Sturgill v. Muterspaw

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JAARON M. STURGILL, II, :

:

Plaintiff, : Case No. 1:19-cv-00594

:

v. : Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins

:

RODNEY MUTERSPAW, et al.,

:

:

Defendants.

:

OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“Report” or

“R&R”) (Doc. 71) issued by Chief Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman on August 22,

2024. The Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment

(the “Motions”) be granted in part and denied in part.1 Id. at PageID 1052. Defendants Tara

Dumouchelle and Rodney Muterspaw (collectively, “Defendants”) have filed objections to

the portions of the Motions that the Magistrate Judge denied. Docs. 76, 77.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court OVERRULES Defendants’ objections and

ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 71) in its entirety.

1 Magistrate Judge Bowman recommended that: 1) Dumouchelle’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 59)

be DENIED; 2) the Middletown Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 60) be GRANTED in

part: a) GRANTED as to all claims brought against Defendants Smith, Brewer, Lambert, Lakes, Downing,

Mann and Marksbury; b) GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action against Defendant Gibson; c)

GRANTED as to all claims against Defendant Muterspaw in his individual capacity; d) GRANTED as to all

claims against Defendants Vance and Gibson in their individual capacities; e) DENIED as to Plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Dumouchelle in her individual capacity, as well as for

Plaintiff’s claim against Muterspaw in his official capacity. Doc. 71, PageID 1092.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jaaron M. Sturgill, II, (“Plaintiff” or “Sturgill”), was born in Hamilton, Ohio

in 1996. Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 10. By any measure, his childhood and early adult life was difficult.

But the portion of his story that is relevant to the instant case begins when Plaintiff was 20

years old, “by which time he had been addicted to heroin for about three years.” Doc. 71,

PageID 1052. On Tuesday, July 25, 2017, and while under the intoxicating effects of

methamphetamine and heroin, Sturgill was arrested in Middletown, Ohio and taken to the

Middletown City Jail (the “Middletown Jail” or “Jail”). Id. at PageID 1055. What occurred

over the next three days while Plaintiff was at the Jail is heavily disputed between the parties.

And the Court sees no need to recite again the timeline of events that the Magistrate Judge so

commendably and meticulously recounted in the R&R.

But this remains true: within 63 hours of Plaintiff’s arrival at the Jail, he was found

unresponsive while in a medical observation cell and was later transported to a nearby

hospital. Id. at PageID 1052. He survived this ordeal but was eventually diagnosed with a

number of serious conditions, including sepsis and endocarditis, followed by an extended

period of hospitalization and rehabilitation. Id. He requires ongoing treatment and care. Id.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Review applies only to “any portion to which

a proper objection was made.” Richards v. Colvin, No. 2:12-cv-748, 2013 WL 5487045, at *1

(S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2013). If presented with a proper objection, “[t]he district judge may

accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the

matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). General or

unspecific objections are treated the same as a failure to object. Slater v. Potter, 28 F. App’x

512, 513 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The filing of vague, general, or conclusory objections does not meet

the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a complete failure to object.”); see

Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).

Having carefully reviewed the comprehensive findings and conclusions of the

Magistrate Judge and considered de novo all filings in this case, with particular attention to the

issues as to which Defendants lodged objections, the Court determines that the Report and

Recommendation should be adopted in its entirety.

A. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim Against Defendant Tara Dumouchelle in her

Individual Capacity (Count Four)

i. Background

Plaintiff sued Defendant Tara Dumouchelle (“Dumouchelle”) and others alleging

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment

rights while he was incarcerated at the Middletown Jail from July 25, 2017 to July 28, 2017.

Doc. 71, PageID 1065–66. Despite evidence to the contrary, Plaintiff claims that “[a]t no

time” did Dumouchelle provide any nursing services to him throughout the period of his

detention at Middletown Jail. Doc. 1, ¶ 59. Plaintiff maintains that a sick call note dated July

26, 2017 was “fabricated” after Plaintiff had been transferred from the jail to the hospital “to

make it falsely appear that [Plaintiff’s] request for medical assistance had been responded to

but that he refused any help.” Id. ¶ 63. He asserts that Dumouchelle ignored his symptoms

and doctored the records “to memorialize a meeting with [Plaintiff] that never occurred.” Id.

¶¶ 64, 65. Thus, Plaintiff argues that Dumouchelle acted in “wanton disregard of [his] clearly

established right” either “to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs

or to conceal the other [D]efendants’ unconstitutional conduct.” Id. ¶ 66.

Dumouchelle rejects these allegations. Dumouchelle insists that she “rendered

appropriate and timely medical care with a screening examination upon Plaintiff’s Jail

admission [on July 25, 2017] and a ‘sick call’ examination” on the morning of Thursday, July

27, 2017. Doc. 71, PageID 1075. Dumouchelle maintains that she “wrote a fairly detailed

note reflecting her assessment [of Plaintiff] at the time” and that she “acted appropriately,

within standards of care and was not in any way deliberately indifferent to a serious medical

need under any standard.” Doc. 76, PageID 1134–35. In fact, so confident is Dumouchelle

in her belief that she provided adequate care that she has moved for summary judgment on

this claim. See Doc. 59. She avers that “there is no actual, competent evidence that

Dumouchelle denied medical care to Sturgill.” Id. at PageID 879. To the contrary, as she

posits, “the record establishes that Dumouchelle assessed Sturgill appropriately and

appropriately responded based on her assessment and her knowledge, training, and

experience.” Id. at PageID 879.

The Magistrate Judge disagreed. The Magistrate Judge found that the evidence and

discrepancies in the record were “sufficient to create a triable issue on whether Dumouchelle

examined Sturgill on Thursday [July 27] morning and/or created an accurate record of that

exam.” Doc. 71, PageID 1076. In coming to this conclusion, the R&R relied on a “more

lenient” standard for deliberate indifference articulated in Brawner v. Scott Cnty., Tennessee. 14

F.4th 585 (6th Cir. 2021); see Lawler v. Hardeman Cnty., 93 F.4th 919, 928 (6th Cir. 2024)

(explaining that Brawner adopted a “more lenient test” than prior caselaw when analyzing

pretrial detainees’ deliberate indifference claims under the Fourteenth Amendment). Pursuant

to Brawner, a detainee need only show that (1) he “had a sufficiently serious medical need[,]

and (2) that [the] defendant ‘acted deliberately (not accidentally), [and] also recklessly in the

face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be

known.’” Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Kentucky, 60 F.4th 305, 317 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Brawner, 14 F.4th at 596) (cleaned up). In other words, “a pretrial detainee must have a serious

medical need, and the defendant must act, whether through intentional action or omission,

recklessly in response to the need and the risk it presented to the detainee.” Grote v. Kenton

Cnty., Kentucky, 85 F.4th 397, 405 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 317).

Viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the Magistrate

Judge relied on Brawner to deny Dumouchelle’s Motion for Summary Judgment. First, the

Magistrate Judge meticulously recounted the timeline of Plaintiff’s deteriorating condition to

determine that “a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff had [an objectively] serious

medical need by Wednesday [July 26] afternoon that required some level of medical

attention.” See Doc. 71, PageID 1066–71. Next, the Magistrate Judge found that “if

[Dumouchelle] ignored [a] request to examine Plaintiff on Thursday [July 27] morning, or if

she falsely recorded that he was asymptomatic and refused medical attention, then her

conduct would satisfy the subjective element of Plaintiff’s claim” for deliberate indifference.

Id. at PageID 1076–77. Finally, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Dumouchelle was “not

entitled to qualified immunity” because a “reasonable jury could conclude that, as a medical

professional, [Dumouchelle] knew that Plaintiff required medical attention by no later than

Thursday [July 27] morning, but deliberately disregarded that serious need either by failing

to examine [Plaintiff] at all, and/or by fabricating a record that falsely stated that he had no

symptoms.” Id. at PageID 1080.

Dumouchelle timely objected to these findings. Doc. 76. Dumouchelle maintains that

she is “entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s constitutional claims against her because

no reasonable jury could find that she acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need.” Id. at PageID 1131. Dumouchelle asserts that “the magistrate judge erred by

misapplying the appropriate standard to the facts of this case in concluding that (1) a

reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff satisfied both the objective and subjective elements

of Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference against Dumouchelle[,] and (2) Dumouchelle is

not entitled to qualified immunity.” Id.

ii. Deliberate Indifference

Defendant Dumouchelle submits that the R&R’s characterization of the dual-pronged

standard in Brawner “is fundamentally flawed.” Id. at PageID 1137. Dumouchelle claims that

“[t]he evolving, unclear urgency” of Plaintiff’s condition throughout his detention and his

“continued observation” hours after his examination on July 27 proves that “no reasonable

juror could conclude that Sturgill had an objective, serious medical need on the morning of

July 27.” Id. at PageID 1143 (emphasis added). Therefore, because “Plaintiff’s condition was

not ‘obvious’ . . . until Thursday, July 27 at 1:00 p.m.— hours after Dumouchelle’s visit,” on

“this basis alone” is Dumouchelle “entitled to summary judgment.” Id. at PageID 1143–44.

Further, Dumouchelle alleges that even if she subjectively “‘missed’ signs of a serious

medical condition, that could be evidence of negligence,” which is otherwise insufficient to

establish a claim for deliberate indifference. Id. at PageID 1144–45. She asserts that her “note

and testimony” following her examination of Plaintiff on July 27 does “not establish

deliberate indifference or reckless conduct in the fact [sic] of an unjustifiably high risk of harm.”

Id. at PageID 1145. She also posits that Plaintiff’s allegation that she “completely fabricated

her note” on July 27 is “pure speculation . . . insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”

Id. at PageID 1147 (cleaned up). Under these facts, Dumouchelle asserts that “no reasonable

juror could conclude that [she] acted with deliberate indifference.” Id. at PageID 1138.

This Court is unconvinced by Dumouchelle’s objections. This Court begins by framing

its analysis in relation to the current procedural posture of this case: summary judgment.

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A dispute is “genuine” when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A court

must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

This Court holds that the Magistrate Judge properly denied summary judgment as to

Dumouchelle’s claims. The Magistrate Judge painstakingly recounted several points of

genuine factual dispute that militate against Dumouchelle’s argument that summary

judgment—and not submitting these matters to a jury—is appropriate. See generally Doc. 71,

PageID 1056–62. First, as it relates to the objective element articulated in Brawner,

Dumouchelle submits that the “evolving, unclear urgency” of Plaintiff’s medical need could

not have been, as a matter of law, “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Doc. 76, PageID 1143.

In support of this proposition, Dumouchelle maintains that “the most [she] knew that

morning [July 27] was that Officer Gibson stated [Plaintiff] was complaining of not eating or

drinking . . . .” Id. Thus, because the extent of Dumouchelle’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s

condition was simply what the officers told her, “no reasonable juror could conclude that

Sturgill had an objective, serious medical need.” Id.

That argument is unavailing. In essence, Dumouchelle seeks to make the “serious-

medical-need prong [under Brawner] coextensive with [her] own understanding of the

situation and reaction to it.” Grote, 85 F.4th at 407. This exact argument was rejected by the

Sixth Circuit in Grote. See id. (“The district court appears to have conflated the more subjective

element of a deliberate-indifference claim with its objective element in reaching the opposite

conclusion—that [the plaintiff] did not have a serious medical need until he visibly suffered .

. . in his cell.”). Brawner “lowered the standard for deliberate-indifference claims by pretrial

detainees like” Sturgill. Whyde v. Sigsworth, No. 22-3581, 2024 WL 4719649, at *2 (6th Cir.

Nov. 8, 2024) (citing Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., 60 F.4th 305, 315–16 (6th Cir. 2023)). Today,

officers2 can face liability “even if they did not actually know of a risk of harm to a pretrial

detainee.” Lawler, 93 F.4th at 927. Pretrial detainees “need only prove that the officers

recklessly disregarded a risk so obvious that they either knew or should have known of it.” Id.

(emphasis added). Therefore, Dumouchelle’s exclusive focus on the extent of her knowledge

on the morning of July 27 misses the point. At this stage of the inquiry, what she personally

was made aware of does not matter to the underlying question of whether Plaintiff had an

objectively serious medical need.

This Court further holds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff had an

objectively serious medical need even before July 27. An objectively serious medical need is

one “that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious

that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Martin v.

2 Private companies (and their employees) that perform traditional state functions, such as providing medical

care to inmates, are state actors “for the purposes of § 1983.” Winkler v. Madison County, 893 F.3d 877, 890 (6th

Cir. 2018) (citing Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 521 (6th Cir. 2008)). Common law tort principles govern

causation in the § 1983 context. Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 608 (6th Cir. 2007)

(citing McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 438 (6th Cir. 2005)). Thus, Dumouchelle is an officer within

the meaning of § 1983, and her actions are assessable under that statute.

Warren Cnty., Kentucky, 799 F. App’x 329, 338 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff has

presented sufficient evidence that he had a medical need so serious that even a layperson

could easily have “recognize[d] the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Id. On July 26, one

day before the alleged examination with Dumouchelle, Plaintiff had a court hearing and met

with his lawyer, Kathleen Batliner. At that time, Plaintiff told Ms. Batliner that he had “severe

pain in his legs, wrists, and shoulders.” Kathleen Batliner Dep., Doc. 54, 12:3–4. Batliner

herself observed that Sturgill could “hardly stand up,” had to be assisted in and out of his

chair by the court liaison officer, had to “hold onto the counter” in front of the judge during

the hearing, had spots on his hands, and “could barely move.” Id. at 12:8–9; 13:3–5; 15:10–

15. Based on Plaintiff’s complaints and her belief that Plaintiff had an “obvious” need for

medical attention, Batliner requested the judge presiding over the state court case to release

Plaintiff on an OR bond so that he could immediately go to the emergency room for

treatment. Id. at 15:16–20. That request was ultimately denied for unknown reasons. Id.

Nonetheless, Batliner had informed the judge that Plaintiff was in severe pain, and the judge

confirmed with Plaintiff that he had previously “requested medical assistance while in [J]ail

with the [J]ail nurse.” Id. at 17:13–16.

In addition to this evidence, Plaintiff’s cellmate, Aaron Smith, testified in a deposition

that he witnessed Plaintiff’s condition deteriorate throughout the course of their detention

together and that he had called out to authorities for medical attention on at least four (4)

occasions. After Plaintiff’s return from his court appearance on July 26 and while they were

sharing a cell together, Smith recalled that Plaintiff “wasn’t looking good,” that “his speech

wasn’t all the way there,” that when he was “trying to talk . . . no words were coming out,”

and that “he wasn’t moving real quick.” Aaron Smith Dep., Doc. 49, 21:6–11; 99:17–21. At

one point, Smith even had to help Plaintiff stand up to urinate. Id. at 81:24–25. These visible

indications of Plaintiff’s physical distress led Smith to make “at least . . . four” (4) verbal

requests to corrections officers for Plaintiff to be seen by a nurse. Id. at 81:8. Thus, Plaintiff

has submitted at least two different streams of evidence by laypersons that tend to establish

that he had an objectively serious medical need by July 26.

Dumouchelle posits that by the time she allegedly examined Plaintiff the following

morning on July 27, Plaintiff was “[n]euro[logically] intact,” “walking without difficulty,”

was “seen eating [his] tray,” and had recorded that Plaintiff did “not want to talk to [a] nurse”

even after being asked “multiple times.” Doc. 56, PageID 830. Within hours after this alleged

examination occurred, however, two corrections officers entered the jail cell and attempted

to assist Plaintiff to his feet, at which point “he just immediately fell to the ground.” Aaron

Smith Dep., Doc. 49, 23:9. The two officers then decided to move Plaintiff to an observation

cell due to his worsening symptoms. Doc. 60, PageID 950. And, as the Magistrate Judge

noted, the “decision to transfer Plaintiff to an ‘observation cell’ is itself evidence that Plaintiff

had an objectively serious medical need by around 1 p.m. Thursday [July 27].” Doc. 71,

PageID 1071 (citing Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 318) (placing a pretrial detainee in an

observation cell based on his medical condition “tends to show a sufficiently serious medical

need.”); see also Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., Michigan, 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004)

(same).

It well could be the case, as Dumouchelle argues, that the “most [she] knew that

morning [of July 27] was that Officer Gibson stated [Plaintiff] was complaining of not eating

or drinking.” Doc. 76, PageID 1143. But to thereafter assert that, because Dumouchelle did

not personally perceive urgent symptoms, this definitively demonstrates that “no reasonable

juror could conclude that [Plaintiff] had an objective, serious medical need on the morning of

July 27” is an erroneous conflation of the objective element with the subjective element of

deliberate indifference. Id. Indeed, there were signs of Plaintiff’s outward distress noticed by

two separate laypersons (Plaintiff’s lawyer and his cellmate) on July 26—one full day before

the alleged examination occurred. Plaintiff demonstrated that there were clear indications of

either a drug overdose or severe withdrawal. See, e.g., Hinneburg v. Miron, 676 F. App’x 483,

484, 486 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that “the extreme nature of [the inmate’s] intoxication” met

the objective component where other inmates testified that that the inmate was “visibly high,”

“nodding out and talking to herself,” and repeatedly dropped her head); Border v. Trumbull

Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 414 F. App’x 831, 837–38 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that a detainee’s

medical need was sufficiently serious and obvious where he appeared “severely intoxicated,”

“huddled and slumped over,” had red and glazed eyes, “had difficulty walking and staying

awake,” and “slurr[ed] his speech”); Bertl v. City of Westland, No. 07-2547, 2009 WL 247907,

*5–6 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2009) (finding that an inmate who later died of severe alcohol

withdrawal had “visibly serious medical condition” that “satisfied the objective component”

where he was “lying face down on the floor of his cell, almost comatose, unresponsive and

having seizure-like spasms”). And even the deputies themselves recognized the need for

medical observation by moving Plaintiff into an observation cell just a few hours after the

(alleged) July 27 examination. Doc. 60, PageID 950. These are tell-tale signs that “constitute

the hallmarks of an objectively serious medical need.” Grote v. Kenton Cnty., Kentucky, 85 F.4th

397, 407 (6th Cir. 2023). Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff had a serious

medical need by July 26 that required some level of medical attention.

Second, as it relates to Brawner’s subjective component, Dumouchelle argues that her

actions “do not establish deliberate indifference or reckless conduct in the fact of an

unjustifiably high risk of harm.” Doc. 76, PageID 1145. Dumouchelle posits that her “detailed”

examination note and her deposition testimony regarding her examination methodology

“establish anything but a cursory examination” of Plaintiff on July 27. Id. at PageID 1144.

And Dumouchelle maintains—without citing to any caselaw—that even if she “failed to

appreciate or ‘missed’ signs of a serious medical condition, that could be evidence of

negligence,” not deliberate indifference. Id. at PageID 1144–45.

This element poses a closer call. But precisely because it is a close call does it justify the

Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Dumouchelle is not entitled to summary judgment. The

Magistrate Judge determined there were multiple discrepancies in the record sufficient to

create triable issues of material fact on whether Dumouchelle “recklessly disregarded a risk so

obvious that [she] either knew or should have known of it.” See Doc. 71, PageID 1076–77;

Lawler, 93 F.4th at 927. Plaintiff provided deposition testimony of his cellmate, Aaron Smith,

attesting that “Dumouchelle did not examine Plaintiff at any time that he shared a cell with

Sturgill, including Thursday morning [July 27].” Doc. 71, PageID 1076. Plaintiff pointed out

that Officer Gibson “had no recollection of asking a nurse to see Plaintiff or of accompanying

Dumouchelle to Plaintiff’s cell.” Id. at PageID 1059. While Dumouchelle herself claimed that

she went to Plaintiff’s cell on July 27, 2017, the note reflecting the alleged visit was dated to

July 26, 2017—despite Dumouchelle’s testimony that Plaintiff allegedly informed her of “the

correct date” when she allegedly examined him. Id.; Tara Dumouchelle Dep., Doc. 45, 41:24.

Notably, that same examination note does not contain Plaintiff’s signature, even where there

is a line specifically designated for an “inmate[’]s signature.” Doc. 56, PageID 830. Further,

“Dumouchelle’s recorded observations that she observed Plaintiff eating from his meal tray

while sitting on a bunk [were] inconsistent with his mattress being on the floor, as well as

evidence that breakfast trays would have been retrieved hours before her exam.” Doc. 71,

PageID 1076 (citations omitted). While these discrepancies may not conclusively establish

that Dumouchelle was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical need per se, neither

do these discrepancies vindicate Dumouchelle’s position that she performed a thorough

medical examination—if indeed she conducted one at all. Doc. 76, PageID 1144. For where,

as here, the medical need is obvious, “medical care which is so cursory as to amount to no

treatment at all may amount to deliberate indifference.” Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psychiatric

Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

Dumouchelle seeks to justify her subjective belief that Plaintiff was not suffering from

an objectively serious medical need by claiming that Plaintiff’s symptoms are typical “in

circumstances in which we are 36–48 hours in for an inmate who shot up heroin and had bad

meth.” Doc. 71, PageID 1145. Therefore, as Dumouchelle argues, if she missed Plaintiff’s

symptoms “under these circumstances,” this “would at most be mere negligence, which is

insufficient to satisfy the subjective element of Plaintiff’s claim.” Id. But, as was the case in

Grote, Dumouchelle’s “‘withdrawal’ defense fails.” Grote, 85 F.4th at 409. Here, the need for

medical attention based on Plaintiff’s severe symptoms “was obvious even to non-medical

professionals,” and Dumouchelle’s failure to properly “appreciate that risk does not mean

that she did not act recklessly.” Id.

Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could conclude that either Dumouchelle

ignored Gibson’s request to examine Plaintiff on Thursday morning, or that Dumouchelle

falsely recorded Plaintiff’s symptoms and that he refused medical attention. Viewing the facts

in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, under both theories, Dumouchelle’s conduct or

inaction could satisfy the subjective element of Plaintiff’s allegations. Therefore, the

Magistrate Judge properly denied summary judgement as to this claim of deliberate

indifference against Dumouchelle.

iii. Qualified Immunity

Dumouchelle’s next objection relates to the Magistrate Judge’s denial of her claim that

she is entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. 76, PageID 1131. Dumouchelle maintains that

Plaintiff failed to overcome her claim of qualified immunity because he failed to show “(1)

that Dumouchelle violated [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights and (2) the right was clearly

established.” Id. at PageID 1147. But that argument implies that medical providers who

contract with state institutions can even invoke the defense of qualified immunity when they

are defendants in § 1983 claims.

Not so here. Medical providers who contract to provide medical services to prison

inmates indeed act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

54 (1988); see also Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (“As an initial matter, it

is undisputed that [d]efendant nurses are subject to suit under § 1983 because they acted

‘under color of state law.’”). But being subject to suit under § 1983 “does not mean that a party

has the right to assert qualified immunity.” Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 521 (6th Cir. 2008)

(emphasis added).

The Supreme Court has carved out areas of immunity from suit where the “tradition

of immunity was so firmly rooted in the common law and was supported by such strong policy

reasons that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the

doctrine.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164 (1992) (cleaned up). As it relates to medical

providers who contract to perform medical services at jails and prisons, “the absence of any

indicia that a paid physician [or nurse] . . . would have been immune from suit at common

law, convince us that there was no common-law tradition of immunity for a private doctor

[or nurse] working for a public institution at the time that Congress passed § 1983.” McCullum

v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, because “there does not appear to be any

history of immunity for a private doctor [or nurse] working for the government, . . . the

policies that animate our qualified-immunity cases do not justify our creating an immunity

unknown to the common law.” Id. “Nor do the policy rationales undergirding qualified

immunity counsel in favor of extending immunity to [d]efendant nurses.” Harrison v. Ash, 539

F.3d 510, 522 (6th Cir. 2008). Therefore, as the Sixth Circuit has established, “[n]urses

employed by a private medical provider . . . are not entitled to assert qualified immunity.”

Howell v. NaphCare, Inc., 67 F.4th 302, 317 n.4 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Harrison, 539 F.3d at

524) (“[W]e find that the purposes of qualified immunity do not support the extension of the

doctrine to nurses employed by a private medical provider.”).3

Here, it is uncontested that Dumouchelle is a private citizen employed by Kaiser

Medical Corporation. Doc. 78, PageID 1169. She provided nursing services to the

Middletown Jail on a part-time, 12–15 hours per week basis. Id. As in Howell, Dumouchelle

who is “employed by a private medical provider,” Howell, 67 F.4th at 317 n.4, is “not entitled

3 The Sixth Circuit is not alone in denying qualified immunity to private medical providers who contract with

jails and prisons. See Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570, 580 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that policy justifications

for qualified immunity do not support the availability of the defense to private psychiatrist that contracted with

a county-run hospital); Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 685–86 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that private non-profit

organization that contracted with municipality to provide involuntary detoxification services could not assert

qualified immunity); Rosewood Services, Inc. v. Sunflower Diversified Services, 413 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 2005)

(finding that policy considerations did not justify extending qualified immunity protection to a non-profit firm

that was under contract with the government to provide services to developmentally disabled individuals);

Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a privately employed jail physician was

ineligible for a qualified immunity defense).

to assert qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Harrison, 539 F.3d at 524). Thus, the Magistrate

Judge properly denied summary judgment on Dumouchelle’s qualified immunity argument.

B. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim Against Defendant Rodney Muterspaw in his

Official Capacity as Chief of the Middletown Division of Police (Count Five)

i. Background

Plaintiff alleges that Rodney Muterspaw (“Muterspaw”)—more accurately, the City

of Middletown (“Middletown”)4—failed “to provide adequate training to the corrections

officers working in the [J]ail to ensure that [J]ail detainees received adequate treatment for

medical conditions from which the detainees were suffering.” Doc. 1, ¶ 69. Plaintiff points to

Middletown Jail Policy § 9.8.2 (the “Policy”) and other testimony of record in support of his

failure-to-train claim.5 The referenced Policy states that inmates are permitted “to report

personal illness at any time of the day and emergency medical conditions whenever they

occur,” and that “[t]he staff will ensure they receive adequate treatment for these medical

conditions.” Doc. 51, PageID 609. Plaintiff posits that even though staff were expected to

4 “It is well-settled that a claim against an officer or employee of a governmental entity, in his or her official

capacity, is a claim against the governmental entity itself.” Brunson v. City of Dayton, 163 F. Supp. 2d 919, 927

(S.D. Ohio 2001) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985)). Muterspaw is no longer the Chief of the

Middletown Division of Police; nonetheless, these allegations remain against the City of Middletown itself.

Doc. 77, PageID 1154.

5 The Policy reads, in relevant part:

Emergency medical treatment for all inmates of the Middletown City Jail shall be provided 24 hours a day

through the Atrium Medical Center Emergency Room. A medical emergency includes, but is not limited to,

the following: profuse bleeding, severe pain, unconsciousness, severe head injury, chest pains, difficulty

breathing, severe burns, or psychotic behavior which presents a danger to the inmate or others . . . .

. . . If a medical emergency occurs in the jail, jail staff will immediately call for an emergency squad, and the

onduty Shift Commander, or in his absence, the senior Sergeant and the jail nurse will be notified at once. If

the staff member receiving the complaint is unsure as to the seriousness of the complaint, the ranking supervisor

will be contacted as well as the jail nurse. The jail nurse will make the decision as to the seriousness of the

complaint. If the jail nurse does not respond within 15 minutes, the ranking supervisor will assess the situation

and take appropriate action. Jail staff will administer first aid when appropriate.

§ 9.8.2(A)–(A)(1). Doc. 51, PageID 610.

exercise considerable judgment in making those determinations, “corrections officers did not

receive the adequate training they needed to see that [Plaintiff] received the medical care he

needed.” Doc. 71, PageID 1085 (internal citations omitted). The crux of Plaintiff’s claim is

that, in the absence of additional training, “the breadth of discretion afforded to non-medical

staff [at the Middletown Jail] as the gatekeepers for pretrial detainees to obtain medical care”

caused him the harm for which he now petitions this Court for relief. Id.

Defendant Muterspaw asserts that Plaintiff cannot prove that an official Middletown

policy or custom resulted in the alleged violation of his rights. Doc. 60, PageID 925.

Muterspaw avers that “there is no evidence in the record that establishes that any corrections

officer working in the Middletown Jail while Plaintiff was an inmate there was ever told that

Plaintiff was in ‘severe pain.’” Id. Therefore, “Plaintiff cannot establish that the Middletown

Defendants failed to act on Plaintiff’s alleged report of ‘severe pain’ because that information

was never communicated to them.” Id. at PageID 926. Furthermore, Muterspaw maintains

that the “correction officers in Middletown were adequately trained.” Id. Thus, because

Middletown “trained its corrections officers to provide basic first aid, CPR, and similar

services, to respond to complaints from inmates about medical issues, and to report serious

medical problems to the jail nurses and doctor,” Muterspaw argues that “reasonable minds

can only conclude that Middletown was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff and did not

violate Plaintiff’s [c]onstitutional rights by allegedly failing to train its corrections officers.”

Id. at PageID 927.

The Magistrate Judge rejected Muterspaw’s arguments. In the R&R, the Magistrate

Judge reasoned that Plaintiff’s claim did “not rely on the knowledge [by corrections officers]

of his severe pain” but turned on whether “the Jail was required to train officers ‘to recognize

situations where an inmate is demonstrating obvious signs of being . . . in need of medical

assistance.’” Doc. 71, PageID 1084–85 (quoting Doc. 1, ¶ 73). Thus, the Magistrate Judge

found that Plaintiff had proffered sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that the City’s inadequate training “amounted to deliberate indifference, because

the risk in delegating to untrained jail employees the task of determining when to contact

medical staff, and whether a medical emergency existed, was ‘patently obvious.’” Doc. 71,

PageID 1091 (citing Helphenstine, 90 F.4th at 325).

Muterspaw objects to the R&R to the extent that it: (1) concludes that Plaintiff “c[a]me

forward with sufficient evidence that [Middletown’s] inadequate training amounted to

deliberate indifference[;]” and (2) “recommend[ed] that the Middletown Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment . . . should be denied as to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim

against Middletown.” Doc. 77, PageID 1152 (cleaned up). Muterspaw posits that the

Middletown Jail corrections officers were properly trained and indeed followed standard

protocol, which “was for the officers to talk with inmates making medical complaints, provide

the inmates with a medical form to complete and which the officers would then place in the

nurse’s box, and to escalate the issue to a supervisor or directly to the medical staff depending

on the circumstances presented.” Id. at PageID 1159. Further, Muterspaw emphasizes that

“Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence to demonstrate how” an alleged failure-

to-train corrections officers “made a potential constitutional violation obvious.” Id. at PageID

1160. Ultimately, Muterspaw “disagree[s] with the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on

Helphenstine to support [the Magistrate Judge’s] recommendation that Middletown be denied

a summary judgement on Plaintiff’s Monell claim.” Id. at PageID 1161–62.

ii. Legal Framework

The Court begins by offering a few observations about the correct legal framework

required to analyze Plaintiff’s failure-to-train claim against Middletown. “A municipality is a

‘person’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and so can be held liable for constitutional injuries for which

it is responsible.” Morgan v. Fairfield Cnty., 903 F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Monell v.

Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). This requires Plaintiff to

demonstrate that the alleged federal violation occurred because of a municipal “policy or

custom.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. This requirement may allow a municipality to be held liable

under one of four recognized theories: “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or

legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal

actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence

of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735

F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013).

Here, Plaintiff’s claim against Middletown alleges a failure to adequately train Jail

staff. Notably, a “municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous

where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). There

are two recognized ways to support a claim that a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise is the

result of a municipality’s deliberate indifference. Plaintiff may either prove (1) a “pattern of

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees,” or alternatively, (2) “a single

violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that [the municipality] has failed to

train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for a

constitutional violation.” Shadrick v. Hopkins Cnty., 805 F.3d 724, 738–39 (6th Cir. 2015)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Grote v. Kenton Cnty., Kentucky, 85 F.4th 397, 414

(6th Cir. 2023) (holding that it is “proper to consider possible constitutional violations

committed by a municipality qua municipality, even in the absence of a showing of a

constitutional violation by any one individual officer”). Because Plaintiff has not identified

any other constitutional violations, he must demonstrate that the deliberate indifference to his

serious medical need was a result of the Middletown Jail’s “failure to train the [J]ailers to

handle this potentially recurring situation.” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 323.

iii. Analysis

With this framework in mind, the question before the Court is whether Middletown

Jail’s failure to train its employees amounted to a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s rights.

See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Such a claim has three elements. Plaintiff

must show (1) that Middletown’s “training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks

performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and

(3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.” Winkler v. Madison

Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 902 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

First, as it relates to the adequacy of training program at Middletown Jail, this Court

finds that a reasonable jury could reach a finding “that this training program, to the extent

that it existed, was insufficient.” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 324. Undoubtedly, there was

potential harm to inmates that would necessitate training Jail staff to help identify similar

risks as to what Plaintiff experienced and to mitigate the effects of any harm that might be

visited upon them. Dr. George Kaiser, the Middletown Jail doctor,6 testified that the Jail has

6 While Dr. Kaiser is technically available by phone “24/7,” he testified that he only spends about eight hours

per month at the Jail. Doc. 71, PageID 1082. Dumouchelle testified that she worked 10–15 hours a week at

the Jail. Id. at PageID 1091. Contrast this with the availability of jail medical personnel in Berry v. Delaware

Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 796 F. App'x 857, 864 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that “the jail had ‘nursing coverage 24 hours

a day, seven days a week,’ so the jailers’ training was sufficient”).

a “heavy population of people that are abusing drugs.” George Kaiser Dep., Doc. 51, 26:2–

3. “This reality is reflected in the [J]ail’s policies.” Larrick v. Tuscarawas Cnty., No. 5:21-CV-

00959, 2023 WL 6311396, at *29 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2023). The Middletown Jail Policy

instructs Jail staff that “[e]mergency procedures are [to be] followed for inmates experiencing

severe, life-threatening intoxication (overdose) or detoxification.” Doc. 51, PageID 611. But,

as in Helphenstine, the Policy contains “no instructions or guidelines for how [Jail] staff should

care for an inmate in withdrawal,” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 324, beyond simply “call[ing] for

an emergency squad, and the on-duty Shift Commander . . . and [notifying] the [J]ail nurse.”

Doc. 51, PageID 610. Emphasizing this point, Dr. Kaiser further testified that he “provided

only a one-hour CPR training session [to Jail staff] that did not cover factors that would

inform an officer’s judgment on those issues” relating to identifying the effects of drug

intoxication or detoxification. Doc. 71, PageID 1090 (citing to George Kaiser Dep., Doc. 51,

PageID 588, 14:18–20).

Despite this, Muterspaw—on behalf of the City—claims that Plaintiff has not

presented evidence to support the “conclusion that Middletown failed to adequately train

corrections officers working in the Jail.” Doc. 77, PageID 1161. The record suggests

otherwise. When asked whether the Jail gave corrections officers “criteria or guidelines to

apply to [a] situation when an inmate requested assistance,” Officer Gibson replied with

“nothing particular other than if an inmate looked like he was in distress.” Danny Gibson

Dep., Doc. 50, 14:21–15:1. Given the gravity of the concern, one would expect that the Policy

for the Middletown Jail would have provided guidelines and procedures to be followed in a

medical emergency. But Officer Gibson—a Jail employee—testified that he had never seen the

Policy before. Id. at 18:1–3. When asked whether he recalled “[r]eceiving any training

whatsoever as to what would constitute a medical emergency,” Officer Gibson answered that

he had not. Id. at 18:19–21. And although Dr. Kaiser testified that he had “discussions about

vital signs” with corrections officers, (Doc. 51, 16:22–23), Officer Vance stated that the only

specific training she received “regarding the provi[sion] of medical assistance to inmates” was

“CPR classes.” Linda Vance Dep., Doc. 56, 10:10–15. Thus, contrary to Muterspaw’s

assertions, there is more than sufficient evidence in the record to suggest that Middletown

failed to adequately train corrections officers at the Middletown Jail.

Second, a reasonable jury could conclude that the inadequacy of the Policy and staff

training was “the result of the [Middletown’s] deliberate indifference to inmate health and

safety.” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 325. “Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault,

requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of [the]

action.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (cleaned up). If the “unconstitutional consequences of failing

to train” employees are “patently obvious,” the municipality “could be liable under § 1983

without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.” Id. at 64. In other words, a municipality

could be held liable under § 1983 where the federal rights violation may have been “a highly

predictable consequence of a failure to equip [employees] with specific tools” to handle

potentially recurring situations. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,

409 (1997). For example, “[a]sking employees to use professional judgment that lies outside

their area of expertise may demonstrate deliberate indifference.” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 325.

In this context, a reasonable jury could find that Middletown Jail’s training program

was so inadequate that it was “patently obvious” that a constitutional violation of an inmate’s

rights would result, as demonstrated by the inadequate response by Jail staff to Plaintiff’s

deteriorating medical condition in the events giving rise to the instant case. As discussed

above, Middletown was aware of risks to inmate health because the Jail had a section in its

Policy dedicated to the “assessment, treatment, and observation of inmates manifesting

symptoms of intoxication or detoxification from” drugs. Doc. 51, PageID 611. And the fact

that the Policy included instructions of when to “notif[y]” Jail medical staff, (id.), “is proof

that the [Jail] understood the serious consequences that could result from not appropriately

treating inmates suffering from” drug intoxication or detoxification. Larrick, 2023 WL

6311396, at *30.

And yet, the evidence shows a “disconnect” between Middletown’s recognition of the

risks to inmate health associated with recurring problems with drug overdose and abuse and

the policies needed to address these concerns “and the training necessary to put those policies

to work.” Id. Dr. Kaiser admitted he only performed a “once a year seminar . . . about an

hour long” on the “medical aspects” of the responsibilities of Jail staff. Kaiser Dep., Doc. 51,

14:13–20. Officer Gibson confirmed that he merely “relied on [his] own sense of whether

someone looked healthy or whether there was obvious injury in order to make [the]

determination” that medical attention was needed. Gibson Dep., Doc. 50, 15:7–12. And

Officer Vance similarly agreed that she relied on her own “common sense” and her training—

CPR classes—to determine whether an inmate “[was] in pain or distress and need[ed] to be

seen by medical people.” Vance Dep., Doc. 56, 8:13–22.

But clearly such common sense, absent any comprehensive professional training or

instruction to back it, was not enough. Officer Gibson “did not consult with medical staff

when Plaintiff first alerted him that he was ill.”7 Doc. 71, PageID 1090. Nor did Officers

7 Officer Gibson testified that, when he entered Plaintiff’s jail cell on July 26, he observed Plaintiff “laying on

the floor on a mat,” had just been told by Plaintiff himself that “he didn’t feel good,” and was informed by

Gibson and Vance “immediately” perform these responsibilities after repeated and escalating

requests for medical attention by Plaintiff’s cellmate. Doc. 51, PageID 610. And on Thursday

afternoon, despite Officers Gibson and Vance themselves noting that Plaintiff was “not eating

and not acting right” and that he “would not get up and walk,” (Doc. 60-1, PageID 950), they

still refrained from immediately contacting medical staff—likely in violation of § 9.8.2(A)(1)

of the Policy8—upon concluding based on their own personal assessment that “no medical or

supervisory attention was required.” Doc. 71, PageID 1090. This deliberate inaction—

evidently informed by the shrewdness of Officers Gibson and Vance’s “common sense”—

occurred despite them having moved Plaintiff to an observation cell, where the Sixth Circuit

has held that the mere physical act of moving a pretrial detainee to an observation cell tends

to show that a condition is “sufficiently serious.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890,

899 (6th Cir. 2004). The culmination of all these factors informs this Court’s determination

that a reasonable jury could “conclude that [the inadequate training was] the result of

[Middletown’s] deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety.” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at

325.

Muterspaw contends that it was not “‘patently obvious’ that having correctional

officers in the Middletown Jail notify the [J]ail nurse(s) of inmates who request to be seen or

have reported complaints would lead to the violation of inmates’ constitutional rights to

medical care.” Doc. 77, PageID 1162. But that argument misses the point. Plaintiff does not

Plaintiff’s cellmate that Plaintiff had “had some bad drugs.” Gibson Dep., Doc. 50, PageID 529–30, 36:10–

37:14.

8 “If a medical emergency occurs in the jail, jail staff will immediately call for an emergency squad, and the on-

duty Shift Commander, or in his absence, the senior Sergeant and the jail nurse will be notified at once. If the

staff member receiving the complaint is unsure as to the seriousness of the complaint, the ranking supervisor

will be contacted as well as the jail nurse.” Doc. 51, PageID 610 (emphasis added).

object to the unconstitutionality of a Jail policy of simply contacting medical personnel in the

event of a medical emergency. Rather, Plaintiff takes issue with the discretion afforded to

Middletown’s correctional officers as the gatekeepers for inmates to obtain medical care.

Plaintiff claims that non-medical Jail staff “were expected to exercise considerable

independent judgment to determine whether any [medical] emergency existed, yet [were]

provided no training to help officers exercise that judgment.” Doc. 79, PageID 1173; see also

id. at PageID 1175 (“Plaintiff contends that the [J]ail staff was provided virtually no guidance

in how to exercise its discretion in assessing whether an inmate had a serious medical

condition.”). Hence, a reasonable jury could find that this considerable discretion afforded to

Jail staff, who were not adequately trained to exercise that discretion, reflects Middletown’s

deliberate indifference to serious inmate health and safety concerns that could predictably

arise at the Jail.

Third, the Court considers whether this inadequacy was closely related to or caused

Plaintiff’s injuries—his eventual sepsis and endocarditis diagnoses. The Court finds that a

reasonable jury could conclude, at least at the summary judgment stage, that the causation

element would be satisfied here. The parties’ mutually opposing recitations of the facts

demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to this element. Therefore, summary

judgment is not warranted.

For example, Muterspaw claims that:

The facts show that Middletown had an applicable policy and standard

procedure for dealing with inmate medical complaints, that Gibson listened to

the complaints about Plaintiff and informed Nurse Dumouchelle, and that,

when faced with an obvious medical emergency, Gibson and Vance immediately

consulted Nurse Dumouchelle, Nurse Wilmot, and Dr. Kaiser on the

appropriate response.

Doc. 77, PageID 1160 (emphasis added). Meanwhile, Plaintiff claims that:

Despite recognizing that Plaintiff’s condition had deteriorated to the point that

he needed to be transferred to an observation cell, the officers [Gibson and

Vance] took no action to alert nurse Dumouchelle or any other medical staff

member of this change in condition. All the officers did was transfer Plaintiff

to an “observation cell” with no follow-up by way of recorded “observations”,

nor any contact with medical personnel until Plaintiff was discovered unresponsive in his

cell early the next day.

Doc. 79, PageID 1176 (emphasis added). Here, the parties’ diverging narratives are

fundamentally irreconcilable. And either version, if this Court had the liberty to choose,

would be dispositive to the outcome for a claim of deliberate indifference by Middletown.

Unfortunately, for Defendants Dumouchelle and Muterspaw—or perhaps better stated,

fortunately for Plaintiff—at the summary judgment stage, a court must view the evidence and

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party—in this case Plaintiff.

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

Furthermore, the record demonstrates a plethora of inconsistencies in the parties’

respective renditions of the factual predicates relating to causation—only a few of which are

recounted below. On the one hand, Muterspaw argues that Aaron Smith’s testimony

“confirms that the standard procedure of a corrections officer notifying the nurse when an

inmate makes a medical complaint was followed.” Doc. 77, PageID 1161. Similarly, Officer

Vance claimed that the “first time . . . [she] had heard anything from Smith stating that

Plaintiff was sick or needed assistance” was the afternoon of Thursday, July 27. Vance Dep.,

Doc. 56, 45:16–18. But Aaron Smith’s testimony also alleges that he made at least four

requests to “various [correction officers]” for medical attention on behalf of Plaintiff—all of

which appeared to have been ignored—and that he had heard Plaintiff make an unrequited

verbal request “the first night” while at the Jail. Doc. 49, PageID 402. These are just a few of

the litany of contradictions in the record that necessitate sending this claim to jury, as opposed

to granting a motion for summary judgment where the material facts are clearly still in

dispute.

All in all, Plaintiff has demonstrated by sufficient proof that a reasonable jury could

conclude that Middletown’s training was inadequate for non-medical staff and corrections

officers, that the inadequacy was caused by Middletown’s deliberate indifference to inmate

health and safety, and that the inadequacy caused Plaintiffs injuries. The Magistrate Judge

therefore properly denied summary judgment in favor of Defendant Muterspaw and the city

of Middletown as to this claim.

I. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, and for the reasons stated herein, Defendants Dumouchelle and

Muterspaw’s objections (Docs. 76, 77) are OVERRULED. The Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation (Doc. 71) is ADOPTED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2025 Dripy Lhe

Je opkins

United States District Judge

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