Cook v. CoreCivic, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

CHRISTA COOK, ET AL., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) NO. 3:24-cv-00095

v. )

) JUDGE RICHARDSON

CORECIVIC, INC., ET AL., )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 60, “Motion”) filed by Defendants

CoreCivic, Inc., CoreCivic of Tennessee, Damon T. Hininger, Patrick Swindle, Jason Medlin,

Vince Vantell, Tamekio Warren, Denita Jones, Eugene Sapp, Kashundra Brown, and Dasity Jones

(collectively, “Defendants”). Via the Motion, Defendants request that this Court dismiss Plaintiffs’

claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants filed a

memorandum in support of their Motion (Doc. No. 61, “Memorandum”), and Plaintiffs (as

identified above and defined below) filed a response to the Motion. (Doc. No. 66, “Response’).

Defendants then replied to Plaintiffs’ Response (Doc. No. 67, “Reply”) and thereafter filed a notice

of supplemental authority in support of their Motion. (Doc. No. 68, “Supplemental Authority”).

For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is GRANTED.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ claims originally were asserted in a single complaint (filed in this Court under

case number 3:22-cv-00571) filed on behalf of multiple plaintiffs. The various claims were based

on three different incidents (later called by the Court the Williams Incident, the Allen Incident,

and the Brown Incident, respectively). The Williams Incident was the basis for claims asserted by

Brenda Williams, the Allen Incident was the basis for claims asserted by Plaintiffs (i.e., Christa

Cook and Christa Derick Montgomery, each individually and as survivor and next of kin to

Chriteris Allen), and the Brown Incident was the basis for claims asserted by Cameshia Kindred.

Defendants, along with their co-defendants named in the original complaint (Doc. No. 1),

moved to sever the claims so that each incident would be the subject of a separate lawsuit. (Doc.

No. 18). This Court granted that motion, ordering in essence that the claims be severed based on

the incident involved, such that claims would be spread across three different cases. (Doc. No. 52).

The Court ordered, among other things, that Plaintiffs file a complaint limited to the allegations

for their own claims.1 (Id. at 8). Per this Court’s instructions, on January 16, 2024, Plaintiffs in

this matter filed their complaint (Doc. No. 55, “Complaint”), which was assigned a new case

number (i.e., 3:24-cv-00095, as noted above in the caption to the instant document).2

Via the Complaint, Plaintiffs Christa Cook and Christopher Derick Montgomery bring

claims individually as survivors and next of kin to Chriteris Allen. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs

name the following defendants: CoreCivic, Inc., CoreCivic of Tennessee, Damon T. Hininger,

Patrick Swindle, Jason Medlin, Vince Vantell, Tamekio Warren, Denita Jones, Eugene Sapp,

Kashundra Brown, and Dasity Jones.3 (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiff’s claims are based on alleged: 1)

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint at Doc. No. 55 serves as the operative complaint for purposes of this Motion, and

reference to any counts refers to counts asserted in this complaint.

2 The reason why the Complaint (i.e., the complaint that originated the case filed under the instant case

number (3:24-cv-00095)) had such a high docket entry number (55 rather than 1) is that the entries from

case number 3:22-cv-00571 were effectively imported as docket entries in this case and were assigned

docket entries numbers based on their date of entry in that case, resulting in 54 docket entry numbers lower

than the docket entry number for the Complaint.

3 Defendant Hininger is the CEO of CoreCivic. Defendant Swindle is the COO of CoreCivic. Defendant

Medlin is the Vice President of Facility Operations at CoreCivic. Defendant Vantell was the warden at

Whiteville Correctional Facility (“WCF”) at all times relevant. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Warren was

an assistant shift supervisor at WCF. (Id. ¶ 12). Defendant Denita Jones was a sergeant at WCF. Defendant

Sapp was a unit manager at WCF. Defendants Brown and Dasity Jones were correctional officers at WCF.

violations of 42 § 1983 by all Defendants; 2) so-called Monell liability as to Defendant CoreCivic;

3) common law negligence on the part of Defendants CoreCivic, Byrd, and Curtis; 4) loss of

consortium for which all Defendants allegedly are liable; and 5) violations of Tenn. Code Ann. §

1-3-121 by Defendant CoreCivic.4

FACTS5

Plaintiffs’ allegations relate to Chriteris Allen’s alleged murder at the hands of his cellmate,

who (according to Plaintiffs) killed Allen by placing fentanyl on him on August 26, 2021, at

Whiteville Correctional Facility (“WCF”).6 (Id. ¶ 17). Allen typically called his mother, Plaintiff

Christa Cook, every morning around 6:30 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. (Id. ¶ 18). On the morning of August

26, 2021, however, Allen did not call his mother. (Id.). Based on this fact, Plaintiffs allege that

Allen died somewhere between 5:30 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. (Id.).

4 “CoreCivic" is used below to refer to CoreCivic, Inc. or its subsidiary, CoreCivic of Tennessee, or both;

this is consistent with Plaintiffs’ approach. (Doc. No. 55 ¶ 7). “CoreCivic officials" may include facility-

level administrators and staff, and not just corporate executives at the C-suite level or the corporate board.

5 The facts herein are taken from the Complaint (Doc. No. 55). For purposes of the instant Motion, the facts

in the Complaint are accepted as true, except to the extent that they are qualified herein (as, for example,

by “Plaintiffs allege”) to denote that they are not being taken as true (because they are either legal

conclusions or simply too conclusory to be accepted as true without supporting factual allegations that can

be accepted as true) without but instead are set forth merely to make clear what a party claims to be true.

Throughout this opinion, the Court forgoes any such qualifiers for any fact that it is accepting as true, stating

those facts without qualification even though it is aware that any such (alleged) fact ultimately might not

prove to be true.

If the Court indicates herein that it is not accepting a particular allegation as true, that does not necessarily

mean that anything about the Court’s outcome on, or analysis of, the instant Motion would have been

different had the Court accepted the allegation as true.

6 The Court declines to accept this fact as true because Plaintiffs have not alleged enough factual matter to

make this serious allegation (or murder) plausible. For now the Court will accept as true Plaintiffs’

implication that they somehow know what Allen’s cellmate knew, and for now it will accept as true cellmate

“knew that [Allen] had not moved since the early morning hours, yet he never notified guard staff.” (Id. ¶

21). But it declines to draw the inference that Plaintiffs have drawn base in part on these allegations—that

the cellmate must have murdered Allen. Because it ultimately makes no difference whether the Court

accepts this inference, the Court will forgo explaining why it refuses to accept it, except to say that it strikes

the Court as only a possible inference, and not a plausible one as required under Twombly and Iqbal for it

to be accepted as true.

CoreCivic officers discovered Allen’s body around noon on the same date. (Id. ¶ 19).

Officers failed to perform required, scheduled cell checks as scheduled, and that such failure

caused the delay in discovering Allen’s body. (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 22-23). On the day of Allen’s death,

only one guard was assigned to Allen’s pod even though two or three were normally assigned to

the pod. (Id. ¶ 22). This staffing issue was responsible for the missed cell checks. (Id. ¶ 22).

Defendant Brown (a guard) failed to conduct a required security check, and Plaintiffs contend that

another guards, Defendant Jones, also failed to conduct a required check of Allen’s cell. (Id. at ¶¶

22-23).7 Plaintiff further alleges that “[h]ad Defendants Brown and Dasity Jones conducted a cell

check at breakfast, as they were required to do, then [Allen]’s life could have been saved. (Id. ¶

23). Plaintiffs assert that the fentanyl that killed Allen was brought into the prison by guards and

that CoreCivic acted with deliberate indifference to the presence of drugs at WCF.

The remaining allegations in the Complaint allege in detail the alleged unconstitutional

conduct at a corporatewide level. In support, Plaintiffs cite other lawsuits across various states that

purport to establish CoreCivic’s indifference to staffing issues, among other concerns, settlements

related to some of these lawsuits, and audits that showed concerns of understaffing. (Id. ¶¶ 28-47).

The Complaint sets forth Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, specifically asserting violations

of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs claim that

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the health and safety of Chriteris Allen while he

was incarcerated at the Whiteville Correctional Facility, resulting in his death. Specifically, the

Complaint asserts that CoreCivic's failure to provide adequate staffing and to enforce necessary

7 The Court accepts as true the allegation as to Defendant Brown because the Complaint supports this

allegation by alleging a fact (regarding rigor mortis) that the Court believes it can accept as true. The same

is not true as to Jones; the Complaint notes that Jones has stated in writing that she had indeed checked

Allen’s cell (at 10:15) a.m. but then declares that statement false in an entirely unsupported and conclusory

manner.

security protocols, such as regular cell checks, directly contributed to the delay in discovering

Allen's body and, ultimately, his death by fatal overdose.

Under the theory of deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants were aware

of a substantial risk to Allen's safety but failed to take reasonable steps to address it. This includes

the alleged failure to prevent drug smuggling into the facility. Plaintiffs allege systemic issues,

including chronic understaffing and a culture of neglect within CoreCivic’s management policies,

which Plaintiffs argue created an environment wherein such risks were not only foreseeable but

also exacerbated by the Defendants' actions and inactions.

In support of their assertions, Plaintiffs reference other lawsuits and audits that document

CoreCivic’s systemic neglect and failure to address security risks across its facilities. The

Complaint in effect asserts that these past incidents help establish a pattern of behavior that

contributed to the tragic death of Allen and the failure to protect him while in custody.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs bring three claims, each one against all Defendants.

In Count One, they bring claims under § 1983 based on their alleged deliberate indifference to the

health and safety of Allen in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. And in Counts

Two and Three, Plaintiffs bring claims under state law based on alleged gross negligence and

negligence, respectively.

LEGAL STANDARD

For purposes of a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, the Court must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, as it has

done above. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. Id. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

relief. Id. at 679. A legal conclusion, including one couched as a factual allegation, need not be

accepted as true on a motion to dismiss, nor are mere recitations of the elements of a cause of

action sufficient. Id.; Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010), cited

in Abriq v. Hall, 295 F. Supp. 3d 874, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2018). Moreover, factual allegations that

are merely consistent with the defendant’s liability do not satisfy the claimant’s burden, as mere

consistency does not establish plausibility of entitlement to relief even if it supports the possibility

of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In determining whether a complaint is sufficient under the standards of Iqbal and its

predecessor and complementary case, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), it may be

appropriate to “begin [the] analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. This can be crucial, as no such

allegations count toward the plaintiff's goal of reaching plausibility of relief. To reiterate, such

allegations include “bare assertions,” formulaic recitation of the elements, and “conclusory” or

“bald” allegations. Id. at 681. The question is whether the remaining allegations—factual

allegations, i.e., allegations of factual matter—plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. If not,

the pleading fails to meet the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and thus must be dismissed pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 683.

As a general rule, matters outside the pleadings may not be considered in ruling on a motion

to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) unless the motion is converted to one for summary

judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). When a document is referred to in the pleadings

and is integral to the claims, it may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into one

for summary judgment. Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 219 F. Supp. 3d 645, 652-53 (S.D. Ohio 2016);

Blanch v. Trans Union, LLC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 789, 791-92 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).

ANALYSIS

Under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a government official acted with 'deliberate

indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm. This requires showing both an objective

component (a substantial risk of harm) and a subjective component (the defendant's knowledge of

and disregard for that risk). Specifically, Plaintiffs must show that the Defendants were aware of

the risk to Allen's safety, and that they acted with a 'sufficiently culpable state of mind. As we

move forward in analyzing whether Plaintiffs have met these requirements, it is necessary to

evaluate the adequacy of the factual allegations to support these essential elements."

To further put the following discussion into context, the Court notes that Plaintiffs must

establish certain elements to succeed on their § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference. Under the

Eighth Amendment, which protects against cruel and unusual punishment, Plaintiffs must

demonstrate that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm

to Allen. Specifically, Plaintiffs need to establish two key components. The first component is that

there existed an objectively serious risk to Allen’s health and safety. This includes a condition or

practice that posed a substantial risk of harm, such as the failure to conduct regular cell checks,

the insufficient staffing levels, or the unchecked introduction of fentanyl into the facility.

The second component is subjective. The subjective component is that Defendants were

subjectively aware of this (objectively serious) risk but failed to take appropriate action to mitigate

or eliminate it. Plaintiffs must show that the Defendants knew about the risk of harm to Allen and

disregarded it by failing to act reasonably to prevent it. The Court assumes arguendo (to Plaintiffs’

benefit) that that actionable failures could include the failure to staff the facility adequately, failing

to conduct regular security checks, or allowing drug smuggling into the facility.

This two-component standard for deliberate indifference is crucial in determining whether

Plaintiffs’ claims can survive the motion to dismiss. This is because the factual matter alleged in

the Complaint must plausibly suggest the existence of these two components.

A. Plaintiffs Fail to Establish a § 1983 Claim.

Section 1983 authorizes a federal action against any person who, “under color of state law,

deprives [another] person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or

conferred by federal statute.” Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012)

(citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the Complaint must plausibly allege (1) a

deprivation of a Constitutional or other federal right, and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a

“state actor.” Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014). Thus, to state a claim

under § 1983, a plaintiff must, as a threshold matter, allege that he or she suffered a deprivation of

a specific right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Id. In addition, a plaintiff

must show that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.

The Court will begin by addressing the alleged liability of CoreCivic. Section 1983 liability

cannot be predicated upon a respondeat superior theory, that is, based upon the actions of a

supervisor’s subordinates or upon a supervisor’s mere failure to act. Peatross v. City of Memphis,

818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).

Rather, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution. Each defendant must be personally

involved in the unconstitutional action.” Pineda v. Hamilton Cnty., 977 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir.

2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, a “failure to supervise, control or

train the offending individual” is only actionable if “the supervisor either encouraged the specific

incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it” by “at least implicitly”

authorizing, approving, or knowingly acquiescing in the misconduct. Peatross, 818 F.3d at 242

(quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)).

As a private corporation operating a state prison, CoreCivic can be held liable under certain

circumstances. Powell v. Woodard, No. 17-6212, 2018 WL 5098824, at *2 (6th Cir. May 21, 2018)

(noting, in case in which CoreCivic was sued, that “a private corporation that operates a prison

acts under the color of state law for purposes of § 1983”).

But like any other entity potentially liable under §1983, CoreCivic cannot be held liable

under § 1983 on a respondeat superior basis. Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,8 102 F.3d 810, 818 (6th

Cir. 1996) . Powell v. Woodard, No. 17-6212, 2018 WL 5098824, at *2 (6th Cir. May 21, 2018).

(noting that “a plaintiff may not sue such a corporation [i.e., CoreCivic] solely on the basis of

respondeat superior liability”). Instead, Plaintiffs must allege a corporate policy, custom, or

practice of the corporate defendant (here, CoreCivic) that directly caused the alleged constitutional

violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

Plaintiffs argue that CoreCivic’s understaffing created an environment in which rampant

drug smuggling into prisons flourished, ultimately contributing to Allen’s death..In analyzing the

merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court must determine whether the allegations in the Complaint

establish any Eighth Amendment violation by someone; if not, Monell liability is not possible

because there is no basis for any liability under §1983, let alone Monell liability in particular.

8 In citing Street, the Court finds it worth noting that CoreCivic formerly was known as Corrections

Corporations of America.

This reality is brought home by a recent and very relevant case, Caraway v. CoreCivic of

Tenn., LLC, 98 F.4th 679 (6th Cir. 2024). There, the Sixth Circuit did not address Monell liability

first, but instead first focused on whether the plaintiff had adequately alleged an Eighth

Amendment violation.. Once the court found (for reasons discussed below) that the plaintiffs failed

to state an Eighth Amendment violation, the court noted that the Monell claims failed because “the

complaint doesn't allege an underlying constitutional violation.” Id. at 687.

In Caraway, the plaintiff was the mother (and contemporaneously, the estate) of an inmate

who had died in CoreCivic custody due to a fentanyl overdose. She, like Plaintiffs here, brought

(on behalf of his estate) deliberate-indifference claims, which the Sixth Circuit alternatively calls

“failure to protect” claims. Id. at 683. The plaintiff alleged that CoreCivic’s staffing shortages led

to inadequate screening of prison guards, allowing corrupt employees to smuggle in illicit drugs,

which, in turn, resulted in the inmate’s fatal fentanyl overdose. Setting aside for the moment

whether the plaintiff adequately alleged any Eighth Amendment violations by anyone that could

make someone liable, the Court will discuss what the Sixth Circuit said about whether CoreCivic

could be held liable based on the plaintiff’s allegations.

As to CoreCivic’s liability (which as indicated above would necessarily be Monell

liability), Caraway (like myriad prior cases) makes clear, Monell liability is dependent on the

existence of an underlying constitutional violation (by someone). If no such violation is plausibly

alleged, the corresponding Monell claims necessarily fail.

Thus, before the Court can address whether CoreCivic can be held liable under Monell, it

must first determine whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged an Eighth Amendment violation

by someone (i.e., by one or more of the individual Defendants)—that is, adequately alleged the

above referenced two components. To have done so, Plaintiffs must have alleged factual matter

plausibly suggesting (i) that there existed an objectively serious risk to Allen’s health and safety;

and (ii) Defendants were subjectively aware of this (objectively serious) risk but failed to take

appropriate action to mitigate or eliminate it. Notably, the second component needs to be

determined on a Defendant-by-Defendant basis; even if the first component is plausibly alleged, a

valid claim has not been asserted against a particular individual Defendant unless the second

component exists as to that Defendant. On the other hand, if a claim is plausibly asserted against

even one individual Defendant, Monell liability potentially could exist for CoreCivic.

In Caraway, the Sixth Circuit, affirming the district court’s dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6)

grounds, rejected the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim (which the court

called a “failure-to-protect” claim)9 held that the plaintiff did not adequately allege the commission

of the asserted Eighth Amendment violation by anyone. That is, the Court asked whether the

plaintiff had “allege[d] facts plausibly showing two components,” 98 F.4th at 683, then answered

the question in the negative.

First, the court noted that the seriousness of the risk of harm was to be measured by the

seriousness of the risk itself, and not be the seriousness of what happened to the inmate (such as

death by overdose) because that’ risk ultimately happened to be realized. Id. at 685. This is because

“[t]he relevant constitutional “injury’ is the exposure to an objectively excessive risk, not any

physical harm that befalls the inmate because of that risk.” Id. The court then noted that “that

principle of constitutional injury has implications for § 1983’s causation requirement in this

context.” Id. And turning to §1983’s causation requirement. the court explained that “the plaintiff

must show that the defendants’ unconstitutional act or omission failed to alleviate the excessive

9 See 98 F.4th at 683.

risk [the deceased inmate] faced.” Id.10 Given the plaintiff’s theory in that particular case, that

meant that the plaintiff “must allege facts supporting the conclusion that the defendants’

understaffing caused drugs to proliferate at Whiteville.” Id. at 685-86.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to do so. The court explained that although

understaffing may correlate with increased drug activity in the prison, a mere correlation does not

establish a causal link between CoreCivic’s staffing decisions and the specific harm that occurred.

The court emphasized that to succeed on a deliberate-indifference (i.e., failure-to-protect) claim,

the plaintiff must demonstrate that CoreCivic's staffing policies directly led to the harm suffered

by the inmate, and not merely that a generalized correlation exists between those policies and that

harm. As the court explained, a plaintiff must present specific, non-conclusory allegations that

directly connect the alleged constitutional violation to the particular constitutional injury, rather

than relying on generalized statements about the correlation between staffing levels and prison

conditions. See Caraway, 98 F.4th at 685-86; id. at 686 (“The allegation that intentional

understaffing caused drug proliferation at Whiteville is thus nothing more than a ‘the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,’ which the district court properly rejected.” (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678).

For these reasons, the court held that the plaintiff failed to adequately allege an objectively

serious risk of harm. Id. at 686.11

10 In one place, the court seemed to suggest that the plaintiff must show that the defendants’ unconstitutional

act or omission caused the deceased inmate’s overdose. See id. at 686 (“The complaint, for example, never

explains what inmate-inspection protocol Tennessee law requires, much less how any violation caused

Caraway's overdose.”). But based on everything else in Caraway, the Court disregards any such suggestion.

11 In so holding, the court was clearly treating a failure to plausibly allege causation between an alleged

failure to protect and the alleged constitutional injury (i.e., the objectively serious risk of harm) as a failure

to plead an objectively serious risk of harm. That is, in Caraway’s reasoning, even if an objectively serious

risk of harm is otherwise adequately alleged, it must be treated as not adequately alleged unless

The allegations closely mirror those in the present case, where Plaintiffs contend that

understaffing facilitated unchecked drug smuggling, leading to Allen’s exposure to fentanyl and

eventual death. Plaintiffs here, much like in Caraway, fail to allege non-conclusory facts

demonstrating that CoreCivic’s staffing policies directly caused Allen’s death. Instead, their claims

rely on broad allegations that CoreCivic prioritizes profit over safety and, as a result, deliberately

operates with fewer officers than necessary. In Caraway, the court held that such corporate-level

allegations, without particularized facts tying the understaffing to the proliferation of drugs at the

inmate’s particular facility, fail to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. Id. at 686.

Likewise, here, Plaintiffs cite audits and reports criticizing CoreCivic’s staffing decisions, but they

do not connect these general criticisms to the alleged risk (from drugs) faced by Allen in particular.

And, like the plaintiff in Caraway, Plaintiffs rely on a speculative theory: they allege that

CoreCivic’s chronic understaffing enabled guards to smuggle in fentanyl, which then made its way

to Allen’s cell, resulting in his death. However, as in Caraway, there is no factual allegation

directly connecting CoreCivic’s staffing decisions to the specific risk faced by Allen. Plaintiffs do

not provide any concrete facts demonstrating how the alleged staffing shortages led to drug

proliferation within the facility or how CoreCivic’s policies enabled specific guards to smuggle

drugs.

As a reminder, the Sixth Circuit in Caraway was not specifically analyzing whether

CoreCivic could be liable (under Monell) for any constitutional violations, but rather whether the

plaintiff had adequately alleged a constitutional violation (by anyone at all) in the first place. If

the plaintiff (also) adequately alleges causation between the alleged failure to protect and the

alleged objectively serious risk of harm. The Court herein proceeds accordingly.

not, of course, no defendant (whether CoreCivic or an individual defendant) could by liable under

§1983.

The broader point here is that Plaintiffs' deliberate-indifference claims fail against all

Defendants, as did the plaintiff’s claims in Caraway, because Plaintiffs have not alleged factual

matter that plausibly suggests an objectively serious risk of harm. See Caraway, 98 F.4th at 686

(“[The Plaintiff’s complaint fails to adequately plead an objectively serious risk of harm. That's

enough to sink its Eighth-Amendment claim.”).

Even if Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an objectively serious risk of harm, their claims

fail because they do not satisfy the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation.

Caraway held that a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that prison officials were actually

aware of a serious risk of harm and deliberately disregarded it. Id. at 687. The court found that

even though the plaintiff in Caraway alleged that CoreCivic officials were aware of drug problems

within the facility, he failed to provide any specific facts about how, when, or through what means

CoreCivic officials obtained that knowledge. Id.

Plaintiffs’ allegations here suffer from the same deficiency. They assert in broad terms that

CoreCivic knew about drug smuggling and failed to prevent it, but they do not allege any specific

facts demonstrating that CoreCivic officials were aware of a particularized risk to Allen (e.g., a

risk specific to his place of incarceration while he was there) and yet deliberately ignored it. See

id. at 687. In fact, Plaintiffs rely largely on the same 2017 and 2020 audits that Caraway expressly

rejected as insufficient to demonstrate subjective awareness.

Moreover, the court in Caraway noted that CoreCivic had taken remedial steps in response

to staffing shortages and drug concerns, making it difficult to infer deliberate indifference. Id.

Here, Plaintiffs acknowledge that CoreCivic had security measures in place at WCF, including

policies requiring cell checks and searches for contraband. Although Plaintiffs argue that these

policies were inadequately enforced, they fail to allege facts showing that CoreCivic officials

intentionally ignored known risks to Allen (or, for that matter, any inmates at WCF). Plaintiffs

have not alleged sufficient facts to show that CoreCivic’s staffing policies directly caused Allen’s

death. Instead, their claims rely on generalized allegations of corporate-wide failures, which are

insufficient to sustain a Monell claim.

B. Plaintiffs Fail to State Supervisory Liability Claims Against Individual Defendants.

From what the Court can tell, it appears that Plaintiffs may seek to impose supervisory

liability on certain individual defendants. But because the Complaint does not allege an underlying

constitutional violation, any claims of supervisory liability fail. See

Payne v. Sevier Cnty., No. 3:14-CV-346-PLR-CCS, 2016 WL 552351, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 10,

2016), aff'd, 681 F. App'x 443 (6th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases for the proposition that supervisory

liability under § 1983 cannot attach where there is no underlying constitutional violation).

C. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over the State-Law Claims.

Plaintiffs also assert several state law claims against Defendants. A district court “may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Ford v. Frame, 3 F. App'x 316, 318 (6th

Cir. 2001) (“[D]istrict courts possess broad discretion in determining whether to retain

supplemental jurisdiction over state claims once all federal claims are dismissed.”). The Supreme

Court has noted that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial,

the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the

remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); see

also Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] federal court that

has dismissed a plaintiff's federal-law claims should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff's state-law

claims.”).

Having granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ federal claims

(over which the Court has original jurisdiction), and because the aforementioned factors weigh in

favor of declining jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Instead, the Court dismisses them

without prejudice. Plaintiffs may seek to refile them in a Tennessee state court, although the Court

expresses no opinion about how those claims might fare in state court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No.

60). Plaintiffs’ federal claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.

The Court, in its discretion declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and Plaintiffs’ state-law claims will be DISMISSED without

prejudice.

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment under Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Chi Richardson

ELI RICHARDSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE