holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) governs dismissals of pro se and in forma pauperis complaints
How later courts described this case
- holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) governs dismissals of pro se and in forma pauperis complaints
- upholding district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under Apple v. Glenn because the named defendant, a federal judge, was entitled to absolute judicial immunity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
William Mark Willis, Case No. 4:25 cv 565
Plaintiff,
-vs- JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER
U.S. District Court Judge John MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Coughenour, ORDER
Defendant.
Plaintiff William Mark Willis has filed a pro se and in forma pauperis civil rights complaint
in this case against Judge John Coughenour of the United States District Court for the Western District
of Washington. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff contends Judge Coughenour violated his constitutional rights
by issuing a “frivilous enjunction” [sic] against the President of the United States, which Plaintiff
contends infringed upon his right to vote by prohibiting the President from “doing the job” that
Plaintiff elected the President to do. (Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ II.D and III.C.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks $1 dollar
in damages. (Id. at 6, ¶ IV.)
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Nevertheless, in order to avoid dismissal, even pro se complaints
must meet basic federal pleading requirements and set forth allegations sufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
governs dismissals of pro se and in forma pauperis complaints).
Further, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have an independent duty to
police the boundaries of their jurisdiction in every case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A district
court “may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of a
complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer
open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint warrants sua sponte dismissal pursuant to Apple v.
Glenn.
It is well-established that judges are entitled to absolute immunity from civil suits for money
damages based on conduct and decisions they make during the performance of their judicial
functions. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th
Cir. 1997). This far-reaching protection is designed to ensure that the independent and impartial
exercise of judgment by judicial officers is not impaired by exposure to potential damages. Barnes,
105 F.3d at 1115. Absolute judicial immunity shields judicial officers from damages suits arising
out of the performance of their judicial functions even when they act erroneously or in bad faith.
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12; Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1115. There are only two sets of circumstances in
which a judicial officer is not entitled to immunity. A judge is not immune from liability for
“nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity,” and for actions “taken
in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12.
Plaintiff’s action as against Judge Coughenour clearly pertains to conduct occurring during
the performance of the Judge’s official judicial functions as to which he is absolutely immune from
suit. Plaintiff does not allege facts plausibly suggesting that Judge Coughenour took any non-
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judicial action, or any action taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Plaintiff's
displeasure with a ruling of Judge Coughenour, which is the most his complaint suggests, is not
sufficient to overcome judicial immunity.
Plaintiff's claims are totally implausible, frivolous, and devoid of legal merit. See
Metzenbaum v. Nugent, 55 Fed. App'x 729 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding district court's sua sponte
dismissal of a complaint under Apple v. Glenn because the named defendant, a federal judge, was
entitled to absolute judicial immunity); Forbush v. Zaleski, 20 Fed. App'x 481 (6th Cir. 2001)
(same).
Conclusion
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted, and
his complaint is dismissed in accordance with the Court’s authority established in Apple v. Glenn.
The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision
could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Pamela A. Barker ______
PAMELA A. BARKER
Date: March 27, 2025 U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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