National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________

)

NATIONAL TREASURY )

EMPLOYEES UNION, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

) Civil Action No. 25-0381 (ABJ)

RUSSELL VOUGHT )

in his official capacity as )

Acting Director of the )

Consumer Financial )

Protection Bureau, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

“CFPB RIP”

Elon Musk – February 7, 2025

“The CFPB has been a woke and weaponized agency against disfavored industries and

individuals for a long time. This must end.”

Russell Vought – February 8, 2025

“That was a very important thing to get rid of.”

President Donald Trump – February 10, 2025

The motion for preliminary injunction to be decided boils down to one question: should

the Court take action to preserve the the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau now, before the

case concerning its fate has been resolved? That is an extraordinary step, and before it can step in,

the Court must conclude that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims, that they would

suffer irreparable harm in the meantime if the Court lets the lawsuit run its course, and that an

injunction would be in the public interest.

The Court has made those findings, and the answer is an overwhelming yes: the Court can

and must act.

The evidence presented in connection with the motion – the testimony of the agency’s

Chief Operating Officer and other witnesses, and the agency’s own documents, produced by both

sides – showed that Russell Vought, the Acting Director of the CFPB, ordered all employees to

stop work on February 10, 2025. As of that date, the defendants were fully engaged in a hurried

effort to dismantle and disable the agency entirely – firing all probationary and term-limited

employees without cause, cutting off funding, terminating contracts, closing all of the offices, and

implementing a reduction in force (“RIF”) that would cover everyone else. These actions were

taken in complete disregard for the decision Congress made 15 years ago, which was spurred by

the devastating financial crisis of 2008 and embodied in the United States Code, that the agency

must exist and that it must perform specific functions to protect the borrowing public. The

elimination of the agency was interrupted only because plaintiffs sought and obtained the Court’s

intervention on the day the overwhelming majority of the employees were going to be fired.

That slowed, but did not deter, the defendants. The shut down activities continued for the

next two weeks, and it wasn’t until the Sunday afternoon before the Monday when the Court was

scheduled to hold a hearing that agency officials turned around and announced to the surprised

staff that they were supposed to have been performing their statutorily mandated duties all along.

The testimony and the contemporaneous documents suggest that those last minute

communications were nothing more than window dressing, and that nothing has changed. The

defendants are still engaged in an effort to implement a Presidential plan to shut the agency down

entirely and to do it fast. Absent an injunction freezing the status quo – preserving the agency’s

data, its operational capacity, and its workforce – there is a substantial risk that the defendants will

complete the destruction of the agency completely in violation of law well before the Court can

rule on the merits, and it will be impossible to rebuild.

It may be that defendants decided to authorize the resumption of some work and the

reactivation of some contracts in light of a belated, but genuine recognition that there were certain

duties that had to be performed to comply with the law while the agency was still open. The

material in the record and the chronology suggest, though, that the change of heart was more likely

a charade for the Court’s benefit. Either way, it’s purely temporary; the Court’s oversight is the

only thing holding the defendants back. If the Court denies the motion for interim relief, the RIF

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notices that have already been prepared will go out before the ink is dry on the Court’s signature,

the employees will be back on administrative leave for just thirty days before they are gone, and

the defendants will pull the plug on the CFPB.

This is precisely the sort of situation preliminary injunctions were designed to address. If

the defendants are not enjoined, they will eliminate the agency before the Court has the opportunity

to decide whether the law permits them to do it, and as the defendants’ own witness warned, the

harm will be irreparable.

* * *

On February 9, 2025, Plaintiffs National Treasury Employees Union (“NTEU”), National

Consumer Law Center (“NCLC”), National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

(“NAACP”), Virginia Poverty Law Center, Rev. Eva Steege, and the CFPB Employee Association

filed this action against the Acting Director of the CFPB, Russell Vought, and the CFPB itself.

See Compl. [Dkt. # 1]. Plaintiffs challenge decisions made and actions taken by the defendants to

carry out President Trump’s vow to have the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)

“totally eliminated.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 47, n.14, citing Joey Garrison (@joeygarrison), X (Feb.

10, 2025), https://x.com/joeygarrison/status/1889132023933022283?Mx=2.

Pending before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, Pls.’ Mot.

for TRO [Dkt. # 10], which, with the parties’ consent, was deemed to be a motion for preliminary

injunction. See Order [Dkt. # 19]. This motion is fully briefed. Defs.’ Opp. to Pls.’ Mot. for

Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. # 31] (“Defs.’ Opp.”); Pls.’ Reply Mem. in Support of Pls.’ Mot. [Dkt. # 40]

(“Pls.’ Reply”). The Court has also had the benefit of briefs filed by three amici curiae:

twenty-two states and the District of Columbia, Br. of Amici Curiae States of N.Y., N.J., Ariz.,

Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., Haw., Ill., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Nev., N.M., N.C., Or., R.I.,

Vt., Wash., Wis., and D.C. in support of Pls.’ Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. # 24] (“States’ Br.”);

non-profit Tzedek DC, Amicus Br. of Tzedek DC [Dkt. # 33]; and Br. of 203 Members of Congress

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as Amici Curiae [Dkt. # 84] (“Members’ Br.”). For the reasons set out in detail below, plaintiff’s

motion will be granted, and the Court will enter an order to preserve the status quo while the case

moves forward on the merits.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was created in response to a severe economic

crisis that gripped the nation. In 2008, “the subprime mortgage market collapsed, precipitating a

financial crisis that wiped out over $10 trillion in American household wealth and cost millions of

Americans their jobs, their retirements, and their homes. In the aftermath, . . . [t]hrough the

Treasury Department, the administration encouraged Congress to establish an agency with a

mandate to ensure that ‘consumer protection regulations’ in the financial sector ‘are written fairly

and enforced vigorously.’” Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 205 (2020),

quoting Dept. of Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation 55 (2009). Congress

acted on these proposals, and as part of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,

commonly referred to as the Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010), it

established the CFPB to serve as “an independent financial regulator within the Federal Reserve

System.” Seila L., 591 U.S. at 206.

The statute provides that the agency “shall regulate the offering and provision of consumer

financial products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.” 12 U.S.C. §5491(a);

see generally, Title X, Dodd-Frank Act, also known as the Consumer Financial Protection Act of

2010, 12 U.S.C. § 5491 et. seq.

Congress tasked the CFPB with “implement[ing]” and “enforc[ing]” a large

body of financial consumer protection laws to “ensur[e] that all consumers

have access to markets for consumer financial products and services and

that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair,

transparent, and competitive.” . . . Congress transferred the administration

of 18 existing federal statutes to the CFPB, including the Fair Credit

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Reporting Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Truth in

Lending Act. . . . In addition, Congress enacted a new prohibition on “any

unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice” by certain participants in the

consumer-finance sector.

Seila L., at 206, citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5511(a), 5481(12), (14); see also id. § 5581. 1

As a result of the consolidation of functions accomplished by the statute, the CFPB is now

“the only federal agency authorized to supervise the nation’s largest banks for their compliance

with consumer financial protection laws. It also supervises nonbanks of all sizes in certain market

segments, like mortgage companies and payday lenders, as well as larger nonbank participants in

other consumer financial market segments, like credit reporting agencies, digital payment apps,

and debt collectors.” Members’ Br. at 13. “To date, the CFPB has returned more than $21 billion

improperly taken from at least 205 million consumers, in addition to at least $5 billion in civil

penalties made available to compensate consumers in cases where the business that took their

money is insolvent.” Id. at 12.

The statute mandates that the CFPB maintain specific subject matter offices and units,

produce specific periodic reports, and provide testimony and reports to Congress.

1 See Members’ Br. at 2. “The CFPB was born out of the most severe economic and financial

crisis since the Great Depression. Congress thoroughly investigated the root causes of the 2008

crisis and determined that regulatory failures were largely to blame. Because responsibility for

consumer financial protection was dispersed across federal agencies, consumers were, at best, a

secondary consideration for regulators. After an exhaustive legislative process, Congress passed

the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 . . .. One of the greatest

achievements of that bipartisan effort was to consolidate consumer financial protection in a single

agency, the CFPB, that would be a watchdog for consumers, armed with the legal authority

necessary to prevent another financial meltdown.” Id.

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I. Required Offices and Positions

The CFPB is statutorily required to maintain:

 a Consumer Advisory Board to “advise and consult with the Bureau in the exercise

of its functions . . . and to provide information on emerging practices in the

consumer financial products or services industry,” 12 U.S.C. § 5494(a);

 a unit that has “a single, toll-free telephone number, a website, and a database” to

centralize the collection and monitoring of and the responses to consumer

complaints about consumer financial products or services, 12 U.S.C.

§ 5493(b)(3)(A);

 “a unit whose functions shall include providing information, guidance, and

technical assistance regarding the offering and provision of consumer financial

products or services to traditionally underserved consumers and communities,”

12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(2);

 “a unit whose functions shall include researching, analyzing, and reporting on” a

number of specific issues, including “developments in markets for consumer

financial products or services,” “areas of risk to consumers,” and “access to fair and

affordable credit for traditionally underserved communities,” 12 U.S.C.

§ 5493(b)(1);

 “the Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity” which “shall . . . provid[e]

oversight and enforcement of Federal laws intended to ensure the fair, equitable,

and nondiscriminatory access to credit for both individuals and communities that

are enforced by the Bureau;” coordinate fair lending efforts with other agencies and

regulators; and work with private industry, fair lending, civil rights, consumer and

community advocates on the promotion of fair lending compliance and education,

12 U.S.C. § 5493(c)(1);

 an “Office of Financial Education, which shall be responsible for developing and

implementing initiatives intended to educate and empower consumers to make

better informed financial decisions,” 12 U.S.C. § 5493(d);

 an “Office of Service Member Affairs, which shall be responsible for developing

and implementing initiatives for service members and their families,”

12 U.S.C. § 5493(e); and

 an “Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans . . . to facilitate the financial

literacy of individuals” 62-years-old and older “on protection from unfair,

deceptive, and abusive practices and on current and future financial choices,”

12 U.S.C. § 5493(g)(1).

6

The statute also requires the CFPB to have “a Private Education Loan Ombudsman . . . to

provide timely assistance to borrowers of private education loans.” 12 U.S.C. § 5535(a). The

Ombudsman must “receive, review, and attempt to resolve informally complaints from borrowers

of loans . . . including, as appropriate attempt[ing] to resolve such complaints in collaboration with

the Department of Education and with institutions of higher education, lenders, guaranty agencies,

loan servicers, and other participants in private education loan programs.” Id. § 5535(c)(1).

II. Required Research and Reports

The statute requires the Bureau to produce research, reports, and information on specific

topics, including credit rates and credit cards, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1646(a), (b); id. § 1632(d)(3);

market developments for consumer financial products or services and consumer access to those

products, 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(1); depository institutions and aggregate lending patterns, id.

§ 2809(a); and emerging risks to consumers, id. § 5512(c)(3). And it must make “[a]ll public data

assets published by the Bureau” publicly available and freely available for download. Id. § 5499.

The CFPB Director and offices within the Bureau are also required to report to Congress.

See 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(C) (requiring the Director to report annually to Congress on the

complaints received by the Bureau in the prior year regarding consumer financial products and

services, including information and analysis about complaint numbers, complaint types, and, as

applicable, information about resolution of complaints); id. § 5493(c)(2) (D) (requiring an annual

report from the Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity); id. § 5493(d)(4) (requiring an

annual report from the Director on financial literacy activities and strategy to improve financial

literacy of consumers); id. § 5535(d) (requiring an annual report from the Private Education Loan

Ombudsman). And the Director must report to the President and testify before Congress

semi-annually. Id. § 5496.

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III. Rulemaking, Enforcement, and Supervision

In addition to these statutorily mandated activities, Congress gave the CFPB specific

rulemaking, enforcement, and supervisory authority. Congress granted the Bureau rulemaking

authority, see 12 U.S.C. § 5512, specifically permitting it to promulgate regulations that identify

“unfair, deceptive, or abusive” practices and establish disclosure requirements to aid consumers’

understanding of financial products and services. See id. § 5531(b); id. §§ 5532, 5533. Congress

also granted the Bureau enforcement authority, authorizing it to conduct investigations, hearings,

and adjudication proceedings, and to initiate civil litigation and refer criminal matters to the U.S.

Attorney General. Id. §§ 5561–67. And Congress granted the CFPB supervisory powers, id.

§§ 5514–16, authorizing it to examine and require periodic reports from financial institutions, id.

§§ 5514, 5515, including payday lenders, private education lenders, insured depository

institutions, and credit unions with more than $10 billion in assets. Id. § 5514(a)(1)(B), (D)–(E),

(b)(1); id. § 5515(b)(1).

In addition, the Bureau is required by the statute to report on these authorized activities.

See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5496(c) (requiring the Director’s semi-annual report to Congress to include

“(4) an analysis of complaints about consumer financial products or services that the Bureau has

received and collected in its central database on complaints during the preceding year; (5) a list,

with a brief statement of the issues, of the public supervisory and enforcement actions to which

the Bureau was a party during the preceding year; (6) the actions taken regarding rules, (7) ) an

assessment of significant actions by State attorneys general or State regulators relating to Federal

consumer financial law;” and “(8) an analysis of the efforts of the Bureau to fulfill the fair lending

mission of the Bureau”).

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IV. The CFPB’s Funding

The CFPB does not rely on annual appropriations for its funding. Seila L., 591 U.S. at 207.

Rather, it “receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the

appropriations process through bank assessments.” Id. at 207–08, citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5497(a)(1),

(2)(A)(iii), 2(B) (“Each year, the CFPB requests an amount that the Director deems ‘reasonably

necessary to carry out’ the agency’s duties, and the Federal Reserve grants that request so long as

it does not exceed 12% of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve (inflation

adjusted).”). This arrangement was approved by the Supreme Court in CFPB v. Community

Financial Services Association of America, Ltd., 601 U.S. 416 (2024). 2

The Bureau’s annual budget in recent years has exceeded 500 million dollars, Seila L.,

591 U.S. at 208, citing CFPB, Fiscal Year 2019: Ann. Performance Plan and Rep., p. 7, and in its

first five years alone, it “obtained over $11 billion in relief for over 25 million consumers,

including a $1 billion penalty against a single bank in 2018.” Id. at 206, citing CFPB, Financial

Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2015, p. 3. The brief filed by

Members of Congress reports that the total is now more than $21 billion. Members’ Br. at 3, 12.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Friday, January 31 President Trump fires CFPB Director Rohit Chopra. See Email

from CFPB Office of the Director (Feb. 3, 2025) [Dkt. # 23-1]

(“Feb. 3 Email”).

2 Given that circumstance, it is not clear that the February 26, 2025 guidance from Russell

Vought, in his capacity as Director of OMB (“tax dollars are being siphoned off to fund

unproductive and unnecessary programs that benefit radical interest groups while hurting

hard-working citizens”), has much bearing on the CFPB. See Mem. from Russell T. Vought,

Director, Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, and Charles Ezell, Acting Director, Off. of Pers. Mgmt., to

Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Feb. 26, 2025) [Dkt. # 70-2] at Page 1–7 of 7.

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Effective date of appointment of Secretary of Treasury Scott

Bessent as CFPB Acting Director. See Feb 3 Email.

Monday, February 3 CFPB Office of the Director email to DL_CFPB_AllHands; DL_

CFPB_AllHands_Contractors

Subject: Instructions from Acting Director

Colleagues,

Secretary of the Treasury Bessent has been named

Acting Director of the CFPB, effective January 31,

2025. As Acting Director, Secretary Bessent is

committed to appropriately stewarding the agency

pending new leadership. In order to promote

consistency with the goals of the Administration,

effective immediately, unless expressly approved by

the Acting Director or required by law, all

employees, contractors, and other personnel of the

Bureau are directed:

 Not to approve or issue any proposed or final

rules or formal or informal guidance.

 To suspend the effective dates of all final rules

that have been issued or published but that have

not yet become effective.

 Not to commence, take additional investigative

activities related to, or settle enforcement

actions.

 Not to issue public communications of any type,

including publication of research papers.

 Not to approve or execute any material

agreements, including related to employee

matters or contractors.

 Not to make or approve filings or appearances by

the Bureau in any litigation, other than to seek a

pause in proceedings.

If you have any questions, please raise issues through

your existing management for consideration by the

Acting Director.

Thank you.

Feb. 3 Email.

10

Tuesday, February 4 Acting Director Bessent emails all CFPB staff and

contractors directing them “[n]ot to initiate supervisory

designation proceedings or designate any nondepository

institution for supervision.” Am. Compl. ¶ 37.

Thursday, February 6 Officials from the Department of Treasury notify CFPB officials in

the evening that two United States Department of Government

Efficiency (“DOGE”) Service officials would need access to

CFPB’s headquarters. First Decl. of Adam Martinez [Dkt. # 31-1]

(“First Martinez Decl.”) ¶ 6; Testimony of Adam Martinez, Tr. of

Evidentiary Hr’g (Mar. 10, 2025) [Dkt. # 73] (“Mar. 10 Tr.”) at 19.

Members of DOGE, including Christopher Young, enter CFPB

headquarters. Decl. of Daniel J. Kaspar, NTEU Director of Field

Operations [Dkt. # 14-1] (“Kaspar Decl.”) ¶ 6; Martinez Testimony,

Mar. 10 Tr. at 20.

Friday, February 7 CFPB management and DOGE personnel Christopher Young,

Jordan Wick, and Jeremy Lewin have a follow-up meeting. DOGE

representatives gain access to all non-classified CFPB systems.

Kaspar Decl. ¶ 6; First Martinez Decl. ¶ 7; Martinez Testimony,

Mar. 10 Tr. at 21.

Christopher Young of DOGE is officially detailed to CFPB.

Martinez Testimony, Mar. 10 Tr. at 21, 137–38. DOGE staff are

designated as senior advisors of CFPB. Martinez Testimony,

Mar. 10 Tr. at 144.

The “CFPB homepage at consumerfinance.gov – the launching pad

for most American consumers’ interactions with the CFPB – was

changed to a ‘404 - Site Not Found’ error message.” Third Decl. of

Erie Meyer, CFPB Chief Technologist [Dkt. # 38-9] ¶ 19.

Elon Musk posts “CFPB RIP,” accompanied by a tombstone emoji,

to his personal X account. Kaspar Decl. ¶ 6; Am. Compl. ¶ 39, citing

https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1887979940269666769.

CFPB General Counsel and Senior Advisor to the Director Seth

Frotman is terminated. Decl. of Seth Frotman [Dkt. # 38-13] ¶ 1;

see also Martinez Testimony, Mar. 10 Tr. at 125 (testifying that

Mark Paoletta joined the CFPB as Chief Legal Officer around this

date).

The President designates Director of the Office of Budget and

Management Russell Vought as Acting Director that evening. First

Martinez Decl. ¶¶ 9–10; Am. Compl. ¶ 38.

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Saturday, February 8 8:50 a.m. Acting Director Vought sends email all CFPB employees.

From: Vought, Russell

To: _DL_CFPB_AllHands

Subject: Directives on Bureau Activities

Date: Saturday, February 8, 2025 8:50:28 PM

Dear Colleagues,

I am honored that President Trump designated me as

Acting Director of the Bureau on February 7, 2025.

As Acting Director, I am committed to implementing

the President’s policies, consistent with the law, and

acting as a faithful steward of the Bureau’s resources.

To that end, I am directing that, effective

immediately, unless expressly approved by the

Acting Director or required by law, all employees,

contractors, and other personnel of the Bureau shall:

 Not approve or issue any proposed or final rules

or formal or informal guidance.

 Suspend the effective dates of all final rules that

have been issued or published but that have not

yet become effective.

 Not commence, take additional investigative

activities related to, or settle enforcement

actions.

 Not open any new investigation in any manner,

and cease any pending investigations.

 Not issue public communications of any type,

including publication of research papers and

compliance bulletins.

 Not approve or execute any material agreements,

including related to employee matters or

contractors.

 Not make or approve filings or appearances by

the Bureau in any litigation, other than to seek a

pause in proceedings.

 Cease all supervision and examination activity.

 Cease all stakeholder engagement.

If you have any questions, please raise issues through

your existing management for consideration by the

Acting Director.

Thank you.

12

Russell T. Vought

See Email from Russell Vought (Feb. 8, 2025) [Dkt. # 23-2] (“Feb.

8 Email”).

Vought sends a letter to Federal Reserve Chair Jerome

Powell stating that the CFPB does not need funds for Third

Quarter FY 2025. Ex. G to First Martinez Decl. [Dkt.

# 31-1] at Page 22 of 22. 3

Vought posts on X: “The CFPB has been a woke &

weaponized agency against disfavored industries and

individuals for a long time. This must end.” See

@russvought, X (Feb. 8, 2025); Ex. F to Decl. of A. Roston

& A. Scible [Dkt. # 38-17] (“Roston/Scible Decl.”).

Sunday, February 9 Chief Operating Officer Adam Martinez emails all CFPB

employees and contractors.

To: _DL_CFPB_AllHands

Subject: Please Read: DC Headquarters Building

Operating Status (2/10-2/14)

Date: Sunday, February 9, 2025 1:39:00 PM

(This message is for DC Headquarters Staff and

Contractors)

Dear Colleagues:

The DC Headquarters Building will be closed this

week (2/10-2/14). Employees and contractors are to

work remotely unless instructed otherwise from our

Acting Director or his designee.

Thank you.

Adam

Adam Martinez

Chief Operating Officer

3 Citations to filings with the court include the docket number of the filing, [Dkt. # __], pin

cites to page or paragraph numbers appearing in the original documents, and where available,

Bates numbers placed on a document by the parties at the bottom right corner. For filings

containing multiple documents in a single docket entry, the Court includes pin cites to the PDF

page numbers at the top right of the document placed on the filing by the court’s Electronic Case

Filing system: “at Page __ of __.”

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Email from Adam Martinez (Feb. 9, 2025) [Dkt. # 23-3]

(“Feb. 9 Email”).

Plaintiffs file the instant lawsuit. Compl. [Dkt. # 1].

Monday, February 10 8:30 a.m. Vought sends email to all CFPB employees and

contractors.

To: DL CFPB AllHands

Subject: Additional Directives on Bureau Activities

Date: Monday, February 10, 2025 8:30:43 AM

Good morning, CFPB staff,

As you have been informed by the Chief Operating

Officer in an email yesterday, the Bureau’s DC

headquarters building is closed this week.

Employees should not come into the office. Please

do not perform any work tasks. If there are any

urgent matters, please alert me through Mark

Paoletta, Chief Legal Officer, to get approval in

writing before performing any work task. His email

is [REDACTED]. Otherwise, employees should

stand down from performing any work task. Thank

you for your attention on this matter.

Best,

Russ Vought

Acting Director

Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection

Email of Feb. 10 [Dkt. # 23-4] (“Feb. 10 Email” or “stop work

email”). 4

Adam Martinez meets with the Office of Personnel Management

(“OPM”) regarding the mechanics for a Reduction in Force (“RIF”).

Martinez Testimony, Mar. 10 Tr. at 46, 126–27.

4 The exhibits introduced by the parties and counsel for both sides have referred to this email

as the “stop work” order or email, and the Court will refer to it in the same manner in this opinion.

See Pls.’ TRO Mem. [Dkt. # 14] at 12; Defs.’ Opp. at 34; Mar. 10 Tr. at 49, 56 (counsel for

defendants referring to Acting Director Vought’s “stop-work email” and “the stop-work order”);

Defs.’ Ex. 3 [Dkt. # 56-1] at page 5 of 116, CFPB_00005 (Chief Legal Officer Paoletta referring

to the email as “the stop work order”).

14

8:45 a.m. In response to the stop work email, CFPB Chief

Information Officer Christopher Chilbert emails Adam Martinez to

clarify the level of support to be provided in light of the order.

I want to clarify the level of support we should be

providing based on this email. I think the minimum

is:

1) Onboarding new political leadership and

providing them with necessary service desk

support to them

2) Performing security monitoring tasks for our

networks

3) Supporting US DOGE members with requests

4) Perform any maintenance tasks needed to

ensure that the HMDA application, Consumer

Complaint Database operate, ServiceNow, and

Microsoft365 platform (email/SharePoint)

continue to operate.

5) Support any other requests from the Acting

Director or new political leadership.

I think this is the minimum, but I want to confirm

before giving the team direction.

Defs.’ Ex. 1 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Pages 1–2 of 116, CFPB_00001–2. 5

8:54 a.m. Martinez responds to Chilbert and agrees: “That is all

correct. The USDS Team [also referred to as DOGE] will let you or

me know if any other work is needed.” Defs.’ Ex. 1 [Dkt. # 56-1]

at Page 1 of 16, CFPB_00001.

11:58 a.m. Chilbert replies to Martinez, requesting authorization to

create list of contractors necessary to support operational

emergencies. Defs.’ Ex. 1 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 1 of 116,

CFPB_00001.

5 Defendants’ exhibit list appears at [Dkt. # 70-3].

15

4:43 p.m. CFPB Assistant Director, Research Jason Brown tells

Chief Legal Officer Mark Paoletta that the Office of Research has

stopped work on publishing Average Prime Offer Rate (APOR).

Defs.’ Ex. 3 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 5 of 116, CFPB_00005.

7:15 p.m. Chief Legal Officer Paoletta replies to Brown: “The task

of doing the work to publish the Average Prime Offer Rate (APOR)

and publishing it are exempted from the stop work order.” Defs.’

Ex. 3 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 5 of 116, CFPB_00005.

President Trump tells a reporter that he intends to have the CFPB

“totally eliminated” and “we did the right thing. The CFPB was a

very important thing to get rid of, and it was also a waste. I mean,

number one, it was a bad group of people running it, but it was also

a waste.” See Alejandra Jaramillo, Trump confirms goal to “totally

eliminate” the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CNN

(Feb. 10, 2025), Ex. G to Roston/Scible Decl. [Dkt. # 38-17].

Tuesday, February 11 Approximately 85 CFPB probationary employees are fired. Decl. of

Peyton Diotalevi, NTEU National Counsel [Dkt. # 41-1] (“Diotalevi

Decl.”) ¶ 4; Kaspar Decl. ¶ 16; Martinez Testimony, Mar. 10 Tr. at

128; Testimony of Alex Doe, Tr. of Evidentiary Hr’g (Mar. 11,

2025) [Dkt. # 74] (“Mar. 11 Tr.”) at 45; see also Template of

Notification of Termination During Probationary Period, Pls.’ Ex. C

[Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 7 of 107.

10:27 a.m. CFPB Chief Financial Officer Jafner Gueye tells

deputies to identify which “contracts directly support a statutory

requirement, meaning that we would not be able to meet a statutory

requirement without this contract.” Pls.’ Ex. F [Dkt. # 60-1] at

Page 14–15 of 107.

11:10 a.m. Email from Consumer Response and Education

identifying contracts that directly support its statutory requirements

(attachment not provided). Pls.’ Ex. F [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 14 of

107.

12:36 p.m. Adam Martinez emails Chief Legal Officer Paoletta and

James Bishop to introduce them to Chief Financial Officer Jafner

Gueye: “1. At your convenience he will be ready to provide you a

briefing on the Civil Penalty Fund including the contractor/vendor

that serves as the Bureau’s intermediary and the process for

disbursements of funds to consumers. 2. Jafnar is currently in

communications with the Federal Reserve regarding the Bureau’s

ability to return money to either Treasury or the Federal Reserve if

needed.” Pls.’ Ex. E [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 12 of 107.

16

12:47 p.m. Email from Joshua Galicki to contracting officers with

subject line “Urgent Action: Contract Termination and Continuation

Notifications (Emails)” with instructions on how to issue contract

termination notifications. Galicki states, “We need to get these

Termination Notifications out ASAP.” Pls.’ Ex. A [Dkt. # 60-1] at

Page 2 of 107; see also Decl. of Charlie Doe [Dkt. # 38-4] (“Charlie

Doe Decl.”) ¶¶ 5–6 (stating the Bureau issued “an urgent directive

to the contracting department to cancel all of the agency’s contracts.

I am aware of only two exceptions to this initial directive: the

contract for storing litigation data and the database that houses

employees’ financial disclosure information”).

4:32 p.m. Chief Legal Officer Paoletta emails Chief Financial

Officer Gueye on behalf of Acting Director Vought, “Subject:

Cancellation of CFPB contracts,” directing “the cancellation of all

contracts in the following divisions: Enforcement (102 contracts),

Supervision (16 contracts), External Affairs (3 contracts), Consumer

Response (20 contracts), Office of Director (33 contracts), and

Legal Division (all except 2 contracts – FD Online Licenses and

litigation data)” and the contract for concrete repairs. Defs.’ Ex. 4

[Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 6 of 116, CFPB_00006; see also Martinez

Testimony, Mar. 10 Tr. at 162–64.

5:14 p.m. Josha Galicki emails contracting officers advising them

of the directive to terminate all Enforcement, Supervision, External

Affairs, Consumer Response, and Office of Director contracts. Pls.’

Ex. B [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 5 of 107.

Wednesday, February 12 6:51 p.m. Adam Martinez emails Chief Financial Officer Gueye,

Jordan Wick, Christopher Young, and OPM Deputy Associate

Director, HR Strategy Jason Parman approving the Statement of

Work for “RIF Consulting Services,” under which CFPB is to pay

OPM initial funding of $171,925. Pls.’ Ex. II [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page

3–4 of 60.

Thursday, February 13 Plaintiffs file an amended complaint and motion for temporary

restraining order. Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 7]; Mot. for TRO [Dkt. # 10].

3:30 p.m. The RIF team, including Alex Doe, Adam Martinez, and

others meet with Jordan Wick, Jeremy Lewin, and OPM officials.

Alex Doe Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr. at 38. Jeremy Lewin and Jordan

Wick talk off screen with Acting Director Vought, and Wick tells

the group that they want formal RIF notices to go out no later than

February 14. Id. at 41–44.

17

Approximately 130 CFPB term employees were fired. Diotalevi

Decl. ¶ 4; Martinez Testimony, Mar. 10 Tr. at 128; Alex Doe

Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr. at 45.

Post on X regarding tip line for the public to report “being pursued

by CFPB enforcement or supervision staff, in violation of Acting

Director Russ Vought’s stand down order.” Diotalevi Decl. ¶ 6;

Pls.’ Ex GG [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 103 of 107.

Julie Barnard is terminated from her temporary excepted service

appointment as a Markets & Policy Fellow. She is also the Student

Loan Ombudsman. The stated reason for her termination is the

February 11, 2025 Executive Order. Pls.’ Ex. H [Dkt. # 60-1] at

Page 19–20 of 107; Decl. of Julia Barnard [Dkt. # 38-10] (“Barnard

Decl.”) ¶ 2.

5:01 p.m. Adam Martinez emails Michael Mahoney of OPM

attaching CFPB’s “request for an exception to the RIF 90-day rule

for competitive areas.” Pls.’ Ex. JJ [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 7–8 of 60.

This memorandum serves as the Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) request for an exception

to the competitive area 90-day rule. . . . The CFPB

is responding to Executive Order Implementing

The President’s “Department of Government

Efficiency” Workforce Optimization initiative –

The White House dated February 11, 2025 and

the CFPB Acting Director’s work stoppage order

dated February 10, 2025.

Pls.’ Ex. JJ [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 9–11 of 60 (emphasis added); see

also Martinez Testimony, Mar. 10 Tr. at 48–49 (confirming the two

justifications).

RIF team receives the templates from OPM for firing the 1200

employees “at night on the 13th.” Alex Doe Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr.

at 46–47.

10:10 p.m. Jeremy Lewin emails Adam Martinez that “[w]e owe

Acting Director Vought an update at 10am tomorrow.” Pls.’ Ex. JJ

[Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 6 of 60.

10:12 p.m. Martinez, Lewin, and others are informed that OPM

approved the exception request. Pls.’ Ex. JJ [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 6

of 60.

18

Friday, February 14 12:55 a.m. Plaintiffs file their supporting memorandum and exhibits

for the motion for a temporary restraining order. Pls.’ Mem. in

Supp. for Mot. for TRO [Dkt. # 14] (“Pls.’ TRO Mem.”).

8:28 a.m. Adam Martinez emails [REDACTED] advising that the

request for an exception to the RIF ninety-day rule for competitive

areas was approved. Pls.’ Ex. JJ [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 6 of 60.

8:30 a.m. RIF team including Adam Martinez meets to review OPM

templates. Alex Doe Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr. at 47.

10:00 a.m. RIF team including Adam Martinez meets with OPM.

Alex Doe Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr. at 47.

11:08 a.m. The Court sets a scheduling hearing for 2:00 p.m. that

afternoon. See ECF Notice of Hr’g (Feb. 14, 2025).

11:36 a.m. [REDACTED] emails Jason Parman of OPM HR

Strategy about the Exception Template: “Attached are templates of

Reduction in Force notifications with and without Severance Pay.”

Pls.’ Ex. MM [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 21 of 60.

12:27 p.m. CFPB’s Office of Human Capital sends email:

On Monday, February 10th CFPB’s Acting Director

issued guidance for Bureau staff to pause work tasks.

In accordance with the Acting Director’s guidance

employees should exercise administrative leave until

otherwise instructed. For staff who have been asked

to work by the Acting Director, the Chief Legal

Officer, or another designee (i.e. through their

leadership chain, etc.) they should record that time as

they normally would. All time not in a working

status should be reflected in webTA under the

“Admin/Excused Absence” leave transaction

category.

Pls.’ Ex. J [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 27 of 107.

12:38 p.m. Adam Martinez emails [REDACTED], forwarding a

12:34 email he sent to Chris Young, Jeremy Lewin, Jordan Wick,

copying Mark Paoletta and others:

My team and I had a productive conversation with

OPM this morning to work out any identified risks

and answer follow-up questions regarding today’s

actions and notifications to staff. OPM shared that

19

typically during the 30-day notice, employees work

during this time to transfer any duties. Mark P. just

happened to call me, and I was able to ask for

clarification and expectations for the first phase of

notifications.

We are going to place all staff on administrative

leave for the 30-day notice period. This will provide

the flexibility for our new leadership team to call

back staff to fulfill closeout duties such as

enforcement cases. If there are pockets of staff who

we later determine do not need to be called back, we

can immediately offboard them (i.e., terminate

access) for the duration of the notice period. I will

provide you all notice right before the letters go out,

along with the final numbers. This will all be done

this afternoon.

Pls.’ Ex. KK [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 13 of 60.

1:36 p.m. Adam Martinez receives email from [REDACTED]

notifying him of the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary

restraining order in this case:

Hi Adam, Wanted to make sure you were aware there

is a hearing for a temporary restraining order or

preliminary injunction related to today’s activities

scheduled for 2pm today. While we will continue

preparing, it’s just a consideration when deciding

when to send out the notices.

Pls.’ Ex. LL [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 15 of 60; Alex Doe Testimony,

Mar. 11 Tr. at 51.

Alex Doe was instructed that Adam “wanted me to reach out to

OPM and tell them that they needed to provide the attachments right

away and that we no longer had until close of business. . . . he wanted

me to forward my email to him so he could reach out to some of

their senior leadership and get those attachments quicker.” Alex

Doe Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr. at 52.

1:44 p.m. [REDACTED] sends email to OPM urgently requesting

materials for RIFs: “Thanks for everything you’re doing, but we

need the last set of attachments now. We cannot wait until COB.

We also need an answer on the attached question about the guidance.

Apologies, but we have been instructed we do not have until COB.”

Pls.’ Ex. MM [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 17 of 60; Martinez Testimony,

20

Mar. 10 Tr. at 135–36 (testifying that the people on this email are

members of the RIF team and that this email was not a mistake).

2:00 p.m. Court hearing begins.

2:27 p.m. [REDACTED] sends email attaching list of employees to

be fired. Pls.’ Ex. NN [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 24 of 60.

3:07 p.m. OPM official emails Adam Martinez attaching the signed

February 14, 2025 Letter from OPM Associate Director, Workforce

Policy and Innovation Veronica Hinton approving the request for an

exception to the sixty-day notice requirement for a RIF.

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approves, with

one exception, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s

(CFPB) February l3, 2025, request for OPM approval of an

exception to the 60-day notice period provided given to

employees selected for release through a reduction in force

(RIF). Your request indicates that a RIF is necessary due to

the impact of the Executive Order (EO) titled,

“Implementing The President’s ‘Department of

Government Efficiency’ Workforce Optimization Initiative”

(February 11, 2025), and the CFPB Acting Director’s work

stoppage order dated February 10, 2025.

OPM approves your request in accordance with 5 CFR

351.801 (b).

Pls.’ Ex. OO [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 26, 28 of 60; see also Martinez

Testimony, Mar. 10 Tr. at 48.

4:57 p.m. Adam Martinez emails [READACTED] confirming that

“I’m dual hatted right now with Ops and OHC. I will be on the RIF

list but in next group.” Pls.’ Ex. PP [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 30 of 60.

5:04 p.m. The Court enters the parties’ Consent Order, reflecting

the parties’ agreement that plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO will be

deemed a motion for preliminary injunction and that the agreement

would remain in place until the resolution of motion. The Order

provides that defendants shall not: delete, destroy, remove, or

impair any data, database, or other CFPB records; terminate any

CFPB employee, except for cause related to the specific employee's

performance or conduct; issue any notice of reduction-in-force to

any CFPB employee; or transfer, relinquish, or return any money

from the CFPB's reserve funds. Order. Order [Dkt. # 19]. The

Court sets a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary

injunction on Monday, March 3, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. Id.

21

Alex Doe “reache[s] out to Adam’s other senior advisor” at around

5:00 p.m. and advises that “RIFs [can] not occur until March 3rd.”

Alex Doe Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr. at 52–53.

7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. “[E]mails go[ ] back and forth at 7:00, and

all the way up to near 10 o’clock about these [RIF] notices and fields

for them and what to code them under.” Alex Doe Testimony,

Mar. 11 Tr. at 54.

9:56 p.m. Email regarding materials for RIFs: “Hi you all. Here’s

the proposed coding for the separation actions. Can you please

review and approve for me? . . . [W]e will need to key these over the

weekend so they are there Tuesday morning.” Pls.’ Ex. QQ [Dkt.

# 66-1 at Page 32 of 60.

1:21 p.m. Adam Martinez emails Regional Office Staff and

Contractors that CFPB regional offices will remain closed the week

of February 17–21. Pls.’ Ex. K [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 29 of 107.

Tuesday, February 18 8:15 a.m. Email from [REDACTED] to Adam Martinez and

Christopher Chilbert requesting authorization to repair the website’s

homepage and stating that DOGE personnel “damaged the website

by deleting the homepage.” Pls.’ Ex. L [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 31 of

107; Decl. of Adam Scott [Dkt. # 38-6] (“Scott Decl.”) ¶ 2.

9:32 a.m. Christopher Chilbert responds that he does not have

authorization to reactivate the website: “My understanding is that

the decision to delete the homepage was made by Acting Director

Vought, and it was not an error made by the members of the DOGE

team.” Pls.’ Ex. L [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 31 of 107; Scott Decl. ¶ 3.

Wednesday, February 19 10:12 a.m. Mark Paoletta emails Adam Martinez and Jafner Gueye:

“To follow up on my conversation with Adam just now, I am

directing you to not terminate or suspend any contracts without

specific authorization from Acting Director Vought or me.” Defs.’

Ex. 50 [Dkt. # 66-2] at Page 2 of 14, CFPB_00118.

The first RIF team meeting after Court’s February 14 Consent Order

is held, including Adam Martinez and OPM officials. Alex Doe

Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr. at 54. Martinez is “more focused on the

transfer of functions at that meeting . . . explaining that he had had

conversations with new leadership and the chief legal officer about

what the wind-down of an agency really meant, and that there were

. . . functions that would need to transfer, and OPM was pressing us

to identify where those would transfer and we did not yet have an

answer.” Id. at 55. “Q. Did he refer at this meeting to winding down

the Agency? A. He did. Q. What did you understand that to mean?

22

A. Closing of the Agency.” Id. at 54–56. “And he used that phrase,

‘the closure of the Agency’? A. He did.” Id. at 57. Martinez said

or implied the plan was on pause because of the order. Id. at 57–58.

7:19 p.m. Mark Paoletta emails Adam Martinez, Jafner Gueye, and

Anthony Licata directing them to rescind contract termination

notices. Defs.’ Ex. 51 [Dkt. # 66-2] at Page 3 of 14, CFPB_00119.

President Trump announces in an interview that his administration

has “virtually shut down the out of control CFPB.” Lesley Stahl,

Why the Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau is being targeted by

Trump, DOGE, CBS News (Feb. 23, 2025), Ex. P to Roston/Scible

Decl. [Dkt. # 38-17].

Thursday, February 20 An “internal meeting” is held “with some human capital colleagues

that are not part of the RIF team . . . . And in that meeting, [Adam

Martinez] was a lot more specific about what exactly the plan was

for the Bureau.” Alex Doe Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr. at 58.

“[Martinez] said there would no longer be a CFPB. He said that we

were legitimately shutting down. He said that we would be wiped

out within 30 days. He said that the White House had instructed us

to cancel all of our committees and advisory boards and travel cards

and purchase cards and to only keep any contracts that were

necessary to effectuate the closure of the Agency within 30 days. . . .

Adam said there would be no positions to compete for. Q. No

positions to compete for, you understood that to mean because the

entire divisions would be eliminated? A. Because the Agency

would be eliminated. He was a lot more specific in that meeting that

was just the CFPB.” Alex Doe Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr. at 59.

“During meetings about the CFPB’s shut-down that took place

between Monday, February 18 and Tuesday, February 25, staff were

told by Senior Executives that the CFPB would be eliminated except

for the five statutorily mandated positions; that the CFPB would

exist in name only; and that, once this Court’s injunction was over,

everything would need to be either removed from the building or

destroyed. Staff were told by Senior Executives that the CFPB

would no longer have an employee location and that data could not

be stored at any CFPB location because there wouldn’t be any

locations left. Staff were told that no DHS, OIG, GAO, OMB,

Internal Controls, Congressional, or other compliance would be

necessary because the CFPB would ‘not exist’ and it would no

longer be ‘our problem.’” Decl. of Drew Doe [Dkt. # 38-5] (“Drew

Doe Decl.”) ¶ 7 .

23

“Senior Executives explained that the work stoppage on February

10 was characterized as a work stoppage to avoid the 10-day legal

limit on administrative leave.” Drew Decl. ¶ 8.

7:04 p.m. Jordan Wick emails Russell Vought and Mark Paoletta

Subject: More contracts to cut

Hi all, Please see attached for the next tranche of

contracts for which we recommend immediate

termination – they’re composed of the following:

 Consumer Credit Information Surveys and

Panels, which will no longer be used

 Various support services (user research and

testing, financial mgmt., internal controls, and

identity access software), all of which we can do

without

These contracts represent $8.4M in obligated value.

@Vought, Russell (CFPB), let us know if you

approve cancelling these and then the rest of the team

will proceed.

Defs.’ Ex. 52 [Dkt. # 66-2] at Page 5 of 14, CFPB_00121.

Friday, February 21 A CFPB Realty Officer sends an email stating that the “CFPB’s

main focus” is “moving out of [its] large headquarters building” on

“a very, very tight timeframe . . . (30 days).” The email also states

that the Bureau will move out “of the regional offices with San

Francisco being the first one.” Diotalevi Decl. ¶ 15.

11:15 a.m. Deputy General Counsel Sonya White emails Adam

Martinez. “Subject: Legal Assistance with Procurement Template

for Contract Termination” “Josh reached for a legal review on the

contract termination template. Confirming that LD is authorized to

assist?” Defs.’ Ex. 5 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 7 of 116, CFPB_00007.

11:30 a.m. Adam Martinez replies to Sonya White.

Hi Sonya – (+Mark P. and Dan for Situational

Awareness) Legal Division is authorized to support

all operational matters being exercised on behalf of

our new leadership and our regulatory/statutorily

requirements including:

Procurement/Contract Actions

Financial Management Actions

Human Capital Actions

24

Labor Relations Actions

Employee Relations Actions

Ethics Actions including vetting of new PAS/SCH

Cs

Technology and Infrastructure Support

Administrative Operations Actions (Security,

facilities, maintenance)

Data Governance/Administration

EEO Processing Counsel Support

Reasonable Accommodation Counsel Support

Mission related support should be coordinated

directly through Mark or Dan.

Defs.’ Ex. 5 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 7 of 116, CFPB_00007.

Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia file amicus brief in

support of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. States’

Br.

Monday, February 24 Defendants file opposition to the motion for preliminary relief,

attaching Declaration of Adam Martinez. Defs.’ Opp. [Dkt. # 31];

First Martinez Decl.

Tuesday, February 25 8:53 a.m. Senior Litigation Counsel Rebecca Smullin sends email

stating that her Consumer Sentinel Account, which has information

subject to litigation holds, is being deactivated. Defs.’ Ex. 8 [Dkt.

# 56-1] at Page 14 of 116, CFPB_00014.

1:25 p.m. Liane Fiano in the Office of Communications emails

LaShaun Warren and copies Adam Martinez and others. “I no

longer have access to Sprinklr, which is where [our] social media

backup records are maintained. We have hard copy exports for

Director Chopra’s account, but everything else lived within Sprinklr

and on our public channel. As the public channels were removed

unexpectedly, we may not be in compliance with our records

retention requirements.” Defs.’ Ex. 7 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 12–13

of 116, CFPB_00012–13.

Tzedek DC files amicus brief in support of plaintiffs’ motion for a

preliminary injunction. Tzedek DC Amicus Br. [Dkt. # 33].

Wednesday, February 26 10:14 a.m. Email regarding discontinuation of Citrix Virtual

Desktop: “The Citrix Virtual Desktop will be unavailable after

Friday, February 28, 2025, at 11:59 PM EST.” Pls.’ Ex. M [Dkt.

# 60-1] at Page 33 of 107. This is the program that allows

25

employees to securely log in to the CFPB system when they are not

at a CFPB computer. Diotalevi Decl. ¶ 20.

Russell Vought, in his capacity as OMB Director, issues memo:

Guidance on Agency RIF and Reorganization Plans Requested by

Implementing The President’s “Department of Government

Efficiency” Workforce Optimization Initiative. See Mem. from

Russell T. Vought, Director, Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, and Charles

Ezell, Acting Director, Off. of Pers. Mgmt., to Heads of Exec.

Dep’ts and Agencies (Feb. 26, 2025) [Dkt. # 70-2] at Page 1–7 of 7.

Thursday, February 27 OPM and RIF team meet. “[W]e discussed some guidance that

came out from Acting Director Vought, but in his OMB capacity. It

was giving him guidance about RIFs for federal agencies.” “[Adam]

said he would discuss it further with acting leadership and that he

would let us know – ‘us’ being the RIF team both at CFPB and at

OPM – that he would let us know if the plan changed. And that has

never – to this day has never happened.” Alex Doe Testimony, Mar.

11 Tr. at 60–61.

11:25 a.m. Email “Subject: Pickup of Personal Belongings and

Return of Equipment from the CFPB HQ: . . . We recognize that you

have personal property, work materials. and federal records in your

office or cubicle. To prepare to vacate the building, the Operations

team has packed up your personal belongings for pickup at 1700 G

Street.” Pls.’ Ex. O [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 37 of 107.

4:18 p.m. Email from Adam Martinez to Research, Monitoring, and

Regulation (“RMR”)

Subject: Statutory/Legal Required Work

Date: Thursday, February 27, 2025 4:18:00 PM

Attachments: Directives on Bureau Activities.msg

Hi RMR Colleagues – Good afternoon.

Thank you for your patience as we continue through

transition and our new leadership’s review of the

Bureau.

On February 8 (email attached), our Acting Director

outlined several areas where work stoppage was

being implemented at the Bureau. He did exclude

areas approved by him or required by law. We want

to ensure that you are aware that statutorily required

work and/or work required by law are authorized.

26

Your teams are authorized to continue carrying out

these responsibilities. Any actions or

communications with outside parties must be sent to

Mark Paoletta, Chief Legal Officer and Daniel

Shapiro, Deputy Chief Legal Officer.

Should you have any questions at all, please feel free

to contact our Chief Legal Officer as directed by the

Acting Director. Alternatively, you are always

welcome to reach out to me if needed. I am happy to

share guidance provided to other leaders and

employees regarding authorized work, including my

own team.

Thank you for your support.

Adam

Adam Martinez

Chief Operating Officer

Defs.’ Ex. 16 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 34 of 116, CFPB_00034.

11:55 p.m. Plaintiffs file reply and supplemental declarations

disputing First Martinez Declaration. Pls.’ Reply [Dkt. # 40]; Pls.’

Suppl. Decls. [Dkt. # 38].

As of February 27, “[n]o member of the Escalated Case

Management [is] perform[ing] any work since at least the February

10th stop-work order.” Emory Doe Decl. [Dkt. # 48-3] ¶¶ 4–5.

RMR employees remain confused because Martinez’s February 27

email does not reference the February 10 stop work email of Vought:

“no work in my office has restarted.” Decl. of Greer Doe [Dkt.

# 48-5] (“Greer Doe Decl.”) ¶ 8.

Friday, February 28 8:54 a.m. Adam Martinez emails Gueye Jafnar and others, directing

them to reinstate the ETK (Entellitrack) contract. ETK is the

database and workstream for EEO, reasonable accommodation, and

anti-harassment/bullying cases, and are required to be proceed by

law.

 This is in response to email highlighting “inability to access

EEO complaints”

 “Some vendors that were asked to ‘turn back on’ operations

were able to, others cannot be back on so easily.”

 “we will not be able to run statutorily required reports”

27

Defs.’ Ex. 19 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 39–41 of 116, CFPB_00039–

41.

10:18 a.m. Deputy Associate Director and Acting Associate

Director, Research, Monitoring, and Regulations Janis Pappalardo

emails Adam Martinez, “In light of your e-mail and discussion

yesterday, my understanding is that we can resume all regular work

related to fulfilling statutory obligations, including regular

management activities. Is that correct?” Defs.’ Ex. 20 [Dkt. # 56-1]

at Page at 44 of 116, CFPB_00044.

10:20 a.m. Martinez replies to Pappalardo that her understanding

that “regular work related to fulfilling statutory obligations,

including regular management activities” can be resumed is correct.

Defs.’ Ex. 20 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 44 of 116, CFPB_00044.

10:33 a.m. Principal Deputy Assistant Director, Supervision Policy

& Operations Cassandra Huggins emails Martinez, “To be clear, the

Feb. 8 email directed us to cease all supervision and examination

activity. Am I correct that directive still stands?” Defs.’ Ex. 22 [Dkt.

# 56-1] at Page 51 of 116, CFPB_00051.

10:49 a.m. Text message telling Francis Doe to “stand down until

further notice.” Pls.’ Ex. S [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 50 of 107; see Decl.

of Francis Doe [Dkt. # 48-4] (“Francis Doe Decl.”) ¶¶ 6–9 (Francis

Doe in RMR and two colleagues receives a direct text to their

personal cell phones, stating: “In response to Adam Martinez’s

email, John [McNamara] has instructed us to stand down until

further notice.” After further emails, declarant emailed Mr.

McNamara again, asking “To clarify, should I get started or wait for

guidance?” Mr. McNamara responded that I should “[w]ait for

guidance.” Having not received any further guidance, I continue to

remain unauthorized to perform any work. Despite Mr. Martinez’s

February 27 email, my understanding is that the stop-work order

issued on February 10th remains in effect.”).

10:58 a.m. Adam Martinez responds to Huggins’ 10:33 a.m. email:

“That is correct. If there are any reports to congress per statute or

anything like that, I’d recommend reaching out to Mark. Other

divisions are raising questions about reports or other statutory

requirements. I’m personally trying to be helpful to just ensure

people know they can ask questions or seek clarification, even it’s

just on operational issues.” Defs.’ Ex. 22 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 50–

51 of 116, CFPB_00050–51.

5:11 p.m. Assistant Director of Research Jason Brown emails

Research staff, telling them to resume “statutory work” – “We

28

stopped most of our statutory work, I know, not because of the

February 8 email, but because of the February 10 email. I clarified

this point with the COO.” Brown states that “the Research

environment not functioning as before.” Pls.’ Ex. Q [Dkt. # 60-1]

at Page 41 of 107.

203 Members of Congress file amicus brief in support of plaintiffs’

motion for a preliminary injunction. Members’ Br.

Saturday, March 1 1:59 p.m. Christopher Young sends Teams message to Adam

Martinez asking if they are “prepared to implement the RIF” if the

“judge lift[s] the TRO.” Defs.’ Teams Exchange Ex. [Dkt. # 70-1]

at Page 1–2 of 2, CFPB_00131–32.

Sunday, March 2 Defendants file Supplemental Declaration of Adam Martinez. [Dkt.

# 47-1] (“Second Martinez Decl.”).

Plaintiffs file Second Declaration of Matthew Pfaff [Dkt. # 48-2]

(“Second Pfaff Decl.”); Declaration of Emory Doe [Dkt. # 48-3];

Decl. of Francis Doe [Dkt. # 48-4]; and Declaration of Greer Doe

[Dkt. # 48-5].

3:33 p.m. Adam Martinez emails all CFPB employees and

contractors on behalf of Chief Legal Officer Mark Paoletta.

Subject: All Hands Message re: Work Required by

Law

Date: Sunday, March 2, 2025 3:33:06 PM

Message from Mark Paoletta, Chief Legal Officer

On behalf of Acting Director Vought, I am writing to

you to ensure that everyone is carrying out any

statutorily required work, as he set forth in his

February 8th email.

On February 8, 2025, you received an email from

Acting Director Vought directing you to halt several

classes of work unless “required by law” or expressly

approved by the Acting Director. On February 10,

2025, you received an email from Acting Director

Vought directing you to reach out to me for the

authorization required by the February 8 email.

These measures were intended to ensure that new

leadership could establish operational control over

the agency while ensuring that it would continue to

fulfill its statutory duties. Many of you understood

29

this and continued to perform functions required by

law and sought approval from me to perform work,

which I have promptly granted.

It has come to my attention, however, that some

employees have not been performing statutorily

required work. Let me be clear: Employees should

be performing work that is required by law and do

not need to seek prior approval to do so. If you have

any questions, please reach out to me immediately,

and I will promptly give you an answer and

authorization if warranted. If you are aware of other

employees that are needed to assist you in

performing a statutorily required task but are not

doing so, please raise this with me immediately.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Mark Paoletta

Chief Legal Officer

CFPB

Defs.’ Ex. 24 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 56 of 116, CFPB_00056.

Monday, March 3 8:45 a.m. Office of Supervision Examinations staff member Caitlyn

Sellers emails supervision staff, instructing them to “continue to

comply with the stop work order.” Pls.’ Ex. V [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page

58 of 107.

10:00 a.m. Court hears argument on plaintiffs’ motion for a

preliminary injunction. It sets an evidentiary hearing for Monday,

March 10, 2025. See Minute Entry (Mar. 3, 2025).

10:02 a.m. [REDACTED] emails Adam Martinez. “Hi, Adam,

Based on every email starting 2/10 the unambiguous guidance was

to stop all work tasks, no stipulation of statute requirements was

made. As of today, Consumer Complaint Database (CCDB) has not

had been refreshed with new data since 02/22/2025 and displays an

error banner . . . .” Pls.’ Ex. Z [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 73 of 107.

11:33 a.m. CFO Gueye reply to Nykea Bolton email: “In general

we are very narrowly turning back contracts (or portions of

contracts) that directly support statutory requirements. . . .

Specifically can you outline for each contract what (statutorily

required) action will not be able to be accomplished at all without

the contract? I can’t stress enough that this needs to be as specific

as possible. We’ll need to be prepared to have someone on the team

30

defend this justification to external parties. All PCards across the

bureau have been cancelled. We’ve been authorized to reopen one

for the entire bureau with a very limited limit so we are triaging the

requests as they come in. I’m using the same criteria as above (i.e.

directly being indispensable to meet a statutory requirement).”

Defs.’ Ex. 29 [Dkt. # 56-1] at Page 98–99 of 116, CFPB_00098–99.

11:39 a.m. Chief Financial Officer Gueye replies to Chilbert email:

“[W]e’re getting a lot of requests to turn contracts back on. I will

send out guidance shortly but for your awareness we are not turning

back on every contract we’ve had. We’re taking a very narrow

approach: if without the contract the Bureau can’t meet a statutory

requirement then it will be considered for reactivation. Meaning that

a contract enhancing our ability to meet a statutory requirement is

not enough to get it back on. It needs to be the only way the bureau

can currently meet that requirement. Also as you’re providing

justifications please be prepared to have to defend those to external

patties. We’ve been routinely asked to provide for names of the

people providing the justification.” Defs.’ Ex. 38 [Dkt. # 56-1] at

Page 96 of 116, CFPB_00096; Martinez Testimony, Mar 10 Tr. at

85 (Martinez does not believe guidance has been sent out).

12:31 p.m. Email providing term employee with notification of

termination (approved on February 15) pursuant to “E.O. 14210 and

the stop work email from Russ Vought.” Pls.’ Ex. CC [Dkt. # 60-1]

at Page 89–90 of 107.

3:52 p.m. Regional Director, Midwest Region John Schroeder

emails supervision examiners asking them to “refrain from all work

activity other than ministerial tasks” pending further guidance,

forwarding Paoletta’s March 2 email. Pls.’ Ex. U [Dkt. # 60-1] at

Page 55–56 of 107.

Email notifying supervision staff that Martinez and Paoletta’s

March 2 emails do not authorize them to carry out activities

“required by law.” Pls.’ Ex. W [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 63 of 107.

Tuesday, March 4 7:50 a.m. Email providing probationary employee with Notification

of Termination (approved on February 13) pursuant to “E.O. 14210

and the stop work email from Russ Vought.” Pls.’ Ex. BB [Dkt.

# 60-1] at Page 85–87 of 107.

8:38 a.m. Chris Chilbert sends email to Chief Financial Officer

Jafner Gueye and others request to pay for Google Analytics

platform, without which CFPB “will lose all historical data.” Pls.’

Ex. EE [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 95 of 107.

31

8:45 a.m. Christopher Chilbert sends email to someone who has

asked to fix the homepage: “I believe it is important to restore the

home page as soon as possible, but that is not currently authorized.”

Pls.’ Ex. DD [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 92 of 107.

8:58 a.m. Gueye sends email advising that there is a problem with

PCards, and that there is only one PCard exception, which has “a

very limited total limit.” Pls.’ Ex. EE [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 94

of 107.

OPM and RIF hold team meeting, with Martinez no longer

attending. “On the 4th, it was mostly about a cost estimate for the

final phase after the 1200, doing, you know, reduction in force on

the rest of the positions.” Alex Doe Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr. at 61–

62.

White House issues statement that “President Trump ordered the”

CFPB “to halt operations.” The White House, “President Trump is

Making Government Work for You Again,” Pls.’ Ex HH [Dkt. #

60-1] at Page 105–107 of 107.

Wednesday, March 5 7:27 a.m. Email advising of indefinite postponement of mandatory

training. Pls.’ Ex. SS [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 37 of 60.

10:01 a.m. Email from Cassandra Huggins emails regional

examiners directing them to prepare a report requested by Mark

Paoletta on their supervision examination activity. Pls.’ Ex. UU

[Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 42 of 60.

Thursday, March 6 OPM and RIF hold another team meeting on work OPM needs the

RIF team to do to help define competitive levels. Martinez is no

longer attending meetings. Alex Doe Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr. at 63.

1:08 p.m. Email regarding reporting on supervision activity and

return to administrative leave. Pls.’ Ex. WW [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page

53 of 60.

6:17 p.m. Bruce McNitt emails John McNamara about the impact

of contract cancellations on the Office of Markets. Pls.’ Ex. XX

[Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 55–56 of 60.

Friday, March 7 10:07 a.m. Email from head of Office of Students team indicating

that they are currently unable to perform required complaint-review

function. Pls.’ Ex. ZZ [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 60 of 60.

Monday, March 10 The Court holds evidentiary hearing at which Adam Martinez

testifies. See Minute Entry (Mar. 10, 2025); Mar. 10 Tr.

32

Tuesday, March 11 The Court holds evidentiary hearing at which Adam Martinez

concludes his testimony, and Alex Doe and Matthew Pfaff testify.

See Minute Entry (Mar. 11, 2025); Mar. 11 Tr.

ANALYSIS

V. THE COURT MAY EXERCISE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER

THIS CASE.

“[E]very federal court has a ‘special obligation to satisfy itself’ of its own jurisdiction

before addressing the merits of any dispute.” Dominguez v. UAL Corp., 666 F.3d 1359, 1362

(D.C. Cir. 2012), quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). As

an Article III court, this Court’s judicial power is limited to adjudicating actual “cases” and

“controversies.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).

A. The Court has jurisdiction to decide Counts One, Three, and Four.

In Count One, plaintiffs have alleged both statutory and constitutional violations, and it is

a fundamental proposition of constitutional law that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of

the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177

(1803). Counts Three and Four are predicated on the APA. These are the claims that will underlie

this ruling, 6 and the Court has jurisdiction to hear them and to impose injunctive relief.

While the decisions in this case implemented Presidential directives, the President is not

the defendant in this action: plaintiffs sued Russell Vought, in his official capacity as Acting

Director of the CFPB, and the agency itself. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U.S. 579 (1952), the Supreme Court remedied the President’s wrongful seizure of the nation’s

6 Given that finding, and the fact that the relief to be granted will be predicated on those

counts, the Court need not address the merits of Count Two, which asserts that the firing of the

CFPB Director did not create a “vacancy” that could be filled under Federal Vacancies Reform

Act, 5 U.S.C. §3345, and that therefore, the appointment of defendant Vought as Acting Director

of the CFPB violated the Appointments Clause. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

33

steel mills through an injunction to his subordinates, and that case continues to be cited for the

proposition that “courts have power to compel subordinate executive officials to disobey illegal

Presidential commands.” Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1072, n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

In Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the D.C. Circuit reiterated the

“bedrock principle that our system of government is founded on the rule of law.” And it explained

that therefore:

it is sometimes a necessary function of the judiciary to determine if

the executive branch is abiding by the terms of legislative

enactments. In most cases, any conflict between the desire to avoid

confronting the elected head of a coequal branch of government and

to ensure the rule of law can be successfully bypassed, because the

injury at issue can be rectified by injunctive relief against

subordinate officials.

Id. at 978 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

These principles apply to cases raising constitutional questions as well as statutory

questions; “the court’s power to enjoin unconstitutional acts by the government . . . is inherent in

the Constitution itself.” Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 190, n.22 (D.C. Cir. 2006), quoting

Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d, 1 at 11, n.15 (1986). See also id. at 343 (“the ‘APA’s waiver of

sovereign immunity applies to any suit whether under the APA or not’”), citing Chamber of Com.

v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 7

7 See also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491, n.2 (2010),

in which the Supreme Court recognized its power to hear challenges to the constitutionality of

governmental action on separation of powers principles, citing Correctional Servs. Corp. v.

Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (equitable relief “has long been recognized as the proper means

for preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally”); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)

(“[I]t is established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue

injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution . . . .”); and Ex parte Young,

209 U.S. 123, 149, 165, 167 (1908).

34

Count One alleges that the defendants’ actions to dismantle and shut down the CFPB are

unconstitutional because they exceed the executive’s authority and usurp the legislature’s

authority: “[t]he CFPB was established as a federal agency by Congress by statute, the Dodd

Frank Act, signed into law in 2010, and can be eliminated only by Congress.” Am. Compl. ¶ 79.

This claim is likely to succeed as there is no mystery about what is going on as the

President and his delegees, Elon Musk and Russell Vought, have made their actions and intentions

clear.

On February 6, officials representing the Department of the Treasury notified the CFPB

that individuals from United States DOGE Service would need access to the building that evening.

First Martinez Decl. ¶ 6. A follow-up meeting was held on February 7. Id. ¶ 7. On that date, the

President designated Russell Vought, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to serve

as the Acting Director of the CFPB, id. ¶ 10; Feb. 8 Email, and by that evening, Musk had already

posted “CFPB RIP” and a tombstone emoji on his social media site X. Kaspar Decl. ¶ 6.

On February 8, Vought suspended rulemaking, investigative, public communication, and

litigation activities, but also ordered that “effective immediately,” all CFPB employees shall

“cease all supervision and examination activity,” and “cease all stakeholder engagement.” Feb. 8

Email. By February 10, the day Vought ordered all employees to stop all work, President Trump

acknowledged that his goal was to have the agency “totally eliminated,” and he added that “we did

the right thing. The CFPB was a very important thing to get rid of, and it was also a waste. I

mean, number one, it was a bad group of people running it, but it was also a waste.” See Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 2, 47, n.14, citing @factpostnews, X (Feb. 10, 2025), https://x.com/joeygarrison/status/

18891320239 33022283?Mx=2.

35

1. The constitutional claims are not barred by Dalton v. Spector.

Defendants argue that this Court has no power to hear the constitutional claim that

underlies Count One, as it is nothing more than a statutory claim, and they cite Dalton v. Specter,

511 U.S. 462, 472 (1994), for that principle. But the holding in that case arose in a situation that

is not at all analogous to the situation here. In Dalton, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Secretary

of Defense from closing the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. The President had made the decision

to do so pursuant to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 10 U.S.C. § 2687.

As the opinion explains in detail, the Act established an “elaborate selection process” that

concludes with a set of recommendations on the President’s desk: the Secretary issues

recommendations for closure or realignment after he has given notice and an opportunity for public

comment; the Secretary submits the recommendations to Congress and to the Defense Base

Closure and Realignment Commission, an independent body whose members are appointed by the

President and confirmed by the Senate; and the Commission conducts hearings, resulting in the

transmittal of a report and recommendations to the President, who has the decision-making

authority. Id. at 464–65. The Act then sets out a timetable for the President’s approval or

disapproval of the recommendations and the submission of any certification of approval to

Congress. Id.

The Court made quick work of the plaintiffs’ claims challenging the actions of the

Secretary and the Commission, finding that they could not be reviewed under the APA because

they were not “final agency actions;” they were simply recommendations to the President, who

had the ultimate decision-making authority. Id. at 476. The actions of the President could not be

reviewed under the APA because the President is not an “agency” under that Act. Id.

36

Thus, the question of jurisdiction in Dalton boiled down to the issue of whether the

President exceeded his authority under the Act, and that, according to the Court, could not be

characterized as a constitutional question. First, it observed:

Our cases do not support the proposition that every action by the President,

or by another executive official, in excess of his statutory authority is ipso

facto in violation of the Constitution. On the contrary, we have often

distinguished between claims of constitutional violations and claims that an

official has acted in excess of his statutory authority.

Id. at 472, citing, inter alia, Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581 (1958) (“In keeping with our

duty to avoid deciding constitutional questions presented unless essential to proper disposition of

a case, we look first to petitioners’ non-constitutional claim that respondent [Secretary of the

Army] acted in excess of powers granted him by Congress ”). 8 The Court then distinguished the

situation before it from what had been at issue in Youngstown:

In Youngstown, the Government disclaimed any statutory authority for the

President’s seizure of steel mills. The only basis of authority asserted was

the President’s inherent constitutional power as the Executive and the

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Because no statutory authority

was claimed, the case necessarily turned on whether the Constitution

authorized the President’s actions. Youngstown thus involved the conceded

absence of any statutory authority, not a claim that the President acted in

excess of such authority. The case cannot be read for the proposition that

an action taken by the President in excess of his statutory authority

necessarily violates the Constitution.

8 The Court also cited Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691,

n.11, (1949), which stated that sovereign immunity would not shield an executive officer from suit

if the officer acted either unconstitutionally or beyond his statutory powers. It commented that

there was a difference: “[i]f all executive actions in excess of statutory authority were ipso facto

unconstitutional . . . there would have been little need in Larson for our specifying unconstitutional

and ultra vires conduct as separate categories.” Id. Count One alleges that the decision to close

the agency is contrary to statute and the constitution; if the defendants do not defend on the grounds

that the President was exercising his constitutional authority, the Court may not need to reach the

constitutional question.

37

Id. at 473 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Applying that reasoning, the Court found that

the respondents’ claim that the Secretary’s action was inconsistent with the Act was at bottom a

statutory claim. It held that “[w]here a statute, such as the 1990 Act, commits decisionmaking to

the discretion of the President, judicial review of the President’s decision is not available.” Id. at

477.

That ruling does not serve as any sort of impediment here. While the government disputes

whether it is engaged in the elimination of the agency as a matter of fact, it is not suggesting that

doing so would have been an exercise of discretion authorized by the statute in question as the

Secretary’s actions were in Dalton. See Defs.’ Opp. at 28–29. Nor are plaintiffs solely alleging

that defendants in this case exceeded any statutory authority accorded to the agency under the

Dodd-Frank Act; their argument is that Acting Director Vought’s actions to close the agency on

behalf of the President violated both the separation of powers inherent in the Constitution and the

statute that created the CPPB and assigned it mandatory duties. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 9, 10, 76–

80, and 92.

There are significant differences between the abrupt closure of a federal agency by the

executive and the implementation of the multi-layered administrative, executive, and

Congressional process that led to the closure of a shipyard. Therefore, it is telling here that the

Dalton Court took pains to emphasize that it was not repudiating Marbury v. Madison or the

“nearly two centuries of constitutional adjudication” that followed; the “conclusion that judicial

review is not available for respondents’ claim follows from our interpretation of an Act of

Congress, by which we and all federal courts are bound.” 511 U.S. at 477. Since there is no act

of Congress that empowers the President to shut down the CFPB in his discretion, Dalton does not

38

apply, and the Court has jurisdiction to perform its traditional duty and consider both the statutory

and constitutional claims.

2. The APA claims are properly predicated on discrete, final agency

action.

Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the APA claims because, as

they characterize the complaint, plaintiffs are simply voicing a generalized grievance about agency

policy or management, and such claims are not cognizable under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

Federation, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) and Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004)

(“SUWA”). See Defs.’ Opp. at 14–15 (“Plaintiffs’ claims and requested injunction present exactly

the type of wholesale challenge that the APA forbids. They do not seek judicial review of a

discrete agency action. Rather, they seek wholesale judicial review of Defendants’ management

of the CFPB.”); id. at 17 (“Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on their APA claims because they are

sweeping programmatic challenges unavailable under the APA.”). Defendants also pluck one

sentence from Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 809 (2022), and repeat that “the APA does not permit

review of an ‘abstract decision.’” Defs.’ Opp. at 18, citing 597 U.S. at 809. But they do not

suggest that the holding of that case bears on this dispute in any other way. See Defs.’ Opp. at 18.

Defendants’ repeated incantation of the words “programmatic” and “abstract” cannot

change the character of what is actually going on, and there is at least one discrete order before the

Court that is ripe for review.

Plaintiffs’ claims under the Administrative Procedure Act are predicated on sections

706(2)(C) and 706(2)(A). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 90, 93. Section 706(2)(C) provides that “the reviewing

court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be in excess of statutory

jurisdiction, authority or limitations,” and (2)(A) directs the reviewing court to hold unlawful and

39

set aside agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(C), (2)(A).

Congress specified what it meant by these terms. According to the definitions section of

the statute, “agency action” includes “the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction,

relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. §551(13). The word “order”

in that series is defined to mean “the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative,

negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making.” Id.

§ 551(6). There is no question that on February 10, 2025, Acting Director Vought ordered CFPB

employees to stop work. But was that order “final” such that it would be a reviewable agency

action? The statute further explains that when undertaking this review, “the reviewing court shall

decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and

determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. Id. § 706 (“Scope of

Review”).

The test to be applied when a court is ensuring itself of its jurisdiction to review agency

action was set out in Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). “As a general matter, two conditions

must be satisfied for agency action to be ‘final’: First the action must mark the ‘consummation of

the agency’s decision-making process, . . . it must not be of a merely tentative of interlocutory

nature. And second, the action must be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,”

or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’” Id. at 177–78 (citations omitted).

The thrust of defendants’ opposition to the pending motion is that Acting Director Vought’s

February 8 email was nothing more than the typical pause in regulatory and enforcement activities

that would mark the arrival of any new administration.

Incoming Presidents of both parties have routinely issued directives that

pause policy-related decision-making to allow the reevaluation of those

40

policies that were under consideration or under development but not

finalized by the prior administration. Consistent with this practice, on

January 20, 2025, President Trump ordered agencies across the government

to freeze regulatory actions so that new agency leadership may reevaluate

policies and enforcement priorities.

In line with these principles, on February 8, 2025, Russell Vought, Acting

Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau e-mailed all CFPB

staff to direct that, unless “required by law” or “expressly approved by the

Acting Director,” staff were not to take substantive actions that might reflect

policy decisions inconsistent with new leadership’s views on the best way

to meet the agency’s statutory responsibilities.

After this directive, Plaintiffs . . . filed the present motion.

Defs.’ Opp. at 1; see also Defs.’ Opp. at 28–29.

The problem for the defendants is that this explanation is largely irrelevant, and it is

factually incorrect. It is true that plaintiffs filed their initial complaint the day after the February 8

directive. See Compl. [Dkt. #1]. But the February 13 motion for a temporary restraining order

was not filed at that time; it came after the February 10 stop work order and the actions that

followed in its wake. See Mot. for TRO [Dkt. #10]. And the February 8 email is not the basis for

plaintiffs’ request for interim relief, nor will it be the subject of this order. The Court’s concern is

February 10.

Defendants do posit that the February 10 “Vought ‘stop work’ email” does not satisfy the

Bennett test either, but they do that by trying – unsuccessfully – to blur the obvious distinction

between what happened on Vought’s first day at the agency and what he did two days later, relying

on the arguments advanced concerning the February 8 email in their brief. See Defs.’ Opp. at 18

(“[T]he e-mail marks the initiation, not the consummation, of the agency’s decision-making

process. As described in more detail infra at 28–33, the Vought e-mail’s directive to pause some

agency activities reflects a decision by CFPB leadership that agency personnel should not advance

the prior administration’s policies until new leadership has an opportunity to reevaluate agency

41

priorities. That decision is thus ‘preliminary’ in nature and ‘not directly reviewable.’”) (internal

citation omitted).

The record shows that the February 10 stop work order marked the end of whatever

decision-making process the Acting Director found to be necessary, and that it had immediate,

concrete legal consequences. While the February 8 “Directive on Bureau Activities” carved out

activities “expressly approved by the Acting Director or required by law,” the “Additional

Directives” issued on February 10 superseded those instructions with a straightforward,

unqualified statement: “[p]lease do not perform any work tasks.” The order did include the

information that if there were “urgent matters,” employees could “alert” the Acting Director

“through Mark Paoletta, Chief Legal Officer, to get approval in writing before performing any

work task.” Feb. 10 Email. 9 The email concluded by reiterating, “[o]therwise, employees should

stand down from performing any work task.” Id.

The consequences were swift. As of February 10, agency employees understood that no

work meant no work. 10 See Martinez Testimony, Mar. 10 Tr. at 206. On February 11 and 12, all

eighty-five probationary employees were terminated. See, e.g., Alex Doe Testimony, Mar. 11 Tr.

at 45. On what grounds? The Notification of Personnel Action issued by the Office of Personnel

Management, headed by the very same Director, Russell Vought, cited only two sources of

9 As will be set out in more detail below, there were some requests for approval that were

granted, but those generally involved operational needs – keeping the lights on and the computers

running, or doing the work needed to effectuate the RIFs and contract terminations.

10 As of the day before, February 9, employees were informed that the CFPB headquarters

building would be closed, and the President had already announced on January 20, 2025 that

agencies in the executive branch “shall, as soon as practicable, take all necessary steps to terminate

remote work arrangements and require employees to return to work in-person at their respective

duty stations on a full-time basis.” Return to In-Person Work, https://www.whitehouse.gov/

presidential-actions/2025/01/return-to-in-person-work/.

42

authority: the Executive Order 14210 of February 11 and “the stop work email from Russ Vought

Entitled ‘Additional directives on Bureau Activities’” dated February 10. See Notices of Personnel

Action, Pls.’ Ex. BB [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 86 of 107; Pls.’ Ex. CC [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 90 of 107.

In short, the February 10 work stoppage order had an immediate impact on probationary

employees’ legal rights and obligations. See id. at Pages 87, 91 of 107 (second page of Notices

explaining the contents of the first page and the employee’s rights).

Also, on February 11, agency staff received direction to terminate contracts with outside

vendors, affecting the contractors’ rights and obligations, and a template for accomplishing this

task was circulated. Pls.’ Ex. B [Dkt. # 60-1] at 5 of 107; Template of Notification of Termination

During Probationary Period, Pls.’ Ex. C [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 7 of 107.

On February 12, with the probationary and term employees out of the way, the CFBP

entered into an agreement with OPM to receive “RIF Assistance.” Pls.’ Ex. II [Dkt. # 66-1] at

Page 3 of 60. The objective was to fire approximately 1175 employees as soon as possible, leaving

only a skeleton crew to oversee the functions associated with the RIF. Pls.’ Ex. JJ [Dkt. # 66-1]

at Page 10 of 60.

To do that, it was necessary to ask OPM to exempt the CFPB from the ninety-day notice

period ordinarily required when an agency implements a RIF, which is supposed to give the

discharged employees an opportunity to compete for the positions that remain. Since it had already

been determined that there would be no open positions to fill, because the agency was shutting

down completely, the agency submitted a request for an exception to the ninety-day period on

February 13. Pls.’ Ex. JJ [Dkt. # 66-1] at Pages 9–11 of 60.

What did the CFBP identify as the “circumstances” that would warrant giving notice less

than 90 days before a proposed reduction? It wrote: “[t]he CFPB is responding to Executive Order

43

Implementing The President’s ‘Department of Government Efficiency’ Workforce Optimization

Initiative . . . dated February 11, 2025 and the CFPB Acting Director’s work stoppage order dated

February 10, 2025.” Id. at 11.

Unsurprisingly, the Office of Personnel Management approved the request the next day,

again citing only two reasons: the Executive Order of February 11, and “the CFPB Acting

Director’s work stoppage order dated February 10, 2025.” Pls.’ Ex. OO [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 28

of 60.

Given this set of exchanges between the two departments operating under Russell Vought’s

direct control, the defendants’ suggestion that the document that both agencies referred to as a

“work stoppage order” was merely interlocutory, and not a “final order” from which legal

consequences flowed, is entirely unsustainable.

And the consequences kept on coming. On February 13, “term” employees, who were

hired under a temporary/excepted appointment were terminated, and again, the Executive Order

and “the stop work email from Russ Vought” were identified as the justifications. See Pls.’ Ex.

QQ [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 32–33 of 60.

On February 14, the CFPB’s Chief Operating Officer Adam Martinez was informed by

OPM that employees typically work during the notice period, even if it has been truncated to thirty

days, so he asked Mark Paoletta, Director Vought’s legal advisor at both OPM and the CFPB, for

“clarification and expectations.” Pls.’ Ex. KK [Dkt. # 66-1] at Page 13 of 60. After that

conversation, Martinez communicated that all staff would be placed on administrative leave for

the thirty-day notice period. See id. The Operations Manager of the CFPB Office of Human

Capital then disseminated instructions that “employees should exercise administrative leave until

44

otherwise instructed” – why? – “[i]n accordance with the Acting Director’s guidance” of

February 10. Pls.’ Ex. J [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page 27 of 107.

Count Three specifically includes the issuance of the stop work directive as one of

defendants’ orders that constitutes final action under the APA. Given the facts set forth above, the

Court finds that the amended complaint presents at least one final, discrete agency action for the

Court’s review under the APA.

However, that is not the only focus of the complaint. Defendants point to plaintiffs’

iteration of the series of steps taken by agency leadership, including the February 10 work stoppage

order, and plaintiffs’ description of those circumstances as an unlawful effort “to dismantle an

agency that Congress established,” Am. Compl. ¶ 9, see also, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4, 10, 80, 91,

92, 94, as an indication that the complaint amounts to nothing more than a “programmatic”

challenge that does not pass muster under the APA given the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in

Lujan and SUWA. Defs.’ Opp. at 15–16.

But this lawsuit is not a challenge of any agency “program.” It does not challenge any

exercise of the agency’s discretionary authority to regulate activities within its purview or to

enforce particular statutory provisions. It is a challenge to the wholesale cessation of activities –

the decision to shut down the agency completely – which is not within the executive’s authority.

Defendants can hardly complain that the focus of the action is too broad; it was the Acting Director

who chose to paint with a broad brush, not plaintiffs.

Defendants quote SUWA for the proposition that “the purpose of the APA’s discrete agency

action requirement is: ‘to protect agencies from undue judicial interference with their lawful

discretion, and to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy disagreements which courts lack

45

both expertise and information to resolve.” Defs.’ Opp. at 16, quoting SUWA, 542 U.S. at 66–

67. 11

None of those principles is at risk here. The decision to close an agency is not a theoretical

or hypothetical concept – it’s real. The agency is either open or it’s not. It is either responding to

calls from consumers or it’s not. There is nothing abstract about firing employees, cutting off the

funding stream, terminating contracts, or stopping all work; plaintiffs are not engaged in a “policy”

disagreement with the agency, but a battle for its existence. Therefore, in the Court’s view, even

if the February 10 work stoppage order does not satisfy the requirements of a “final order,” the

11 By introducing and editing the quoted language from the SUWA opinion in this manner,

defendants leave out the circumstances that were being discussed in that case, which are easily

distinguished from the case at hand. In SUWA, the petitioners were challenging an agency’s

“failure to act” under section 706(1) of the APA. 542 U.S. at 61–62. And while the Supreme

Court made it clear that like the actions that can be set aside under section 706(2), an agency action

that can be compelled under section 706(1) must be a discrete one, 542 U.S. at 63, it also went to

some lengths to liken section 706(1) to a writ of mandamus and explain that “a claim under 706(1)

can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete action that it is

required to take.” Id. at 64 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 65 (“The limitation to required

agency action rules out judicial direction of even discrete agency action that is not mandated by

law. . . .”) (emphasis in original).

“With these principles in mind,” the Court then turned to one of the claims before it and

found that the statute the petitioners were seeking to enforce in that claim left the agency with a

great deal of discretion as to how to achieve the broad statutory objectives. Id. at 65–66. It was

in that context that the Court made the quoted remarks about “[t]he principal purpose of the APA

limitations we have discussed – and of the traditional limitations upon mandamus from with they

were derived,” and went on to express concern about the situation that would arise “if courts were

empowered to enter general orders compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates[,]” and

find that “the prospect of pervasive oversight by federal courts over the manner and pace of agency

compliance with such congressional directives is not contemplated by the APA.” Id. at 66–67

(emphasis added).

Here, plaintiffs are not invoking the APA to compel compliance with any statutory

provision under section 706(1); while it will be prudent to ensure than any interim relief ordered

is enforceable without the Court’s taking on the problematic role of managing the agency’s

day-to-day operations, the cited section of SUWA does not bear on this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction or the merits of plaintiff’s APA claims.

46

APA claims in Counts Three and Four can be construed as challenging a final, concrete decision

to shut down the agency entirely. 12

The fact that the effort was temporarily stymied or slowed down by the Court’s intervention

and entry of a consent order to freeze the situation does not mean that the decision is not yet

finalized or that it was ever abandoned. As will be explained in more detail below, notwithstanding

defendants’ considerable efforts to paper over what they were assiduously trying to accomplish in

one stroke before the Court ruled at the TRO hearing on February 14, their subsequent attempts to

deny what was afoot are at odds with the undisputed facts in the record and the documents

produced by both sides. Indeed, only two days after the agency’s Legal Officer – who like the

police chief in Casablanca who was “shocked, shocked” to find gambling going on – professed to

be surprised that some employees were not working, the White House posted a message on its

“Work for You Again” webpage boasting: “President Trump ordered the Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau – the brainchild of Elizabeth Warren, which funneled cash to left-wing

advocacy groups – to halt operations.” Pls.’ Ex HH [Dkt. # 60-1] (underlining in original). In

12 Count One could also be construed as being brought under section 706(2)(B) of the APA,

which authorizes the reviewing court to set aside agency action “contrary to constitutional right,

power, privilege, or immunity.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B).

47

sum, the impending closure of the agency is also an action that can be a subject of review under

the APA. 13

B. There are plaintiffs with standing to bring this action.

“[T]o give meaning to Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, the courts have

developed a series of principles termed ‘justiciability doctrines,’” which include standing,

ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United

States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996), citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 750; Fla. Audubon

Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (standing is a necessary “predicate

to any exercise of our jurisdiction”). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show that

it has “suffered an injury in fact” that “is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,”

and it must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000),

13 Defendants have directed the Court to the memorandum opinion and order issued in Mayor

and City Council of Baltimore v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Civ. No. MJM-25-458,

2025 WL 814500 (D. Md. Mar. 14, 2025). See Defs.’ Notice of Suppl. Auth. [Dkt. # 78] (pointing

out that “the court emphasized and explained that ‘[t]he distinction between discrete acts, which

are reviewable, and programmatic challenges, which are not, is vital to’ the APA’s ‘conception of

the separation of powers;’” and that “the Baltimore court rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that they

could ‘challenge a disembodied and unrealized [purported] decision to drain the CFPB of its

operating funds and reserves’”).

The district court’s thoughtful analysis in that case does not bear on the resolution of this

one. The Baltimore lawsuit dealt solely with the funding of the agency, and in particular, Vought’s

February 8 letter to Jerome Powell and the fact that the CFO was communicating with the Federal

Reserve later that week about the possibility of transferring funds back to the Federal Reserve.

2025 WL 814500 at *12–14. Whether those circumstances were sufficiently final to be amenable

to judicial review does not aid in answering the questions addressed here: was the February 10

stop work order final, and has there been a reviewable decision to close the agency entirely?

Moreover, the court in Baltimore based its factual conclusions on what was taking place on the

declarations and documents before it; it did not have the benefit of the full evidentiary hearing held

in this case, which cast some of those declarations and documents in a distinctly different light.

48

quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Banner Health v.

Price, 867 F.3d 1323, 1333–34 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

A plaintiff must show a personal interest in the dispute at all stages of litigation, Davis v.

Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 733 (2008), demonstrating standing “with the manner and

degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

When seeking a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show standing with specific facts

supported by affidavit or other evidence. See Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. United States Dep’t of Com.,

928 F.3d 95, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding that in the context of a preliminary injunction, courts

consider “whether the plaintiff has a substantial likelihood of standing – that is, whether the

plaintiff is likely to be able to demonstrate standing at the summary judgment stage”), quoting

Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

While “plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press,” TransUnion

LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021), it is not necessary that each plaintiff in a case show

standing for each claim; a showing that one plaintiff has standing is sufficient. UAW-Lab. Emp.

& Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[UAW] clearly has standing, and

we need not consider whether the other plaintiffs do.”), citing Mountain States Legal Found. v.

Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996). And plaintiffs need not await the harm to occur

before they can sue or obtain relief: “a person exposed to a risk of future harm may pursue forward

looking, injunctive relief to prevent the harm.” TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 436, citing Clapper

v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414, n.5 (2013); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102

(1983).

The six plaintiffs in this case include three member organizations – a union and an

association that both represent CFPB employees, and a membership-based advocacy group; two

49

consumer advocacy groups; and the estate of an individual consumer who passed away during the

pendency of this case. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13–18. The Court finds that some of them have

presented specific facts supported by affidavit or other evidence to demonstrate that they have

standing, and therefore, it need not address them all at this stage.

1. Injury in fact

An injury in fact is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both (a) concrete and

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, as opposed to merely conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan,

504 U.S. at 560. An injury is particularized if it affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual

manner. Id. at 560 n.1.

(a) Member Organizations

The National Treasury Employees Union is a union that represents CFPB employees, Am.

Compl. ¶ 13; see Kaspar Decl. ¶ 2, and the CFPB Employee Association is an association of current

and former CFPB employees, including probationary employees who have already been fired.

Am. Compl. ¶ 18; Decl. of Christina Coll [Dkt. # 38-15] (“Coll Decl.”) ¶¶ 2–3. Defendants

contend that plaintiff CFPB Employee Association has not established standing. Defs.’ Opp. at

9–10.

A union or other member organization can assert organizational standing on its own behalf,

associational standing on behalf of its members, or both. Equal Rts. Ctr. v. Post Properties, Inc.,

633 F.3d 1136, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2011), citing Abigail All. For Better Access to Developmental

Drugs v. Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2006). An organization has standing on its

own behalf if it satisfies the same standing test that applies to individuals: an actual or threatened

injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the alleged illegal action and likely to be redressed by a

favorable court decision. Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990). An

50

organization has associational standing if it can show that “(a) its members would otherwise have

standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the

organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the

participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Transp. Sec.

Admin., 429 F.3d 1130, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2005), quoting United Food & Comm. Workers Union

Loc. 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 553 (1996) (internal quotation omitted).

Actions by a defendant that “make it more difficult for” an organization “to accomplish

[its] primary mission . . . provide injury for purposes both of standing and irreparable harm.”

League of Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also People for the

Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 797 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The

United States Supreme Court has made plain that a ‘concrete and demonstrable injury to [an]

organization’s activities – with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources – constitutes

far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests’ and thus suffices for

standing.”), quoting Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (holding that generalized

grievances or an abstract concern with a subject that could be affected by the case does not confer

standing, but a showing that alleged illegal action will increase the resources the group must devote

to programs independent of the lawsuit challenging the action does).

The CFPB Employee Association has shown both organizational and associational

standing. The association’s membership is made up entirely of CFPB employees, “dedicated

public servants,” including probationary and term employees, and its purpose to advance CFPB

employees and the mission of the agency. Coll Decl. [Dkt. # 38-15] ¶¶ 2–3. Given that the

association’s existence depends on the existence of an agency workforce, the actions by defendants

to eliminate the CFPB would undoubtedly “make it more difficult for” the association “to

51

accomplish [its] primary mission.” League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 9. This is enough to

demonstrate an injury in fact to support organizational standing. See id.

Moreover, the CFPB Employee Association has demonstrated associational standing.

Defendants terminated probationary and term CFPB employees en masse and without cause during

the week of February 10 and is poised to fire the remaining employees. Alex Doe Testimony,

Mar. 11 Tr. at 45; Alex Doe Decl. [Dkt. # 38-2] at 4. 14 Association members who have serious

health issues or have family members with serious health issues face the risk of concrete and actual

or immanent harm if they lose the health care coverage that comes with their jobs. See Coll Decl.

¶¶ 4–6 (identifying a fired term employee member, who recently learned that she could have a

chronic auto-immune condition and planned to have further medical testing in late March or early

April, expects that she will lose her CFPB health insurance during the critical stage of establishing

a treatment plan with her doctor); id. ¶ 7 (another member who is still employed but at risk of

termination is the insurance provider for the family; she has a spouse on full medical leave with

an ongoing serious medical condition and termination would result the inability to provide the

necessary medical care for them). These harms to its members are sufficient to demonstrate injury

in fact for the CFPB Employee Association.

14 The parties have both addressed the potential significance of the district court decision in

Maryland v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., No. JKB-25-0748, 2025 WL 800216 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2025),

which ordered a number of federal agencies, including the CFPB, to reinstate probationary

employees and prohibiting further reductions in force without notice. Pls.’ Notice of Suppl. Auth.

[Dkt. # 80]; Defs.’ Response to Notice of Suppl. Auth. [Dkt. # 82] (attaching a declaration from

Adam Martinez, identified now as the Acting Chief Human Capital Officer of the CFPB, which

attests that the probationary employees have been reinstated). The Court appreciates the agency’s

compliance with a court order. But it does not find that the decision in a different case and a

different district, challenging a much broader set of executive actions, on grounds different than

those advanced here, being brought by the states as opposed to the organizations and individuals

found to have standing here, should control the interim management of this case, particularly given

the fact that the government has already appealed it, and the finality of it is uncertain.

52

Defendants argue that in seeking a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff-association must

identify a particular member who has standing. Defs.’ Opp. at 37 n.11, citing Ranchers-Cattlemen

Action Legal Fund, United Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 573 F. Supp. 3d 324, 334

(D.D.C. 2021).

The Court is satisfied that the detailed descriptions of individual members’ circumstances

without their names are sufficient to show that at least one identified association member has

suffered an injury in fact, particularly given the personal medical information involved. 15

Plaintiff National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which is also a

membership organization, also has demonstrated the necessary injury in fact. The NAACPS’s

“mission is to achieve equality, political rights, and social inclusion by advancing policies and

practices that expand human and civil rights, eliminate discrimination, and accelerate the well-

being, education, and economic security of Black people and all persons of color.” Decl. of Keisha

D. Bross, Ex. 3 to Pls.’ TRO Mem. [Dkt. # 14-3] (“Bross Decl.”) ¶ 2. This includes working to

protect and educate its members on consumer financial protection issues, see Bross Decl. ¶¶ 3–7,

and the organization has provided evidence that this work has been harmed as a result of

defendants’ actions. The NAACP has been forced to cancel plans to provide CFPB resources at

15 NTEU’s members also have a personal stake in this matter. See Kaspar Decl. ¶ 18

(identifying an NTEU member whose spouse and child each received separate cancer diagnoses

with thirty days of each other and who faces imminent harm from the potential loss of health care

coverage and the inability to obtain life insurance coverage in the future); id. ¶ 22 (identifying one

employee who was very close to completing ten years in government prior to termination and will

likely lose eligibility for the Public Service Loan Forgiveness). But it is not necessary to address

defendants’ arguments that the district court lacks jurisdiction to hear challenges to employment

actions against members of NTEU, Defs.’ Opp. at 11–14, or that those claims constitute improper

“claim splitting” by the plaintiffs, id. at 7–9, at this time. While the actions against employees that

have been taken or threatened are among the facts alleged in the complaint, the Court need not

decide now whether it can or should address their legality when the case proceeds on the merits;

at this point, its focus is the closure of the agency as a whole.

53

the association’s state-by-state conferences “to protect members in the respective state from

financial harm,” Bross Decl. ¶ 6, as well as an educational program offered with the CFPB for its

members on “housing discrimination, CFPB financial protection, and how to protect financial

rights.” Bross Decl. ¶ 7. These are actual harms that impede the work of the organization and

constitute an injury in fact. League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 9.

Furthermore, NAACP members have suffered an injury in fact. Juanita West-Tillman is

an NAACP member who lost everything in the recent Altadena fire in California. Decl. of Juanita

West-Tillman [Dkt. # 38-14] (“West-Tillman Decl.”) ¶¶ 1–2. The CFPB had been providing direct

assistance to NAACP members who were victims of the California fires, including connecting

NAACP members with resources to help them get back on their feet, but this ended when the

CFPB stopped work in early February. West-Tillman Decl. ¶ 4. West-Tillman has been the target

of numerous financial scams and predatory schemes targeting fire victims, and she has “had a

difficult time determining what assistance was legitimate and what was fraudulent.” West-Tillman

Decl. ¶ 3. She planned to take advantage of and rely on CFPB’s assistance, but defendants’ stop

work order and other actions leave her and other NAACP members at risk of becoming victims of

financial predators. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. This is not mere speculation; it is a concrete, actual harm to

NAACP member West-Tillman.

(b) Consumer Advocacy Organizations

Plaintiffs National Consumer Law Center and Virginia Poverty Law Center have also

presented sufficient evidence to show they have suffered an injury in fact. The National Consumer

Law Center is both a customer of and a vendor to the Bureau. It researches, publishes, and

conducts presentations and seminars on matters that affect low-income consumers, and it relies

heavily on the CFPB’s reports and consumer database for that work. See Decl. of Richard Dubois,

54

Ex. 6 to Pls.’ TRO Mem. [Dkt. # 14-6] (“Dubois Decl.”) ¶¶ 3–4, 10–13. 16 Losing this data will

undermine a key part of its mission and work, id., and this type of informational injury has long

been accepted as sufficient to confer standing. See Action All. of Senior Citizens of Greater Phila.

v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 937–38 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (organization suffered cognizable injury when

government cut off “generous flow of information” on which it relied); Drs. for Am. v. Off. of Pers.

Mgmt., 2025 WL 452707, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2025) (“The denial of information these doctors

wish to use in their routine activities has inhibit[ed] . . . their daily operations and thereby caused

an injury both concrete and specific to the work in which they are engaged.”) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (alternations in original).

Further, defendants’ termination of most of CFPB’s contracts, including its contract with

NCLC, is an injury in fact. The Bureau terminated its subscription to NCLC’s manual and

cancelled the three-part training series NCLC had been retained to provide to CFPB staff. See

Dubois Decl. ¶¶ 7–8 (“The CFPB’s contract is the largest single publications contract for NCLC

and significant[ly] assists in funding NCLC’s publications work.”); Feb. 11, 2025 Email from

CFPB Supervisory Contracting Officer Braden Sanner to NCLC, Pls.’ Ex. D [Dkt. # 60-1] at Page

10 of 107 (directing NCLC “to stop work on the subject contract immediately”). NCLC’s work

will increase as a result of defendants’ actions: in the absence of the CFPB, it will have to organize

more trainings and publish more materials; it will have to use more resources to support the legal

service providers that will have to handle the diverted consumer complaints; and it will have to

16 See 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(A) (requiring the bureau to maintain a database of consumer

complaints and responses); 12 U.S.C. § 5499 (requiring all public data assets published by

the bureau to be made publicly available); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(1), (3)(c), (d)(4); id.

§ 5496(c); 15 U.S.C. § 1646(a), (b); id. § 1632(d)(3); id. § 2809(a); and id. § 5512(c)(3) (requiring

reports from various units and the Director).

55

dramatically increase its advocacy in the states and redirect advocacy to multiple agencies and

litigation that would otherwise not be necessary. Dubois Decl. ¶ 15. This is injury in fact.

The other consumer advocacy organization, the Virginia Poverty Law Center, works to

“break down systemic barriers that keep low-income Virginians in the cycle of poverty.” Decl. of

James Speer, Ex. 5 to Pls.’ TRO Mem. [Dkt. # 14-5] (“Speer Decl.”) ¶ 2. It relies on CFPB’s

Consumer Response unit to assist it in providing aid to consumers who call VPLC’s predatory

lending helpline, and “[i]f the complaint system goes away entirely or becomes so unreliable that

it cannot be depended upon, it will make fulfilling our consumer-protection mission much harder.”

Id. ¶¶ 9–10, 15–16, 24. This also constitutes injury in fact.

(c) Individual Consumer

Finally, at the time this action was filed, individual plaintiff Reverend Eva Steege was

engaged in receiving assistance from the CFPB when defendants stopped the Bureau’s work. At

the time, Steege was 83-years old and a Pastor of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. See Decl. of

Pastor Eva Steege, Ex. 2 to Pls.’ TRO Mem. [Dkt. # 14-2] (“Steege Decl.”) ¶ 1. She incurred

student loans when pursuing higher education at the Lutheran Theological Seminary. Id. ¶ 2.

When she submitted her February 13 declaration to the Court, Steege was in hospice care, and she

was only expected to live for another six months. Id. ¶ 1–2. It was her hope to resolve the debt

and spare her family that burden after she died. Id. ¶ 2. She had been trying to enroll in the

Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program to no avail, and contacted the CFPB for help. Id. ¶¶ 2–

3.

On January 23, 2025, Steege met with CFPB employees and the Student Loan

Ombudsman, who explained that she qualified for not only loan forgiveness under the program,

but also a $15,000 refund of overpayments. Id. ¶ 4. Steege was scheduled to have a follow-up

56

meeting on Monday, February 10, id., but after Vought issued the stop work order, and defendants

fired the Ombudsman, Pls.’ Ex. H [Dkt. # 60-1] (Barnard termination notice); Decl. of Julia

Barnard [Dkt. # 38-10] (“Barnard Decl.”) ¶ 2, the CFPB cancelled the meeting. Steege Decl. ¶ 7;

Barnard Decl. ¶ 14. Steege’s fear of leaving her surviving family members saddled with her

student loan debt came to pass on March 15, when she died. See Suggestion of Death [Dkt. # 83].

Now that her husband, Ted Steege, has been substituted as a plaintiff in her stead, Min. Order

(March 26, 2025) (granting motion to substitute), he has standing on his own behalf and on behalf

of her estate to pursue her claim. 17

2. Causation and Redressability

“It is well established that ‘[c]ausation, or traceability, examines whether it is substantially

probable that the challenged acts of the defendant, not of some absent third party, will cause the

particularized injury of the plaintiff.’” Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir.

2012) (alteration in original), quoting Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir.

1996); see also Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. FEC, 13 F.3d 412, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“fair

traceability turns on the causal nexus between the agency action and the asserted injury”). Further,

plaintiffs must demonstrate that it is “‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that their injuries

17 Defendants argue that the PSLF program is administered by the Department of Education,

see Defs.’ Opp. at 22–23, 38, but this is of no moment. The CFPB works hand-in-hand with the

Department to assist consumers trying to enroll in the PSLF; “[m]any of the issues that borrowers

like Pastor Steege face related to federal student loans are, in fact, related to the acts and practices

of private student loan servicing companies.” Barnard Decl. ¶¶ 11–12; see 12 U.S.C. § 5535(c)(2)

(providing that the student loan ombudsman works to “ensure coordination in providing assistance

to and serving borrowers seeking to resolve complaints related to their private education or Federal

student loans”) (emphasis added). And contrary to defendants’ assertion, see Defs.’ Opp. at 38,

Steege showed that her efforts to apply own were unsuccessful, and her time was indeed running

out. Steege Decl. ¶¶ 1–3. This is enough to establish injury in fact.

57

will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky.

Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).

Defendants do not dispute that plaintiffs’ claimed injuries in fact are traceable to

defendants’ actions or that efforts to shut down the CFPB. The challenged actions – including the

stop work order from Vought, and the decision to shutter the Bureau, implemented by cancelling

CFPB contracts, terminating term and probationary employees, and preparing to execute

widespread RIFs – directly threaten the very existence of the CFPB Employee Association and

have placed its terminated employee members and their families at risk. They have caused the

NAACP to cancel planned trainings and programs and halted direct support Bureau staff were

giving to NAACP members trying to differentiate between legitimate financial support and

unscrupulous criminals preying on who were victims of the Altadena fires. They will cause both

NCLC and VPLC to expend more resources on their missions, and they have left Pastor Steege’s

heirs at risk of inheriting unresolved student debt. Nor do defendants dispute that a ruling from

this Court in plaintiffs’ favor would redress these injuries.

Accordingly, Court finds that several plaintiffs have demonstrated that they meet the

requirements for Article III standing and that is has jurisdiction over this case. See TransUnion

LLC, 594 U.S. at 431; UAW-Lab. Emp. & Training Corp., 325 F.3d at 362.

VI. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE STATUS

QUO.

“A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a

clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.’” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392

(D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “The

purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until

a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). Rule 65

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authorizes a district court to issue interim relief to prevent irreparable injury and to preserve the

status quo while the district court assesses the merits of a case. Dellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5028,

2025 WL 559669, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2025), citing Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 301, 314

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The usual role of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending

the outcome of litigation.”) (cleaned up). A district court “ha[s] authority, from the necessity of

the case, to make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the subject of the petition” until it

can determine how to proceed, as “the law contemplates the possibility of a decision either way,

and therefore must provide for it.” Id. at *3, quoting United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573

(1906).

“The standard for obtaining either a TRO or a preliminary injunction is identical.” Id.,

citing Gordon v. Holder, 632 F.3d 722, 723–24 (D.C. Cir. 2011). When considering a motion for

a preliminary injunction, the Court must consider whether the movant has met its burden of

demonstrating that: (1) it “is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) it is “likely to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [its] favor,” and

(4) an injunction serves the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.

For some time, the Court of Appeals adhered to a “sliding-scale” approach, where “a strong

showing on one factor could make up for a weaker showing on another.” Sherley, 644 F.3d at 392.

However, in Sherley, the Court explained that because the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter

“seemed to treat the four factors as independent requirements,” it had more recently

“read Winter at least to suggest if not to hold ‘that a likelihood of success is an independent, free-

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standing requirement for a preliminary injunction.’” Id. at 393, quoting Davis v. Pension Benefit

Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 18

Whatever the status of the sliding scale analysis might be, the D.C. Circuit has clearly

stated that a failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits is sufficient to defeat a motion

for a preliminary injunction. See Ark. Dairy Coop. Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 573 F.3d

815, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2006). As

another court in this district has observed, “absent a substantial indication of likely success on the

merits, there would be no justification for the Court’s intrusion into the ordinary processes of

administration and judicial review.” Navistar, Inc. v. EPA, Civil Action No. 11-cv-449 (RLW),

2011 WL 3743732, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2011) (alteration omitted), quoting Hubbard v. United

States, 496 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198 (D.D.C. 2007).

Moreover, it remains the law in this Circuit that a movant must demonstrate irreparable

harm, which has “always” been a “basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts.” Sampson v.

Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974), quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506–

07 (1959).

The Court finds that a consideration of each of the factors supports the issuance of a

preliminary injunction in this case. The testimony before the Court and the declarations and

exhibits submitted by both sides have established that the requested relief is absolutely necessary

18 The Court of Appeals has not gone further to clarify whether the sliding scale approach is

inconsistent with Winter, and the manner in which courts should weigh the four factors “remains

an open question” in this Circuit. Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2014). See

also League of Women Voters v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Because appellants

satisfy each of the four preliminary injunction factors, this case presents no occasion for the court

to decide whether the ‘sliding scale’ approach remains valid after Winter.”); Changji Esquel

Textile Co. v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th 716, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (reiterating that the Court has not yet

decided the issue).

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to preserve the status quo so that the CFPB will still be standing when the Court reaches the merits

of this case.

A. Likelihood of Success of the Merits

1. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their ultra vires and constitutional

claims in Count One.

As defendants’ many citations to Article II of the United States Constitution imply, there

is an Article I. And Article I, Section 1 provides: “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be

vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .” U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.

Article I, Section 8 lists the powers of Congress, including “[t]o regulate Commerce . . .

among the several States,” and “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for

carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in

the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. Const. art. I,

§ 8. This power includes the authority to create new federal agencies and official positions. See

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (under the Necessary and Proper Clause, “Congress may

undoubtedly . . . create ‘offices’”). As Chief Justice Marshall explained more than 200 years ago,

the framers included this provision “in a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come . . . to

be adapted to the many crises of human affairs.” M’Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819)

(emphasis in original).

Under the Constitution, the President does not have legislative authority. Instead, Article II

vests executive power in “a President of the United States of America,” who “shall take Care that

the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. art. II § 3 (the Take Care Clause). The Supreme

Court has repeatedly emphasized the breadth of the President’s discretion to determine how this

should be done, but it has also drawn a clear demarcation between executing, or implementing, the

laws and making them in the first place.

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In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see

that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be

a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking

process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing

of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor

equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to

execute.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). After all, members of

Congress are democratically elected too.

Congress exercised its legislative power in 2010 in response to a genuine, devastating

financial crisis. It created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and gave it a job to do:

There is established in the Federal Reserve System, an independent bureau

to be known as the “Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection”, which shall

regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or

services under the Federal consumer financial laws.

12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). The Dodd-Frank Act was quite specific about what that regulation would

entail, including: “establishing a single, toll-free telephone number, a website, and a database . . .

to facilitate the centralized collection of, monitoring of, and response to consumer complaints

regarding consumer financial products or services,” 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(A); designating a

Private Education Loan Ombudsman within the Bureau “to provide timely assistance to borrowers

of private education loans,” id. § 5535(a); establishing an Office of Financial Protection for Older

Americans, id. § 5535(g)(3)(B), an Office of Service Member Affairs, id. § 5535(d)(2), and the

Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity, id. § 5493(c); and researching, analyzing, and

reporting on market developments for consumer financial products and services and consumer

access to those products and services. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1646(a), (b); id. § 1632(d)(3). In

accordance with the Constitution, these provisions mandating the existence of, and the functions

to be carried out by, the CFPB were enacted by the legislative branch and signed into law by the

President of the United States.

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Plaintiffs allege in Count One that defendants were intent on executing the current

President’s plan to eliminate the agency and to do so in a hurry, in violation of the statutory

imperatives of the Dodd-Frank Act and contrary to the constitutional limitations on executive

authority and the Take Care Clause. 19 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75–80.

It is fundamental to the separation of powers embodied in the Constitution that “[t]he

President’s power . . . must stem from either an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. Defendants do not even try to maintain that the Constitution or any

statute accorded the President the authority to dismantle the agency. Instead, in their February 24

opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction, they denied that it was happening at all, or

that there was any imminent risk of its happening in the near future if the Court declined to act.

[O]n February 8, 2025, Russell Vought, Acting Director of the Consumer

Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), e-mailed all CFPB staff to direct

that, unless “required by law” or “expressly approved by the Acting

Director,” staff were not to take substantive actions that might reflect policy

decisions inconsistent with new leadership’s views on the best way to meet

the agency’s statutory responsibilities. As Acting Director Vought

explained, he was “committed to implementing the President’s policies,

consistent with the law, and acting as a faithful steward of the Bureau’s

resources.”

* * *

19 Plaintiffs characterize Count One as a claim seeking “non-statutory review of official and

agency action,” an effort to “enjoin[] and declare unlawful official action that is ultra vires.” Am.

Compl. ¶ 75. As a “weapon in the arsenal for attacking federal administrative action,” an ultra

vires claim requires the Court to determine whether defendants “plainly act[ed] in excess of [their]

delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the statute that is clear and mandatory.”

Fed. Express Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 39 F.4th 756, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2022), quoting Nyunt

v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors, 589 F.3d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The count complains

that defendants overstepped both the constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority:

paragraph 76 invokes the Take Care Clause in Article II of the Constitution; paragraph 79 of the

amended complaint alleges that “[t]he CFPB was established as a federal agency by Congress by

statute, the Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law in 2010, and can be eliminated only by Congress”;

and paragraph 80 asserts that “[d]efendants’ actions to eliminate the CFPB exceed executive

authority, usurp legislative authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution, defendant

Vought was not lawfully appointed, and his actions are ultra vires and should be enjoined.”

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Given . . . disruptive protests involving the CFPB’s own staff, CFPB

leadership has closed the CFPB Headquarters Building and tightened staff

supervision, making sure that they are focused only on aspects of the

mission that are, in fact, urgently required by law, as determined by the

Chief Legal Officer. Under this internal procedure, work requests have

been approved to allow the CFPB to maintain its statutory obligations.

Remarkably, the CFPB employee groups and other Plaintiffs now spin these

actions and others as being part of a “coordinated campaign by the new

administration to eliminate the” CFPB. But President Trump has nominated

Jonathan McKernan . . . to be the new CFPB Director, and the Senate

Banking Committee will hold a hearing on his nomination this week –

actions that are inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ view of current events.

Similarly, as Acting Director Vought noted in a letter to the Federal

Reserve, the “Bureau’s new leadership will run a substantially more

streamlined and efficient bureau[.]” The predicate to running a “more

streamlined and efficient bureau” is that there will continue to be a CFPB.

Defs.’ Opp. at 1–2 (internal citations and footnote omitted) (alteration in original). This rosy

depiction of events, designed to assuage the Court, was accompanied by the February 24, 2025

Declaration of Adam Martinez, the Chief Operating Officer of the CFPB, First Martinez Decl.,

which was a carefully worded and highly selective account that was immediately contradicted by

a second series of declarations and exhibits submitted by the plaintiffs. The defendants’ witness

was then placed in the awkward position of submitting another declaration, in which he

acknowledged the accuracy of the facts set forth by plaintiffs’ declarants, including their accounts

of his own statements, but he still voiced the assurance that the agency was c

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