Gilliam v. Kuchinski

March 31, 2025

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

J. PAUL GILLIAM, § CIVIL ACTION NO

Plaintiff, § 4:23-cv-01824

§

§

vs. § JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE

§

§

ANTHONY §

KUCHINSKI, et al, §

Defendants. §

OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

The motions for summary judgment and judgment on

the pleadings by Defendants Paul Anthony Kuchinski,

Brooke Schwausch, Bryan Miller, and Eddie Pereira are

granted. Dkts 8 & 10.

Plaintiff J. Paul Gilliam proceeds here pro se. His

motion for sanctions is denied. Dkt 16.

1. Background

Defendants are all police officers with the City of Deer

Park. Gilliam presents claims against them for false arrest

and infliction of cruel and unusual punishment arising

from an encounter in May 2021. See Dkt 1 at 2–4.

Defendants submitted consistent, sworn declarations.

These attest to receiving a report that Gilliam attempted

to use a suspected counterfeit $100 bill at a fast-food

restaurant. For example, see Dkt 8-1 at ¶1 (Kuchinski

declaration). He was then observed riding his bike to a

convenience store, where he made a purchase with that

same bill. Id at ¶¶2–3. Kuchinski arrived first, followed by

Miller, Schwausch, and Pereira. Id at ¶4.

Defendants immediately suspected Gilliam of being

under the influence of some drug. And they knew, for

instance, that Gilliam by reputation was a drug addict, had

been arrested many times on possession charges (including

methamphetamine and crack cocaine), and was known to

become “belligerent and potentially violent” when using.

Id at ¶2; see Dkt 8 at 11–12 (summarizing eight prior

arrests, including for possession and public intoxication).

When Kuchinski asked questions about the $100 bill,

Gilliam “became highly irate” and began screaming, while

also sweating profusely with dilated pupils and visible

tremors. Id at ¶3; see also Dkt 8-6 at 01:54–05:47 (dash-

cam footage showing Gilliam agitated and acting

erratically).

Defendants assessed that Gilliam was a danger to

himself and others, and that they had probable cause to

arrest him for public intoxication. Dkt 8-1 at ¶4; see also

Dkt 8-2 at ¶3 (Schwausch declaration, noting “classic signs

of likely stimulant intoxication,” including restless

agitation, fluctuating mood, rapid and mumbled speech,

and exaggerated reflexes). While in custody and en route to

the station, Gilliam screamed and thrashed in the back

seat of the patrol vehicle, while striking his head against

the partitioning cage. Dkt 8-1 at ¶5; see also Dkt 8-7 (in-car

video). He was found upon arrival at the station to have

self-inflicted injuries that required medical attention.

Dkt 8-1 at ¶5.

Most (if not all) of this was captured on video. Even so,

Gilliam asserts that this arrest was unlawful. He filed a

handwritten complaint against Defendants in both their

individual and official capacities, apparently under §1983,

asserting violation of his rights under the Fourth and

Eighth Amendments. Dkt 1 at 1, 3. In general, he asserts

that Defendants (and Kuchinski in particular) falsified the

grounds that supported their determination of probable

cause to arrest him, and that suggestion the $100 bill was

counterfeit was pretextual and unsupported. Id at 6–7, 9.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in

their individual capacities claiming qualified immunity.

Dkt 8. They also filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings in their official capacity. Dkt 10. Gilliam later

filed a motion for sanctions against them under Rule 56(h),

suggesting that their declarations were perjured. Dkt 16.

2. Legal standard

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires a court to enter summary judgment when the

movant establishes that “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” A fact is material if it “might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Sulzer

Carbomedics Inc v Oregon Cardio-Devices Inc, 257 F3d 449,

456 (5th Cir 2001), quoting Anderson v Liberty Lobby Inc,

477 US 242, 248 (1986). And a dispute is genuine if the

“evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Royal v CCC & R Tres

Arboles LLC, 736 F3d 396, 400 (5th Cir 2013),

quoting Anderson, 477 US at 248.

The summary judgment stage doesn’t involve weighing

the evidence or determining the truth of the matter. The

task is solely to determine whether a genuine issue exists

that would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for

the nonmoving party. Smith v Harris County, 956 F3d 311,

316 (5th Cir 2020). Disputed factual issues must be

resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Little v Liquid

Air Corp, 37 F3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir 1994). All reasonable

inferences must also be drawn in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Connors v Graves, 538 F3d 373,

376 (5th Cir 2008).

Rule 12(c) provides, “After the pleadings are closed—

but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for

judgment on the pleadings.” A reviewing court evaluates a

motion under Rule 12(c) using the same standard as a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6). See Gentilello v Rege, 627 F3d 540, 543–44 (5th

Cir 2010). To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, then, the

complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp v

Twombly, 550 US 544, 570 (2007). A claim has facial

plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v

Iqbal, 556 US 662, 678 (2009), citing Twombly, 550 US at

556.

3. Analysis

The motions for summary judgment, for judgment on

the pleadings, and for sanctions are each treated in turn.

a. Claims in individual capacities

Qualified immunity protects government officials

“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 231 (2009),

quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 (1982). Its

availability as a defense ultimately “turns only upon the

objective reasonableness of the defendant’s acts.”

Thompson v Upshur County, 245 F3d 447, 457 (5th Cir

2001) (emphasis original).

Analysis of qualified immunity involves two inquiries.

See Aguirre v City of San Antonio, 995 F3d 395, 406

(5th Cir 2021); see also Batyukova v Doege, 994 F3d 717,

724–25 (5th Cir 2021). A court must first ask “whether the

facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, show the officer’s conduct violated a

federal right.” Aguirre, 995 F3d at 406, quoting Tolan v

Cotton, 572 US 650, 655–56, (2014). Second, it must

determine whether the allegedly wrongful conduct violated

clearly established law. Tolan, 572 US at 656, citing Hope

v Pelzer, 536 US 730, 739 (2002). But the district court

needn’t go on to the latter inquiry if the former is already

determinative that qualified immunity applies. Camreta v

Greene, 563 US 692, 707 (2011).

Only the first inquiry is necessary here. A court must

generally view the facts in the plaintiff’s favor. But Gilliam

with his response submits only argument, rather than

admissible evidence. And even if his complaint is treated

as being a sworn statement, “where there is video

capturing the events in question and ‘opposing parties tell

two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted

by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a

court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes

of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.’” Valencia v

Davis, 836 F Appx 292, 296 (5th Cir 2020, per curiam),

quoting Scott v Harris, 550 US 372, 380, (2007); see also

Garza v Briones, 943 F3d 740, 744 (5th Cir 2019) (internal

quotation omitted) (rejecting plaintiff’s version of facts

when “blatantly contradicted and utterly discredited by

video recordings”).

Available video evidence entirely displaces the

narrative by which Gilliam purports to proceed under the

Fourth Amendment. See Dkt 1 at 3, 4, 6–9. He was

obviously and without question acting in an agitated,

erratic, threatening manner at the time of arrest, as

described in the declarations. See Dkt 8-6 at 01:54–05:47

(dash-cam video, including audio). Indeed, he essentially

concedes those videos are compromising, because he also

speculates that they were digitally manipulated. See

Dkt 12 at 2. But he provides no supporting evidence for

that exceedingly unlikely contention. To the contrary, see

Dkt 8-1 at ¶¶4–5 (Kuchinksi declaration, authenticating

both videos).

The articulation of probable cause by Defendants was

thus valid. And to be clear, the probable cause was not for

passing counterfeit currency, as that was simply the report

that brought on the investigation. See Dkt 8-1 at ¶1.

Instead, the video supports the declarations that the arrest

was supported by probable cause for public intoxication.

Dkt 8-6 at 03:39 (stating same). And as already noted, the

video makes clear that this was objectively reasonable. See

Thompson, 245 F3d at 457; cf Anokwuru v City of Houston,

990 F3d 956, 963 (5th Cir 2021), quoting Haggerty v Texas

Southern University, 391 F3d 653, 655 (5th Cir 2004)

(citation omitted) (false arrest claims under §1983 require

showing that officers lacked probable cause to arrest).

Gilliam also raises (or at least mentions) an Eighth

Amendment claim. See Dkt 1 at 3. But he provides no

briefing in support of such claim. It is thus abandoned. See

Matter of Dallas Roadster, Ltd, 846 F3d 112, 126 (5th Cir

2017). Regardless, the Eighth Amendment doesn’t apply to

claims about arrest. See Ingraham v Wright, 430 US 651,

669–70 (1977) (Eighth Amendment applies to post-

prosecution treatment). What’s more, the injury to

Gilliam’s forehead was self-inflicted, with video showing

him bashing his own head against the partition cage. See

Dkt 8-7 at 00:37–00:41. Nothing suggests any injury was

due to conduct by Defendants. Indeed, nowhere in either

video is there any appearance of rough handling, much less

anything other than calm, respectful interaction on the

part of Defendants.

Defendants establish that they are entitled to qualified

immunity. Summary judgment will be entered in their

favor on the claims against them in their individual

capacities.

b. Claims in official capacities

To prevail against an officer in his official capacity, a

plaintiff must show that a person acting under color of

state law denied the plaintiff a right under the

Constitution or federal law. Martin v Thomas, 973 F2d 449,

452–53 (5th Cir 1992). A person for these purposes includes

a local governing body if the action claimed to be

unconstitutional implemented a “decision officially

adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell v

Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 US

658, 690 (1978). Any such claim against a municipality

must establish “a policymaker; an official policy; and a

violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the

policy or custom.” Piotrowski v City of Houston, 237 F3d

567, 578 (5th Cir 2001), quoting Monell, 436 US 658, 694

(1978).

Gilliam filed no response to the motion for judgment on

the pleadings. The motion will thus be granted as

unopposed. See Local Rule 7.4. Regardless, his complaint

doesn’t even address the relevant policymaker, the City of

Deer Park. See Dkt 10 at 5, citing Deer Park Charter,

§2.05. It thus fails to establish the potential for Monell

liability.

Judgment on the pleadings will be entered in favor of

Defendants on the claims against them in their official

capacities.

c. Sanctions

The motion by Gilliam for sanctions plainly fails. He

argues that declarations made under penalty of perjury by

Defendants regarding his drug use are false. Dkt 16 at 1.

But this is contradicted by his own arrest record for drug

use and statements made by his father. Dkt 17 at 3, citing

Dkt 8-5 (arrest records and police reports). Nor does

anything support his contention elsewhere that the video

evidence is somehow “CGI Computer generated Imaging.”

Dkt 12 at 2. And to a certainty, nothing submitted suggests

that these officers made their statements with the

requisite “bad faith” under Rule 56(h).

The motion for sanctions will thus be denied.

4. Conclusion

The motion for summary judgment by Defendants Paul

Anthony Kuchinski, Brooke Schwausch, Bryan Miller, and

Eddie Pereira as to the claims against them in their

individual capacities is GRANTED. Dkt 8.

Their motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the

claims against them in their official capacities is also

GRANTED. Dkt 10.

The motion by Plaintiff J. Paul Gilliam for sanctions is

DENIED. Dkt 16.

Gilliam previously sought and obtained leave to amend

his complaint. Dkts 7 & 14. But he never followed through.

Given the video evidence, any future attempt to amend

would be an “exercise in futility” and thus isn’t warranted.

Schiller v Physicians Resource Group Inc, 342 F3d 563, 569

(5th Cir 2003); see also id at 567 (no abuse of discretion

upon dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff “had fair

opportunity to make his case”).

This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

A final judgment will enter separately.

SO ORDERED.

Signed on March 31, 2025, at Houston, Texas.

VBE.

Hon. Charles Eskridg

United States District Judge