Saunders Jr v. MaFarlene, Esq

UEANSITTEEDR NS TDAISTTERS IDCITS TORF INCETW C OYUORRTK

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LOUIS HENRY SAUNDERS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

-against- MEMORANDUM & ORDER

23-CV-7097 (LDH) (TAM)

KIMBERLY A. McFARLANE, Esq.,

Defendant.

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LOUIS HENRY SAUNDERS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

-against-

23-CV-7098 (LDH) (TAM)

HELEN PUNDITS BUA, Esq.,

Defendant.

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LOUIS HENRY SAUNDERS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

-against-

23-CV-7099 (LDH) (TAM)

QUEENS FAMILY COURTHOUSE,

JUDGE GILBERT TAYLOR, JUDGE

CAROL STOKINGER, JUDGE DEAN T.

KUSAKABE, JUDGE CONNIE GONZALEZ,

JUDGE ASHLEY B. BLACK, JUDGE EMILY

RUBEN, JAMEELAH JOY HAYES, Support

Magistrate, and SERENA ROSARIO, Support

Magistrate,

Defendants.

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LaSHANN DeARCY HALL, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Louis Henry Saunders, Jr., appearing pro se, filed these three complaints on

September 14, 2023, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaints are consolidated solely for

the purpose of this Order. The Court grants Plaintiff’s applications to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”). As set forth below, the complaints are dismissed.

BACKGROUND

These three actions arise from Plaintiff’s proceedings in Queens County Family Court.

In the first action, Plaintiff brings claims against Kimberly A. McFarlane, a Special Assistant

Corporation Counsel representing the New York City Administration for Children’s Services

(“ACS”), alleging that Defendant McFarlane lied when she told the Family Court at a hearing on

August 15, 2016, that Plaintiff was in violation of an order of protection. (See Compl. at 3–4,

No. 23-cv-7097, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant McFarlane retaliated

against him after he filed a grievance complaint against her by having “a patrol woman L.

McFarland … [issue] him two bogus traffic tickets.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff seeks unspecified

damages and requests that criminal charges be brought against McFarlane and that she be

disbarred. (Id.)

In the second action, Plaintiff sues Helen Pundits Bua,1 his former court-appointed

counsel, alleging that Bua failed to adequately represent him in the Family Court proceedings.

(See Compl. at 3–5, No. 23-cv-7098, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff seeks to have Bua disbarred and

criminal charges brought against Bua. (Id. at 6.)

1 Plaintiff also mentions Jess Rao in his statement of claim but does not name this individual as a Defendant. (See

In the third action, Plaintiff names the Queens Family Court as well as six Queens Family

Court Judges and two Support Magistrates. (See Compl. at 2, No. 23-cv-7099, ECF. No. 1.)

However, Plaintiff only alleges that Judge Emily Ruben was biased when she granted a neglect

petition brought against Plaintiff. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff seeks to expunge the order granting the

neglect petition and remove the child support order. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff also seeks to have

criminal charges brought against all those involved in the Family Court proceedings. (Id.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the alleged

facts allow the court to draw a “reasonable inference” of a defendant’s liability for the alleged

misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While this standard requires more than a “sheer possibility”

of a defendant’s liability, id., “[i]t is not the [c]ourt’s function to weigh the evidence that might

be presented at trial” on a motion to dismiss. Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37 F. Supp.

2d 556, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Instead, “the [c]ourt must merely determine whether the

complaint itself is legally sufficient, and in doing so, it is well settled that the [c]ourt must accept

the factual allegations of the complaint as true.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

Moreover, where, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, their pleadings “must

be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Sykes

v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Boykin v. KeyCorp,

521 F.3d 202, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 55 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam)). This is “particularly so when the pro se plaintiff alleges that [their] civil rights have

been violated.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Still,

“even pro se plaintiffs asserting civil right claims cannot withstand a motion to dismiss unless

their pleadings contain factual allegations sufficient to raise a ‘right to relief above the

speculative level.’” Jackson v. NYS Dep’t of Labor, 709 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).

Nonetheless, a district court may dismiss a pro se action sua sponte, even if the plaintiff

has paid the Court’s filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous or that the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction. See Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d

362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of frivolous pro se complaint where

pro se plaintiff had paid the required filing fee). An action is frivolous when “either (1) ‘the

factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or

fantasy;’ or (2) ‘the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.’” Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d

605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). A finding of frivolousness is appropriate “when the facts

alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are

judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33

(1992).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section provides, in

pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ..

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To maintain a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant

(1) acted under color of state law (2) to deprive the plaintiff of a right arising under the

Constitution or federal law. Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Pitchell v.

Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1984)).

I. Queens Family Court

Plaintiff’s claim against the Queens Family Court fails because it is not a proper

defendant. As an agency of the State of New York, the Family Court is entitled to immunity

under the Eleventh Amendment. Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366–68 (2d Cir. 2009)

(finding that “the New York State Unified Court System is unquestionably an ‘arm of the State,’

and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity”); McKeown v. N.Y. State Comm’n

on Judicial Conduct, 377 Fed. App’x. 121, 122–23 (2d Cir. May 18, 2010) (summary order)

(noting that state courts, as arms of the State, are immunized from suit); see also N.Y. CONST.

art. 6, § 1 (establishing the unified court system). Because the New York State Unified Court

System is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, this complaint against one of its

family courts, the Queens Family Court, is dismissed because it seeks monetary relief from an

entity that is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

II. Judicial Defendants

Plaintiff asserts claims against Judges Gilbert Taylor, Carol Stokinger, Dean T.

Kusakabe, Connie Gonzalez, Ashley B. Black, and Emily Ruben, as well as Support Magistrates

Jameelah Joy Hayes and Serena Rosario (“Judicial Defendants”). (See Compl. at 2, No. 23-cv-

7099.) Judges have absolute immunity from suit for judicial acts performed in their judicial

capacities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial immunity is an

immunity from suit, not just from the ultimate assessment of damages.”) (citation omitted);

Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009) (“It is well settled that judges generally have

absolute immunity from suits for money damages for their judicial actions.”). This absolute

judicial immunity extends to Support Magistrates in Family Court. See Lomtevas v. Cardozo,

No. 05-CV-2779, 2006 WL 229908, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Hart v. Thompson, 23-CV-

3289, 2023 WL 3949041, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding any of the Judicial Defendants other

than Judge Ruben. (See generally Compl., No. 23-cv-7099.) Moreover, although Plaintiff

alleges that Judge Ruben was biased, he provides no facts to support that conclusion. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff’s only allegation against any of the Judicial Defendants appears to be related to an

official action taken by Judge Ruben while presiding over Plaintiff’s state court proceeding. (Id.)

Therefore, the Judicial Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity and the complaint filed

under docket number 23-cv-7099 is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

To the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against the Judicial Defendants in their individual

capacities seeking injunctive relief rather than damages, the complaint must also be dismissed.

In 1996, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317,

110 Stat. 3847 (1996), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that in “any action brought against

a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief

shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated, or declaratory relief was

unavailable.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint does not allege that a declaratory decree

was violated or allege facts suggesting that declaratory relief was unavailable. In any event,

“declaratory relief against a judge for actions taken within his or her judicial capacity is

ordinarily available by appealing the judge’s order.” Caldwell v. Pesce, 83 F. Supp. 3d 472, 484

(E.D.N.Y. 2015), aff'd, 639 F. App'x 38 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Ashmore v. Prus, No. 13–CV–

2796, 2013 WL 3149458, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2013)). Because Plaintiff has not alleged a

violation of a judicial decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable, his claims against the

Judicial Defendants must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Moreover, the Court has no jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s requests to have the

“neglect petition expunged [and] the current child support order removed.” (See Compl. at 7, No.

23-cv-7088.) Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction

over claims that effectively challenge state court judgments. See D.C. Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16

(1923); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). This includes

challenges in a federal district court to “the validity or enforcement of [a] child support order.”

See Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 404 (2d Cir. 2013); Hart v Thompson, No. 23-CV-3289,

2023 WL 3949041, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2023) (collecting cases).

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint filed under docket number 23-cv-7099 is

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

III. Defendant McFarlane

Plaintiff asserts claims against ACS attorney Kimberly A. McFarlane. (See generally

Compl., No. 23-cv-7097.) “A prosecutor acting in the role of an advocate in connection with a

judicial proceeding is entitled to absolute immunity for all acts ‘intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir.

2013) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). This absolute immunity extends

to ACS attorneys because they perform “functions analogous to those of a prosecutor,” by

“initiat[ing] and prosecut[ing] child protective orders and represent[ing] the interests of the

Department and the County in Family Court.” Cornejo, 592 F.3d at 127-28 (quoting Walden v.

Wishengrad, 745 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1984)). Here, Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant

McFarlane lied in the course of his proceeding are related to her advocacy on behalf of ACS and,

thus, Defendant McFarlane is entitled to absolute immunity. (See Compl. at 3-5, No. 23-cv-

7097.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant McFarlane retaliated against him by getting a

patrol woman to issue two “bogus traffic tickets” three months after the proceeding rises to the

level of the irrational or the wholly incredible and is, thus, deemed frivolous. (Id. at 5.) See

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). As such, the complaint filed under docket number

23-cv-7097 is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IV. Defendant Bua

Plaintiff asserts claims against Helen Pundits Bua, his court-appointed attorney in the

state court proceedings. (See generally Compl., No. 23-cv-7098.) A claim for relief pursuant to

Section 1983 must allege facts showing that the challenged conduct was “committed by a person

acting under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of

[Section] 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or

wrongful.” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). It is well established that court-appointed attorneys do not act

under color of state law when they perform traditional functions of counsel. Polk Cty. v.

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law

when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal

proceeding.”); Sash v. Rosahn, 450 F. App’x 42, 43 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Rodriguez v. Weprin,

116 F.3d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A] court-appointed criminal defense attorney does not act

under color of state law when representing a client.”); Pecou v. Hirschfeld, No. 07-CV-5449,

2008 WL 957919, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2008) (citing Polk Cty., 454 U.S. at 325) (“Court-

appointed attorneys do not act under color of state law merely by virtue of their appointment.”).

Because Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bua relate to her function as counsel for Plaintiff,

Defendant Bua did not act under the color of state law. Therefore, the complaint filed under

docket number 23-cv-7098 is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 2

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, these three complaints, filed in forma pauperis, are dismissed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court declines to grant leave to amend as it finds that

amendment would be futile. Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming

district court decision to dismiss pro se complaint without leave to amend where amendment

would be futile).

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken

in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is directed enter judgment in each case, close each case and mail a

copy of this Order to Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

__/s/LDH______________________

LaShann DeArcy Hall

United States District Judge

Dated: March 28, 2025

Brooklyn, New York

2 In addition, Plaintiff cannot file criminal charges against any of the Defendants in these cases as it is well-settled

that “crimes are prosecuted by the government, not by private parties.” Hill v. Didio, 191 F. App’x 13, 15 (2d Cir.

2006) (citing Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Leeke

v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85 (1981) (holding that a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the

prosecution or non-prosecution of another).