual with a disability

shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits

of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by

3 As a preliminary matter, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ ADA and RA claims

function as IDEA claims because they deal with FAPE violations is unfounded. It is well-

established that plaintiffs may bring ADA and RA suits based upon a denial of FAPE. Courts

have acknowledged that FAPE requirements under the ADA and RA are identical to those

under the IDEA. See P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 735 (3d

Cir. 2009) (Section 504 “protects the rights of disabled children by prohibiting discrimination

against students on the basis of disability, and it has child find, evaluation, and FAPE

requirements, like the IDEA.”); see also Gwendolynne, S. Through Judy S. v. W. Chester Area Sch.

Dist., No. 19-CV-3844-JMY, 2021 WL 949483, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2021) (“under

Section 504, recipients of federal funds must ‘provide a [FAPE] to each qualified handicapped

person who is in the recipient's jurisdiction, regardless of the nature or severity of the person's

handicap.’”), aff'd sub nom. G. S. through Judy S. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., No. 21-1680, 2022

WL 2233909 (3d Cir. June 22, 2022) (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)). FAPE requirements

under Section 504 and the ADA are materially the same as those under the IDEA, while not

superfluous of one another. See Richard S. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 334 F. App'x 508, 509 n.1

(3d Cir. 2009) (“Appellants’ § 504 and IDEA claims are factually indistinguishable, and the

resolution of the IDEA claim is therefore also dispositive of the § 504 claim.”).

any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the RA similarly states that “[n]o

otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason

of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). “The ‘substantive standards for determining liability [under

the ADA and Rehabilitation Act] are the same.’” Gibbs v. City of Pittsburgh, 989 F.3d 226, 229

(3d Cir. 2021) (quoting McDonald v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, Polk Ctr., 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir.

1995)). Thus, the Court “address[es] both claims in the same breath.” Chambers ex rel.

Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Strickland

v. Delaware Cty., No. CV 21-4141, 2022 WL 1157485, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2022).

Additionally, a plaintiff can advance a discriminatory theory under the ADA or RA based on

a failure to accommodate. See McPherson v. Cty. of Dauphin, No. 1:19-CV-01865, 2020 WL

1558206, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2020) (citing Muhammad v. Court of Common Pleas, 483 Fed.

Appx. 759, 763 (3d Cir. 2012)).

To state a claim under either the ADA or the RA, Plaintiffs must allege that D.H. was

a qualified individual with a disability who was precluded from participating in a program,

service, or activity, or otherwise was subject to discrimination, by reason of his disability.

Furgess v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 933 F.3d 285, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2019); see also

Haas v. Wyoming Valley Health Care Sys., 553 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (quotations

omitted); see also Pierce v. Pitkins, 520 F. App'x 64, 67 (3d Cir. 2013). In the specific context of

special education ADA and RA claims, Plaintiffs must allege that “‘(1) [D.H.] is disabled as

defined by the [RA]; (2) [D.H.] is otherwise qualified to participate in school activities; (3) the

school or the board of education receives federal financial assistance; and (4) [D.H.] was

excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subject to discrimination at, the

school.’” A.C. v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 191 F. Supp. 3d 375, 388–89 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting

Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir.1999) (citing W.B. v.

Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub.

Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 803–04 (3d Cir.2007))). Under § 504, Plaintiffs must also plead “‘that the

school district knew or should have reasonably known of the plaintiff's disability.’” A.C., 191

F. Supp. 3d at 389 (quoting Coleman, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 568). Similarly, for compensatory

monetary damages under either the ADA or the RA, Plaintiffs must allege deliberate

indifference, or “(1) knowledge that a federally protected right is substantially likely to be

violated..., and (2) failure to act despite that knowledge.” A.C., 191 F. Supp. 3d at 389; see also

S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 261 (3d Cir.2013) (“a showing of

deliberate indifference may satisfy a claim for compensatory damages under § 504 of the RA

[and the ADA].”).

Despite Defendants’ averments otherwise, the Court finds that Plaintiffs properly

plead their claims under the ADA and Section 504 of the RA. Plaintiffs allege that “because

of [D.H.’s] disabilities,” the District “fail[ed] to provide him with the same protections and

opportunities that other students were provided” and more specifically that “[d]ue to his

disabilities and need for special education instruction, the [] District failed to provide [D.H.]

with any education that was required by the IDEA, and [his] IEP and thus discriminated

against him due to his disabilities, as non-disabled students were not left to languish with no

educational benefit.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 87, 92). Plaintiffs additionally allege that the District “was

aware that as a child with disabilities, [D.H.] had the right to be free of discrimination [. . . ]

and despite that knowledge the [] District failed to ensure that improper verbal and physical

abuse would not be perpetrated upon [D.H. by the District].” (Doc. 1, ¶ 89). Plaintiffs

emphasize that D.H.’s mother complained repeatedly to the District about Stolan’s “cruel

and abusive treatment” and allowed “the improper verbal and physical abuse to continue for

a substantial period of time after the [] District was made aware of the situation,” thus

demonstrating deliberate indifference. (Doc. 1, ¶ 89). Further, Plaintiffs allege that the District

knew or should have known that D.H.’s rights were likely to be violated by allowing D.H. to

remain in a classroom with Stolan and her allegedly abusive teaching tactics. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 89-

96). These allegations are sufficient to provide that Defendants’ denial of benefits to D.H. was

directly related to his disability. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have stated claims for violations of the

ADA and RA and have properly alleged deliberate indifference to support requests for

damages. See S.H., 729 F.3d at 261; (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 80-104). Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts

IV and V of the complaint is therefore DENIED. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 80-104; Doc. 7).

C. MONELL LIABILITY

Defendants argue that Counts I and VI of the complaint, 4 which are brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, must be dismissed because those claims “fail to identify a policy or custom”

and thus “fail to establish Monell liability.” (Doc. 9, at 14). In Count VI, Plaintiffs allege a

failure to supervise and train claim against the District. (Doc. 1, at 18-22, 31-33). Plaintiffs

allege that the District “had and ha[s] unconstitutional customs, policies and practices of

failing to investigate evidence of School District employees [sic] misconduct, abuse and or

harassment[. . .] and failing to adequately supervise and train School District employees with

4 Because the Court dismissed Count I of the complaint for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, the Court declines to address Defendants’ secondary argument that Count I must

be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted due to a failure to

establish Monell liability. The Court will address Defendants’ arguments as they relate to

Count VI.

regard to mandatory reporting obligations and maintaining, preserving and protecting

students from violation of their right to personal security and bodily integrity.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 61).

Plaintiffs continue, “School District knew about Stolan’s proclivity to engage in improper

verbal and physical abuse of minor special education students. Nonetheless, no appropriate,

effective, or adequate steps were taken”. (Doc. 1, ¶ 108).

A § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed in two ways: the plaintiff may

allege that an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom led to his injuries or that his

injuries were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that reflects a deliberate

or conscious choice. Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Estate of Roman v.

City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798-99 (3d Cir. 2019)). A plaintiff alleging an unconstitutional

policy must point to “an official proclamation, policy or edict by a decisionmaker possessing

final authority to establish municipal policy on the relevant subject.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105.

A plaintiff alleging an unconstitutional custom “must evince a given course of conduct so

well-settled and permanent as to virtually constitute law.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105 (citing

Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798). The plaintiff must also allege that the policy or custom was

the proximate cause of his injuries by demonstrating an “affirmative link” between the policy

or custom and the constitutional violation. Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (citing Kneipp v.

Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d

Cir. 1990))). A plaintiff alleging that his injuries were caused by a failure or inadequacy by

the municipality must demonstrate “(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will

confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of

employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause

deprivation of constitutional rights.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106 (citing Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d

at 798; Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)).

“Generally, Monell claims are brought against employees or officials that are

subordinate to the policymakers of a particular government entity. . . .” Michalesko v. Freeland

Borough, 18 F.Supp.3d 609, 623 (M.D. Pa. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Michalesko v. Borough, 658 F.

App'x 105 (3d Cir. 2016). Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but rather allows a

plaintiff to vindicate violations of rights created by the Constitution or federal law. Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979); Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir.

2006). Thus, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, acting

under color of state law, deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-

50 (1999); Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 423. In this case, the School District is considered to be a

municipality. See B.W. v. Career Tech. Ctr. of Lackawanna Cty., 422 F.Supp.3d 859, 889 (M.D.

Pa. 2019); Highhouse v. Wayne Highlands Sch. Dist., 205 F.Supp.3d 639 (M.D. Pa. 2016).

It is well established that “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it

employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983

on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,

691 (1978); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002). Municipalities, such

as the District, “are not liable under § 1983 merely for employing someone who violates a

person's civil rights; rather, a municipality that does not directly violate a person's civil rights

is liable only where it has in place a policy or custom that led to the violation.” B.W., 422

F.Supp.3d at 890; see Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. There must be a “direct causal link” between

the municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation. City of Canton, Ohio v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). “Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not

sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it

was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed

to a municipal policymaker.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985).

“Otherwise the existence of the unconstitutional policy, and its origin, must be separately

proved.” Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24.

The plaintiff bears the burden of identifying the “policy” or “custom.” Beck v. City of

Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 972 (3d Cir. 1996). A court may find that a municipal policy exists

when a “‘decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect

to the action’ issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v. City of Phila., 895

F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481

(1986)). It is also possible for a court to find the existence of a municipal policy in “the isolated

decision of an executive municipal policymaker.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,

139 (1988). “A course of conduct is considered to be a ‘custom’ when, though not authorized

by law, ‘such practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well settled’ as to virtually

constitute law.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citations omitted). A plaintiff can show a custom

by “evidence of knowledge and acquiescence,” Beck, 89 F.3d at 971, and must “demonstrate

that, through its deliberate conduct, [defendant school] was the ‘moving force’ behind [his

alleged constitutional violation].” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404

(1997).

Here, with respect to the first method of establishing municipal liability, the Court

finds that the complaint does not sufficiently allege that a municipal policy or custom caused

D.H.’s injuries. Plaintiffs fail to allege that District had a policy, regulation, and/or custom

to improperly train and supervise its employees or that a Stolan was executing a District

policy, regulation, and/or custom when she allegedly violated D.H.’s rights. See Monell, 436

U.S. at 690. Nor do Plaintiffs allege that other individual Defendants acted pursuant to a

policy, regulation, and/or custom of constitutional violations so well-settled as to constitute

the “standard operating procedure” of the District. Tucker v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 19-CV-

889, 2019 WL 3802066, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2019) (quoting Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850);

see Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). “Vague assertions of policy or

custom” are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Buoniconti v. City of Phila., 148

F.Supp.3d 425, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637

(3d Cir. 1995)); see Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims do not survive under this

theory of Monell liability.

However, Plaintiffs meet their burden to establish a Monell claim by alleging that the

District failed to train, supervise, and/or discipline its employees such that it was deliberately

indifferent to students’ rights. “[T]here are limited circumstances in which an allegation of

‘failure to train’ can be the basis for liability under § 1983.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 387. “Where

the policy ‘concerns a failure to train or supervise municipal employees, liability under section

1983 requires a showing that the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of

persons with whom those employees will come into contact.’” Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749

F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Carter, 181 F.3d at 357). A failure-to-train claim does

not require a plaintiff to allege an unconstitutional policy. See Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at

798. Instead, Plaintiff must just allege that “‘the identified deficiency in a city's training

program must be closely related to the ultimate injury;’ or in other words, ‘the deficiency in

training [must have] actually caused’ the constitutional violation.” Thomas, 749 F.3d at 222

(quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 391).

Plaintiffs allege that the District and District officials “became aware that Stolan was

using very vulgar and inappropriate language in the classroom, constantly engaging in

inappropriate and unwanted contact and behavior with minor special education students,

however, no proper inquiries were made, and no corrective action was taken.” (Doc. 1, ¶

109). They further allege that the District failed to take proper precautions to prevent the

constitutional violations because it did not properly instruct its faculty and staff members on

how to handle reported misconduct or abuse, like that of Stolan, which thus resulted in

continued abuse. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 109-113). The complaint also provides that the District was

aware of Stolan’s abusive tendencies, as both D.H.’s mother and Fulton reported Stolan’s

behavior to Gilroy and other District administrators. (Doc, 1, ¶¶ 23-41). Taken together, these

allegations sufficiently support Plaintiffs’ failure to train and supervise claim. Defendants'

motion to dismiss Count VI is thus DENIED. (Doc.¶¶ 105-113; Doc. 7).

D. STATE LAW CLAIMS IN COUNTS VII THROUGH XI

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ state law tort claims as asserted in Counts VII – XI

are barred by the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the “PSTCA”), 42 Pa.

C.S.A. § 8541. (Doc. 8, at 11-13). The PSTCA provides that “no local agency shall be liable

for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the

local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8541. There are

certain limited exceptions set forth in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8542, which provide that local agencies

and their employees are liable only for negligent acts falling into one of the following

categories: (1) vehicle liability; (2) care, custody, or control of personal property; (3) care,

custody, or control of real property; (4) dangerous conditions of trees, traffic controls, or street

lights; (5) dangerous conditions of utility services facilities; (6) dangerous conditions of streets;

(7) dangerous conditions of sidewalks; (8) care, custody, or control of animals; and (9) sexual

abuse. See Pa.C.S. § 8542.

“Municipal employees, including school district employees, are generally immune

from liability to the same extent as their employing agency, so long as the act committed was

within the scope of the employee's employment.” Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 315 (3d Cir.

2006) (citing 42 Pa. C.S. § 8545). However, the statute provides that the employee will not be

entitled to this immunity if “it is judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the

injury and that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful

misconduct.” See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8550. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized

willful misconduct as requiring a demanding level of fault. Sanford, 456 F.3d at 315. “Willful

misconduct has been defined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as ‘conduct whereby the

actor desired to bring about the result that followed or at least was aware that it was

substantially certain to follow, so that such desire can be implied.’” Sanford, 456 F.3d at 315

(quoting Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994)). “[E]ven where a public

employee acts with a degree of culpability equivalent to ‘recklessness,’ Pennsylvania law

nevertheless affords him immunity.” Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 443 F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir.

2006) (finding that an allegation of deliberate indifference is not sufficient to avoid PSTCA

immunity).

Arguing against dismissal of their state law claims, Plaintiffs, without citing any

caselaw, contend that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the violation of D.H.’s

constitutional rights and thus the “State Law claims must remain as logically flowing from

the Section 1983 Civil Rights Claim.” (Doc. 9, at 13-14). However, as noted above, deliberate

indifference is not sufficient to withstand PSTCA liability. See Bright, 443 F.3d at 287. If the

Court were to construe Plaintiffs’ argument as an attempt to take advantage of the “willful

misconduct” exception to PSTCA immunity, their argument would still fail, as “‘[w]illful

misconduct, however, does not provide an exception to the local agency's immunity.’” B.D.

by & through B.D. v. Cornwall Lebanon Sch. Dist., No. 1:20-CV-01944, 2021 WL 1253522, at

*19 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2021) (citing M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. East, 103 F.Supp.3d 612,

630 (E.D. Pa. 2015)) (emphasis added); see also Palmer v. Bartosh, 959 A.2d 508, 512 n.3 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 2008) (stating that “[t]he [PSTCA] waives governmental immunity only for

certain negligent acts of the agency or its employees; where the employee's conduct is

intentional in nature, the local agency retains its governmental immunity”). Therefore,

finding Plaintiffs’ arguments unpersuasive, the Court finds that the PSTCA bars their state

law claims against the District. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss the state law

claims of the complaint is GRANTED against the District and Counts VII – XI against the

District are DISMISSED with prejudice. (Doc. 1; Doc. 7).

Regarding Plaintiffs’ state law claims in Counts VII – XI against individual

Defendants, to satisfy their burden, Plaintiffs must allege willful misconduct. See Bright, 443

F.3d at 287. Aside from Stolan, Plaintiffs fail to allege willful misconduct by other Individual

Defendants in Counts VII or XI beyond mere deliberate indifference. See Bright, 443 F.3d at

287 (holding that deliberate indifference does not suffice as an allegation of willful misconduct

for immunity purposes). However, in Counts VIII – X, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Stolan

engaged in willful misconduct by alleging she acted in an abusive manner towards D.H. and

that her actions were “extreme and outrageous,” “exceeds the bounds of decency and

tolerability in a civilized society,” and were committed “willful[ly.]” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 131, 134-139,

146). This considered, Counts VII and XI against are DISMISSED without prejudice against

all Individual Defendants aside from Stolan. (Doc. 1). Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts

VIII – X against Stolan is DENIED. (Doc. 7).

E. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AS APPLIED TO COUNT II

In Count II of their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the District, Stolan, Gilroy, Genett,

and Alli are liable to them for Fourteenth Amendment violations (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 70-76).

Defendants assert that Count II must be dismissed against the individual because they are

entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 8, at 6-7). Plaintiffs respond that qualified immunity

does not apply because they have alleged that the Individual Defendants knew that their

actions violated D.H.’s rights. (Doc. 9, at 9).

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is the defendants' burden to

establish that they are entitled to such immunity.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 142

n.15 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir.

1989)). As noted, Defendants mention that Individual Defendants are shielded by the doctrine

of qualified immunity regarding Count II, but do not elaborate on the factual basis for this

contention. (Doc. 8, at 6-7). Considering Defendants' assertion without sufficient factual

support, the Court finds that at the pleading stage, it is premature to determine whether

Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Newland v. Reehorst, 328 F.

App'x 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“it is generally unwise to venture into a

qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is necessary to develop the factual

record in the vast majority of cases.”). Therefore, the Court declines to address Defendants'

claim of qualified immunity at this time and will DENY their motion to dismiss on this basis

without prejudice. (Doc. 7).

F. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The Court will not dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages at this time. Whether

an award of punitive damages is warranted requires “a fact-intensive issue inappropriate for

resolution at the motion to dismiss stage, where no factual record has yet been developed.”

Miller v. Helm, No. 17-CV-1590, 2017 WL 6405738, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2017). Indeed,

“this Court has consistently held that it is premature to dismiss demands for punitive damages

prior to discovery.” Campbell v. Balon, No. 16-CV-779, 2017 WL 2880856, at *19 (M.D. Pa.

July 6, 2017); Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc. v. Scranton Prods., Inc., No. 14-CV-853, 2017 WL

2126320, at *11 n.15 (M.D. Pa. May 16, 2017). Here, Plaintiffs do not seem to contest that

punitive damages cannot be alleged against the District and Individual Defendants in their

official capacities. (Doc. 9, at 14). Instead, Plaintiffs state that they seek punitive damages

against Individual Defendants in their individual capacities. (Doc. 9, at 14). Thus, at this

preliminary stage of litigation, dismissal of Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages against

Individual Defendants in their individual capacities is not appropriate. (Doc. 7).

G. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure

to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment

would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.

2002). Further, “[a] district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave

to amend.’” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 564 F. App'x 672, 673 (3d

Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)). In

this case, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint in an attempt to

cure the deficiencies outlined herein as they relate to the claims dismissed without prejudice.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. (Doc. 7). Counts I and III are DISMISSED without prejudice. Counts VII

– XI as asserted against the District are DISMISSED with prejudice. Counts VII and XI as

asserted against Gilroy, Lalli, and Genett are DISMISSED without prejudice. Count XIII is

DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendants’ motion to dismiss all other claims is DENIED.

(Doc. 7).

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: March 31, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge