Brown v. Cook County Auditor's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RONALD BROWN, )

) Case No. 23 CV 10452

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

v. )

)

COOK COUNTY AUDITOR’S OFFICE, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Ronald Brown filed an amended complaint against his former employer, the Cook

County Auditor’s Office,1 claiming that his termination was the result of religious and racial

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

et seq. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion

[25] with prejudice.

The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts of the case, as laid out

comprehensively in this Court’s Opinion dismissing Plaintiff’s original complaint. There, the Court

concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations failed to plausibly establish the existence of a sincere religious

practice or belief entitled to Title VII protection or that Plaintiff’s treatment was connected to his

race. The Court gave Plaintiff an opportunity to amend if he believed in good faith that he could cure

the complaint’s deficiencies. Plaintiff thereafter filed the operative amended complaint.

Having dismissed Plaintiff’s original complaint, the Court, as an initial matter, examines in

what ways, if any, the amended complaint differs from Plaintiff’s original complaint. As it pertains to

1 Defendant notes, again, that the “Auditor’s Office” of Cook County is incorrectly named in this

action. The Court will simply refer to the defendant as “Defendant” in this Opinion.

his claim of religious discrimination, Plaintiff added allegations that “the American Baptist Resolution

Concerning Abortion and Ministry in The Local Church explicitly opposes abortion,” (Dkt. 24 ¶ 17),

and that Plaintiff, whose religion opposes murder, “believes that [] receiving the vaccine [] would make

him a participant in the abortion that killed the unborn baby,” (id. ¶ 18). The amended complaint also

summarizes portions of Plaintiff’s request for religious accommodation, which Plaintiff appended

to—and thus were incorporated by reference into— both his original and amended complaints.

As applicable to his claim of racial discrimination, Plaintiff added an allegation that he

provided demographic information, including his race, to the Cook County Human Resources

Department upon request. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) Plaintiff added allegations that Human Resource Bureau

Chief Velisha Haddox and Human Resource Equal Employment Opportunity Officer Priya

Khatkhate “knew that [Plaintiff] was African-American[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 12, 22.) The amended complaint

also asserts for the first time that “Plaintiff has not yet had an opportunity to conduct discovery and

has not had sufficient time to demonstrate how similarly situated individuals outside his protected

class were treated more favorably, particularly his white or Caucasian counterparts. Based on

information and belief this is what the record would show.” (Id. ¶ 49.) Plaintiff then cites case law in

his amended complaint that sets forth the legal standard—for summary judgment. (Id. ¶¶ 50–51.)

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to rectify the deficiencies this

Court identified in its Opinion dismissing the original complaint. In considering the original and

amended complaints, Plaintiff’s factual allegations are substantially the same. None of the amended

complaint’s new allegations change the fact that Plaintiff did not specify his race or religion in either

his religious accommodation request or subsequent email correspondence. (See Dkt. 20 at *2.) Neither

does the amended complaint allege factual allegations that would support a shift in the Court’s finding

that Plaintiff’s request for accommodation stemmed from his “beliefs [] based not in religion but in

his more broadly defined personal preferences, such as his ‘cultural beliefs’ and adherence to ‘holistic

healing.” (id. at *5.) Still, the amended complaint fails to state a claim.

As to Plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination, this Court will not permit Plaintiff to embark

ina fishing expedition in an attempt to “demonstrate how similarly situated individuals outside his

protected class were treated more favorably[.]” (Dkt. 24 4 49.) Plaintiff must “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face,” Adlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)—not merely claim

that facts supporting his claim may exist somewhere in the universe. See Taha v. Int'l Bhd. Of Teamsters,

Loc. 781, 947 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2020) (on a motion to dismiss, courts “may reject sheer

speculation, bald assertions, and unsupported conclusory statements’).

Having been granted an opportunity to cure the original complaint’s deficiencies, Plaintiff

undertook hardly any substantive amendments. “Although ‘a plaintiff whose original complaint has

been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) should be given at least one opportunity to try to amend [the]

complaint before the entire action 1s dismissed,” Rastom v. Rustom ¢» North Star Trust Co., 2019 WL

4034620, at *7 (N.D IIL Aug. 27, 2019) (Aspen, J.) (quoting Rannion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of

Greater Chi. and Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015)), “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed’ provides reason to disallow additional opportunities to amend.” Id.

(quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Because Plaintiff has been afforded an opportunity

to amend, and because any subsequent amendment would be futile, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's

amended complaint with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 3/27/2025

Entered:

SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN

United States District Judge