Opinion

State v. Taylor

  • 968 S.W.2d 900
  • 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 772
  • 1997 WL 469520
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Aug 15, 1997
Status
Published
Author
Lafferty
On the bench
Lafferty, Wade, Summers
Cited by
630 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.8%

noting that the same standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel that is applied in federal cases also applies in Tennessee

How later courts described this case

  • noting that the same standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel that is applied in federal cases also applies in Tennessee
  • stating that the same - 10 - standard for ineffective assistance of counsel applies in both federal and Tennessee cases
  • stating that the same - 21 - standard for ineffective assistance of counsel applies in both federal and Tennessee cases
  • stating that the same - 16 - standard for ineffective assistance of counsel applies in both federal and Tennessee cases

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

MONTRO TAYLOR, )

)

Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9703-CR-00114

)

vs. ) SHELBY COUNTY

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

Respondent.

) No. P-17976

)

)

FILED

August 15, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

ORDER Appellate C ourt Clerk

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion requesting that the

judgment in the above-styled cause be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court

of Criminal Appeals. In 1976, the petitioner and a co-defendant were convicted of

murder in the perpetration of a robbery, as well as the underlying robbery. On appeal,

the Supreme Court affirmed the felony murder convictions but reversed the robbery

convictions because of double jeopardy considerations. Briggs v. State, 573 S.W.2d

157 (Tenn. 1978). The sentence for each murder conviction remained at one hundred

ninety-nine (199) years.

Subsequently, on January 27, 1997, the petitioner filed this, his first,

petition for post-conviction relief challenging the propriety of his sentence for the felony

murder. The trial court dismissed the petition without appointment of counsel or an

evidentiary hearing upon a finding that the petition was barred by the one-year statute

of limitation. We agree.

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-30-202(a), a petitioner must petition for post-

conviction relief within one year of the date of the final action of the highest state

appellate court to which an appeal is taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one year of

the date on which the judgment became final. The Compiler’s Notes to T.C.A. § 40-30-

201 state that the 1995 Post-Conviction Act governs all petitions for post-conviction

relief filed after May 10, 1995. Moreover, the Compiler’s Notes indicate that any person

having ground for relief recognized under this part shall have at least one year from

May 10, 1995, to file a petition or a motion to reopen a petition under this part.

Under T.C.A. § 40-30-202(b), a court does not have jurisdiction to

consider a petition for post-conviction relief if it was filed outside the one-year statute of

limitation unless (1) the claim in the petition is based upon a final ruling of an appellate

court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized at the time of trial, if

retrospective application of that right is required, (2) the claim in the petition is based

upon new scientific evidence establishing that such petitioner is actually innocent of the

offense or offenses for which the petitioner was convicted, or (3) the claim in the

petition seeks relief from a sentence that was enhanced because of a previous

conviction and such conviction in the case in which the claim is asserted was not a

guilty plea with an agreed sentence, and the previous conviction has subsequently

been held to be invalid.

In the present case, the petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction

relief on January 27, 1997. Accordingly, the petition is governed by the 1995 Post-

Conviction Act, and the petition was filed outside the statute of limitation set forth in

T.C.A. § 40-30-202(a). Moreover, the petitioner has failed to show that any of his

claims fall within one of the exceptions set forth in T.C.A. § 40-30-202(b).

It is, therefore, ORDERED that the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of

the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, is granted, and the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Enter, this the ___ day of August, 1997.

_____________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE

_____________________________

2

JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE

_____________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE

3

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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