Komorek v. Conflict International, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

STEPHEN J. KOMOREK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 2:24-cv-1227

v. Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL, INC., et

al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Stephen J. Komorek and his company, API International Consulting Group, Inc.,

bring fourteen causes of action ranging from federal RICO claims to common law defamation and

other tort claims against twelve Defendants. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 30.) This matter is before the

Court on three motions to dismiss filed by ten Defendants in this case: (1) the Second Motion to

Dismiss filed by Defendants Conflict International. Inc. (“Conflict”), Conflict’s CEO Michael

LaCorte, Michael Tapling, Joseph Hill, Andrew McLaren, Bearden Investigative Agency, Inc.

(“BIA”), and BIA’s CEO, Michael Thompson (together, “Conflict Defendants”) (Conflict Mot.,

ECF No. 36); (2) the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants James Wesley Bearden and JW

Bearden & Associates PLLC (“Bearden Firm”) (together, “Bearden Defendants”) (Bearden Mot.,

ECF No. 37); and (3) the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Victoria Pressly (Pressly Mot.,

ECF No. 58). Defendants World Association of Detectives, Inc. and Robert A. Heales filed an

answer to the Amended Complaint and have not moved to dismiss. (ECF No. 32.)

For the reasons stated in this Opinion and Order, the Court GRANTS Conflict Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36), GRANTS Bearden Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.

37), and GRANTS Ms. Pressly’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 58). The Court DENIES as moot

Defendants’ previous Motions to Dismiss relating to the original complaint (ECF Nos. 24, 25, 26)

and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Disqualify Counsel (ECF No. 31). All of Plaintiffs’ claims are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff Mr. Komorek, an Ohio resident, is a licensed private investigator who practices in

Ohio, North Carolina, and New York. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2.) He is the founder and CEO of Plaintiff

API International Consulting Group, Inc., (“API”), an Ohio private investigations firm. (Id. ¶¶ 21,

23.) Plaintiffs invoke this Court’s federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and this

Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, claiming complete diversity between the

Parties and an amount in controversy over $75,000. (Id. ¶ 19.)

Plaintiffs bring fourteen causes of action against Mr. Komorek’s former employer,

Conflict, and Conflict’s “agents, associates, [and] co-conspirators.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Conflict is a New

York-based private investigation firm led by CEO Michael LaCorte, a resident of the United

Kingdom who owns property in New York. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6.) Conflict is a subsidiary of a United

Kingdom entity, Conflict International, Ltd. (Id. ¶¶ 33–34.) Mr. Komorek started working for

Conflict as a full-time employee in 2019 after a “trial loan period” from his previous employer that

started in 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 28–29.)

While employed by Conflict, Mr. Komorek terminated a Conflict subcontractor, Matthew

Parker, on Mach 9, 2020, based on Mr. Parker’s alleged criminal behavior toward a female

employee of Conflict. (Id. ¶ 58.) After his termination, Mr. Parker contacted Mr. LaCorte to report

that Mr. Komorek “fraudulently exaggerated” his miliary and government service and his

relationship with government intelligence agencies and services. (Id. ¶¶ 59–61.) Mr. LaCorte

opened an internal investigation into Mr. Komorek, and Mr. Komorek cooperated and provided

his military records except for his military medical records. (Id. ¶¶ 62–63.) Conflict sent Mr. Parker

a cease-and-desist letter. (Id. ¶¶ 64–68.)

Around the same time, Mr. Komorek raised concerns to Mr. LaCorte that Conflict was

conducting operations in the United States that were not authorized by law and was engaged in

questionable accounting practices. (Id. ¶¶ 34–36.) Furthermore, Mr. Komorek is a disabled combat

veteran of the United States Army, and he alleges that Mr. LaCorte engaged in behaviors

“triggering” to his Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) resulting from his time in the

military. (Id. ¶¶ 38–41.) Mr. Komorek resigned from Conflict on February 25, 2022 after one such

triggering incident. (Id. ¶ 41.) He then started API as “his own investigation and consulting

business.” (Id. ¶ 42.)

Several weeks after Mr. Komorek resigned from Conflict, two Conflict clients contacted

him, unsolicited, to request Mr. Komorek’s investigative services due to dissatisfaction with

Conflict since his departure. (Id. ¶ 45.) Mr. Komorek agreed to perform services for these clients.

(Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, “motivated by a deep-seated desire to retaliate against

Komorek” for causing “financial damage” to Conflict, engaged in a conspiracy and a pattern of

criminal acts against Mr. Komorek, including mail and wire fraud. (Id. ¶¶ 46–54.) Plaintiffs allege

that Defendants made accusations about Mr. Komorek that were similar to those Mr. Parker raised

to Conflict after Mr. Komorek terminated Mr. Parker’s employment. (Id. ¶ 69.) Specifically,

Plaintiffs claim Defendants fraudulently submitted a military records request in violation of the

Privacy Act of 1974, the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 18 U.S.C. § 100 (false

statements), 18 U.S.C. §1341 (mail fraud), and 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (unsworn declarations under

penalty of perjury). (Id. ¶ 48.)

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants filed a false and libelous Ethics Complaint (“WAD

Ethics Complaint”) to the World Association of Detectives (“WAD”), of which Mr. Komorek was

a Member and Board Member. (Id. ¶ 49.) In the WAD Ethics Complaint, Conflict called for Mr.

Komorek to be removed from WAD based on misrepresentations regarding his suitability for

employment, representations to others placing Conflict at risk of liability and harm, unbefitting

conduct, breach of fiduciary duties to Conflict, violations of WAD’s code of ethics, non-

compliance with licensing requirements, and malicious property damage. (Id. ¶¶ 257–62.)

Plaintiffs refute these allegations at length in the Amended Complaint. (See id. ¶¶ 253–463.)

Defendants also contacted an API client, who was formerly a Conflict client, and

“libel[ed]/slander[ed]” Mr. Komorek to the client and to a subcontractor Mr. Komorek hired to

perform work for the client. (Id. ¶¶ 50–51.) As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs allege

that a private investigation company that Mr. Komorek was in negotiations to acquire permanently

broke off discussions. (Id. ¶ 52.)

The Court will recite other alleged facts as they are relevant to each individual claim

assessed below.

II. Procedural History

a. Earlier Lawsuits

On November 4, 2022, Mr. Komorek and API filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for

the Southern District of New York based on similar facts. See Komorek v. Conflict Int'l, Inc., No.

22-cv-09467, 2024 WL 1484249, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024). In that suit, the plaintiffs alleged

a violation of a New York state labor law, five counts of libel against Conflict and Mr. McLaren,

and tortious interference with prospective business advantage against Conflict and Mr. LaCorte.

Id. Plaintiffs originally made claims against Mr. LaCorte but later withdrew those claims. Id. at

*3. The defendants in that suit moved to dismiss all claims. Id. at *4. On March 29, 2024, the New

York federal court dismissed with prejudice the plaintiffs’ tortious interference with prospective

business advantage claim, API’s libel claim, and part of the plaintiffs’ New York labor law claims.

Id. at *13. The court denied the motions to dismiss as to Mr. Komorek’s libel claim, which was

assessed under Ohio law.1 Id. at *7–11, 13. Mr. Bearden and his law firm represent Conflict and

Mr. McLaren in that case.

Separately, on March 14, 2023, Conflict and its U.K. parent company brought various

contract and tort claims against Mr. Komorek and API in the same court. Conflict Int’l, Inc. v.

Komorek, No. 23-CV-02165, 2024 WL 1347577, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024). Mr. Komorek

and API filed a motion to dismiss. Id. The Court dismissed Conflict’s claims for abuse of process,

tortious interference of contract, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.

Id. at *18–19. The Court allowed Conflict’s claims for breach of contract, unfair competition,

breach of fiduciary duty (in part) and unjust enrichment to continue. Id.

b. This Lawsuit

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on March 15, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) They bring a total of four civil

RICO claims, alleged variously against seven of the twelve Defendants: Conflict, Mr. LaCorte,

Mr. Bearden, the Bearden Firm, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Pressly, and Mr. McLaren. (Am Compl.,

¶¶ 173–225.) Plaintiffs allege four predicate acts to support the RICO claims, each discussed in

the Analysis section. (Id. ¶¶ 120–72; see infra, Analysis Section I.a.)

1 The surviving libel claim against Mr. McLaren in Komorek, 2024 WL 1484249, relates in part to

statements also raised in this lawsuit. As this Court concludes below, Plaintiff’s libel claim here is

barred by the statute of limitations.

Plaintiffs also allege ten claims under Ohio law:

• Fraud (Count V) against Conflict and Mr. LaCorte;

• Unfair competition (Count VI) against Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, Mr. Bearden, Mr.

Thompson, Mr. Tapling, Mr. Hill, WAD, Mr. Heales, and Does 1–10;

• Trade libel (Count VII) against Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, Mr. Bearden, Mr. Tapling,

Mr.Hill, WAD, Mr. Heales, and Does 1–10;

• Libel per se (Count VIII) against the same Defendants;

• Slander (Count IX) against Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, and Mr. Bearden;

• Tortious interference with business relations (Count X) against Conflict, Mr. LaCorte,

Mr. Bearden, Ms. Pressly, Mr. McLaren, and Mr. Hill;

• Tortious interference with prospective business relations/economic advantage (Count

XI) against Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, Mr. Bearden, and WAD;

• Intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count XII) against all twelve named

Defendants and Does 1–10;

• Civil conspiracy (Count XIII) against the same Defendants; and

• Unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion (Count XIV) against Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, Mr.

Bearden, the Bearden Firm, BIA, Ms. Pressly, Mr. McLaren, and Mr. Thompson.

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 226–463.)

As alleged, Mr. Tapling, Mr. Hill, and Mr. McLaren were employees of Conflict and acted

on its behalf for the relevant period. (Id. ¶¶ 7–9.) Ms. Pressly’s relationship to the other Parties is

not explained, but Plaintiffs allege that at all relevant times, she acted “for the benefit and/or under

the control of Conflict.” (Id. ¶ 10.) Mr. Bearden and the Bearden Firm represent Conflict, Mr.

LaCorte, and Mr. McLaren in the New York federal litigation. See Komorek, 2024 WL 1484249.

Plaintiff alleges the Bearden Defendants acted on behalf of Conflict and under its control. (Id.

¶¶ 11, 13.) BIA’s relationship to the other Parties is not explained, but Plaintiffs allege that the

Bearden Firm hired BIA to investigate Mr. Komorek’s alleged misrepresentations. (Id. ¶ 179.) Mr.

Thompson is BIA’s CEO. (See id. ¶ 121; Conflict Mot., PageID 824.) Mr. Heales is Executive

Director of WAD. (Am. Compl., ¶ 21.)

Conflict Defendants moved to dismiss all claims against them for failure to state a claim

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Conflict Mot.) Bearden Defendants

(Bearden Mot.) and Ms. Pressly (Pressly Mot.) also moved to dismiss. WAD and Mr. Heales

answered the Amended Complaint and have not moved to dismiss. (ECF No. 32.) Plaintiffs

responded to the Conflict Motion (ECF No. 45), the Bearden Motion (ECF No. 44), and the Pressly

Motion (ECF No. 59). The moving Defendants filed replies. (Conflict Reply, ECF No. 50; Bearden

Reply, ECF No. 51; Pressly Reply, ECF No. 60.)

Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Disqualify Counsel regarding attorney Jack J. Rizzuto for a

conflict of interest, acting as a witness, working as a subordinate for certain defendants, and

misconduct relating to non-compliance with this Court’s Local Rules. (ECF No. 31.) Conflict

Defendants filed a response. (ECF No. 42.) Plaintiffs filed a reply. (ECF No. 43.)

LEGAL STANDARD

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, plaintiffs must satisfy the pleading

requirements set forth in Rule 8(a), which requires a pleading to contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Accordingly, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (clarifying

the plausibility standard from Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, “[a]lthough for purposes

of a motion to dismiss [a court] must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, ‘[the

court is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Id. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotations omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that “the circumstances of fraud or mistake

shall be stated with particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The Sixth Circuit has explained that “[s]o

long as a [party] pleads sufficient detail—in terms of time, place and content, the nature of a

defendant’s fraudulent scheme, and the injury resulting from the fraud—to allow the defendant to

prepare a responsive pleading, the requirements of Rule 9(b) will generally be met.” United States

v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 504 (6th Cir. 2008).

As a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction over state common law claims, the

Court, sitting in Ohio, applies Ohio law. See, e.g., Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Est. of Bosch,

387 U.S. 456, 464–65, (1967); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 68 (1938). “In diversity

cases, the federal courts must apply state law ‘in accordance with the then controlling decision of

the highest state court.’” Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting

United States v. Anderson Cnty., Tennessee, 761 F.2d 1169, 1173 (6th Cir. 1985)).

ANALYSIS

The Amended Complaint in this case, which spans 106 pages and includes 479 paragraphs,

does not come close to complying with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(1)

and (2) direct the complaint be “a short and plain statement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2). Rule 8(d)

requires all pleadings, including a complaint, to be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(d)(1). The directives in Rule 8 are crystal clear and well-known to any law school graduate. For

whatever reason, Plaintiffs’ counsel have ignored a basic rule of pleading, no doubt costing

Plaintiffs a substantial amount of money. Moreover, because of the verbosity of the Amended

Complaint, this Court has been forced to spend needless time addressing all the unnecessary

allegations in it. Both of Plaintiffs’ counsel are ADMONISHED for violating Rule 8. Any future,

similar conduct will result in sanctions from this Court.

The Court begins its analysis with Plaintiffs’ federal RICO claims before turning to the

state law claims.

I. Federal RICO Claims

Plaintiffs bring civil RICO claims against Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, Mr. Bearden, the Bearden

Firm, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Pressly, and Mr. McLaren. (Am Compl., ¶¶ 173–225.)

The RICO criminal statute makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated

with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to

conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a

pattern of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Federal law provides a civil remedy of treble

damages, attorney’s fees, and costs to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason

of a violation of [18 U.S.C. §] 1962.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). “[T]o state a civil RICO claim, a

plaintiff must allege (1) two or more predicate racketeering offenses, (2) the existence of an

enterprise affecting interstate commerce, (3) a connection between the racketeering offenses and

the enterprise, and (4) injury by reason of the above.” Grow Michigan, LLC v. LT Lender, LLC,

50 F.4th 587, 594 (6th Cir. 2022). Each of these elements must be alleged as to each defendant.

See Compound Prop. Mgmt., LLC v. Build Realty, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 3d 839, 858 (S.D. Ohio 2020)

(Cole, J.)

a. Predicate Racketeering Offenses

Plaintiffs allege four predicate racketeering offenses against various Defendants. (Am.

Compl., ¶¶ 120–172.) To qualify as a predicate racketeering offense, the offense must be listed as

“racketeering activity” under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). “To allege a valid RICO claim . . . a plaintiff

must show not only that the predicate act was a ‘but for’ cause of plaintiff’s injuries, but also that

it was a proximate cause.” Heinrich v. Waiting Angels Adoption Servs., Inc., 668 F.3d 393, 405

(6th Cir. 2012) (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).

i. Military Records Request

Conflict retained attorney Mr. Bearden and the Bearden Firm to prepare the WAD Ethics

Complaint about Mr. Komorek. (Id. ¶ 178.) The firm retained BIA and BIA CEO Mr. Thompson

to investigate Mr. Komorek’s alleged misrepresentations of his military service and previous

employment. (Id. ¶ 179.) Mr. Thompson completed a Standard Form 180 (“SF180”) document

requesting Mr. Komorek’s U.S. Army personnel records and medical or service treatment records.

(Id. ¶ 181–88.) He indicated on the form that he had no relationship to Mr. Komorek and that he

was an investigator making the request to validate records for Mr. Komorek’s employment. (Id.)

The SF180 is available to the public online.2 See Standard Form 180, available at

https://www.archives.gov/veterans/military-service-records/standard-form-180.html. The

instructions indicate that certain types of information may only be released to individuals with

certain relationships to the military veteran whose records are requested. See id. It does not place

2 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject

to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial

jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” Under this Rule, the Court “may take judicial notice of public records,

and it is not required to accept as true factual allegations that are contradicted by those records.”

Clark v. Stone, 998 F.3d 287, 298 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor, 860 F.3d

382, 387 (6th Cir. 2017)).

restrictions on who may file a request in general. See id. It also states that “[r]elease of information

is subject to restrictions imposed by the military services consistent with Department of Defense

regulations, the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act of

1974.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that the form was “signed by Thompson” and that “Thompson provided

an illegible signature.” (Id. ¶ 180–83.) Plaintiff alleges Mr. Thompson received Mr. Komorek’s

records “in violation of the Privacy Act of 1974 and Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552

et. Seq); False Statements 18 U.S.C. [§] 1001; for Mail Fraud 18 U.S.C. [§] 1341; for Perjury 18

U.S.C. [§] 1621; for Unsworn Declarations Under Penalty of Perjury 28 U.S.C. [§ 1746.” (Am.

Compl., ¶ 191–92.)

Of the statutory violations claimed by Plaintiffs, only the accusation of mail fraud, in

violation of 18 U.SC. § 1341, is listed as a racketeering offense. See 18 U.S.C. 1961(1). Mail fraud

consists of “(1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme.” United

States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 2005). “A scheme to defraud includes any plan or

course of action by which someone uses false, deceptive, or fraudulent pretenses, representations,

or promises to deprive someone else of money.” Id. at 402. “A plaintiff must also demonstrate

scienter to establish a scheme to defraud, which is satisfied by showing the defendant acted either

with a specific intent to defraud or with recklessness with respect to potentially misleading

information.” Heinrich, 668 F.3d at 404. Mail fraud pled as a predicate RICO act is subject to the

heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under

which a plaintiff must explain why the statements were fraudulent, among other details. Id.

Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to raise an inference that the military records request

was false or otherwise fraudulent and that any Defendant made the military records request with

the required fraudulent scienter. First, the Amended Complaint does not adequately explain the

alleged fraud. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Thompson, at the direction and on behalf of other

Defendants, submitted an SF180 to the federal government. It appears that Plaintiffs allege that

Mr. Thompson made a false representation when he signed Section III of the SF180 form. But the

form he submitted, which is attached to the Amended Complaint, shows that the signature only

relates to the information contained in Section III.3 (See ECF No. 30-18.) There, Mr. Thompson

lists his name, address, and other personal information, and states that he is an “Investigator” with

no relation to Mr. Komorek. (See id.) Plaintiffs do not allege that any of this information is false,

misleading by omission, or fraudulent in any other way.

Regardless, Plaintiffs do not allege that any Defendant made this records request with the

requisite scienter for a mail fraud claim. Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts or otherwise

explained a theory of how Defendants’ alleged act of making a public records request in

compliance with federal procedures constitutes a fraudulent act.

Ultimately, there are no plausible grounds for Plaintiff’s mail fraud claim based on the facts

alleged in the Amended Complaint. And the other violations of law listed under this predicate act

are not actionable as “racketeering activity” under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Accordingly, the first

alleged predicate act is not a predicate act under RICO.

ii. Retaliating Against a Witness and Wire Fraud

Plaintiffs’ second alleged predicate RICO act pertains to Ms. Pressly and Mr. McLaren.

3 The Form SF180 submitted by Mr. Thompson is heavily referenced in the Amended Complaint,

is attached to the Amended Complaint, and is integral to Plaintiffs’ claims. The Court considers

the completed form for the purposes of Defendants’ Motions. See Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ.,

807 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir. 2015) (“In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider the

[c]omplaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the

case and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the

[c]omplaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” (quotation and citation omitted)).

(Am. Compl., ¶¶ 136–57.) Plaintiffs’ allegations under this section are difficult to follow. It

appears Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Pressly made negative statements about Mr. Komorek’s business

practices to Trudy Jacobson, a former client of Conflict who is now a client of API. (See id.) Ms.

Pressly also sent Ms. Jacobson a letter written by Mr. McLaren in which Mr. McLaren claims that

Mr. Komorek failed to pay him a 10% commission relating to work done for Ms. Jacobson. (Id.

¶ 144–45.) Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Pressly was convicted of harassment of Ms. Jacobson in state

court in Leawood, Kansas. (Id. ¶ 154–55.) They also allege “on information and belief,” that Ms.

Pressly is engaged in a “smear campaign” impersonating Ms. Jacobson online. (Id. ¶¶ 156, 203.)

On these facts, Plaintiffs allege the predicate acts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1343, and retaliating against a victim, witness, or informant, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e).

(Id. PageID 162.) Both offenses are listed as racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).

The elements of wire fraud mirror those of mail fraud, with the added requirement that one

must use wires in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. Heinrich, 668 F.3d at 404. As with mail

fraud, allegations of wire fraud are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).

Here, Plaintiffs plainly fail to plead facts about the fraudulent scheme to which Ms. Pressly’s and

Mr. McLaren’s acts allegedly contributed. They also fail to allege how Ms. Pressly and Mr.

McLaren acted with scienter regarding the statements made to Ms. Jacobson. Plaintiffs do not

adequately plead wire fraud for the purposes of a predicate RICO offense.

Similarly, Plaintiffs fail to plead a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e), which prohibits

intentionally taking actions harmful to any person for providing truthful information to a law

enforcement officer relating to a federal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e). Plaintiffs allege that Ms.

Pressly is under investigation for criminal offenses in Ostego County, New York for harassment

of Ms. Jacobson. (Am. Compl., ¶ 155.) But they do not allege that the investigation relates to a

federal offense—they only allege she was engaged in harassment and was being investigated in

state court. Plaintiffs also fail to allege facts that support any connection between Ms. Pressly’s

alleged intimidation with the alleged affairs of a criminal RICO enterprise.

On the facts pled under the second predicate act, Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege a

predicate RICO offense.

iii. Wire Fraud

Third, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. McLaren committed a wire fraud offense by asking Ms.

Pressly to email Ms. Jacobson the letter about Mr. Komorek as described above and by sharing

negative information about Mr. Komorek’s military career and record via LinkedIn. (Am. Compl.,

¶¶ 158–65.) Again, Plaintiffs do not advance a plausible theory of the fraudulent scheme at play

here. And under the heightened pleading standards for wire fraud claims, Plaintiffs fail to allege

facts raising a plausible inference that Mr. McLaren acted with recklessness or intent to deceive

regarding the information he shared about Mr. Komorek.

On the facts pled under the third predicate act, Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege a

predicate RICO offense.

iv. Fraud and Misuse of Visas, Permits, and Other Documents

Last, Plaintiffs allege Mr. LaCorte sent a completed visa questionnaire to an attorney to

obtain legal assistance in applying for a U.S. visa. (Am. Compl., ¶ 166.) Plaintiffs stated that

LaCorte falsely indicated on the questionnaire that he had never been arrested. (Id. ¶¶ 167–69.)

Plaintiffs state that on information and belief, Mr. LaCorte was arrested in Cuba in October 2000

on offenses including entry without a visa, illegal use of equipment, and espionage, among others.

(Id. ¶ 169.) It appears Plaintiffs allege that Mr. LaCorte also, at some point, filed a Petition for

Nonimmigrant Worker Visa Application, USCIS Form I-219. (See id. ¶¶ 166–68.) Plaintiffs claim

that Mr. “Komorek suffered the emotional distress of going to the appropriate government

agencies and reporting the above information.” (Id. ¶ 170.)

On these facts, Plaintiffs allege fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546, an offense listed as racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1961(1). The statute prohibits misrepresentations of material facts on immigration forms

submitted to the U.S. Government. See Carmen v. Health Carousel, LLC, No. 1:20-CV-313, 2023

WL 5104066, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2023) (Cole, J.). As a fraud offense, this claim is subject

to the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b). See id.

Conflict Defendants argue that the questionnaire was sent to Conflict’s outside legal

counsel for legal advice pertaining to a future U.S. visa application for Mr. LaCorte. (Conflict

Mot., PageID 843.) Plaintiffs do not dispute this characterization. (See ECF No. 45, PageID 1026–

27.) Conflict Defendants attached a redacted version of the completed form to their Motion. (ECF

No. 36-4.)4 The form is titled “L-1A Visa Employee Questionnaire” and is branded with a law

firm letterhead at the top. (See id., PageID 888.) The form states it is for the purpose of assisting

the applicant in preparing a visa application and that “this [is] NOT a government form.” (Id.)

Conflict also attached to their Motion a blank USCIS Form I-129. (ECF No. 36-5.)

Plaintiffs only allege that Mr. LaCorte falsely answered the arrest history question on the

questionnaire sent to Conflict’s outside law firm. They do not allege that he provided false or

misleading information on the visa application itself. Nor do they allege that the visa application

even requires the applicant to report criminal or arrest history. Plaintiffs also fail to allege that Mr.

LaCorte acted with fraudulent scienter. Additionally, Plaintiffs do not allege facts sufficient to

4 The Court takes judicial notice of this questionnaire because Plaintiffs reference it in the

Amended Complaint, it is integral to Plaintiffs’ RICO claims against Mr. LaCorte and other

Defendants, and it is attached to Conflict Defendants’ Motion. See Kreipke, 807 F.3d at 774.

raise an inference that the alleged misrepresentation on the visa questionnaire was a “but for” or

proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries or that it was connected to the alleged RICO enterprise.

On the facts pled under the fourth predicate act, Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege a

predicate RICO violation.

v. Pattern of Racketeering Activity

The Court concludes that none of the predicate acts pled in the Amended Complaint

adequately alleges racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Even if any one of the

predicate acts listed above were adequately pled, Plaintiffs need to plead at least two predicate acts

as to each Defendant, and they do not clear that bar. Additionally, Plaintiff only pleads one

predicate act against Defendants BIA, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Hill and Mr. Tapling, so the civil RICO

claim fails against them.

b. Existence of an Enterprise

Plaintiffs allege that Conflict “comprises an enterprise at defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).”

(Am Compl. ¶¶ 75, 105.) Under that statute, the term “‘enterprise’ includes any individual,

partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals

associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).

Because the alleged “enterprise” here is a corporation, a “distinctness” requirement applies:

“to successfully plead a RICO claim, there must be both (1) the ‘person’ against whom the claim

is asserted,” and, separately, “(2) the ‘enterprise’ that forms one of the elements of the RICO

claim.” Compound Prop. Mgmt., 462 F. Supp. 3d at 856 (citing Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd.

v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001)). Interpreting this “distinctness” requirement from Cedric

Kushner, the Sixth Circuit has held that,

1) individual defendants are always distinct from corporate enterprises because they

are legally distinct entities, even when those individuals own the corporations or

act only on their behalf; and 2) corporate defendants are distinct from RICO

enterprises when they are functionally separate, as when they perform different

roles within the enterprise or use their separate legal incorporation to facilitate

racketeering activity.

In re ClassicStar Mare Lease Litig., 727 F.3d 473, 492 (6th Cir. 2013).

Under these principles, Plaintiffs’ civil RICO claim against Conflict is insufficiently pled

because Conflict is also the alleged “enterprise.” See Shields v. UnumProvident Corp., 415 F.

App’x 686, 691 (6th Cir. 2011) “([A] corporation cannot become an enterprise distinct from itself

for RICO purposes.”) But Plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims against the five individual RICO

defendants based on Conflict as the enterprise, are not necessarily improper on the “enterprise”

element.

Additionally, the Court need not assess whether the Bearden Firm, considered a “corporate

defendant” for the purposes of the “enterprise” element, is sufficiently distinct from Conflict as

alleged because Plaintiffs do not state a coherent predicate RICO act against it. Plaintiffs merely

allege that Mr. LaCorte retained the law firm to investigate Mr. Komorek. (See Am. Compl.

¶¶ 178–79.) Plaintiffs do not explain why that act would constitute a predicate RICO violation.

In the alternative, Plaintiffs state that Defendants acted “as a group of individuals

associated in fact” for the purpose of causing harm to Mr. Komorek and his business. (Am. Compl.,

¶ 76.) “[A]n association-in-fact enterprise is a group of persons associated together for the common

purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009)

(quotation and citation omitted). An association-in-fact RICO enterprise “must have at least

three . . . features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and

longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id. at 946. Also,

the association-in-fact “must be separate from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it

engages.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).

The only common purpose that Plaintiffs allege binds together the members of the alleged

association-in-fact enterprise is the desire to cause harm and damage to Mr. Komorek. (See Am.

Compl., ¶ 76.) That alleged common purpose is not separate from the pattern of racketeering

activity alleged: the four predicate acts listed above that all regard bringing harm and damage to

Mr. Komorek. See Wright v. Richardson, 740 F. Supp. 3d 601, 619 (E.D. Mich. 2024) (dismissing

the plaintiff’s RICO claim because the plaintiff “fail[ed] to adequately demonstrate how each

defendant participated in the management or operation of the enterprise,” among other reasons).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to plead an association-in-fact enterprise.

c. RICO Claims Conclusion

The Court concludes that none of the four alleged predicate RICO acts is sufficiently pled

as to any of the seven RICO defendants. Even if any one of the predicate acts was sufficiently pled,

a civil RICO claim requires at least two predicate acts as to each defendant, and Plaintiffs’ RICO

claims fail on that independent ground. Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead an

“enterprise” as to Conflict. For these reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff’s four civil RICO claims (Counts I through IV) against all seven RICO defendants.

II. Common Law Fraud

Plaintiffs allege common law fraud against Conflict and Mr. LaCorte on two grounds. (Am.

Compl., ¶ 227.) First, they claim Conflict and Mr. LaCorte “fraudulently represented that

[Conflict] was a company solely owned and incorporated in the State of New York and that

Komorek would be given a 20% ownership interest in the company.” (Id. ¶ 228.) Mr. Komorek

relied on this representation when agreeing to work for Conflict. (Id. ¶ 229.) He later discovered

that Conflict was wholly owned by Conflict International, Ltd., the U.K. parent company. (Id.

¶ 230.)

Second, Plaintiffs allege fraud based on Mr. LaCorte enlisting Mr. Komorek’s assistance

with the visa application described above. (See supra, Analysis Section I.a.iv.) Mr. Komorek states

that he suffered emotional distress of reporting Mr. LaCorte’s undisclosed arrest history to

government agencies. (Id. ¶ 236.)

Under Ohio law, common law fraud consists of six elements:

[1] a representation or, where there is a duty to disclose, concealment of a fact, [2]

which is material to the transaction at hand, [3] made falsely, with knowledge of its

falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false

that knowledge may be inferred, [4] with the intent of misleading another into

relying upon it, [5] justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment, and

[6] a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.

Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 868 (Ohio 1998) (citations omitted) (cleaned up).

Plaintiffs state that their first fraud allegation is based on a fraud-in-the-inducement theory. (ECF

No. 45, PageID 1031.) “Fraud in the inducement arises when a party is induced to enter an

agreement based on a misrepresentation.” Matter of Est. of McDaniel, 212 N.E.3d 351, 368 (7th

Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 2023). “The fraud or misrepresentation must be made with the intent of

inducing the party’s reliance.” Id. All six fraud elements must be proven under a fraud-in-the-

inducement theory. Id. Generally, a fraud claim cannot be “predicated on a representation

concerning a future event.” Yo-Can, Inc. v. The Yogurt Exch., Inc., 778 N.E.2d 80, 89 (7th Dist.

Ohio Ct. App. 2002). “However, a promise made with a present intention not to perform is a

misrepresentation of an existing fact even if the promised performance is to occur in the future.”

Id.

Additionally, Plaintiffs’ fraud claims are subject to the heightened pleading standards of

Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Republic Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bear Stearns &

Co., 683 F.3d 239, 247 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Rule 9(b) to state common law fraud claims).

Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff claiming fraud: “(1) to specify the allegedly fraudulent statements;

(2) to identify the speaker; (3) to plead when and where the statements were made; and (4) to

explain what made the statements fraudulent.” Id. Additionally, “[a]lthough ‘conditions of a

person’s mind may be alleged generally,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), the plaintiff still must plead facts

about the defendant’s mental state, which, accepted as true, make the state-of-mind allegation

‘plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

a. Fraud Relating to Ownership Interest

Plaintiff’s fraud-in-the-inducement theory is insufficiently pled on several grounds. First,

Plaintiff does not state when, where, or under what circumstances Mr. LaCorte made the promise

of a 20% ownership interest to Mr. Komorek. (See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 226–40.)

Second, Plaintiffs do not adequately explain the circumstances of the fraud as alleged. In a

January 18, 2022 email from Mr. LaCorte to Mr. Komorek that is attached to the Amended

Complaint, Mr. LaCorte stated, “When you joined Conflict back in Sept 2018, . . . we were willing

to offer you 20% equity in the company for no fee. Your remit was to build the business on the

back of our existing industry brand and recognition and be rewarded via profits (25% quarterly

and 20% annually). You agreed.” (ECF No. 30-7.) The email then corroborates Plaintiffs’

statement that Mr. Komorek voluntarily changed his compensation to a salary in 2019. (See id.)

Plaintiffs do not allege any facts regarding whether the 20% ownership interest was part of his new

employment agreement or whether Mr. LaCorte made any representations about the 20% interest

as part of that change in Mr. Komorek’s employment arrangement. (See id. ¶¶ 226–40.) Plaintiffs

do not dispute the description of Mr. Komorek’s employment arrangement as described in Mr.

LaCorte’s email except to say that the 20% ownership offer was “rescinded” by Mr. LaCorte via

the email. (See id. ¶ 231.)

Third, based on these same factual ambiguities, Mr. Komorek fails to adequately plead

justifiable reliance. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Komorek “opted to go to a salaried, at-will position

with bonuses,” but they do not allege any facts regarding why and how Mr. Komorek justifiably

relied on the 20% ownership interest in “opting” for the salaried position.5 (Id. ¶ 231.)

Plaintiffs’ fraud-in-the-inducement theory fails on these grounds.

b. Fraud Relating to Visa Application

Plaintiffs’ theory of fraud relating to the visa application is unclear. Plaintiffs seem to allege

that Mr. Komorek would not have entered an employment relationship with Conflict and would

not have assisted with Mr. LaCorte’s visa application had he known that Mr. LaCorte and his

associates were arrested in Cuba in 2000. (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 234–36.)

Several problems arise under this theory of fraud. First, Plaintiffs do not allege that Mr.

LaCoste had a duty to disclose this alleged arrest at the time Mr. Komorek agreed to work for

Conflict. Second, Plaintiffs fail to allege how this was a material fact to Mr. Komorek’s

employment decision or how he justifiably relied on the concealment of the arrest. Last, Mr.

Komorek does not articulate any theory of how he was injured by this alleged concealment.

Similar problems arise regarding the visa application part of Plaintiffs’ vague theory of

fraud. Plaintiffs do not allege that Mr. LaCoste had a duty to disclose the alleged arrest to Mr.

Komorek at the time Mr. LaCoste submitted to the information form to the outside law firm that

was assisting with Mr. LaCoste’s visa application, or how Mr. Komorek justifiably relied on the

alleged misrepresentation as part of Mr. Komorek’s “decision to participate in assisting Mr.

5 Conflict Defendants also argue that the fraud claim is barred by Ohio’s four-year statute of

limitations. (Conflict Mot., PageID 857); Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.09(C). Although Plaintiffs’

explanation of the relevant timeline is unclear and ambiguous, the Amended Complaint does not

conclusively establish that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs’ claim. For the purposes of

Defendants’ Motions, the Court assumes, without deciding, that the statute of limitations does not

conclusively bar his claim.

LaCorte in obtaining a US Visa.” (Am. Compl., ¶ 235.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not allege a

coherent theory of how Mr. LaCorte made the misrepresentation with the intent to induce Mr.

Komorek’s reliance on it.

In sum, Plaintiffs’ theories of common law fraud are insufficiently pled under the

heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on additional

grounds as described above. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ common

law fraud claim against Conflict and Mr. LaCorte.

III. Unfair Competition

Next, Plaintiffs bring a claim for common law unfair competition against Defendants

Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, Mr. Bearden, Mr. Tapling, Mr. Hill, WAD, Mr. Heales, and Does 1–10.

(Am. Compl., ¶ 242.) The claim spans 115 paragraphs across 30 pages of the Amended Complaint

and includes entire pages of Nevada state law, bylaws of Defendant WAD, and email

correspondence that renders this section of the Amended Complaint difficult to discern. (See Am.

Compl., PageID 634–664; ¶¶ 241–355.) The Court endeavors to discern if Plaintiffs state a

plausible claim.

Plaintiffs allege that in June 2022, Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, and others not named as

Defendants requested that the WAD undertake an ethics investigation of Mr. Komorek and that

WAD expel Mr. Komorek from the organization and from WAD’s Board of Directors. (See id.

¶¶ 253–55.) Conflict and Mr. Komorek allegedly made fraudulent accusations “to induce WAD to

take adverse actions against Komorek that they knew would adversely affect Komorek’s and API’s

ability to fairly compete” in the private investigations and consulting industry. (Id. ¶ 255.) Based

on email correspondence included in the body of the Amended Complaint, WAD voted to remove

Mr. Komorek from the Board of Directors, but he was not removed as a member of the

organization generally. (See id., PageID 663.) Mr. Komorek alleges the WAD Ethics Complaint

and the removal “result[ed] in financial loss and emotional distress to Komorek and API.” (Id.

¶ 352.)

a. Applicable Law

Plaintiffs raise their unfair competition claim under Ohio common law. (See id., ¶¶ 241–

355.) Conflict Defendants argue that Plaintiffs instead bring a defamation-based deceptive trade

practice claim under the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“ODTPA”), Ohio Revised Code §

4165.02, to which this Court has applied a one-year statute of limitations. (Conflict Mot., PageID

860); see Lasmer Indus., Inc. v. AM Gen., LLC, 741 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D. Ohio 2010)

(Graham, J.) (holding one-year statute of limitations applied to defamation-based ODTPA claims).

But Plaintiffs explicitly confine their claim to Ohio common law, under which the cause

of action for unfair competition survived the implementation of the ODTPA. (See Am. Compl., ¶¶

241–355; ECF No. 45, PageID 1034–36); Ohio Rev. Code § 4165.02(C) (“This section does not

affect unfair trade practices that are otherwise actionable at common law or under other sections

of the Revised Code.”). Under Ohio law, a four-year statute of limitations applies for tort actions

not specifically covered by other sections of the Ohio Revised Code, including a common law

claim for unfair competition. See StarForce Nat'l Corp. v. Transcor, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-84, 2010

WL 11639831, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2010) (Barrett, J.) (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.09(D)).

Plaintiffs’ cause of action, as alleged, accrued when certain Defendants made the WAD Ethics

Complaint in June 2022, so the claim is not barred by the four-year statute of limitations.

“Although the common-law tort of unfair competition in Ohio normally consists of

misrepresenting the source of goods offered to the public, ‘[t]he concept of unfair competition may

also extend to unfair commercial practices such as malicious litigation, circulation of false rumors,

or publication of statements, all designed to harm the business of another.’” StarForce Nat’l Corp.,

2010 WL 11639831, at *7 (quoting Water Mgmt., Inc. v. Stayanchi, 472 N.E.2d 715, 717 (Ohio

1984)). Generally, for unfair competition claims raised under Ohio law, “Ohio courts are to apply

essentially the same analysis as that applied in assessing the law of unfair competition under the

federal statutes,” including the Lanham Act. Dawson v. Blockbuster, Inc., No. 86451, 2006 WL

1061769, *3 (8th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2006) (citing Cesare v. Work, 520 N.E.2d 586,

paragraph one of the syllabus (Ohio 1987)) (cleaned up); see Future Lawn, Inc. v. Maumee Bay

Landscape Contractors, L.L.C., 542 F. Supp. 2d 769, 780 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (Carr, J.).

Plaintiffs’ unfair competition claim does not fit into the Lanham’s Act’s “two distinct bases

of liability: false association, § 1125(a)(1)(A), and false advertising, § 1125(a)(1)(B).” Lexmark

Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 122 (2014). But the Ohio Supreme

Court has suggested that a deceptive trade practice claim regarding the “circulation of false

rumors” and other public statements may exist under common law. See Water Mgmt., Inc., 472

N.E.2d at 717. On the generous pleading standards applicable at the motion to dismiss stage, the

Court assumes, without deciding, that such a claim exists under Ohio common law. But even

assuming such a cause of action exists, Plaintiffs face another hurdle: issue preclusion.

b. Issue Preclusion on Qualified Privilege

Defendants argue that, by collateral estoppel, Plaintiffs cannot bring an unfair competition

claim based on the WAD Ethics Complaint because the New York federal court concluded that it

was protected as under Ohio’s qualified privilege defense.

i. Issue Preclusion Law

Generally, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars successive litigation

of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to

a prior judgment. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). “[F]ederal rules allow

issue preclusion at the motion to dismiss stage.” Ingram v. Regano, No. 23-3222, 2023 WL

6634262, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 2023) (citing Smith v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, L.P.A., 658

F. App’x 268, 275 (6th Cir. 2016)).

It remains unresolved in the Sixth Circuit whether federal or state issue preclusion law

governs where, as here, “a federal court exercises federal jurisdiction over the federal claims and

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.” In re Berge, 953 F.3d 907, 916 (6th Cir.

2020). Regardless, the Sixth Circuit has applied federal issue preclusion rules in a case addressing

both federal claims and Ohio state law claims, so this Court applies the same. Georgia-Pac.

Consumer Prods. LP v. Four-U-Packaging, Inc., 701 F.3d 1093, 1098 (6th Cir. 2012).

Four requirements must be met before issue preclusion applies:

(1) the precise issue must have been raised and actually litigated in the prior

proceedings; (2) the determination of the issue must have been necessary to the

outcome of the prior proceedings; (3) the prior proceedings must have resulted in a

final judgment on the merits; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is sought

must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.

Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

Additionally, different rules apply depending on whether the defendant or the plaintiff in

the current case is wielding issue preclusion against the opposing party. See id. at 1098–99. Here,

Defendants are using issue preclusion against Plaintiffs, so defensive issue preclusion rules apply.

In defensive issue preclusion, “[m]utuality between the parties is not required,” so it makes no

difference that there are additional Defendants in this case. Id. at 1099 (citing McAdoo v. Dallas

Corp., 932 F.2d 522, 523 (6th Cir. 1991)).

ii. Ohio Qualified Privilege Law

Under Ohio defamation law, defendants may assert a defense of qualified privilege

regarding certain protected communications. See Jacobs v. Frank, 573 N.E.2d 609, 612 (Ohio

1991). “[W]here claims such as tortious interference and disparagement are based on statements

that are qualifiedly privileged under defamation law, the protection afforded those statements

under Jacobs . . . must also apply in the derivative claims.” A&B-Abell Elevator Co. v.

Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 651 N.E.2d 1283, 1295 (Ohio 1995).

Under Ohio law,

[a] qualified or conditionally privileged communication is one made in good faith

on any subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest, or in

reference to which he has a right or duty, if made to a person having a corresponding

interest or duty of a privileged occasion and in a manner and under circumstances

fairly warranted by the occasion and duty, right or interest.

Sygula v. Regency Hosp. of Cleveland E., 64 N.E.3d 458, 466 (8th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 2016)

(citation omitted). For the privilege to apply, a defamation defendant must show “good faith, an

interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and

publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only.” Id. “The privilege may extend to

fraternal or professional organizations.” Komorek, 2024 WL 1484249, at * 12 (citing Putka v. First

Cath. Slovak Union, 600 N.E.2d 797, 805 (8th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Creps v. Waltz, 450

N.E.2d 716, 718 (6th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 1982)).

“Once a defendant demonstrates the existence of the qualified privilege, a plaintiff can

prevail only upon a showing of actual malice.” Kanjuka v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 783 N.E.2d

920, 932 (8th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 2002).

iii. Issue Preclusion Analysis

In Komorek, 2024 WL 1484249, Mr. Komorek and API brought a tortious interference

claim against Conflict in the New York federal court based on the same WAD Ethics Complaint

that forms the basis of several of their claims this case. See id. at *12–13. Conflict raised the

qualified privilege issue in a motion to dismiss as a defense to Mr. Komorek and API’s tortious

interference claim. Id. The parties litigated both qualified privilege and the sufficiency of the

complaint as to actual malice. Id. at *12–13. The New York federal court determined that,

The WAD is a private organization that polices its members through a series of

reporting mechanisms and quasi-judicial proceedings. As a member of the WAD,

LaCorte had an interest in upholding the WAD’s procedures and code of conduct.

See Putka, 600 N.E.2d at 804–05. Accordingly, when LaCorte and three other

WAD members believed Komorek had behaved in a manner that warranted

reporting him to the WAD, they filed a complaint. The WAD Complaint was

appropriately filed with the WAD, and there is no indication that it was published

to non-members. Thus, the qualified privilege attaches to the WAD Complaint.

Komorek, 2024 WL 1484249, at * 12 (citations omitted).

The New York federal court considered arguments from both sides and held that as a matter

of Ohio law, the WAD Ethics Complaint was a privileged communication. Id. That court also held

that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that the statements in the WAD Ethics Complaint

were made with actual malice, as is required to overcome the qualified privilege at the pleadings

stage. Id. at * 13. On those grounds, the New York federal court dismissed with prejudice Mr.

Komorek and API’s tortious interference claim. Id. at *12–13.

Here, Plaintiffs raise an unfair competition claim against Defendants Conflict, Mr.

LaCorte, Mr. Bearden, Mr. Tapling, Mr. Hill, WAD, Mr. Heales, and Does 1–10. (Am. Compl., ¶

242.) The claim is based entirely around the WAD Ethics Complaint and WAD’s adjudication

process that flowed from it. The precise issue of whether the WAD Ethics Complaint was protected

by the defense of qualified privilege under Ohio law was raised and litigated in the New York

federal case. The New York federal court’s determination that the WAD Ethics Complaint was

privileged and that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege actual malice was necessary to the

outcome—it was the reason the New York court dismissed the tortious interference claim with

prejudice. See Komorek, 2024 WL 1484249, at *13. That outcome was a final adjudication on the

merits as to that claim. And the parties against whom estoppel is sought—Mr. Komorek and API—

had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter in that court.

Accordingly, the issue of whether the WAD Ethics Complaint is protected as a matter of

qualified privilege under Ohio law is precluded. It cannot form the basis of Plaintiffs’ unfair

competition claim here. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ unfair

competition claim under Ohio common law against all Defendants. This holding includes Does 1–

10, WAD and Mr. Heales, even though they do not move to dismiss, because the WAD Ethics

Complaint cannot be the basis for this claim as a matter of law.

IV. Trade Libel, Libel Per Se, and Slander

a. Libel

Plaintiffs bring libel claims against Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, Mr. Bearden, Mr. Tapling, Mr.

Hill, WAD, Mr. Heales, and Does 1–10. (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 357, 362.) They allege common law

trade libel on the basis that “Defendants knowingly published false matters that are derogatory to

the Plaintiff Komorek and API’s business, and which were calculated to prevent or interfere with

relationships between the Plaintiffs and others, to the Plaintiff’s detriment.” (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 356–

60.) Plaintiffs also raise a libel per se claim. (Id. ¶¶ 361–67.) For both claims, Plaintiffs refer

generally to the vast factual allegations recited under their unfair competition claim rather than

identifying any specific libelous statements. (See id. ¶¶ 358, 363.)

“Ohio has not recognized a separate tort of trade libel, but has instead dealt with all

commercial falsehoods within R.C. 4165 the statutes governing Deceptive Trade Practices, and

has folded the claim into commercial disparagement.” Accelerated Moving & Storage v. Herc

Rentals, Inc., No. 21AP-523, 2022 WL 3907764, at *4 (10th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2022)

(citing Ohio Rev. Code § 4165.02(A)(10)), appeal not allowed, 204 N.E.3d 568. As discussed

above, Plaintiffs explicitly declined to raise a claim under the commercial disparagement statute,

and such a claim would be-time barred anyway. On the general pleading standards applicable on

a motion to dismiss, the Court construes Plaintiffs’ claims as for general common law libel.

Under Ohio law, “[a]n action for libel [or] slander . . . shall be commenced within one year

after the cause of action accrued.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11(A). A discovery rule exception

applies to the statute of limitations for libel claims, but Plaintiffs make no argument that the

exception applies to any of the allegedly libelous statements. Weidman v. Hildebrant, __ N.E.3d

__, 2024 WL 3707590, at *4 (Ohio 2024) (“[T]he discovery rule applies to claims of libel based

on reputational injuries when the publication of the libelous statements was secretive, concealed,

or otherwise inherently unknowable to the plaintiff due to the nature of the publication.”)

This lawsuit was filed on March 15, 2024 (see ECF No. 1), so any claims based on allegedly

defamatory statements made before March 15, 2023 are time-barred. In their briefs, responding to

Conflict Defendants’ statute-of-limitations argument regarding libel, Plaintiffs reference only one

statement that occurred within one year of March 15, 2024. (ECF No. 45, PageID 1037.) Plaintiffs

allege,

On or about March 20, 2023, a video conference WAD Appeals Hearing was

conducted by WAD members, attended by Plaintiff Komorek, and Defendants

LaCorte and Bearden. In said hearing, the false and libelous statements in Count

IV were verbally repeated by Bearden to the Board Members of WAD and verbally

affirmed by LaCorte.

(Am. Compl., ¶ 370.)

These alleged facts only refer to verbal statements, not written ones. “The term slander

refers to spoken defamatory words and libel refers to written defamatory words.” Holtrey v.

Wiedeman, 221 N.E.3d 284, 295 (12th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 2023) (quotation and citation omitted).

Accordingly, the Court will consider the above statements only as potential slander, not libel.

Plaintiffs allege no statements within the one-year statute of limitations period that are actionable

as libel. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ claims for libel and

libel per se as to all relevant Defendants.

b. Slander

Plaintiffs allege slander against Defendants Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, and Mr. Bearden. (Am.

Compl., ¶ 369.) As stated above, Plaintiffs allege Mr. Bearden verbally restated the allegations in

the WAD Ethics Complaint at the WAD appeal hearing and that Mr. Komorek verbally affirmed

these statements. (Id. ¶ 370.) Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Bearden made additional

slanderous statements at the WAD appeal hearing, which Mr. Komorek attended. (Id. ¶ 370–71.)

Mr. Bearden stated that Mr. Komorek is “trying to destroy [Conflict],” that he has “shown no

contrition” and has “gone on to assault” Mr. Bearden, Mr. LaCorte, WAD, and its Board. (Id.) Mr.

Bearden also accused Mr. Komorek of writing or causing the publication of articles that harm

Conflict’s clients and stated that Mr. Komorek was “responsible for 5 lawsuits involving Conflict.”

(Id.). Plaintiffs allege these statements were false and were made with actual malice. (Id. ¶ 372.)

“The essential elements of a defamation action, whether slander or libel, are that the

defendant made a false statement, that the false statement was defamatory, that the false

defamatory statement was published, that the plaintiff was injured and that the defendant acted

with the required degree of fault.” Holtrey, 221 N.E.3d at 295 (quotation and citation omitted). A

statement is defamatory if it is “made with some degree of fault, reflecting injuriously on a person’s

reputation, or exposing a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or

affecting a person adversely in his or her trade, business or profession.” A&B-Abell Elevator Co.,

651 N.E.2d at 1289.

i. Statute of Limitations – Single Publication Rule

To the extent Plaintiffs’ slander claim is based on the restatement of the allegations made

in the WAD Ethics Complaint, their slander claim is time-barred. “Ohio courts have consistently

rejected efforts to restart the statute of limitations in a defamation action where allegedly

defamatory information, which has already been published or spoken, is republished or

retransmitted to new consumers.” Friedler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 86 F. App’x 50,

55 (6th Cir. 2003); see T.S. v. Plain Dealer, 954 N.E.2d 213, 216 (8th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 2011)

(declining “to depart from settled law in Ohio that provides that the initial date of publication

triggers the statute of limitations for causes of action based on allegedly defamatory materials.”).

ii. Absolute Privilege

Defendants argue that the Mr. LaCorte’s and Mr. Bearden’s statements to WAD members

at the WAD appeal hearing are protected under Ohio’s absolute “litigation privilege” for

statements made in judicial proceedings and certain quasi-judicial proceedings. (Conflict Mot.,

PageID 865; Bearden Mot., PageID 942.) “The litigation privilege provides absolute immunity to

parties, witnesses, lawyers, and judges from future lawsuits for statements made during and

relevant to judicial proceedings.” Reister v. Gardner, 174 N.E.3d 713, 715 (Ohio 2020). “[U]nder

the doctrine of absolute privilege in a judicial proceeding, a claim alleging that a defamatory

statement was made in a written pleading does not state a cause of action where the allegedly

defamatory statement bears some reasonable relation to the judicial proceeding in which it

appears.” Surace v. Wuliger, 495 N.E.2d 939, 942–43 (Ohio 1986). The Ohio Supreme Court

extended this immunity to the “quasi-judicial” setting of attorney disciplinary proceedings. Hecht

v. Levin, 613 N.E.2d 585, 590 (Ohio 1993).

Defendants attempt to stretch the absolute litigation privilege beyond the boundaries

established by the Ohio Supreme Court. The absolute litigation privilege applies in attorney

disciplinary settings, as a “quasi-judicial” proceeding, only “because such a filing initiates the

purely judicial disciplinary procedure created by this court pursuant to Article IV of the Ohio

Constitution.” Hecht, 613 N.E.2d at 588. The WAD appeal hearing, which related to whether Mr.

Komorek would be removed from WAD’s membership and Board of Directors, is no such

proceeding. Rather, WAD is a professional trade association for private investigators and security

professionals. Although statements made in those proceedings were made after the federal cases

in New York were filed, and although those statements gave rise to claims in this lawsuit, they

were not a part of any judicial proceeding. Accordingly, the absolute privilege applicable to

judicial proceedings does not apply to the statements made in the WAD appeal hearing in question.

iii. Qualified Privilege and Issue Preclusion

Still, the allegedly slanderous statements made at the WAD appeal hearing may be

protected by the qualified privilege for defamation claims as described above. The Court considers

whether qualified privilege applies to the restatement of the WAD Ethics Complaint allegations

and to the new statements made at the hearing.

First, the Court must determine the extent to which the statements made at the WAD appeal

hearing are protected under the qualified privilege defense by collateral estoppel. As decided

above, Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from litigating whether the WAD Ethics Complaint is

privileged. It is. And they are collaterally estopped from litigating whether actual malice was

sufficiently pled to overcome that privilege. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs’ slander

allegations are based on the restatement of the allegations in the WAD Ethics Complaint at the

WAD appeal hearing, Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from litigating whether those statements

are protected under the qualified privilege defense. Plaintiffs make no argument as to why issue

preclusion would not also apply in this later context. (See ECF No. 45.) In addition to the statute

of limitations bar, qualified privilege is thus a second independent ground for why restatement of

the WAD Ethics Complaint allegations at the WAD appeal hearing are not actionable here.

But the New York federal court did not assess qualified privilege as to the new statements

made by Mr. Bearden at the WAD appeal hearing. (See Am. Compl., ¶ 371.) Indeed, Mr. Komorek

and API filed the New York federal case in November 2022, several months before the WAD

appeal hearing. Regardless, its analysis of qualified privilege as to the WAD Ethics Complaint is

persuasive as to the new statements at the WAD appeal hearing.

As alleged, based on the WAD Ethics Complaint, “on August 23, 2022, [Mr. Komorek

was] found ‘guilty’ of only 2 of the 6 false allegations, [and Mr. Komorek] was expelled from the

Board of Directors and removed from the membership directory and listserv until such time as

Plaintiff could produce proof of an Ohio Private Investigators license.” (Am. Compl., ¶ 426.) The

WAD “Lower Court” found him guilty of some, but not all offenses, and the “Grievance

Committee of the Whole” voted to reprimand Mr. Komorek. (See Am. Compl., PageID 663.) The

appeal hearing that followed “was conducted by WAD members.” (Am. Compl., ¶ 370.) There is

no indication that the hearing was published to or attended by anyone outside of the WAD

membership. For these reasons, and the reasons stated by the New York federal court in Komorek,

2024 WL 1483249 regarding the WAD Ethics Complaint, the new statements made during the

WAD appeal hearing are protected by qualified privilege.

Accordingly, as described above, Plaintiffs must overcome the qualified privilege by

pleading actual malice. Because “pleading standards in federal court are a matter of procedure, not

substance,” under Erie, this Court applies the federal pleading standard for actual malice. Green

v. Mason, 504 F. Supp. 3d 813, 831 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (Cole, J.) (citing Ohio Bureau of Workers’

Comp. v. MDL Active Duration Fund, Ltd., 476 F. Supp. 2d 809, 816 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“While

state law governs the burden of proving fraud at trial in a diversity action, the procedure for

pleading fraud is governed by the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b))). “Under federal pleading

requirements, a complaint asserting a defamation claim as to which the actual malice standard

applies must set forth facts establishing that the statements were made with malice to avoid

dismissal.” Green, 504 F. Supp. 3d at 831 (quotation and citation omitted) (cleaned up).

Plaintiffs state that Mr. Bearden acted “with actual malice” in making the statements at the

WAD appeal hearing. (Am. Compl., ¶ 364.) But beyond this conclusory assertion, which is

insufficient under the federal pleading standard, Plaintiffs allege no facts to support their

contention that Mr. Bearden acted with at least reckless disregard for the false nature of those

statements. After a heavy review of the Amended Complaint, the Court determines that actual

malice is not sufficiently plead as to these specific statements. Plaintiffs do not draw the Court’s

attention to any facts to the contrary in their response briefs. (See ECF Nos. 44, 45, 59.)

Additionally, Mr. Bearden’s statements that Mr. Komorek was “trying to destroy” Conflict

and had “shown no contrition” are not disprovable and are not actionable as defamation. See

Olthaus v. Niesen, 232 N.E.3d 932, 940 (1st Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 2023) (noting that “federal

defamation law bars claims for statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual

facts about an individual” and that the Ohio Constitution protects opinion speech). The statement

that Mr. Komorek had “gone on to assault” Mr. Bearden, Mr. LaCorte, WAD, and its Board is

devoid of any context from which this court could infer that the statement is disprovable or

otherwise defamatory. Regardless, Plaintiffs do not plead facts sufficient to raise an inference that

Mr. Bearden acted with at least reckless disregard about that statement or the statement that Mr.

Komorek was responsible for five lawsuits regarding Conflict.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege actual malice to overcome the qualified

privilege that protects the statements made at the WAD appeal hearing. For all the reasons stated

above, Plaintiffs’ claim for slander is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all Defendants.

V. Tortious Interference with Business Relations

Plaintiffs allege tortious interference with existing business relations against Conflict, Mr.

LaCorte, Mr. McLaren, Mr. Bearden, Ms. Pressly, and Mr. Hill. (Am. Compl., ¶ 388.) They also

allege tortious interference with prospective business relations and economic advantage against

Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, Mr. Bearden, and WAD. (Id. ¶ 412.)

Regarding interference with existing business relations, Plaintiffs allege that Conflict, Mr.

LaCorte, and Mr. Bearden engaged in malicious and frivolous administrative complaints and civil

litigation against Plaintiffs in retaliation for Mr. Komorek resigning from Conflict. (Id. ¶ 389.)

They allege Mr. Bearden “contacted a law firm client of Plaintiff and made extremely derogatory

and false claims against the Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 393.) Additionally, Mr. McLaren made false and

derogatory statements about Mr. Komorek to a sub-contracted investigator working on a case for

Mr. Komorek’s client. (Id. ¶ 395.) And Ms. Pressly “engaged in criminal harassment of an existing

client.” (Id. ¶ 397.)

Furthermore, on March 4, 2024, “agents of a Federal Law Enforcement Agency” informed

Mr. Komorek that in October 2022, a federal law enforcement agent in Texas called Conflict to

speak to Mr. Komorek about a case. (Id. ¶ 400.) During that October 2022 call, Mr. Hill informed

the agent that Mr. Komorek had been fired, was untrustworthy, and unreliable. (Id.) Accordingly,

the agent in Texas stopped attempting to reach Mr. Komorek and stopped working with him. (Id.).

Plaintiffs allege Mr. Hill, Conflict, and Mr. LaCorte deliberately withheld giving the agent Mr.

Komorek’s contact information. (Id. ¶ 401.)

Under their claim for tortious interference for prospective business relations, Plaintiffs

allege that the administrative complaints and judicial proceedings against Plaintiffs harmed Mr.

Komorek’s relationship with editors of an academic book who withdrew an invitation for him to

contribute to the book. (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 416–19.) Plaintiffs also allege that the WAD Ethics

Complaint and the WAD adjudication process harmed his relationships with a prospective

acquisition and with other business partners in the field. (Id. ¶¶ 420–29.)

a. Tortious Interference Law

“The tort of interference with a business relationship occurs when a person, without

privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposefully causes a third person not to enter into or

continue a business relationship with another.” Gentile v. Turkoly, 86 N.E.3d 991, 997 (7th Dist

Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (quotation and citations omitted). “The elements of tortious interference with

a business relationship are: (1) the existence of a prospective business relationship; (2) the

wrongdoer’s knowledge thereof; (3) an intentional interference causing a breach or termination of

the relationship; and (4) damages resulting therefrom.” Id. (citing First–Knox Nat’l. Bank v. MSD

Properties, Ltd., 47 N.E.3d 490, 494 (5th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 2015)). The intentional interference

must also be improper. Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 860 (Ohio

1999). To determine whether the intentional interference was improper, Ohio courts consider:

(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the interests of the

other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be

advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of

the actor and the contractual interests of the other, (f) the proximity or remoteness

of the actor's conduct to the interference, and (g) the relations between the parties.

Id.

Generally, a tortious interference claim is subject to the four-year statute of limitations for

tort claims not otherwise assigned a statute of limitations under Ohio law. See Ohio Rev. Code

§ 2305.09(D). Conflict Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claims are

substantially the same as the libel claims described above and that the one-year statute of

limitations for libel claims should apply here. (Conflict Mot., PageID 869.) But Plaintiffs’ tortious

interference claims exceed and, at least in part, are distinct the libel facts alleged earlier in the

Amended Complaint, so the Court applies the four-year statute of limitations. (See Am. Compl.,

¶¶ 377–438.) The claim is not barred under that time limit.

b. Issue and Claim Preclusion

Plaintiffs’ claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations and economic

advantage partially relates to the allegations in the WAD Ethics Complaint. (See Am. Compl.,

¶¶ 420–30.) As this Court determined above, Plaintiffs are barred from relitigating the issue of

whether the WAD Ethics Complaint was privileged. It is protected under the qualified privilege

defense, and thus the tortious interference with prospective business advantage claim on that

ground fails as a matter of law. A&B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr.

Trades Council, 651 N.E.2d at 1295 (Ohio 1995) (“[W]here claims such as tortious interference

and disparagement are based on statements that are qualifiedly privileged under defamation law,

the protection afforded those statements under Jacobs . . . must also apply in the derivative

claims.”) The WAD Ethics Complaint is the only ground for liability asserted against WAD under

this claim, so the claim fails as to WAD as a matter of law.

Additionally, Defendants argue that both of Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claims are

barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata. (Conflict Mot., PageID 870; Pressly

Mot., PageID 1129.) “Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, ‘a final judgment on the merits bars

further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.’” Bragg v. Flint Bd. of

Educ., 570 F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153

(1979)). The proponent of a res judicata defense must prove each of the following elements:

1. A final decision on the merits in the first action by a court of competent

jurisdiction; 2. The second action involves the same parties, or their privies, as the

first; 3. The second action raises an issue actually litigated or which should have

been litigated in the first action; 4. An identity of the causes of action.

Autumn Wind Lending, LLC v. Est. of Siegel by & through Cecelia Fin. Mgmt., LLC, 92 F.4th 630,

634–35 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Sanders Confectionery Prods., Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d

474, 480 (6th Cir. 1992)).

In the New York federal case, which was filed in November 2022, the court dismissed with

prejudice Mr. Komorek and API’s tortious interference with prospective business advantage claim

against Conflict. Komorek, 2024 WL 1483249, at *13. That claim was based on the allegations

against Mr. Komorek raised in the WAD Ethics Complaint, which the New York federal court

concluded is a privileged document. As this Court concluded above, Plaintiffs are precluded from

relitigating that specific issue in this case.

The first claim preclusion element is met here because the New York federal court was of

competition jurisdiction and rendered a final judgment dismissing the tortious interference claim

with prejudice. See Dyer v. Intera Corp., 870 F.2d 1063, 1066 (6th Cir. 1989) (“In the federal

courts, a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is considered a decision on the merits with full res

judicata effect.”)

The second element requires the same parties or their privies. “Privity in this sense means

a successor in interest to the party, one who controlled the earlier action, or one whose interests

were adequately represented.” Sanders Confectionary, 973 F.2d at 481. This element is met as to

Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, and Mr. McLaren, who were all defendants in both actions. Additionally,

the interests of Mr. Bearden and Mr. Hill were all adequately represented in that action, because

their allegedly tortious statements were made as part of their employment with Conflict. Conflict

had an interest to protect itself in the litigation, including regarding claims made against its own

employees acting on behalf of Conflict. This element is not met as to Ms. Pressly because she is

not alleged to be a Conflict employee.

The third element requires that the relevant issues were litigated or should have been

litigated in the first action. This element is met as to the allegations against Mr. McLaren and Ms.

Pressly. The facts asserted in this section regarding those Defendants all relate to statements or

actions taken before Plaintiffs filed the November 2022 federal case in New York. And Plaintiffs

have not offered a persuasive reason why those claims should not have been brought in that case.

(See ECF Nos. 44, 45, 59.) But as to the allegation that Conflict, Mr. Hill, and Mr. LaCorte

interfered with Mr. Komorek’s business relations through their October 2022 interactions with the

federal law enforcement official in Texas, Plaintiffs allege that they learned about this alleged

interference in March of 2024, more than a year after the New York federal case had been filed.

(Am Compl., ¶¶ 399–402.) Additionally, the allegations that Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, and Mr.

Bearden interfered with Plaintiffs’ business by filing frivolous lawsuits involves, at least in part,

the lawsuit filed by Conflict against Mr. Komorek and API in New York federal court in March

2023. See Conflict Int’l,, 2024 WL 1347577. Thus, Defendants have not conclusively shown that

these latter two issues should have been raised in the New York federal case.

The fourth element requires an identity of the causes of action, meaning “an identity of the

facts creating the right of action and of the evidence necessary to sustain each action.” Westwood

Chem. Co. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1981). Apart from the facts regarding the Texas

law enforcement official and the March 2023 lawsuit, the underlying accusations and evidence in

this case is the same. The fourth element is met.

Accordingly, under the doctrine of res judicata, Plaintiffs are precluded from bringing

claims for tortious interference regarding all the facts alleged above, except for the facts relating

to the Texas law enforcement officer, Conflict’s March 2023 lawsuit against Mr. Komorek and

API, and the facts alleged as to Ms. Pressly.

c. Sufficiency of Remaining Tortious Interference Claims

The Court addresses those three factual bases for the tortious interference claims in turn.

First, Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim regarding the Texas law enforcement official only

relates to work that Mr. Komorek performed for that official and his agency starting in 2020, during

Mr. Komorek’s employment with Conflict. (See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 399–401.) The “business

relationship” in question, as alleged, was between the agency official and Conflict, not Mr.

Komorek and API (which did not yet exist). “An essential element of the tort is interference by

someone who is not a party or agent of the party to the contract or relationship at issue.” Dorricott

v. Fairhill Ctr. for Aging, 2 F. Supp. 2d 982, 989–90 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (Gwin, J.) (citing Erebia

v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 891 F.2d 1212, 1216 (6th Cir. 1989)). Additionally, Plaintiffs

have failed to allege facts to raise an inference that (1) Mr. Komorek had an existing or prospective

business relationship with that official and his agency, (2) the relevant Defendants knew that such

a relationship existed, and (3) any damages arose from this specific incident. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claims are not sufficiently pled as to those allegations.

Second, the allegation regarding Ms. Pressly’s criminal harassment is vague, and Plaintiffs

fail to allege any facts about her “harassment” or how they relate to Plaintiffs’ existing or

prospective business relationships. (See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 387–438.) The claims are insufficiently

stated on that allegation.

Third, the claims based on alleged malicious and frivolous litigation fail as a matter of

absolute privilege and on the insufficiency of the allegations. Again, “under the doctrine of

absolute privilege in a judicial proceeding, a claim alleging that a defamatory statement was made

in a written pleading does not state a cause of action where the allegedly defamatory statement

bears some reasonable relation to the judicial proceeding in which it appears.” Surace, 495 N.E.2d

at 943. And “[w]here a claim such as tortious interference with contract is based on statements that

are qualifiedly privileged under defamation law, the protection afforded those statements also

apply to the derivative claim.” Mawaldi v. St. Elizabeth Health Ctr., 381 F. Supp. 2d 675, 690

(N.D. Ohio 2005) (Gwin, J.) (citing El–Shiekh v. Nw. Ohio Cardiology Consultants, Nos. L-99-

1380, CI-97-4238, 2000 WL 1298761 (6th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2000)). Absolute privilege

thus applies to the tortious interference claims insofar as they are based on allegedly defamatory

statements made in the New York federal cases and regarding the existence of those actions.

Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to identify any specific defamatory statements that were made as part

of the litigation and how they would be connected to Plaintiffs’ business interests.

To recap, Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claims fail. First, to the extent they rely on the

allegations in the WAD Ethics Complaint, the claims fail as a matter of issue precision on the issue

of qualified privilege. Second, regarding most of the allegations in the tortious interference section

of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred under claim preclusion. Third, regarding

the few allegations that make it past that barrier, the alleged facts fail to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Accordingly, the claims for tortious interference with existing and

prospective business relations are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

VI. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)

Plaintiffs allege IIED under Ohio common law against Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, Mr. Bearden,

the Bearden Firm, BIA, Ms. Pressly, Mr. McLaren, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Tapling, Mr. Hill, WAD,

and Does 1-10. (Am. Compl., ¶ 440.) Plainiffs allege that these Defendants knew that Mr.

Komorek “is a 100% permanent and total disabled combat veteran.” (Id. ¶ 441.) “Several

Defendants” also personally witnessed Mr. LaCorte’s “outbursts” toward Mr. Komorek and “were

aware of the extreme negative and emotional impact this had on” Mr. Komorek. (Id. ¶ 442.) They

also allege a claim for IIED regarding the “deliberate and malicious campaign of harassment,

intimidation and smear of reputation” undertaken by Defendants as described throughout the

Amended Complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 444–45.) Mr. Komorek claims he suffered $10 million in emotional

distress damages as a result of these and other allegedly malicious actions. (Id. ¶ 447.)

Under Ohio law, “[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly

causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and

if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.” Yeager v. Loc. Union 20,

Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers of Am., 453 N.E.2d 666, 671 (1983), abrogated

on other grounds, Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051 (Ohio 2007). Regarding the “extreme and

outrageous conduct” requirement,

It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious

or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that

his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which

would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been

found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme

in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is

one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community

would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,

‘Outrageous!’

The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats,

annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.

Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (Am. L. Inst. 1965)).

To the extent Plaintiffs’ IIED claim is based on Defendants’ alleged defamation of

Plaintiffs, the claim is time-barred. “Ordinarily, claims for intentional infliction of emotional

distress are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.” Cleavenger v. B.O., 184 N.E.3d 968, 975–

76 (9th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 2022). But “[w]hen the essential character of a claim for [IIED]

consists of conduct that is, in substance, another tort, the statute of limitations for the other tort

governs.” Id. at 976 (citing Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 629 N.E.2d 402, 407 (Ohio

1994), superseded by statute on other grounds, Pratte v. Stewart, 929 N.E.2d 415 (Ohio 2010)).

Thus, “when a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based upon conduct

actionable as a claim for defamation, the one-year statute of limitations applies.” Id. Because

Plaintiffs do not allege IIED arising out of any conduct that occurred within one year before March

15, 2024, the claim is time-barred insofar as it relies on allegations of defamation.

Regarding the remaining allegations, Plaintiffs do not plead facts to raise a plausible

inference that Defendants’ conduct was “extreme and outrageous” under Ohio law. Setting aside

the accusations based in defamation, Plaintiffs only refer to Mr. LaCorte’s alleged “outbursts”

toward Mr. Komorek and the fact other Defendants witnessed those outbursts. (Am. Compl., ¶

442.) As alleged, these facts are insufficient to raise a plausible inference that Mr. LaCorte’s or

any other Defendants’ actions were “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Yeagar, 453 N.E.2d at 671.

Furthermore, although Plaintiffs allege the conclusory assertion that these outbursts caused

Mr. Komorek severe emotional distress, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts to support that assertion. The

only factual references in the Amended Complaint to Mr. Komorek’s severe emotional distress

relate to Mr. Komorek “going to the appropriate government agencies and reporting” his belief

that Mr. LaCorte had failed to disclose his 2000 arrest in Cuba on an internal visa questionnaire.

(See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 170, 236.) That allegation is insufficient to raise an inference of severe

emotional harm.

On these grounds, Plaintiffs’ IIED claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

VII. Invasion of Privacy

Plaintiffs allege invasion of privacy against Conflict, Mr. LaCorte, Mr. Bearden, the

Bearden Firm, BIA, Ms. Pressly, Mr. McLaren, and Mr. Thompson. (Am. Compl., ¶ 457.) “In

Ohio, an actionable invasion of privacy is (1) the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of

one’s personality; (2) the publicizing of one’s private affairs with which the public has no

legitimate concern; or (3) the wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities in such a manner as

to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

Moran v. Lewis, 114 N.E.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (citing Housh v. Peth, 133

N.E.2d 340 (Ohio 1956), paragraph two of the syllabus). Plaintiffs raise two theories of liability:

unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private affairs. (See id. ¶¶ 460–62.)

Plaintiffs’ intrusion upon seclusion claim is based on Defendants’ requests to obtain Mr.

Komorek’s military records. (Am. Compl., ¶ 460.) Under Ohio law, “a defendant may be liable

for intrusion upon another’s seclusion if the defendant intentionally intrudes upon the ‘solitude or

seclusion’ or the private affairs or concerns of another, and if such an intrusion would be highly

offensive to a reasonable person.” Moran, 114 N.E.3d at 1257. As discussed above, Defendants’

military records request was not in violation of any laws. Rather, it was a public records request

made on an official U.S. Government form through an official process established for the

disclosure of documents in compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and FOIA. This formal, legal,

and public records disclosure process is not highly offensive to a reasonable person. Additionally,

U.S. Government records subject to public disclosure under federal law are not “private affairs.”

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ intrusion upon seclusion claim fails.

Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants made “false and malicious statements as to

Komorek’s military service.” (Am. Compl., ¶ 461.) The Court construes this allegation as a claim

for public disclosure of private facts. To establish such a claim under Ohio law, a plaintiff must

prove:

(1) that there has been a public disclosure; (2) that the disclosure was of facts

concerning the private life of an individual; (3) that the matter disclosed would be

highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities;

(4) that the disclosure was intentional; and (5) that the matter publicized is not of

legitimate concern to the public.

Templeton v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 72 N.E.3d 699, 701 (9th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 2017).

Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the statements were communicated “to the public at

large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become

one of public knowledge.” Seta v. Reading Rock, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 1061, 1068 (12th Dist. Ohio Ct.

App. 1995). To the extent Plaintiffs allege that Defendants truthfully disclosed the contents of Mr.

Komorek’s military records that were obtained through a public records request, that disclosure is

a matter of legitimate concern to the public—such disclosures are authorized under federal law.

Additionally, such true information cannot be a new public disclosure because those facts are

already a matter of public record. See Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 499 N.E.2d 1291, 1295

(10th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (“There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further

publicity to information about the plaintiff that is already public.”) Third, to the extent Plaintiffs

allege that the Defendants’ statements about Mr. Komorek’s military history were false, those

statements are not “facts” about Mr. Komorek’s private life. Rather, such false accusations would

potentially be actionable as defamation, which is discussed earlier in this Opinion and Order.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim for invasion of privacy is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

VIII. Civil Conspiracy

Last, Plaintiffs allege common law civil conspiracy against all Defendants. “‘In Ohio, a

civil conspiracy consists of the following: (1) a malicious combination; (2) two or more persons;

(3) injury to person or property; and (4) existence of an unlawful act independent from the actual

conspiracy.’” Lee v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 692 F.3d 442, 446 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Universal Coach, Inc. v. New York City Transit Auth., Inc., 629 N.E.2d 28, 33 (8th Dist. Ohio Ct.

App. 1993)). Plaintiffs’ claim fails because, as set out at length in this Opinion and Order, the

Amended Complaint fails to allege an unlawful act sufficient to survive Defendants’ Motions to

Dismiss, let alone one that exists apart from the alleged conspiracy.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this Opinion and Order, the Court GRANTS Conflict Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36), GRANTS Bearden Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.

37), and GRANTS Ms. Pressly’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 58.) The Court DENIES as moot

Defendants’ previous Motions to Dismiss relating to the original complaint (ECF Nos. 24, 25, 26)

and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Disqualify Counsel (ECF No. 31). All of Plaintiffs’ claims are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This holding includes the claims against Does 1–10, WAD,

and Mr. Heales because the claims against them fail as a matter of law or are insufficiently pled.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment and to terminate this case on the Court’s

docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

3/29/2025 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE