EFIRD v. ROCKINGHAM COUNTY SHERIFF SAMUEL SCOTT PAGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MELISSA EFIRD, )

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:24CV332

ROCKINGHAM COUNTY SHERIFF

SAMUEL SCOTT PAGE, et al., )

Defendants.

ORDER

This is a civil rights action filed under 42 USC § 1983 by Plaintiff Melissa Efird,

mother and personal representative of the Estate of Kyle Barrett Kepley (“Kepley”), who died

by suicide in May 2022 at the Rockingham County Detention Center (““RCDC’”), where he

was held as a pretrial detainee. Plaintiff filed the instant matter against nine defendants,

including Rockingham County Sheriff Samuel Scott Page in his official capacity; four RCDC

officers in their individual capacities; RCDC’s contracted medical provider, Southern Health

Partners, Inc. (“SHP”); and three medical providers employed by SHP, alleging violations of

federal civil rights law and North Carolina law. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges

that officers and medical personnel at RCDC knew that Kepley was at a substantial risk of

suicide, including that Kepley was going through opiate withdrawal, made delusional and

psychotic statements, expressed that he wanted to die, and that one of Kepley’s friends called

the Rockingham County Sherrifs Office and told an employee there that Kepley struggled

with his mental health and was suicidal, but that Defendants did not take action to reduce this

tisk and instead placed him in a cell alone, did not institute a Special Watch, and did not

conduct rounds to check on him for over an hour after he said he wanted to die. (Am. Compl.

[Doc. #9] §[§| 34-43.) Plaintiff further alleges that the RCDC “had a history of multiple deaths

associated with failure to comply with state law on observational rounds,” including three

recent suicides, and that it was the policy and practice of the RCDC not to conduct mental

health screenings and not to conduct required rounds. (Am. Compl. {| 47-48, 66-76.)

This matter is before the Court on a Partial Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Sheriff

Page, RCDC Officer Orin Spencer Stultz, and RCDC Officer Reid James Boyd, Sr. (“Moving

Defendants”) [Doc. #13]. For the foregoing reasons, Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

is granted in part and denied in part.

I. STANDARD

“To sutvive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as ttue, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

USS. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This

standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than “an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. A claim is facially plausible

when the plaintiff provides enough factual content to enable the court to reasonably infer that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin

to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id. In this way, Rule 12(b)(6) protects against meritless litigation by

requiting sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” so

as to “nudge[ ] the[] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” ‘Twombly, 500 U.S.

at 555, 570; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. The Court must accept as true all of the factual

allegations contained in a complaint, but is not bound to accept legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. Thus, “when there ate well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume

their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Id. at 679.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Count 1: § 1983 Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Page, sued in his official

capacity,! and Officers Stultz and Boyd, sued in their individual capacities, alleging deliberate

indifference to Kepley’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Am. Compl. {| 58-59.) Moving Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not

plausibly alleged that they violated Kepley’s constitutional rights. (Defs.’ Br. [Doc. #14] at 7-

The Fourteenth Amendment applies to claims of deliberate indifference by pretrial

detainees. Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023). “To state a claim for deliberate

indifference to a medical need, the specific type of deliberate indifference claim at issue in this

case, a prtettial detainee must plead that (1) they had a medical condition or injury that posed

a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly

acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the

1To the extent that Plaintiff asserts an official capacity claim against Sheriff Page in Count 1, the Court will

treat the allegation as duplicative of the Monell claims tn Counts 2, 3, and 4, addressed znjra.

2 For ease of reference, cited page numbers will refer to the sequential numbers generated by the Court’s

Electronic Case Filing (“ECE”) system.

defendant knew or should have known (a) that the detainee had that condition and (b) that

the defendant's action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of hatm; and (4) as a result,

the detainee was harmed.” Id. at 611. A detainee’s “substantial risk of suicide is certainly the

type of ‘serious harm’ that is contemplated by the first prong of the deliberate indifference

test.” Id. at 612 (quoting Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 2001)); Buffington v.

Baltimore Cnty., 913 F.2d 113, 120 (4th Cir. 1990).

Notably, however, while Plaintiff pleaded the constitutional violation in Count 1 under

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Parties’ briefing evaluates Plaintiffs

constitutional claim only under the Eighth Amendment. Until recently, the standards for

evaluating deliberate indifference to medical needs claims under the Eighth Amendment for a

convicted prisoner and under the Fourteenth Amendment for a pretrial detainee were treated

the same, but in Short v. Hartman, the Fourth Circuit held that the deliberate indifference

standard under the Fourteenth Amendment is different from the Eighth Amendment

standard. Short, 87 F.4th at 607. Now, a pretrial detainee “no longer has to show that the

defendant had actual knowledge of the detainee’s serious medical condition and consciously

disregarded the tisk that their action or failure to act would result in harm” and must only

show that the defendant’s action or inaction was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 611.

Because Kepley was a pretrial detainee at the time he died, Plaintiffs constitutional claim is

governed by Short’s objective Fourteenth Amendment analysis, not the subjective test applied

under the Eighth Amendment. In light of this recent change in standard, and given Plaintiffs

allegations that all Defendants knew that Kepley was at a substantial risk of suicide and failed

to act to protect him, and her factual allegations in support of this claim, including that Kepley

was going through withdrawal, was acting delusionally, and told an officer that he wanted to

die, the Court will deny Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Count 1 at this time to

allow the Patties an opportunity to re-brief the constitutional issues under the Fourteenth

Amendment standatd and the guidance set out in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Short v.

Hattman, 87 F.4th at 611-15.5 Thus, Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 1 is

denied without prejudice. Given the factual allegations, and given that discovery is well

underway, it may be most efficient to address these issues at summary judgment, but Moving

Defendants may choose to te-brief the issue now under the appropriate standards or raise it

instead at summary judgment.

B. Counts 2, 3, and 4: § 1983 Monell Liability

Plaintiff also asserts three municipal liability claims against Sheriff Page in his official

capacity under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658

(1978): in Count 2, Plaintiff alleges that there was a policy or custom at RCDC of failing to

perform supetvisory rounds in compliance with state law and failing to provide adequate

mental health assessments and care (Am. Compl. {[{] 66-76); in Count 3, Plaintiff alleges that

3 Although Plaintiffs underlying constitutional claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment objective

analysis, the qualified immunity analysis may still require examining Defendants’ subjective knowledge. See

Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 301-02 (4th Cir. 2021); see also King v. Blackwood, No. 1:21CV383,

Recommendation, Doc. #124 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 20, 2024) (allowing Monell claim to proceed after discovery),

adopted in part, Order, Doc. #132 (Feb. 3, 2025), and Order, Doc. #169 (Feb. 13, 2025) (adopted in relevant

part but denying qualified immunity at summary judgment). In any event, because Plaintiffs underlying

constitutional claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court will allow the Parties time to brief

the issue under the appropriate standard before ruling on the question of qualified immunity. The Court also

notes that the decision in Short addresses other issues raised by the Parties in the briefing, and that guidance

can be considered and addressed further in future briefing. See, e.g., Short, 87 F.4th at 613-15 (“In the absence

of an allegation that Sergeant Morgan knew of and relied on a medical provider’s evaluation 2 the moment, she

cannot use the medical provider’s inaction to justify her own post-hoc. We thus conclude that the Complaint

sufficiently alleges that Sergeant Morgan was deliberately indifferent to Ms. Short’s serious medical needs by

failing to follow the steps outlined in the Prison Policy to mitigate Ms. Short’s suicide risk.”).

Sheriff Page failed to train and supervise his officers on how to respond to mental health cate

emergencies and how to conduct observational rounds in compliance with state law (Am.

Compl. J] 77-82); and in Count 4, Plaintiff alleges that there was a policy or custom at RCDC

of failing to maintain equipment required to document supervisory rounds and a policy of

inadequate staffing at RCDC (Am. Compl. {J 83-87). Moving Defendants move to dismiss

all three Monell Counts against Sheriff Page.

As noted above, the Court is allowing the Parties to re-brief the issue of the underlying

constitutional violation alleged in Count 1 under the Fourteenth Amendment standard

recently announced in Short. Because municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional

violation by an individual, see Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 697-98 (1999); City of Los

Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986), the Court will reserve its decision on the issue of

Monell liability until the Parties have an opportunity to brief the underlying constitutional

violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, and will address all of Plaintiffs constitutional

claims at once. The Court further notes that consideration of the issues raised by Defendant

Sheriff Page regarding Monell liability will likely involve consideration of matters outside the

Amended Complaint, and would therefore need to be considered at summary judgment. See

also King v. Blackwood, No. 1:21CV383, Recommendation, Doc. #124 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 20,

2024) (allowing Monell claim to proceed after discovery), adopted in part, Order, Doc. #132

(Feb. 3, 2025), and Order, Doc. #169 (Feb. 13, 2025) (adopted in relevant part but denying

qualified immunity at summary judgment). The Court will therefore deny Moving Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claims against Sheriff Page in Counts 2, 3, and 4, and Moving

Defendants may choose to te-brief the issue now under the appropriate standards or raise it

instead at summary judgment.

C. Counts 5, 6, and 8: State Law Claims

Plaintiff brings several claims under North Carolina law against Sheriff Page in his

official capacity and Officers Stultz and Boyd individually: in Count 5, Plaintiff alleges that

Sheriff Page and Officers Boyd and Stultz violated North Carolina General Statue § 162-55,

which prohibits injury to a prisoner by a jailer (Am. Compl. {J 88-95); in Count 6, Plaintiff

brings a claim against Sheriff Page for vicarious liability under North Carolina’s medical

malpractice statute based on the conduct of the SHP personnel at RCDC (Am. Compl. {J 96-

107); and in Count 8, Plaintiff advances a claim for wrongful death against Sheriff Page and

Officers Stultz and Boyd (Am. Compl. {[§[ 115-19).4

Moving Defendants first argue the Court should decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over these claims. (Defs.’ Br. at 15-17.) However, because there are federal § 1983

claims overt which the Court has jurisdiction, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiffs state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Ifno federal claims remain after summaty

judgment, it is likely that the Court would decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining

state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(). The Court can therefore revisit that issue after

consideration of any motions for summary judgment after the close of discovery.

+ Plaintiff brings this claim under North Carolina General Statute § 28-174, but North Carolina’s wrongful

death statute is now located at North Carolina General Statute § 28A-18-2. The Court understands Plaintiff to

have intended to bring a claim under § 28A-18-2.

-

Moving Defendants additionally argue that their liability is limited by the doctrines of

governmental immunity and public official immunity. (Defs.’ Br. at 17-20.) “Under the

doctrine of governmental immunity, both a county and a county’s public officials are immune

from suits alleging negligence in the exercise of a governmental function, unless the plaintiff

shows that the county or county’s public officials waived immunity.” Butterfield v. Gray, 279

N.C. App. 549, 554 (2021) (citing Est. of Williams ex re/ Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks

& Recreation Dep’t, 366 N.C. 195, 198 (2012)). Purchasing lability insurance “may waive

governmental immunity for both a county and a sheriff,’ but only to the extent of the

insurance coverage, and “[g]overnmental immunity is therefore not watved where the

applicable liability insurance policy excludes a plaintiff's claim from coverage.” Butterfield, 279

N.C. App. at 556 (citing Patrick v. Wake Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 188 N.C. App. 592, 595

(2008)).

In this case, Rockingham County took out an insurance policy that specifically provides

that purchase of the policy does not constitute a waiver of governmental immunity. (Insurance

Policy, [Doc. #13-1] at 15.)> The language in these provisions ts identical to language in other

insurance policies that North Carolina courts have interpreted as not waiving governmental

immunity, see Hatt v. Brienza, 246 N.C. App. 426, 434 (2016), and which Plaintiff agrees

5 Plaintiff references the insurance policy in the Amended Complaint (Am. Compl. {{] 4-6), and Moving

Defendants provided the Policy in its entirety attached to their Motion to Dismiss. (See Doc. #13-1.) Plaintiff

has not raised a question as to the validity or authenticity of the Policy as attached, and the Court will consider

the policy as provided by Moving Defendants without converting Moving Defendants’ motion into one for

summary judgment. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (noting that in

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts may consider “documents incorporated into the complaint

by reference”); see also Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted)

(noting that courts will consider documents that ate “integral to the complaint” and authentic).

“presetves [Sheriff] Page’s governmental immunity for state tort claims brought in his official

capacity.” (Pl’s Br. [Doc. #31] at 22.) Thus, Plaintiff does not dispute Sheriff Page’s

entitlement to governmental immunity on the state law claims. Therefore, Plaintiff's North

Carolina tort claims against Sheriff Page in his official capacity in Count 5 (Injury to Prisoner),

Count 6 (Medical Malpractice), and Count 8 (Wrongful Death) are dismissed on governmental

immunity grounds.

Moving Defendants also argue that Officers Stultz and Boyd are entitled to public

official immunity. (Defs.’ Br. at 19-20.) Under North Carolina law, public officials “engaged

in the performance of governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion|]

may not be held personally liable for mete negligence,” Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 112

(1997) (quotation omitted), and this immunity shields the official from lability “unless the

officet’s actions were ‘malicious, corrupt, or outside the scope of his official authority.”” White

v. City of Greensboro, 586 F. Supp. 3d 466, 482 (M.D.N.C. 2022) (quoting Thomas v. Sellers,

142 N.C. App. 310, 313 (2001)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that the individual Defendants acted

willfully and wantonly. Further, under Fourth Circuit precedent, where an officer is denied

qualified immunity, he is likewise not entitled to public official immunity. See Bailey v.

Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 742 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that North Carolina public official

immunity is “unavailable to officers who violate clearly established rights”); Cooper v.

Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153, 160 (4th Cir. 2013). Because the Court is reserving its decision on

Plaintiffs constitutional claims and Moving Defendants’ qualified immunity defense until the

Parties have te-briefed the underlying constitutional issue, the Court will likewise deny the

Motion to Dismiss based on public official immunity at this time. As noted above, Plaintiff

alleges that all Defendants, including Officers Stultz and Boyd, knew of Kepley’s risk of suicide

and failed to take steps to minimize this risk, and it is likely that any further assessment of the

immunity defense would need to be made after discovery, where Plaintiff will have to present

evidence to support these contentions. Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will therefore

be denied as to the state law claims against Officers Stultz and Boyd, and Moving Defendants

may choose to te-brief the issue now ot raise it instead at summary judgment.

I. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc.

#13] is denied, except that the Motion is granted as to all North Carolina state law claims

against Sheriff Samuel Scott Page in Counts 5, 6, and 8, on the basis of governmental

immunity. ‘The Motion is denied without prejudice, and Moving Defendants may choose to

re-brief the issues now under the appropriate standards or raise them instead at summaty

judgment.

This, the 31st day of Match, 2025.

LO udbSHenb

nited States Magistrate Judge

10