The opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JULY 1996 SESSION
FILED
June 11, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9512-CR-00390
)
Appellee, ) SHELBY COUNTY
)
VS. ) Hon. Jon Kerry Blackwood, Judge
)
DERENZY TURNER and ) (Felony Murder and Attempted
) Aggravated Robbery)
VERNON WEST, ) (Second Degree Murder)
) Nos. 95-00953 and 95-0094
Appellants. )
FOR THE APPELLANTS: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Turner: CHARLES W. BURSON
WILLIAM C. GOSNELL Attorney General and Reporter
3074 East Street
Memphis, TN 38128 ROBIN L. HARRIS
Assistant Attorney General
West: 450 James Robertson Parkway
RANDALL B. TOLLEY Nashville, TN 37243-0493
242 Poplar Avenue
Memphis, TN 38103 JOHN W. PIEROTTI
District Attorney General
REGINALD R. HENDERSON
PHILLIP GERALD HARRIS
Assistant District Attorneys General
201 Poplar Avenue
Suite 301
Memphis, TN 38103-1947
OPINION FILED:__________________
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART
CORNELIA A. CLARK,
Special Judge
OPINION
Defendant Derenzy Turner was indicted for first degree premeditated murder,
murder in the perpetration of a robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery.
Defendant John Donald was indicted for the same offenses. Defendant Vernon
West was indicted for first degree premeditated murder and murder in the
perpetration of a robbery. Donald’s case was severed from that of his co-
defendants. Defendants Turner and West were tried together.
Turner was convicted by a jury of felony murder and attempted aggravated
robbery. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole on the murder
conviction and to five years for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction. West
was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty (20) years.1 Both
defendants have appealed as of right.
Turner does not appeal his conviction for attempted aggravated robbery, but
raises for review six issues addressing the sufficiency of the evidence as to his
felony murder conviction. West raises seven issues for review: (1) sufficiency of the
evidence, (2) whether the jury properly considered the evidence of self defense and
the jury charge on that issue, (3) whether prosecutorial misconduct affected the
verdict, (4) whether trial counsel was ineffective in not calling John Donald, Jr. to the
stand and not moving for severance as to Derenzy Turner; (5) whether including the
word “defendants” in the charge of “criminal responsibility for the conduct of
another”, which was addressed only to co-defendant Turner, confused the jury to
the prejudice of West, (6) whether both co-defendants can be convicted of murder
when one bullet was the cause of death, and (7) whether West’s sentence of twenty
years is excessive. We reverse Turner’s conviction for felony murder, but affirm the
judgment of the trial court in all other respects.
I.
1
At the close of the state’s proof the trial judge granted a judgment of
acquittal for West on the charge of felony murder.
2
We begin with a brief recitation of the facts. The unusual fact pattern is
determinative of some issues in this case. In particular, the question of who fired
the fatal shot was contested strenuously at trial.
On the day of the murder Vernon West was carrying a 9-mm. Glock handgun
belonging to his fiancee’s nephew. He had possession of the gun because his
fiancee and her sister had asked him to hold it to keep the nephew out of trouble.
West carried the gun underneath the seat in his truck, intending to place it
eventually in his mother’s safe.
West stopped at Southland Mall to have cleaned several gold chains that he
wore around his neck. Keenan Washington was the shop owner who cleaned the
chains. While waiting for the work to be performed, both West and Washington
were invited by another individual to attend a concert. West accepted, but waited
for Washington to finish his work.
According to Katrina Bates, Derenzy Turner and John Donald, who were
friends, first saw West at the mall. They noticed the gold chains he wore, and
began making plans to follow West and rob him of the chains. West noticed them
there, but did not know them.
After Washington’s store closed, he and West left the mall and went to Red
Lobster, where West’s sister worked, to park West’s truck. At that time West took
the 9-mm. gun from his truck because he did not want to leave it at a place where
he knew break-ins had occurred. He carried it with him. While in the parking lot,
West noticed a black car loitering nearby.
West and Washington next stopped at a liquor store. They then traveled to
the Dodge Store, a service station and convenience market. Washington went into
the station and West went to the outside restroom. According to him, as he exited
the bathroom, John Donald appeared, pointed a pistol at his head, and attempted
to steal his gold chains. At that point Turner drove up to West and Donald in a
3
black Beretta and told Donald to “put the gun up”, apparently because too many
people could see what was happening. There was also an elderly man on the
scene, who tried to proceed to his car. West attempted to move to the car with the
elderly man, but Donald followed him. West then got in the car with the elderly
man, who stopped the vehicle. Donald approached West again. West picked him
up and slammed him down on the hood of the car, continuing to hold him down.
Somehow Donald got loose, took his right hand, and flipped his own gun back over
his head. West believes it landed somewhere in the parking lot.
Once the altercation was over, West went to Washington’s car. Donald went
toward the Beretta. West was frightened. He did not go into the store to get help.
When he found that the keys were not in the ignition and that Washington had not
returned, he used a speed loader to load the seventeen-bullet, 9-mm. weapon.
According to West, he then walked toward the store to find Washington.
While West and Donald were fighting near the bathroom, the victim, Vicki
McKinney, and her children were leaving the Dodge Store and entering their car.
Daughter Kenya, who was thirteen, was in the front passenger seat. She saw West
and Donald wrestling. She also saw West leave and load his gun. She saw him
walk first to the back of the car, then toward another area, and then he started
shooting. She testified that it was West who shot first and that the driver of the
black Beretta only returned fire. A gunfight ensued between West and someone
inside the Beretta.
A little boy apparently informed a store security guard of the altercation going
on outside the store. The security guard, Tyrone Simpson, went to investigate and
got within arm’s length of West. He saw West get a 9-mm. Glock from his car and
start shooting at the Beretta. He shot until he emptied his gun. Simpson also
observed 9-mm. shell casings after the cars left the lot. Simpson testified that the
4
shots returned came from a smaller caliber gun. Simpson never actually saw shots
fired from the black Beretta.
Michael Sims also testified for the state that West shot first. Sims saw West
(whom he identified as the man with the 9-mm.) get his gun from his car and then
saw him shoot over the McKinney car. He used the McKinney car as a shield when
an individual in the Beretta returned fire. He moved with the car as it moved. Sims
assumed that the person with the 9-mm. fired the most shots because he emptied
his gun out.
As the shooting continued, the Beretta began to move across the parking lot
as though exiting.
Vicki McKinney started her car and attempted to drive out of the Dodge
parking lot at about the same time the Beretta was leaving. She drove her car
across the path of the Beretta and into the middle of the exchange of gunfire. She
was shot in the left temple during the shootout, and crashed her car into a pole on
the street a short distance away. She never regained consciousness, and died
several days later in the hospital.
Kenya McKinney testified that her mother was facing forward when she was
shot and that West was behind them. Kenya said she never ducked, but she did
turn her head as she looked around the scene. She did not see Vernon West ever
point a gun directly at her mother on the left side of the car, but acknowledged that
he also continued to move around. She did not observe him every second.
A major issue between the two defendants concerned who fired the fatal
bullet. The bullet came from a 9-mm. gun. There were no bullet holes found in the
McKinney car itself. West’s gun was a 9-mm., and, according to the ballistics
5
expert, the markings on the fatal bullet were very similar to those found in West’s
gun. However, the bullet recovered from the body was too mangled to determine
absolutely if it had come from his gun. Nine shell casings from West’s gun were
found on the pavement. West told officers that the only gun shooting back at him
was probably either a .22 or .25 caliber pistol. No other 9-mm. weapons were
recovered.
Bryan Kelly, a navy veteran with weapons training, testified for West that he
was present and heard shots that sounded like those of a 9-mm. gun coming from
the black Beretta. He saw West run for cover. He never saw or heard him fire a
gun. He never actually saw who fired any shots. On cross examination he admitted
he never came forward to provide this information to the police. He first met West
when they were in jail at the same time, and provided him the same information
about which he testified at trial.
Ivan Thomas testified for West that someone in the black Beretta shot first,
and that all the shots fired on both sides sounded as though they came from a 9-
mm. gun. He also said West was never on the left side of the Beretta. He heard
a total of eight or nine shots. On cross examination Thomas admitted that he was
more than fifty yards from the site of the shooting at all times. He also
acknowledged that he gave a statement to the police immediately after the
shooting. In that statement he said West fired the first shots. He also said the
shooter from the Beretta was probably using a .380 because he shot fourteen times,
and that there was only one person in the Beretta. He also said there was a
passenger in West’s Malibu. He further admitted that he incorrectly stated on which
side of the body the victim was shot.
West testified on direct examination that his location was different from
where shell casings from his gun were found. He had no idea what gun John
Donald used in the attempted robbery. West said he never saw the McKinney car.
6
He was not certain about the caliber of the gun returning fire from the Beretta. He
admitted during cross examination that in his earlier statement to police he said the
return fire came from a .22 or a .25 pistol.
II.
Although defendant Turner raises six issues raised on appeal, all allege
essentially the same concern - that the facts presented in this case are not sufficient
to warrant a finding that Turner is guilty of first degree murder in the perpetration of
a robbery or attempted robbery. West also challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence by which he was convicted of second degree murder.
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we must review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in determining whether
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We do not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence and
are required to afford the state the strongest legitimate view of the proof contained
in the record as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be
drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions
concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given to the
evidence, as well as factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier
of fact, not this court. Id.
A guilty verdict rendered by the jury and approved by the trial judge accredits
the testimony of the witnesses for the state, and a presumption of guilt replaces the
presumption of innocence. State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973).
Because a verdict of guilty removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it
with a presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of illustrating
why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict returned by the trier of fact.
State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). This court will not disturb a
7
guilty verdict for lack of sufficient evidence unless the facts contained in the record
and any inferences which may be drawn from the facts are insufficient, as a matter
of law, for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.
A. Turner
To support a conviction for felony murder, the state must prove that Derenzy
Turner recklessly killed another person in the perpetration of or attempt to
perpetrate a robbery. T.C.A. §39-13-202(a)(2). Robbery is defined as “the
intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or
putting the person in fear”. T.C.A. §39-13-401(a). Aggravated robbery is robbery
accomplished with a deadly weapon. T.C.A. §39-13-402(1). A criminal attempt
occurs when a defendant, with the culpability required for the underlying offense,
acts with intent to complete a course of action or to cause a result that would
constitute the underlying offense, and the conduct constitutes a substantial step
toward the commission of the offense. T.C.A. §39-12-101(a)(3). Finally, a party is
criminally responsible for an offense committed by another if, acting with requisite
intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the
proceeds or results of the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to
aid another person to commit the offense. T.C.A. §39-11-402(2).
Turner argues that his conviction cannot stand because, to sustain a
conviction for first degree felony murder, the killing must have been done in
pursuance of, rather than collateral to, the robbery. State v. Severs, 759 S.W.2d
935, 938 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The death of the victim must have had a close
connection with the felony and not be separate, distinct, and independent from it.
Id.; Farmer v. State, 201 Tenn. 107, 296 S.W.2d 879, 833 (1956). The issue is
whether the death results from a natural and probable or foreseeable consequence
of the defendant’s action in committing the underlying felony. However, when one
enters into a scheme with another to commit one of the felonies enumerated in the
8
statutes and death ensues, both defendants are responsible for the death
regardless of who actually committed the murder. State v. Brown, 756 S.W.2d 700
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 834, 111 S.Ct. 102, 112 L.Ed.2d 73
(1990).
Turner does not attempt to argue that acts committed by fleeing felons after
the commission of the felony may not constitute felony murder. He argues instead
that the theory of proximate cause in relation to felony murder is limited to acts
committed by the accused or his accomplices in the underlying felony, which
actually produced the death. State v. Severs, 759 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1988). Since the jury apparently found that West, the intended victim of the
robbery, fired the fatal bullet, he contends he cannot be held responsible.
In Severs this court discussed at some length the “agency” theory of felony
murder. We upheld a trial court’s dismissal of a conviction of first-degree felony
murder because the victim of the attempted larceny was the person who actually
killed the defendant’s co-perpetrator. This court held that the felony-murder rule
may not be applied if a killing is attributable to the act of one other than the
defendant or those associated with him in the original unlawful enterprise. Id..,
citing People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130 (1965).
To sustain a conviction for felony murder, the death in question must result from the
effort to perpetrate rather than the effort to thwart the felony. Id.
Although we do not necessarily agree with the Severs analysis, we concede
that Severs would require a reversal of the felony murder conviction if the killing of
Ms. McKinney by the intended robbery victim is deemed to be collateral to the
attempted aggravated robbery. That is not the case here. In finding West guilty of
second degree murder, the jury determined that the attempted robbery ended
before West went back to his car, loaded his weapon, and began firing. The murder
was not committed in pursuance of the earlier attempted robbery but as a separate,
9
knowing act. Accordingly, though on a different basis, we reverse Turner’s
conviction for felony murder.
Turner has not appealed his conviction for attempt to commit aggravated
robbery. That conviction stands.
B. West
The bases on which West challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction of second degree murder are different. He contends first that
since the original police investigation concluded that Turner and Donald had caused
the death of McKinney, he cannot now be held liable. West cites no authority to
support his position and no such authority exists. At the time the initial investigation
was done, the murder weapon had not been identified. At that time West had not
turned in his gun or made a statement to police. Subsequent investigation did
identify West’s gun as providing the fatal bullet, and did identify witnesses who saw
West shoot first. Many murder investigations begin with a focus on one suspect,
only to shift as other evidence is gathered.
West next contends that he is not the person who fired the fatal bullet. He
relies primarily on testimony from Kenya McKinney that she never saw West point
the gun directly at her mother, and from other persons who stated that West was
on the right side of the car during much of the shootout. West also argues that the
evidence is insufficient because all witnesses did not testify that he shot directly at
the victim, and because the ballistics report was inconclusive.
However, the testimony was not consistent about where West was at all
times during the shooting. He used the victim’s car as a shield and shot through
and around it. As the car drove out of the parking lot it passed directly between the
two shooters. West’s 9-mm. gun is the only one of that caliber actually identified at
the scene, and is most probably the source of the fatal bullet.
10
The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support a finding by a rational
trier of fact that defendant West, using a 9-mm. weapon from which the deadly
bullet probably came, utilized Vicki McKinney’s car as a shield and shot through it
or around it while initiating a shootout with persons from whom he had successfully
escaped after they attempted to rob him. He continued to shoot at the car as the
victim tried to drive away. The jury found that he committed a knowing killing of
another. See T.C.A. §39-13-210(a)(1). The evidence supports that verdict. This
issue is without merit.
III.
West next asserts in his next five issues that:
(1) the jury did not properly consider the defense of self-
defense.
(2) prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutors
(a) “coached” Kenya McKinney’s testimony, (b) failed to interview
other witnesses once they decided to blame him for the killing, and (c)
made improper statements during closing arguments.
(3) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel because she failed to move for a severance from Turner and
failed to call John Donald, Turner’s co-defendant on the attempted
robbery charge.
(4) the jury charge on “criminal responsibility for the conduct
of another” was confusing and prejudicial because it uses the word
“defendants” in the plural, but applied only to Derenzy Turner; and
(5) he cannot be convicted of a one-bullet homicide
because both co-defendants have been convicted of some form of
homicide and because that would create “too much culpability in this
homicide”.
These issues were not raised in the motion for new trial, thereby denying the trial
judge an opportunity to address or correct them. See T.R.A.P. 36(a). Procedurally,
then, these issues have been waived. T.R.A.P. 3(e); State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d
381, 388 (Tenn. 1995); State v. Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247, 257 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1995). Due to the gravity of the case we have considered the issues on the merits.
See Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 388. The first, fourth, and fifth issues are clearly
11
without merit. We will discuss briefly the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
and ineffective assistance of counsel.
IV.
West alleges three ways in which prosecutorial misconduct adversely
affected the verdict in his case: (1) coaching a young witness; (2) failing to
investigate statements of two witnesses who suggested someone in the Beretta had
a 9-mm. weapon; and (3) making closing arguments laden with “innuendo, antics,
facts not in the record, and misstatements of law”. The test to be applied by
appellate courts in reviewing instances of prosecutorial misconduct is “whether the
improper conduct could have affected the verdict to the prejudice of the defendant”.
Harrington v. State, 215 Tenn. 338, 385 S.W.2d 758, 759 (1965).
During the cross-examination of Kenya McKinney, West’s attorney
questioned her about a prior inconsistent statement she gave police, and about
whether her change in testimony was based on pressure from the prosecutor:
Q. . . . And last year when you gave your statement
you were asked which one of them was firing from this
vehicle and you said the passenger in the front seat.
Do you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did you say that?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that true?
A. I don’t know which one it was.
Q. Do you know why you would have said that last
year?
A. No.
Q. Has someone talked to you since you gave this
statement and said maybe that wasn’t true?
A. Maybe what wasn’t true? What you just read?
Yes.
12
Q. Who’s talked to you and said maybe that wasn’t
true?
A. Him.
Q. Who are you pointing to?
A. Him.
Q. Mr. Henderson? This man right here? The
prosecutor?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did he talk to you about maybe what you
said wasn’t correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that why you are saying today you don’t know?
A. No.
The phraseology “has someone ... said maybe [the earlier statement] wasn’t true”
came from the attorney, not the thirteen-year-old witness. The witness testified she
did not change her testimony because of that conversation. On redirect, the
following exchange occurred:
BY MR. HENDERSON
Q. Kenya, when we spoke with you, did we tell you
that what you need to do is come up here and tell the
truth?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you done that?
A. Yes.
MR. HENDERSON: No further questions.
It can hardly be prosecutorial misconduct for the district attorney general to ask a
young witness to be sure her testimony is correct or truthful. There is no indication
in this record that the district attorney general asked this witness to testify
untruthfully. This issue is without merit.
13
West next contends that his right to a fair trial was violated because the state
focused on proof that the fatal bullet came from his 9-mm. gun. He contends the
state had a duty to call Brian Kelly and Ivan Thomas as witnesses because their
testimony was favorable to him. He does not complain that their existence was
withheld from him; in fact, he admits that he met Kelly in jail and sent him to his own
attorney first. Both witnesses were called by West at trial, and their testimony was
fully presented to the jury. Thomas’ testimony at trial was inconsistent with the
statement he originally gave to police. Kelly never fully explained why he did not go
to the police with his information. West’s only discernible complaint is that the
prosecutor should have credited the trial testimony of those witnesses more.
It is without question that the state is not required to call any particular
witness or to use all witnesses equally available to both sides, except when the
state knowingly conceals a witness with exculpatory testimony. Hicks v. State, 539
S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976); Wright v. State, 512 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1974). The state did not attempt to conceal these witnesses. This issue
is without merit.
West last contends that the prosecution’s closing argument contained
several instances of misconduct. In determining whether statements made in
closing argument constitute reversible error, it is necessary to determine whether
the statements were improper and, if so, whether the impropriety affected the
verdict. State v. Sutton, 562 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tenn. 1978). We are guided by
such factors as the intent of the prosecutor in light of the facts and circumstances
of the case, the strength or weakness of the evidence, the curative measures, if
any, undertaken by the trial court in response to the conduct, and the cumulative
effect of the conduct. Judge v. State, 539 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1976).
Our Supreme Court has observed that “argument of counsel is a valuable
14
privilege that should not be unduly restricted. Our courts seek to give great latitude
to counsel in expressing their views of the case to the jury”. Smith v. State, 527
S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tenn. 1975). See also State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 809
(Tenn. 1994).
West’s argument on this point continues to focus on the assistant district
attorney general’s statements about premeditation, and his emphasis of West’s
liability over that of Turner. Since the jury convicted West only of the lesser offense
of second degree murder, and convicted Turner of first degree (felony) murder, it
seems clear this argument did not prejudice West.
As to more specific complaints, West notes that the prosecutors in both the
opening and closing portions of their arguments said, “This is the Dodge Store . . .
this ain’t Doge City at high noon . . .”. In the opening portion of the statement, the
prosecutors said:
It’s not acceptable behavior to ride around with a loaded
gun and to come into a parking lot full of people. And
you know it’s full of people. This is the Dodge Store on
a Friday night on Elvis Presley in 1994. This ain’t
Dodge City at high noon in 1854. Maybe that was
acceptable then, but it ain’t now. Why? Because
innocent people get killed. Innocent people like Ms.
Vicki McKinney.
No contemporaneous objection was made to this argument. In fact, during her own
closing, West’s counsel made the following responsive remarks:
. . . This is a -- I am not sure what Mr. Henderson
said. This isn’t Dodge City in 1880. I think Mr. Harris at
one point said this isn’t Abilene, Kansas. Can’t just
have shootouts on parking lots. People going to get
killed. Going to be having this all the time.
I tell you what, it’s not Abilene, Kansas, in 1880.
Because if it was and two people went out and acted in
the manner that John Donald and Derenzy Turner did,
they would have been hung on the spot. They didn’t
put up with that kind of behavior. And people had a
15
right to defend themselves. People still have the right
to defend themselves if they are placed in a situation
beyond their control.
This is not some vigilante thing where Vernon West
went and took the law into his own hands. . . .
The prosecutor then responded in rebuttal as follows:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, where we are today
is at a pivotal crossroads. As Ms. Skahan pointed out,
this isn’t Dodge City. It isn’t whatever in 1880.
The use and possession of guns is ingrained in our
heritage. People used to have to have guns. That’s
how they defended themselves. They walked out and
they shot a buffalo. They needed them. They were
going up the Chisholm Trail riding with a guy named
Beryl Goodnight. They could have been attacked by
Comanches or whatever. Or rustlers. They couldn’t
ride a hundred and fifty miles to --
MS. SKAHAN: Your Honor, I object. This is outside the
record.
MR. HARRIS: She argued to that, Your Honor, about
they would have strung somebody up in 1990 or 1880
or whatever.
THE COURT: All right. Just don’t go too far, sir.
MR. HARRIS: The point is this, ladies and gentlemen,
that’s ingrained in our life, the possession of firearms.
It is. The possession of firearms.
But we are here today in 1995. Times are different. In
1850--1880 in Dodge City, they didn’t have 911. They
didn’t have gas stations, with people pulling up. They
didn’t have 9 millimeter. Glocks that can fire seventeen
shots in five seconds.
When taken in context, it appears that all three attorneys utilized the example of the
“lawless” Old West to make points in their arguments. The objection made by
defense counsel appeared to concern not the example itself, but counsel’s detailed
recitation of particular facts about a particular individual traveling on the Chisholm
Trail. The objection was not repeated during the last, simple reference to Dodge
City in 1880. We do not find this colorful use of language to be misconduct on the
part of the prosecutors.
16
As to the other statements objected to on appeal by the appellant, only a few
were objected to during the trial. None were raised in the motion for new trial. It is
well settled that without a contemporaneous objection to a prosecutor’s statements,
the error is waived. State v. Farmer, 927 S.W.2d 582, 591 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996);
State v. Sutton, 562 S.W.2d 820, 825 (Tenn. 1978). We have carefully reviewed
the record, and find no misconduct during argument that might have affected the
jury’s verdict to the defendant’s detriment.
The issue concerning prosecutorial misconduct is without merit.
V.
While ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be raised on direct appeal
merely on the record, such a practice is “fraught with peril”. State v. Beard, No.
03C01-9502-CR-00044 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, September 26, 1996), quoting
Wallace v. State, No. 01C01-9308-CC-00275 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville,
September 15, 1994). This is because without an evidentiary hearing it is virtually
impossible to demonstrate prejudice as required to prove such claims. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Without
proof, we can only speculate as to counsel’s reasoning for her actions.
Under the Sixth Amendment, when a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is made, the burden is upon the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s
performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial in terms of
rendering a reasonable probability that the result of the trial was unreliable or the
proceedings fundamentally unfair. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Strickland standard has been
applied, as well, to the right to counsel under Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee
Constitution. State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 419 n. 2 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 874, 107 L.Ed.2d 164, 110 S.Ct. 211 (1989).
17
The standard for determining competency of counsel in Tennessee was first
articulated in Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). We note that the
approach to the issue of the ineffective assistance of counsel does not have to start
with an analysis of an attorney’s conduct. If prejudice is not shown, we need not
seek to determine validity of the allegations about deficient performance. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069.
Rule 8(c), Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that two or more
defendants may be joined in the same indictment, presentment or information if
each of the defendants is charged with accountability for each offense or if the
offenses charged were part of a common scheme or plan or so closely connected
in respect to time, place and occasion that it would be difficult to separate proof of
one charge from proof of the others. A trial judge may, however, grant a severance
prior to trial if “. . . it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination of the
guilt or innocence of one or more defendants”. Tenn. R. Crim. Pro. 14(c)(2)(i).
Severance may also be granted if an out-of-court statement of a co-defendant
makes reference to the defendant but is not admissible against him. Tenn. R.
Crim. Pro. 14(c)(1)(iii).
The trials of these two co-defendants involved identical facts and witnesses.
The peculiar facts made it extremely difficult to separate proof about one defendant
or charge from proof of another. There were no problematic co-defendant
statements. No legal basis exists to conclude that a pretrial motion to sever would
have been granted. Therefore the failure to file such a motion does not
demonstrate prejudice under Strickland, and the failure to move for a severance
does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
West also complains about his attorney’s failure to call John Donald, the
severed co-defendant, to testify. However, he acknowledges in his brief that there
18
is “no way to forecast whether John Donald, Jr. would have taken his Fifth
Amendment privileges, testified or had to answer some questions”. The
presentation of this argument highlights the reason why ineffective assistance of
counsel claims should normally be raised by petition for post-conviction relief. A
trial court usually must hear such a witness in order for the appellant to establish
that the failure to call the witness denied critical evidence to the prejudice of the
defendant. See Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
Neither the trial court nor this court can speculate on what a witness’ testimony
might have been if introduced by defense counsel. Id. West has not met his
burden of proof. This issue is without merit.
VI.
Finally, West contends that his twenty-year sentence for second degree
murder is excessive. This issue also was not raised in the motion for new trial.
However, we choose to address it on the merits.
The sentence range for a Class A felony is fifteen (15) to twenty-five (25)
years. The presumptive sentence for the defendant is the minimum sentence in the
range before enhancement or mitigating factors are considered.2 The trial court in
this case sentenced the defendant to twenty (20) years, which is in the middle of the
range.
When an accused challenges the length, range, or manner of service of a
sentence, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo review of the sentence with a
presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn.
Code Ann. §40-35-401(d). If our review reflects that the trial court followed the
statutory sentencing procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after giving due
2
T.C.A. §40-35-210. The crime occurred August 26, 1994. The defendant
was sentenced July 21, 1995. Effective July 1, 1995, for crimes committed after
that date, the presumptive sentence for a Class A felony is the mid-point of the
range if there are no enhancement or mitigating factors.
19
consideration and proper weight to the factors and principles set out under the
sentencing law, and made findings of fact that are adequately supported by the
record, then we may not modify the sentence even if we would have preferred a
different result. State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
However, “the presumption of correctness which accompanies the trial
court’s action is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial
court considered sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances”.
State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). In this respect, for the purpose
of meaningful appellate review,
the trial court must place on the record its reasons for arriving
at the final sentencing decision, identify the mitigating and
enhancement factors found, state the specific facts supporting each
enhancement factor found, and articulate how the mitigating and
enhancement factors have been evaluated and balanced in
determining the sentence. T.C.A. §§40-35-210(f) (1990).
State v. Jones, 883 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tenn. 1994).
In conducting a de novo review of a sentence, this court must consider:
(a) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and sentencing hearing;
(b) the presentence report;
(c) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing
alternatives;
(d) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved;
(e) any statutory mitigatory or enhancement factors;
(f) any statement that the defendant made known on his own behalf; and
(g) the potential or lack of potential for rehabilitation or treatment.
Tenn. Code Ann. §§40-35-102, -103, and -210; see State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d
859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). The burden is on the defendant to show that the
sentence was improper. Sentencing Commission Comments, Tenn. Code Ann.
§40-35-401(d).
20
In his brief West does not specify what mitigating factors the court failed to
find. The trial court did find as mitigating factors under T.C.A. §40-35-113 (2) that
the defendant acted under strong provocation and (9) that he assisted the
authorities in locating the persons who were involved in the crime.
West also does not explain which enhancement factors he thinks were
improperly applied. His argument focuses on his contention that he was an
innocent bystander in these events. He recites that 400 community leaders signed
a petition stating that he acted in self-defense. He does not dispute the application
of the enhancement factors found by the trial court under T.C.A. §40-35-114:
(1) Defendant has a prior history of criminal convictions and
criminal behavior.
(9) Defendant possessed a firearm during the commission
of the offense.
(13) The felony was committed while on probation.
(16) The crime was committed under circumstances under
which the potential for bodily injury to victims were great and
(17) The person killed was someone other than the intended
victim.
All of the enhancing factors found by the trial court are applicable here.
Sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court, and the weight to be given any
particular enhancement or mitigating factor lies within the court’s discretion. State
v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tenn. 1986). Having found the existence of five
enhancement factors and only two mitigating factors, the trial judge acted within his
discretion in imposing a sentence of twenty years. This issue is without merit.
For the reasons set forth above, the conviction of Derenzy Turner for first
degree felony murder is reversed and dismissed. His conviction for attempted
aggravated robbery is affirmed. The judgment of the trial court as to Vernon West
is affirmed in all respects.
21
__________________________________
CORNELIA A. CLARK
SPECIAL JUDGE
CONCUR:
__________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY
JUDGE
__________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES
JUDGE
22
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JULY 1996 SESSION
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9512-CR-00390
)
Appellee, ) SHELBY COUNTY
)
VS. ) Hon. Jon Kerry Blackwood, Judge
)
DERENZY TURNER and ) (Felony Murder and Attempted
Aggravated Robbery)
VERNON WEST, ) (Second Degree Murder)
) Nos. 95-00953 and 95-0094
Appellants. )
JUDGMENT
Came the appellants, Derenzy Turner and Vernon West, by counsel and also
came the attorney general on behalf of the state, and this case was heard on the
record on appeal from the Criminal Court of Shelby County; and upon consideration
thereof, this court is of the opinion that there is reversible error as to the appellant
Turner’s conviction for murder in the perpetration of a robbery.
It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed as to the appellant Turner’s conviction for attempted
aggravated robbery and as to the appellant West’s conviction for second degree
murder. It is further ordered by the court, pursuant to the opinion filed in this cause
and incorporated herein, that the conviction of appellant Turner for murder in the
perpetration of a robbery is reversed and dismissed.
Costs of this appeal will be borne two-thirds by the appellants and one-third
by the state.
Per Curiam
Peay, Welles, Clark