SORIANO v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

)

ADRIAN SORIANO

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v. Civil Action No. 2:25-222

)

) Judge Nora Barry Fischer

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

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STATE, U.S. EMBASSY IN BUENOS

)

AIRES, ARGENTINA, MARCO RUBIO,

)

Secretary of State,

)

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is a Complaint for Writ of Mandamus filed by pro se Plaintiff

Adrian Soriano seeking a writ of mandamus directing Defendants, the United States Department

of State, U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, to explain

the legal reasons why a temporary business visitor/temporary tourist visitor (“B1/B2”) visa

application of Argentinian citizen Alejandro Barreca was rejected and to reconsider the

application. (Docket No. 3). Plaintiff initially filed this action on February 18, 2025, without

paying the filing fee or submitting an in forma pauperis application. (Docket No. 1). He later paid

the filing fee, and the Complaint was filed on February 23, 2025. (Docket Nos. 3, 4). After careful

consideration of Plaintiff’s Complaint and for the following reasons, the Court will dismiss this

case for lack subject matter jurisdiction.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he is a U.S. citizen residing in Pittsburgh. (Docket No. 3 at ¶ 5). He

is the owner of an unspecified business and invited Barreca to attend the NTEA Trade show which

he believes is critical to the development of this business. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2, 9). Plaintiff avers that

Barreca applied for a B1/B2 visa at the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina on January 30,

2025. (Id.). He contends that Barreca supplied all necessary documentation and attended a visa

interview on that date, but the U.S. Embassy rejected his application and cancelled an existing B2

tourist visa for Barreca at the same time. (Id. at ¶ 10). Plaintiff claims that the U.S. Embassy did

not provide a reason for its actions. (Id.). He further states that he and Barreca submitted multiple

requests for review and clarification on January 30, 2025, January 31, 2025, February 4, 2025,

February 5, 2025, and February 12, 2025, and Defendants have failed to respond. (Id. at ¶ 11).

Plaintiff filed this Complaint for Mandamus approximately one week later on February 18,

2025. (Docket No. 1). He claims that he is suffering financial and reputational harm because he

is unable to host Barreca for the trade show and Barreca is therefore unable to perform permissible

B-1 activities on behalf of his business including “significant opportunities for business

expansion.” (Docket No. 3 at ¶ 13). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “have a non-discretionary

duty to process and adjudicate visa applications in accordance with applicable law and to provide

a legally sufficient explanation for any rejection.” (Id. at ¶ 15). He further contends that

“Defendants’ failure to provide an adequate explanation for rejecting the visa application and their

failure to respond to requests for review is unlawful and unreasonable.” (Id. at ¶ 16).

In his Prayer for Relief, Plaintiff asks that this Court:

1. Issue a Writ of Mandamus compelling Defendants to provide a

lawful and specific reason for the rejecting of the visa

application of Alejandro Barreca.

2. Order Defendants to reconsider the visa application in light of

the legal and factual circumstances, as Plaintiff’s legitimate

business interests are being harmed.

3. Award Plaintiff any further relief this Court deems appropriate,

including costs and attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to

Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.

(Docket No. 3 at 3).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). “They possess only that power

authorized by Constitution or statute, which is not expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (internal

citations omitted). In every case, the Court has “an independent obligation to determine whether

subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v.

Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). The Court’s

“continuing obligation” to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction is present extends to it inquiring

into “issues of standing and mootness sua sponte.” Seneca Res. Corp. v. Twp. of Highland, Elk

Cnty., Pennsylvania, 863 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2017) (further citations and quotations omitted).

“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss

the action,” and an order dismissing a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without

prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings claims under the Mandamus Act arising from the denial of a B-1/B-2 visa

application of another individual, Barreca, that he invited to attend a trade show and asserts that

the denial of the visa has harmed his business. (Docket No. 3). He seeks an order compelling

Defendants to provide legal reasons for the denial and/or to reconsider the denial because of harm

to the business. (Id.). Having carefully considered the allegations in the Complaint, this matter

will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A. Non-Attorney Lacks Capacity to Represent Barreca or Business in Federal Court

At the outset, as a non-attorney representing himself pro se, Plaintiff is precluded from

representing his business or Barreca and from bringing any claims on behalf of the business or

Barreca under both 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and Third Circuit caselaw. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all

courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by

counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes

therein.”); see also Williams v. United States, 477 F. App’x 9, 11 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted)

(“Parties may proceed in federal court only pro se or through counsel.”). Hence, any claims by

the business or Barreca must be dismissed as Plaintiff lacks the capacity to represent them, and the

Court therefore focuses its analysis on the propriety of the claims brought by Plaintiff on his own

behalf. See id.

B. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Claims

With respect to his own claims, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that

he has standing to bring this case nor shown that the Court has jurisdiction to grant him the

extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus compelling further action on Barreca’s visa application

which he admits was already denied by the Embassy. The Court also believes that leave to amend

must be denied because even if Plaintiff had standing to bring his claim, it would be barred by the

doctrine of consular non-reviewability. On the latter point, the Supreme Court has explained that:

[f]or more than a century, this Court has recognized that the

admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental

sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political

departments largely immune from judicial control.’” [Trump v.

Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 702, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 201 L.Ed.2d 775 (2018)

(quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d

50 (1977))]. Congress may delegate to executive officials the

discretionary authority to admit noncitizens “immune from judicial

inquiry or interference.” Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,

588–591, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952). When it does so, the

action of an executive officer “to admit or to exclude an alien” “is

final and conclusive.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,

338 U.S. 537, 543, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950); see also Dept.

of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 138–139, 140

S.Ct. 1959, 207 L.Ed.2d 427 (2020); [Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408

U.S. 753, 765–766, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972)];

Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659–660, 12 S.Ct.

336, 35 L.Ed. 1146 (1892). The Judicial Branch has no role to play

“unless expressly authorized by law.” [United States ex rel. Knauff

v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317

(1950)]. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not

authorize judicial review of a consular officer’s denial of a visa;

thus, as a rule, the federal courts cannot review those decisions. This

principle is known as the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.

Dep’t of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 908, 144 S. Ct. 1812, 1820, 219 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2024). The

Court’s rationale follows.

As an initial matter,

“the remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in

extraordinary situations.” Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449

U.S. 33, 34 (1980). To qualify for relief, a plaintiff must show: “(1)

a clear and indisputable right to relief, (2) that the government

agency or official is violating a clear duty to act, and (3) that no

adequate alternative remedy exists.” Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v.

Sec. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 2 F.4th 121, 132 (3d Cir.

2021) (quoting Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Judicial Review

§ 8312 (2d ed. Apr. 2021 update)). […] [T]hese requirements are

jurisdictional. Id. “[U]nless all are met, a court must dismiss the case

for lack of jurisdiction.” Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183,

189 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

…

“The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. §

1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff only if he has

exhausted all other avenues of relief and only if the defendant owes

him a clear nondiscretionary duty.” Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602,

616 (1984). To that end, “a plaintiff must allege that an officer of

the Government owes him a legal duty which is a specific, plain

ministerial act devoid of the exercise of judgment or discretion.”

Harmon Cove Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Marsh, 815 F.2d 949, 951 (3d

Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An act is ministerial

only when its performance is positively commanded and so plainly

prescribed as to be free from doubt.” Id.

Shaqran v. Blinken, Civil No. 23-1406, 2024 WL 3237595, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2024).

Similarly, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, the Court may only compel agency action

if the agency has “a discrete, nondelegable duty to act.” Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. and Valerii

Khadikov v. Marco Rubio, et al., 2025 WL 860493, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2025) (citing Norton

v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 63–65 (2004); Massie v. United States Dep't of Housing

and Urban Development, 620 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010)).

“[S]tanding is generally an inquiry about the plaintiff: is this the right person to bring this

claim.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 348 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.

811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997)). As such, Plaintiff bears the burden to establish

Article III standing by showing that he has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable

to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable

judicial decision.” Mielo v. Steak ‘n Shake Ops. Inc., 897 F.3d 467, 478 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). As to injury in fact, “a plaintiff must first show that he or

she suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest. Second, a plaintiff must show that the injury

is both concrete and particularized. Third, a plaintiff must also show that his or her injury is actual

or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Taken together, Plaintiff must show that Defendants owe him a discrete, nondelegable duty to

provide him reasons why Barreca’s visa was denied or to reconsider the denial of the application,

that he has been personally injured by Defendants’ failure to act, and that his injuries can be

redressed by the order he has requested. See Bimbo Bakeries, 2025 WL 860493 at *6.

It is this Court’s opinion that Plaintiff has not established that he has standing to pursue

mandamus relief in this case for several reasons.

First, while the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is pro se and has a duty to liberally construe

the allegations in the Complaint, he has not cited any specific provisions of the INA nor its

implementing regulations which were allegedly violated by Defendants. (See generally Docket

No. 3). As noted above, judicial review of visa applications is narrowly circumscribed, see Munoz,

602 U.S. at 908, and the extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus may only be issued if Plaintiff

shows a clear right to relief and a clear duty of Defendants to act, see Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc., 2

F.4th at 132. Plaintiff has simply not done so here.

Second, a review of pertinent caselaw confirms that an individual who merely sponsors the

visa application of another person lacks standing to challenge the denial or cancellation of a visa.

See e.g., Fife v. Barr, 469 F. Supp. 3d 279, 297–98 (D.N.J. 2020), aff’d sub nom. Fife v. Att’y Gen.

United States, 845 F. App’x 95 (3d Cir. 2021) (affirming District Court decision that sponsors of

F-1 nonimmigrant student visas did not have standing because they were bystanders to applicant’s

visa status and lacked standing to contest the cancellation of the visas). Plaintiff alleges only that

he “invited” Barreca to attend a trade show and therefore has not demonstrated that he has any

statutory or constitutional right in Barreca’s visa application. (See Docket No. 3 at ¶¶ 1, 2, 9).

Third, a business challenging the denial of a B-1 business visitor visa application could

possibly establish that it is within the zone of interests sufficient to meet the initial prong of the

standing test. See e.g., CSL Plasma Inc. v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 33 F. 4th 584,

593 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (finding that plasma companies sufficiently stated a cause of action

challenging the denial of B-1 visas to Mexican applicants denied visas to enter the U.S. to donate

plasma at U.S. facilities). Yet, as the Court has already explained, Plaintiff is not a lawyer and

cannot bring any claims on behalf of his business via this lawsuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654.

Fourth, and most importantly, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate standing in this case because

he admits that the Embassy denied Barreca’s application, and the relevant statutes and regulations

make clear that there is no non-discretionary duty for the consular officer at the Embassy to provide

the visa applicant with extensive legal reasons for the denial nor to re-adjudicate a visa which has

been refused. See Bimbo Bakeries, 2025 WL 860493, at *6-7. To that end, the U.S. District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently recognized that:

[t]he State Department by regulation has a discrete, nondelegable

duty—upon execution of a visa application—to either: (i) issue the

visa, (ii) refuse the visa application under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), 8

U.S.C. § 1201(g), or other applicable law, or (c) discontinue

granting the visa under INA section 243(d).” 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(a).

Section 221(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8

U.S.C. § 1201(g), provides that “[n]o visa or other documentation

shall be issued to an alien if (1) it appears to the consular officer,

from statements in the application, or in the papers submitted

therewith, that such alien is ineligible to receive a visa... [or] (2) the

application fails to comply with the provisions of this Act, or the

regulations issued thereunder[.]” When a consular officer refuses

the issuance of a visa, the consular officer must inform the applicant

of the ground of ineligibility and whether there is a mechanism to

overcome the refusal. 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(b).

Bimbo Bakeries, 2025 WL 860493, at *4. As to the reasons for the denial, the statute provides

that:

a consular officer who denies a visa application “because the officer

determines the alien to be inadmissible” must “provide the alien

with a timely written notice that ... (A) states the determination, and

(B) lists the specific provision or provisions of law under which the

alien is inadmissible.” § 1182(b)(1). The statute requires no

explanation, however, “to any alien inadmissible” on certain

grounds related to crime and national security. § 1182(b)(3).

Munoz, 602 U.S. at 904. With respect to reconsideration, Courts have found that “there is no

mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to ‘reconsider’ [a] refused visa application that is in

‘administrative processing,’ and thus the Court cannot compel the Embassy to do so.” Bimbo

Bakeries, 2025 WL 860493, at *6.

In a similar factual scenario, Chief Judge Mark R. Hornak of this District found that the

same principles rendered a case brought by a visa applicant moot and dismissed the claims for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. See Denisova v. Mayorkas, Civil A. No. 2:23-CV-01902-MRH,

2024 WL 2043664, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 8, 2024). As Chief Judge Hornak explained,

[…] Mr. Denisov’s visa application was refused at his interview at

the Almaty consulate on May 23, 2023, thus mooting the case. And

while that refusal was followed by a request for further information,

that request simply commenced the reconsideration process, as

opposed to continuing the prior application period. As have the other

courts that have considered this question, the Court concludes that

the consular officer’s action in refusing Mr. Denisov’s application

constituted a final agency decision such that the issue has been

rendered moot such that the Court has no jurisdiction over the

action. The Complaint must therefore be dismissed.

Id. It appears to the Court that “standing is a more appropriate inquiry here because the Embassy’s

refusal to issue […] a visa occurred prior to commencement of litigation.” Bimbo Bakeries, 2025

WL 860493, at *5 (citing W. Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 718–19 (2022) (“[S]tanding

concern[s] whether a plaintiff has satisfied the requirement when filing suit[.]... [M]ootness, not

standing, [ ] addresses whether ‘an intervening circumstance [has] deprive[d] the plaintiff of a

personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit’”) (internal quotation omitted).

All told, this Court must similarly conclude that Plaintiff has failed to establish subject

matter jurisdiction over this case because he is not the “right person” to bring this lawsuit and has

otherwise not shown that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling Defendants to undertake

further action on another individual’s visa application by providing legal reasons for the denial or

reconsidering the application. As noted, Plaintiff has not met his burden to show a clear right to

the relief he seeks as he has not cited any statute or regulation requiring Defendants to provide him

with the legal reasons for denying Barreca’s visa application nor to reconsider the denial of that

application. See Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc., 2 F.4th at 132. Further, the Court’s independent

research has revealed that the consular officer at the Embassy owes no further duty to the visa

applicant, Barreca, and Defendants therefore owe Plaintiff no such duty as he is, at most, a sponsor

of the application. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint for Writ of Mandamus must be dismissed

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

C. Leave to Amend

As a final matter, in pro se civil rights actions, a plaintiff is generally granted leave to

amend “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital,

293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, the Court finds that leave to amend would be futile as

Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue this action for the reasons set forth above. See Bimbo Bakeries,

2025 WL 860493, at *6. However, even if Plaintiff had standing, his Complaint would be subject

to dismissal for failure to state a claim under the doctrine of consular non-reviewability because

he has not shown that his own constitutional rights were infringed by the denial of Barreca’s visa

application. See Munoz, 602 U.S. at 904. In any event, as the Court has explained, a consular

officer at the Embassy does not need to provide extensive legal analysis to refuse a visa but may

simply provide a citation to the statutory provision under which the alien is inadmissible and may

even withhold that information if the denial is based on criminal activities or national security

reasons. See Munoz, 602 U.S. at 904. Plaintiff also cannot plead a cognizable claim asserting any

harm arising from delays in the post-refusal administrative processing of Barreca’s visa application

because he filed this action approximately three weeks after the visa was refused. (Docket No. 3).

As Chief Judge Hornak recounted in his decision, courts have noted that much longer delays

extending beyond a year were not unreasonable. See Denisova, 2024 WL 2043664, at *5 (listing

cases with delays of one year, 30-months and 25-months which were not unreasonable). Hence,

leave to amend is denied.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Complaint for Mandamus is dismissed, without

prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See e.g., Korvettes, Inc. v. Brous, 617 F.2d 1021,

1024 (3d Cir. 1980) (“A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is plainly not a determination of the

merits of a claim. Ordinarily, such a dismissal is ‘without prejudice.’”); New Jersey Physicians,

Inc. v. President of U.S., 653 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2011) (“the District Court’s dismissal for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction was by definition without prejudice.”). An appropriate Order

follows.

s/Nora Barry Fischer

Nora Barry Fischer

Senior U.S. District Judge

Dated: March 28, 2025

cc/ecf: Adrian Soriano

5951 Brownsville Rd

Pittsburgh, PA 15236

(via first class mail and by email to: adrian@pushnpull.net )