The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
BILLY NAVARRE CERTIFIED : CASE NO. 2:24-CV-00085
USED CAR IMPORTS L L C ET AL
VERSUS : JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
CLAREMONT PROPERTY CO : MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court are two related motions: Plaintiffs’ Opposed Motion for Extension of Time
to File Amended Complaint [doc. 29] and Claremont’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint [doc. 33]. For the following reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’
Opposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Amended Complaint [doc. 29] is GRANTED. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Claremont’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint
[doc. 33] is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
The Court dismissed fraud-based claims brought by Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants Billy
Navarre Certified Used Car Imports, L.L.C., Billy Navarre Imports, Inc., Lake Charles Auto Plaza,
Inc., Navarre Chevrolet, Inc., Navarre Management, L.L.C., and Navarre Nissan LLC
(collectively, “Navarre”) on July 30, 2024. Doc. 26. The Court allowed Navarre two weeks to
attempt to amend its Complaint to add more particularized accusations of fraud. Id. On the
deadline, Navarre moved to extend the deadline by another two weeks, arguing that good cause
exists to extend the deadline because family travel and other deadlines effectively compressed the
window to amend the claims beyond what Navarre needed to investigate and draft the amendment.
Doc. 29. Navarre further argued that a two-week delay could cause no prejudice. Id.
Claremont Property Company (“Claremont”) opposed the motion for extension, arguing
that the fraud allegations are inherently prejudicial, having caused Claremont to incur litigation
fees and potential reputational damage. Doc. 30. In its opposition, Claremont argues that by
admitting the need to conduct additional investigation as to the fraud claims, Navarre essentially
admits that it inadequately investigated those claims in the first place and that Navarre should not
now be granted more time to embellish fundamentally frivolous claims. Id. Claremont further
argues that there can be no good cause to extend the deadline because Navarre should have known
from the inception of litigation that Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires fraud
claims be supported by specific factual representations that necessitate a thorough investigation.
Id.
Before the court ruled on the motion for extension, Navarre filed its Second Amended
Complaint two weeks after the original deadline, on the date requested in its motion for extension.
Doc. 31.
Claremont then moved to strike the Second Amended Complaint. Doc. 33. In its motion
to strike, Claremont argues that the Second Amended Complaint was untimely filed; that the
opposed request for an extension was itself untimely filed in violation of this Court’s standing
order;1 and that there can be no good cause to grant Navarre additional time to amend fraud claims
it should have adequately researched in the first place. Doc. 33.
1 Judge Cain’s standing order requires that “a motion for extension of a deadline in any matter pending before the
undersigned shall be filed at least two (2) business days prior to the deadline. The moving party shall provide the
undersigned the specific reasons justifying the extension, even if the motion is unopposed. No request for extension
filed in violation of this order will be granted absent a showing of exigent circumstances.”
II.
LAW AND APPLICATION
Generally, courts favor amendment and disfavor motions to strike. Courts should “freely
give leave” to amend a pleading “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15(a)(2). In
deciding a motion to amend, the court should consider “whether permitting the pleading would
cause undue delay in the proceedings or undue prejudice to the nonmovant, the movant is acting
in bad faith or with a dilatory motive, the movant has previously failed to cure deficiencies by
prior pleadings, or the proposed pleading is futile in that it adds nothing of substance to the original
allegations or is not germane to the original cause of action.” Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 239
(5th Cir. 1983). Although the limited question here is whether the deadline to amend should be
extended, the courts’ liberal approach toward amendments supports granting the extension.
On the other hand, “[m]otions to strike are disfavored and infrequently granted.” Bank of
Jackson Hole v. Robinson, 14-1413, 2016 WL 1060356, at *2 (W.D. La. Mar. 14, 2016) (citing
United States v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (N.D. Tex. 2002)); see also
Cargo v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., No. 05-2010, 2011 WL 1234391 (W.D. La. Apr. 1, 2011) (internal
citations omitted). As the Fifth Circuit has noted:
“Partly because of the practical difficulty of deciding cases without a factual record
it is well established that the action of striking a pleading should be sparingly used
by the courts. * * * It is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for
the purposes of justice. * * * The motion to strike should be granted only when the
pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy.”
A disputed question of fact cannot be decided on motion to strike. It is true, also,
that when there is no showing of prejudicial harm to the moving party, the courts
generally are not willing to determine disputed and substantial questions of law
upon a motion to strike. Under such circumstances, the court may properly, and we
think should, defer action on the motion and leave the sufficiency of the allegations
for determination on the merits.
Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Escambia Cnty. Fla., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (Sth Cir.
1962)(quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir.
1953))(internal footnotes omitted, alteration original).
Navarre’s oversight in waiting until the deadline to seek an extension does not appear to
have been made in bad faith, and Claremont makes no argument that the two-week delay
prejudiced Claremont, beyond the argument that the fraud claim itself prejudices Claremont.
Although Claremont argues that Navarre should have investigated its fraud claims thoroughly from
the outset, these arguments drift toward the substantive merits of the amendment. In the interest
of maintaining a complete record of this action, the extension is granted and the motion to strike
is denied without any prejudice to Claremont’s right to attack the substantive merit of the
amendment by appropriate motion.
HI.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Opposed Motion for
Extension of Time to File Amended Complaint [doc. 29] is GRANTED. It is FURTHER
ORDERED that Claremont’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint [doc. 33] is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED at Lake Charles, Louisiana, this 31“ day of March, 2025.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE