TOBIN v. FLOWERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

MATTHEW A. TOBIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24cv621-LC-HTC

JUDGE MICHAEL A. FLOWERS, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Matthew A. Tobin, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, filed a handwritten document purporting to be a civil rights complaint

under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 containing vague conspiracy allegations and seeking

millions of dollars against two state court judges and the Okaloosa County Board of

County Commissioners (“OCBCC”). Doc. 1. After reviewing the “complaint,” the

Court concluded that it failed to state a claim against the Defendants because the

judges are immune from liability and there were no facts alleged against the

OCBCC. Doc. 4. Nevertheless, the Court gave Tobin an opportunity to file an

amended complaint and advised him of the applicable legal standards. Id. Tobin’s

amended complaint, Doc. 8, however, fails to cure the deficiencies identified and

continues to fail to state a claim. Moreover, Tobin has failed to pay the required

initial partial filing fee as instructed and has not complied with Court orders. Thus,

for the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that this case be

dismissed.

I. Background

Tobin, an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections incarcerated at

Santa Rosa Correctional Institution, names three Defendants in his amended

complaint: Judge Michael A. Flowers, Judge John Jay Gontarek, and the Okaloosa

County Board of County Commissioners. His amended complaint, in its entirety,

states:

13-CA-5168. In 2013 Tobin filed a lawsuit in state court against the

OCBCC and three other defendants. This case led to a meeting in the

Judge’s, Flowers Chambers, but was halted because of missing

documents. Or so it was thought. Instead those documents were

already on file. Tobin has tried to seek judicial attention on this case

many times since with [indiscernible handwriting] Judge(s) but was

either ignored or…well ignored. A civil action in state court should not

take over a decade to receive fair judicial attention. Furthermore, Judge

Gontarek filed a civil child custody/support case under a criminal case

number and has it struck from the record. See attached.1 Even more

recently Tobin is being refused access to civil actions in state court by

Judge Gontarek on a malpractice suit attempting to be filed in the First

Judicial Circuit.

Doc. 8 at 5-6. Based on these allegations, Tobin sues Defendants under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(2) and seeks “actual damages for the lawsuit that has yet to receive judicial

attention,” “punitive damages because this same judicial court is proving a pattern

of obstructing Tobin’s actions in state court,” and “$200 million.” Doc. 8 at 7, 9.

1 Tobin’s amended complaint, Doc. 8, includes no attachments.

II. Legal Standard

Because Tobin is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and seeking relief

from government employees, the Court must dismiss his complaint, or any portion

thereof, if it determines it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). To state a claim, Tobin

must plead factual content which allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference

that the named Defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must liberally construe Tobin’s pro se

allegations, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), but conclusory

allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to a

presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286

(1986).

III. Discussion

A. The Judges are Immune from Liability

Tobin sues state court Judges Flowers and Gontarek in their individual and

official capacity. As this Court previously told Tobin, judges are “entitled to

absolute judicial immunity from damages for actions taken while acting in [their]

judicial capacity, unless [they] acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Higdon

v. Tusan, 746 F. App’x 805, 810 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal citations and quotations

omitted); see also Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000). Judicial

immunity applies even if a judge’s actions are erroneous, malicious, or exceed the

judge’s jurisdiction. See id.; see also Medrano v. Sunny Isles Beach Police Dep’t,

2007 WL 9703577, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2007) (“Judicial immunity applies

‘however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its

consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff’”) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner,

474 U.S. 193, 199–200 (1985)). Here, Tobin’s claims revolve around Judge

Flowers’ and Judge Gontarek’s handling of state court cases (e.g., managing

documents, striking things from the record, initiation of a lawsuit), and nothing

shows either judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Accordingly, his

individual capacity claims against these judges are barred by judicial immunity.

Tobin’s claims against the judges in their official capacity are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment because such claims are ones against the State of Florida. See

Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that damages

against a circuit court judge sued in his official capacity are barred by sovereign

immunity because the suit is one against the judge’s employer, the State); Badillo v.

Thorpe, 158 F. App’x 208, 212-13 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding claims against Florida

circuit court judge and county administrator in their official capacity are barred by

Eleventh Amendment immunity). The Eleventh Amendment provides that states are

immune from civil suits. See U.S. Const. amend. XI. (“[t]he Judicial power of the

United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States”). “Congress has not

abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, or 1985

cases, and Florida has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal civil

rights actions.” Henry v. Fla. Bar, 701 F. App’x 878, 880 (11th Cir. July 14, 2017).

Because Tobin’s claims against the Judges are barred by judicial immunity

and the Eleventh Amendment, they should be dismissed.

B. Failure to State a Claim Against the OCBCC

This Court also previously directed Tobin that he has failed to state a claim

against the OCBCC because he has set forth “no facts regarding OCBCC, let alone

specific facts indicating OCBCC was involved in the alleged conspiracy.” Doc. 4.

Tobin’s amended complaint continues to fail to contain any such facts.

“Section 1985 provides a vehicle to redress conspiracies to interfere with civil

rights.” Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations

omitted). Section 1985(2) contains six clauses “provid[ing] a cause of action for

two types of conspiracies: ‘[T]he first four clauses … refer to conspiracies …

designed to obstruct the course of justice in any court of the United States’ while

‘the last two clauses … refer to conspiracies designed to deny or interfere with equal

protection rights.’” Jimenez v. Wizel, 644 F. App’x 868, 873 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing

Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 801 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981)) (emphasis added).

“To state a claim under § 1985(2) … the plaintiff must [therefore] either ‘show a

nexus between the alleged conspiracy and a proceeding in federal court’ or ‘show a

racial or otherwise class-based discriminatory animus.’” Id. (citing Bradt, 634 F.2d

at 796) (emphasis added).

Here, Tobin’s claims are premised on state court proceedings—rather than

federal court proceedings—and he has not alleged, let alone shown, an underlying

racial or class-based animus; thus, he fails to state a claim for either type of

conspiracy. Additionally, Tobin has not “provide[d] sufficient allegations to make

plausible that there was a ‘meeting of the minds between two or more persons to

accomplish [the] common and unlawful plan,’” which is required “[i]rrespective of

the type of conspiracy alleged.” Id. (citing McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,

206 F.3d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir. 2000)) (en banc). Indeed, his scantly pled amended

complaint contains no specific facts about the underlying conduct of Defendants nor

identifies a “common and unlawful plan” or a “meeting of the minds.” See Collins

v. Bates, 2018 WL 5090845, at *7 (11th Cir. May 10, 2018) (finding the plaintiff’s

“vague and conclusory allegation that all of the defendants conspired against him

was insufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy for purposes of

establishing a §§ 1983, 1985, or 1986 violation”) (internal citations omitted); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief”).

Because Tobin fails to state a claim against the OCBCC, the claim should be

dismissed.

C. Tobin has Failed to Pay the Initial Partial Filing Fee

As an additional and independent ground for dismissal, Tobin has failed to

pay the initial partial filing fee as instructed and has not complied with Court orders.

On January 31, 2025, the Court granted Tobin’s second motion to proceed in forma

pauperis and required him to pay an initial partial filing fee of $20 within twenty-

one (21) days. Doc. 11. The Court warned Tobin that his failure to pay the fee as

instructed could result in a recommendation that this case be dismissed. Id. The

twenty-one (21) day period has expired, and Tobin has not paid the fee. Based on

the foregoing, dismissal of this case is appropriate. See Brown v. Tallahassee Police

Dep’t, 205 F. App’x 802, 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The court may dismiss an action

sua sponte under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)] for failure to prosecute or

failure to obey a court order.”) (citations omitted); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835,

837 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[D]ismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where the

litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion.”) (citations

omitted).

IV. Conclusion

After Tobin filed his original complaint, Doc. 1, the Court issued an order

describing the applicable legal standards and advising him that he failed to state a

claim based on judicial immunity and the lack of factual allegations contained in his

complaint. Doc. 4. The Court gave Tobin an opportunity to submit an amended

complaint, id., and specifically directed him as to the applicable legal standards.

Although Tobin has submitted an amended complaint, Doc. 8, it continues to

fail to state a claim and continues to sue state court judges who are immune from

liability. Because Tobin has not cured the deficiencies previously identified, and for

the other reasons set forth herein, this case should be dismissed with prejudice. See

Brennan v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 626 F. App’x 939, 945-46 (11th Cir. 2015)

(“A pro se litigant must be given at least one opportunity to amend his complaint

before the court dismisses the action with prejudice if it appears that a more carefully

drafted pleading would state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”).

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:

1. That this case be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and

§ 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim and for failure to follow Court orders.

2. That the clerk be directed to close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 28th day of February, 2025.

/s/ Hope Thai Cannon

HOPE THAI CANNON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations may be filed within 14

days of the date of this Report and Recommendation. Any different deadline that

may appear on the electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not

control. A copy of objections shall be served upon the Magistrate Judge and all other

parties. A party failing to object to a Magistrate Judge’s findings or

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the

district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th

Cir. R. 3-1.