Huff v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

Monday, 21 Marcn, 2UL9 □□□

Clerk, U.S. District Court, IL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

URBANA DIVISION

BRESHAUNA HUFF, )

Plaintiff, )

)

Vv. ) Case No. 23-cv-2290

)

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE )

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS d/b/a _+)

THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT)

URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, )

Defendant. )

OPINION

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 6). For the following reasons, Defendant's

Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Breshauna Huff filed a thirteen-count complaint against Defendant The

Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois d/b/a The University of Illinois at Urbana-

Champaign (“Defendant” or “the University”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff began working for the

University in the Building Services Department in August of 2016. (Doc. 1 at 2). She

claims she worked for Defendant for about five years before Defendant began retaliating

against her to due to her health issues. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that, based on guidelines she had received, she believed she would

have access to intermittent and maternity leave for her high risk pregnancy. (Id.) Upon

requesting the time, however, Plaintiff was denied leave and subsequently disciplined.

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(Id.) Plaintiff contends she was discriminated against and harassed throughout her

pregnancy including at least up until the time she filed her complaint. (Id.)

While Plaintiff alleges she worked enough hours to qualify under the Family

Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., she was denied leave which led to

the loss of seniority for having unexcused, unpaid time. (Id. at 3). Thus, Plaintiff was

required to use sick time and vacation time to attend doctors’ appointments. ([d.) Plaintiff

claims she was micromanaged and questioned about “non-authorized breaks,” even

though she was permitted to take breaks as needed. (Id.)

Plaintiff informed the University she was taking off work early due to pregnancy

complications and provided Defendant’s agents with her doctor’s note. (Id.) Defendant

knew that, while Plaintiff had not yet given birth to her child, she still began receiving

parental pay from August 23, 2021, to October 3, 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff contends she was

disciplined because she did not have FMLA or parental leave for the last two weeks after

giving birth. ([d.) Specifically, Plaintiff was written up for being out on maternity leave

during the time frame that her child was born. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges she received an “informal corrective action in the form of a

Constructive Contract” on November 1, 2021. (Id.) She received a “Performance

Improvement Discussion” in January 2022 due to unexcused absences. (Id. at 4).

Defendant admits that Plaintiff's “ pending disciplinary action due to unexcused absences

in May 2022 was held in abeyance at the time Ms. Huff filed this action.” (Id.) Throughout

this period and continuing to the present time, Plaintiff felt targeted, harassed, and

discriminated against by the University. (Id.)

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Plaintiff now seeks damages and requests that the University restore her seniority

for the time she lost. Counts I, III, and V of Plaintiff's Complaint are claims pursuant to

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seg. (“ADA”). Counts II,

IV, and VI are corresponding state law claims under the Illinois Human Rights Act

(“THRA”). Count VII includes claims for interference/retaliation and discrimination in

violation of the FMLA. Counts VIII and IX are claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for retaliation

and gender/pregnancy discrimination. Counts X and XII are claims for

gender/ pregnancy discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.. Counts XI and XIII are corresponding claims under the

THRA. Defendant moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims except for the FMLA

interference/ retaliation claim asserted in Count VII.

Il. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends Plaintiff's claims under the IHRA should be dismissed under

the doctrine of sovereign immunity based on Defendant's status as a state university.

Defendant also asserts Plaintiff's claims under § 1981 should be dismissed for multiple

reasons, including that the claims are based solely on disability and gender and not race.

Furthermore, Defendant alleges Plaintiff's ADA and Title VII claims should be dismissed

because the allegations in the complaint are not encompassed within Plaintiff's EEOC

charge of discrimination.

In her response to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff moves to voluntarily dismiss her

§ 1981 claim. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Counts VIII and

IX.

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A. Legal Standard

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See

Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). When considering a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court construes the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and construing all

reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Id. To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need

only provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing she is entitled to relief and

giving defendants fair notice of the claims. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir.

2011). However, the complaint must set forth facts that plausibly demonstrate a claim for

relief. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A plausible claim is one that

alleges factual content from which the court can reasonably infer that defendants are

liable for the misconduct alleged. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Merely

reciting the elements of a cause of action or supporting claims with conclusory statements

is insufficient to state a claim. See id. The complaint must do more than assert a right to

relief that is “speculative.” See Virnich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011).

B. THRA Claims and Sovereign Immunity

Defendant moves to dismiss Counts II, IV, VI, XI, and XIII, each of which is

brought under the IHRA, on the basis of sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment

to the United States Constitution provides, “The Judicial power of the United States shall

not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against

one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign

State.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI. Subject to certain exceptions, the Eleventh Amendment

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has been interpreted to prohibit “suits against a state, whether by its own citizens or

citizens of another state.” Gerlach v. Rokita, 95 F.4th 493, 499 (7th Cir. 2024). For claims

where plaintiff seeks a monetary judgment, “only congressional abrogation or waiver by

the state itself can over a state’s sovereign immunity.” Id. “Congress’ intent to abrogate

the States’ immunity from suit must be obvious from a clear legislative statement.”

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). This immunity extends to the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.

Carmody v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 893 F.3d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 2018).

Under the IIlinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act, “the State of Illinois shall not be

made a defendant or party in any court,” except as provided in certain statutes. 745 ILCS

§ 5/1. The IHRA is not mentioned as an exception to the State Lawsuit Immunity Act.

745 ILCS § 5/1.5; see also Harris v. Illinois, 753 F. Supp.2d 734, 740-41 (N.D. Ill. 2010)

(dismissing IHRA claim against state agency as barred by sovereign immunity); Sanders

v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 2023 WL 3285605, at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 5, 2023) (“Illinois has not

consented to lawsuits brought against it under the IHRA thereby barring Plaintiff's

claims.”) .

In arguing against dismissal, Plaintiff makes a policy argument that institutional

interests should not be prioritized over the rights and welfare of individuals and her

THRA claims should be permitted to proceed. Regardless of the merits of sovereign

immunity as a policy in these circumstances, Congress has not abrogated and the State

has not waived its immunity from suit under the IHRA. Therefore, the Court grants

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts II, IV, VI, XI, and XIII based on sovereign

immunity.

C. Title VII/ADA Claims and Exhaustion of Remedies

Defendant contends Plaintiff's ADA claims in Counts I, III, and V and her Title VII

claims in Counts X and XII should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. Specifically, Defendant alleges Plaintiff’s Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) Charge of Discrimination does not match the allegations in her

complaint. Plaintiff’s charge, which is attached to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,!

indicates that the discrimination began taking place on November 12, 2021, and

concluded on May 2, 2022. (Doc. 6-1). In describing her claim, Plaintiff stated:

I began my employment with Respondent in or around August 2016. My

current position is Building Service Worker. Respondent was aware of my

high-risk pregnancy. I requested an intermittent and maternity leave,

which were denied. Subsequently, I was disciplined. I believe I have been

discriminated against because of my sex, female (pregnancy), in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. I also believe I have

been discriminated against because of my disability, in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.

Id.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges she was on parental leave from August 23, 2021, to

October 3, 2021. Defendant alleges Plaintiff's claims in the complaint are based on: (1)

Defendant's actions prior to Plaintiff going on parental leave; (2) Defendant’s actions

before/during Plaintiffs parental leave; and (3) Plaintiff receiving discipline on

‘In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court can consider the charge, which is central to

Plaintiff's complaint and mentioned within it. See O’Brien v. Village of Lincolnshire, 955 F.3d 616,

621 (7th Cir. 2020).

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November 1, 2021. Defendant contends these claims fall outside the allegations of the

charge as to both the timeline and substantive nature of the discrimination. Given that

the charge only alleges discrimination that occurred after Plaintiff returned from parental

leave, Defendant argues any allegations of discrimination occurring prior to November

12, 2021, and prior to Plaintiff's return from leave are not reasonably related to the charge

on its face.

Upon receiving a right to sue letter, a plaintiff in federal court “may bring only

those claims that were included in her EEOC charge, or that are like or reasonably related

to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.” Chaidez v. Ford Motor

Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

This requirement affords the EEOC and employee an opportunity to settle the matter

while also ensuring that the employer has adequate notice of the challenged conduct. Id.

at 1004.

“Claims are like or reasonably related when (1) there is a reasonable relationship

between the allegations in the charge and the claims in the complaint and (2) the claim in

the complaint can reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the

allegations in the charge.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The charge

and complaint must at least describe the same conduct and involve the same individuals.

Id. at 1004. A plaintiff cannot bring new claims that are inconsistent with the claim in her

charge, even if the same parties and facts are involved. Id. at 1004-05. The determination

of whether the complaint and EEOC charge include claims that are “like or reasonably

related to” one another “requires a careful examination and comparison of the charges

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and the complaint.” Id. at 1005. When, as here, the charge was initiated by a nonlawyer,

courts should construe the claims in the EEOC charge liberally. Id. at 1005 n.3.

Plaintiff cites Thomas v. Chicago Teachers’ Pension Fund, 2022 WL 17543703 (7th Cir.

Dec. 6, 2022), a discrimination case wherein Thomas listed October 26, 2020, as both the

earliest and latest date of discrimination and claimed it was a “continuing action.” Id. at

“1. The only other date mentioned in the charge was Thomas’s beginning date of

employment on March 9, 2015. Id. The defendant in Thomas sought dismissal of Thomas’s

claim in the complaint that he was denied a promotion in February 2020 because that date

was not referenced in the charge. Id. at *3. The Seventh Circuit determined that the

absence of the February 2020 date in the charge was not fatal and the charge did not need

to include “every fact that, individually or in combination, forms the basis” of the suit.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court further noted that the

charge referenced “a failure to promote, and February 2020 falls within 300 days of the

charge.” Id. The charge and complaint “describe the same conduct (failure to promote)

and implicate the same company.” /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held

the allegations were sufficient to establish Thomas exhausted his administrative remedies

under a liberal reading of his charge, because Thomas had provided the “minimum”

allegation about the same conduct and same employer. Id. at *4.

As in Thomas, the dates on which Plaintiff alleges she was discriminated against,

including the disciplinary action on November 1, 2021, appear to have occurred within

300 days of the filing of her EEOC charge on June 3, 2022. While some of the dates of

actions referenced in the complaint are uncertain and others relate to her FMLA-related

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claims which need not be exhausted, Plaintiff alleges in her response that the acts of

discrimination occurred within 300 days of filing her charge. Furthermore, the allegations

in Plaintiff's charge are reasonably related to the allegations in her complaint, particularly

when the charge is interpreted liberally. Both documents address the primary issue of

discrimination arising from Plaintiff's pregnancy and reference the same individuals,

thereby establishing the requisite nexus between the administrative charge and

complaint. At the very least, the claims in the complaint could be expected to grow out

of the EEOC’s investigation of the charge. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to as to Counts I, III, V, X, and XII is denied.

lil. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's IHRA

claims and her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is GRANTED Counts II, IV, VI, VIII, IX, XI,

and XIII are hereby dismissed. Defendant’s Motion is DENIED as to Counts I, IIL, V, X,

and XII. Defendant shall file an answer or other responsive pleading within 14 days of

the entry of this Order.

ENTER: March 31, 2025 eA

(ZOLLEIGAR. LAWLESS

fp N ITED SHA ES DISTRICT JUDGE

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