Jarju v. St Johns Hospital of the Sister Third Order

monday, 31 Marcn, 2029 □□ □□□□□ |

Clerk, U.S. District Court, IL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

JACQUALINE S. JARJU, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 23-cv-3038

)

ST. JOHN’S HOSPITAL OF THE )

HOSPITAL SISTERS OF THE )

THIRD ORDER OF ST. FRANCIS )

d/b/a HSHS ST. JOHN’S HOSPITAL, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, U.S. District Judge:

On February 17, 2023, Plaintiff Jacqualine Jarju filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) against

Defendant St. John’s Hospital of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order (“St. John’s”)

alleging St. John’s discriminated against due to her disability in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (“ADA”).! Before the Court is St. John’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30).

I. BACKGROUND

St. John’s Motion includes a section listing the undisputed material facts in this

case. (Doc. 30 at 2-8: 1-33); see also Local Rule 7.1(D)(1)(b) (stating that a motion for

summary judgment must include a section listing the undisputed material facts). Under

1 Plaintiff checked other boxes on her complaint form regarding race discrimination and harassment.

However, she later testified that the lawsuit was fundamentally about whether her termination was

lawful regarding her disability. Other claims were not fully developed.

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Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b), a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must respond

to the moving party’s undisputed material facts and provide additional material facts,

which must be supported by admissible evidence.

Jarju has not complied with the Court’s Local Rules as she failed to file a response

despite being granted an extension to do so. See July 17, 2024 Order. She has not noted

which of St. John’s facts are undisputed material facts, disputed material facts, disputed

immaterial facts, or undisputed immaterial facts. Civil LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(1-4). Under Local

Rules 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6) and 7.1(D)(3)(a)(5), a party’s “failure to respond to any numbered

fact will be deemed an admission of fact.” Civil LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6). Thus, the following

material facts are based on St. John’s properly supported brief and the Court’s review of

the provided record.

St. John’s hired Jarju as a “Cook/ Cashier” (“Cook”) on July 26, 2021. (Doc. 30 at J

1). On July 29, 2021, while at work, Jarju injured her ankle while at work. (Id. at § 2).

During a meeting on August 19, 2021, Jarju informed her managers that she needed to

take time off work to have her ankle injury evaluated. (Id. at {| 5). Because she did not

qualify for FMLA leave, management removed her from the schedule until she could

have her ankle injury addressed. (Id. { 6). At the same meeting, human resource (“HR”)

representatives accused Jarju of inappropriately removing food from the cafeteria on

prior occasions. (Id.). Jarju admitted that she did take food that was given to her by a

coworker. (Id.). She later stated that the meeting and accusations made her so nervous

that she would not take food again, even if it was offered. (Id.). HR further explained that

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proper procedure required paying for food or receiving management approval for taking

unpaid food. (Doc. 30, Ex. 3 at 2).

On August 20, 2021, Jarju submitted paperwork requesting ADA accommodation

for medical conditions that existed prior to being hired by St. John’s in relation to the cook

position. (Id. at § 7). The submission included a doctor’s note from May 2021 generally

outlining Jarju’s medical conditions and symptoms. (Id.). However, the note did not

explain any specific accommodations the doctor recommended and did not provide

support for the accommodations that Jarju requested in her original paperwork, such as

lifting restrictions, an ergonomic chair, and additional breaks. (Id. at § 7).

A long email chain, and other discussions, ensued between HR and Jarju. (Doc. 30,

Ex. 11 at 1-13). A human resources generalist sent an email to Jarju on August 26, 2021,

stating:

“Per our conversation, we are needing further clarification on:

-Lifting and carrying items greater than 5 pounds

-Ergonomic chair needs, including where a chair would be needed

in the department

Please also have your physician provide a letter clarifying your pound.

restriction for lifting, carrying, sitting and frequency of breaks restriction.”

(Id. at 11). On September 1, 2021, another human resources generalist followed up by

email, asking Jarju if she would be able to submit the additional information requested

by her colleague by September 3, 2021. (Id. at 10). The same day, Jarju responded that she

was working on getting the documentation. (Id. at 9-10). Additionally, she requested a

copy of St. John’s accommodation policy, which was immediately resent to her because

it was originally provided to her in July 2021. (Id.) After some back and forth, Jarju and

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HR agreed that discussion about accommodations for the Cook position would resume

when Jarju obtained a doctor’s note that specifically addressed her accommodations

request. (Id. at 9).

On September 2, 9, and 14, 2021, Jarju submitted letters from a Doctor of Podiatric

Medicine (DPM) regarding her recent ankle injury. (Doc. 30 at J 11-12). Together, the

letters requested medical leave and stated that upon her return to work, she needed to be

restricted to “sit down work only for one month in boot.” (Doc. 30, ex. 10). On September

21, 2021, Jarju returned to work. (Doc. 30 at □□ 12). Based on her DPM’s noted restrictions,

St. John’s gave Jarju a temporary sedentary position greeting, taking temperatures, and

handing out masks at the Women’s and Children’s Clinic. (Id. at J 12-13).

On September 28, 2021, two bags of food were delivered for a patient to the

security desk where Jarju was working. (Doc. 30 at § 19). At some point, Jarju looked in

the bags. (Doc. 30 at {| 20). One bag contained soda and candy. The other contained

chicken wings. (Id.). Some of the chicken wings spilled on the counter. (Id.). Jarju cleaned

up the mess. (Id.). Eventually, she placed the chicken wings in her personal tote bag which

she took with her at the end of her shift. (Id.). A security guard who witnessed the events

reported it to HR. (Id. at ¥ 21).

On October 4, 2021, HR began an investigation into the security guard’s allegation

of food theft. (Id. at § 27). The security guard stated that Jarju asked him if “he would like

to share the contents” and later stated “you sure you don’t want these? They are going to

go to waste.” (Id. at § 22). Further, HR reviewed the video footage showing that Jarju

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placed the food in her bag and left the building with it. (Id. at 28). The video was also

consistent with the security officer’s account. (Id. at { 27).

On October 4, 2021, HR called Jarju into a meeting about the incident. When asked

if she took the food, Jarju denied doing so. (Id. at { 27). Eventually, she admitted that she

took the food home and disposed of it because it sat out for six or more hours and was

not safe to eat. (Id. at J 22). After being presented with the video evidence disputing her

timeline, the security guard’s statements and her past incidents of taking food that did

not belong to her, Jarju admitted that she could understand how that may be construed

that she took the food for personal consumption. (Id. at § 24). The HR representatives

that were present at the meeting then took a break to consult the HR Director. (Id. at J

30). Jarju was terminated due to the repeated theft of unapproved food with the

investigative conclusions being memorialized in a report. (Doc. 30, ex. 3).

Ill. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no genuine dispute exists

as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could

find in favor of the nonmoving party. Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). A

factual dispute is only material if its resolution might change the suit’s outcome under

the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S, 242, 248 (1986). When ruling

on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe facts in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving

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party’s favor. Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2008). “At summary judgment,

a court may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which

inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.” Paz v. Wauconda

Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 464 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations

omitted).

The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for

the motion and identifying the evidence the movant believes demonstrates the absence

of any genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

After the moving party does so, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings

and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477

US. at 255 (quotation and footnotes omitted).

As previously stated, Jarju’s failure to respond to any numbered fact is deemed an

admission of the fact that is supported by the summary judgment record. Civil LR

7.1(D)(2)(b)(6). Although deference may be given to pro se litigants, Jarju’s pro se status

does not excuse her from complying with rules of civil procedure. Cady v. Strahan, 467

F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006).

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, St. John’s argues that Jarju fails to establish

her prima facie case for retaliatory termination. Additionally, St. John’s contends that it

did not fail to accommodate Jarju because discussions regarding her accommodation

were ongoing when she was terminated for cause.

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B. Retaliatory Termination

Pursuant to the ADA, “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual

because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or

because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner

in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [it].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). The ultimate

burden of demonstrating that St. John’s engaged in unlawful retaliation lies with Jarju.

Hudson v. Chi. Transit Auth., 375 F.3d 552, 561 (7th Cir. 2004). To survive summary

judgment, Jarju must establish that the “record contain(s) sufficient evidence for a

reasonable factfinder to conclude that a retaliatory motive” was the reason for her

termination. Lesiv v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 39 F.4th 903, 911 (7th Cir. 2022). Further, Jarju must

“produce evidence that a retaliatory motive actually influenced the decision-maker, not

merely that it could have.” Brown v. Advoc. S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1108 (7th Cir.

2012) (emphasis in original).

Jarju must submit evidence that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her

employer took an adverse action against her and (3) there was a “‘but for’ causal

connection between the two.” Parker v. Brooks Life Science, Inc., 39 F.4th 931, 936 (7th Cir.

2022) citing Kotaska v. Fed. Express Corp., 966 F.3d 624, 632 (7th Cir. 2020). St. John’s does

not dispute Jarju engaged in a protected activity by requesting accommodations and her

termination is clearly an adverse action. St. John’s argues that Jarju has not presented

evidence that her request for accommodation is the “but-for” reason that she was

terminated.

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Jarju can prove causation either through evaluation of the evidence as a whole or

the burden-shifting framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973); Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. Of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 555, 657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2011).

Under the McDonnell burden-shifting framework, Jarju must demonstrate that she “(1)

engaged in protected activity; (2) was performing her job satisfactorily; and (3) was

singled out for an adverse employment action that similarly situated employees who did

not engage in protected activity did not suffer.” Dickerson, 657 F.3d. at 601-602. If Jarju

satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to St. John’s to offer a non-invidious reason for

Jarju’s termination. Id. at 602. If St. John’s meets the burden, Jarju must then demonstrate

that the reason that St. John’s provided is pretextual. Id.

Jarju has failed to meet her initial burden because she has not provided evidence

that she was singled out for an adverse employment that similarly situated employees

who did not engage in protected activity did not suffer. As such, Jarju cannot prevail

under the burden shifting framework.

Jarju also failed to provide evidence as a whole from which a reasonable factfinder

could conclude that her accommodation requests were the reason for her termination.

Jarju merely states in her complaint that she was not “informed of any issues with [her]

behavior until [she] requested accommodations” and that she “did not have any

complaints about [her] her work until [she] requested accommodations.” Timing alone

is rarely enough to establish causation. Parker, 39 F.4th at 937. Suspicious timing

“combined with additionally evidence of pretext” can justify denial of summary

judgment. Id. In light of the intervening events that include at least two instances of

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removing food from the workplace without permission, the mere fact that Jarju was in

the process of negotiating accommodations is insufficient to show St. John’s reason for

terminating her was a pretext. See Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., L.P., 651 F.3d 664,

675 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Plaintiffs intervening violation of employee

guidelines broke the inference of causation based on the five-day interval between his

complaints and termination).

C. Failure to Accommodate

To establish a failure to accommodate claim, Jarju must show that: (1) she is both

qualified and has a disability; (2) St. John’s was aware of the disability; and (3) St. John’s

failed to accommodate her disability. Guzman v. Brown County, 884 F.3d 633, 642 (7th Cir.

2018). As with her retaliation claim, St. John’s does not challenge the first two elements

but argues Jarju has not met her burden of proffering evidence that establishes a disputed

issue of material fact as to whether St. John’s engaged in the interactive process to

determine a reasonable accommodation.

After an employee discloses their disability to their employer, the ADA “obligates

the employer to engage with the employee in an ‘interactive process’ to determine the

appropriate accommodations under the appropriate circumstances.” Gile v. United

Airlines, 213 F.3d 365, 373 (7th Cir. 2000). This process requires an employer to engage in

a flexible give-and-take with the employee that can determine what reasonable

accommodations, if any, that would allow the employee to continue their employment.

Id. If there is a breakdown in the interactive communication, the court must “isolate the

cause of the breakdown and then assign responsibility” for the breakdown. Bultmeyer v.

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Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996). In the process, “employees must

make their employers aware of any nonobvious, medically necessary accommodations

with corroborating evidence such as a doctor’s note .. . before an employer may be

required under the ADA’s reasonableness standard to provide a specific modest

accommodation that an employee requests.” Ekstrand v. Sch. Dist. Of Somerset, 583 F.3d

982, 976 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, an employer may not be obligated to provide a

specifically requested modest accommodation unless the employer is made aware of its

medical necessity to the employee. Id.

Based upon the record, St. John’s was engaged in the interactive process. Once

Jarju provided a doctor’s note regarding her intervening ankle injury, HR immediately

made a sedentary position available to her for one month based upon the specific

restrictions ordered by her doctor. Additionally, according to Jarju, the interactive

process regarding her other existing disabilities was on hold until she was later cleared

to return to her Cook position. Jarju stated that she was in the process of getting medical

documents that HR requested with more specificity about necessary accommodations for

the cook position at which time she would submit a new accommodation request.

Therefore, a reasonable jury could not find that St. John’s failed to accommodate Jaru’s

requests for accommodation.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For all of these reasons, St. John’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) is

GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment and terminate the case.

ENTER: March 31, 2025

LLEEN &“LAWLESS

UNITED4TATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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