The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
WILLIAM SEAN BUCKNER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-22-146-JAR
)
CITY OF SALLISAW, OKLAHOMA; )
LT. HOUSTON MURRAY, )
individually; and )
CHIEF OF POLICE TERRY FRANKLIN, )
individually, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter
or Amend Opinion and Order and Judgment Pursuant to FRCP Rule 59 (Docket
Entry No. 98). On April 29, 2024, this Court entered an Opinion and
Order granting the summary judgment motions filed by Defendants Houston
Murray, City of Sallisaw and Terry Franklin (Docket Entry No. 92).
Plaintiff brings this Motion in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e). After a court enters a final judgment, Rule 59(e) provides a
mechanism for a party aggrieved by the judgment to move the Court to
alter or amend that judgment. See Castanon v. Cathey, 976 F.3d 1136,
1140–41 (10th Cir. 2020). Relief under Rule 59(e) is available only
under limited circumstances, typically only when the moving party can
establish one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling
law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, or (3) the need to correct
clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Servants of Paraclete v. Does,
204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000).
While Rule 59(e) grants district courts the “chance to rectify
[their] own mistakes immediately after [the] decision,” Banister v.
Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 508 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted),
granting a Rule 59(e) motion is strictly limited to cases where the
district court “misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the
controlling law.” Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012. Rule 59(e)
motions are not opportunities to relitigate issues already decided. They
cannot be used to introduce new legal theories, arguments, or evidence
that could have been presented before judgment. See Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff first asserts that Defendant Murray’s claim for qualified
immunity is somehow nullified by the fact Plaintiff complied with the
Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff had every opportunity
to raise this issue in response to Murray’s summary judgment motion but
failed to do so in his four-page response. Additionally, Plaintiff’s
legal basis is not correct – either legally or logically. Nothing in
the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act can alter Murray’s federal
right to qualified immunity. This assertion for altering the judgment
is denied.
Plaintiff also attaches a series of documents to his Rule 59 motion
ostensibly demonstrating that Murray received a bad conduct discharge
from the military and a Declaration of Gary S. Barthel, a former judge
advocate for the United States Marine Corps, who attests that Murray’s
activities constituted a felony. Plaintiff then, as the argument goes,
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proceeds to contend that Murray was disqualified from acting as a law
enforcement officer in the State of Oklahoma. Glaringly omitted from
Plaintiff’s Motion is any justification for providing this information
for the first time in a Rule 59 motion. Beyond questions of
admissibility and introducing a previously undisclosed alleged expert
witness for the first time at this late hour is the legal bar to the
consideration of this new evidence. Clearly, this evidence was
available to Plaintiff to utilize in a response to Murray’s summary
judgment and was not provided. Indeed, Plaintiff’s response largely did
not contest the material facts alleged by Defendants. The use of this
information is completely improper and will not be considered.
Having presented no legally recognized basis for granting relief
under Rule 59, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied in toto.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend
Opinion and Order and Judgment Pursuant to FRCP Rule 59 (Docket Entry
No. 98) is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2025.
______________________________
JASON A. ROBERTSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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