The opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
OCTOBER SESSION, 1997 FILED
October 17, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
JAMES EDWARD LOPER, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
) No. 02C01-9611-CC-00398
Appellant )
) LAKE COUNTY
vs. )
) Hon. JOE G. RILEY. JR., Judge
BILLY COMPTON, Warden, )
and STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Writ of Habeas Corpus)
Appellee )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
JAMES EDWARD LOPER, Pro Se CHARLES W. BURSON
Register Number 253396 Attorney General and Reporter
Route 1, Box 330
Tiptonville, TN 38079-9775 KENNETH W. RUCKER
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
C. PHILLIP BIVENS
District Attorney General
P. O. Drawer E
Dyersburg, TN 38024
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, James Edward Loper, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his
pro se application for writ of habeas corpus. On September 5, 1995, the appellant
pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to one count of rape of a child, one
count of aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The
appellant is currently serving an effective fifteen year sentence at the Lake County
Regional Correctional Facility for these offenses. On October 11, 1996, the
appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the judgments
entered against him are void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of
the offenses charged. On October 14, 1996, finding that “allegations concerning the
sufficiency of the indictments are not subject to habeas corpus relief,” the trial court
dismissed the appellant’s petition. The appellant now appeals the trial court’s
dismissal.
After a review of the record, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
The trial court dismissed the appellant’s petition for failure to state a ground
for which habeas relief was available. The appellant asserts, relying exclusively
upon federal habeas corpus law, that the “defective” indictment against him
effectively denied the trial court the jurisdiction to enter a judgment against him,
thereby, rendering his convictions void. We reject this argument by the appellant.
In Tennessee, habeas corpus relief is only available when a conviction is void
because the convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a
defendant, or that a defendant's sentence has expired and he is being illegally
restrained. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). It is well-
established that allegations concerning the sufficiency of the indictment are not the
proper subject of state habeas corpus relief. See Haggard v. State, 475 S.W.2d
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186, 187 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Brown v. State, 445 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1969); Barber v. State, No. 01C01-9408-CR-00281 (Tenn. Crim. App. at
Nashville, Feb. 23, 1995). Clearly, the appellant is attempting to expand the scope
of habeas corpus in Tennessee to that which applies in the federal courts. See 28
U.S.C.S. § 2241 et seq. However, we are not obligated to incorporate federal
habeas limits and laws into our state procedure. Turks v. State, No. 02C01-9502-
CR-00035 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Jan. 3, 1997). This argument is without
merit.
Moreover, we find the substance of the appellant’s claim to be without merit.
The appellant, in his application for writ of habeas corpus, alleges that the
judgments entered against him for the offenses of rape of a child, aggravated rape,
and aggravated sexual battery are void because the indictment fails to allege the
mens rea of the offenses charged. In order for an indictment to satisfy both
constitutional and statutory guidelines, it must contain the material elements of the
offense and must sufficiently apprise the accused of the offense he is called upon to
defend. State v. Tate, 912 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); see also
Tenn. Code Ann. §40-13-202 (1990); State v. Perkinson, 867 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1992). No requisite mental state is included in the definition of these
offenses. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522 (1994 Supp.); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
13-502 (1994 Supp.); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504 (1994 Supp.). When the
legislature fails to define a specific mental state in the definition of an offense,
permitting proof of either intent, knowledge, or recklessness, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
11-301(c)(1991), an allegation of criminal conduct will provide the accused
constitutionally adequate notice of the facts constituting the offense. Moreover,
since under these circumstances, the accused's mental state is not a material
element of the offense and need not be included in the indictment, the appellant’s
challenge is not jurisdictional in nature, i.e., a defect that renders the indictment
void. State v. Dison, No. 03C01-9602-CC-00051 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville,
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Jan. 31, 1997) (citations omitted). Other panels of this court have upheld the validity
of indictments under similar challenges. See, e.g., Slagle v. State, No. 03C01-
9704-CR-00145 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, June 25, 1997); State v. Vann, No.
03C01-9602-CC-00066 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, June 10, 1997); State v.
James, No. 01C01-9601-CR-00016 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Mar. 27, 1997);
State v. Burrell, No. 03C01-9404-CR-00157 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Feb. 11,
1997).
Contrary to the appellant's assertions, the allegations in the indictment
sufficiently apprise the accused of the offenses of rape of a child, aggravated rape,
and aggravated sexual battery. Consequently, we find the indictment valid.
The trial court's dismissal of the appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus is
affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
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___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
___________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
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