Carswell v. Hunt County Texas

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

GWENDOLYN CARSWELL, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:20-CV-02935-N

§

HUNT COUNTY, TEXAS, §

§

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This Order addresses Defendant Hunt County’s motion to dismiss [119]. The Court

grants in part and denies in part the motion.

I. ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE

This is a jail conditions case. Carswell — Gary Lynch III’s mother — filed this suit

in response to Lynch’s death while in custody at Hunt County Jail. She alleges that Hunt

County violated Lynch’s constitutional right to medical care. Pl.’s Second Am. Compl.

¶¶ 10–11 [116].

Lynch entered Hunt County Jail on February 12, 2019.1 Id. ¶ 61. Throughout his

detainment, he experienced chest and arm pain, low blood pressure, difficulty breathing,

headaches, nausea, dizziness, weakness, and lack of appetite. Id. ¶¶ 23–24, 33, 39, 45,

52, 76. Hunt County Jail personnel knew of Lynch’s declining health because his

symptoms were observable, he told them about his symptoms, and other detainees raised

1 The Court accepts the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint as true for the purposes of this

Order.

concerns about his symptoms. Id. ¶¶ 14–15, 21–24, 26, 41, 45, 51–54. At one point, Vi

Wells, a nurse at the jail, told a detainee that Lynch’s blood pressure was low and then

directed the detainee to keep an eye on Lynch. Id. ¶ 23; see also id. ¶ 36 (“But cellmates

were told they needed to take care of [Lynch].”). On a different occasion, Helen Landers,

another nurse, stopped outside of Lynch’s cell to conduct a blood pressure check, but

Lynch was too weak to get out of his bunk bed. Id. ¶ 25. Landers marked on a blood

pressure check form that Lynch refused the check instead of entering the cell to perform

the check. Id. ¶¶ 25, 47. Further, the blood pressure check form included an entry on the

day after Lynch died, indicating that personnel made false entries on the form. Id. ¶ 72. A

detainee also asked Officer Kolbee Perdue to check on Lynch. Lynch told Perdue about

his symptoms, and Perdue stated that he would move Lynch to a bottom bunk, but Perdue

did not do that or anything else to address Lynch’s medical issues. Id. ¶¶ 26–27.

Then, on February 19, a gas leak was discovered at Hunt County Jail, so personnel

evacuated all detainees from the facility and transferred Lynch to Tarrant County Jail. Id.

¶ 10. While at Tarrant County Jail, Lynch collapsed in a hallway while holding his chest.

Id. ¶ 16. Sergeant Scotty York grabbed Lynch and told him to get up, then placed him in

a cell. Id. ¶¶ 17, 31. Lynch returned to Hunt County Jail on February 22. Id. ¶ 10. After

he returned, his eyes looked yellow. Id. ¶ 53.

On the morning of February 23, Officer Robinson conducted floor checks at the jail

but failed to do more than pull back a curtain and briefly glance through a window into

Lynch’s cell. Id. ¶ 56. Lynch was on the upper bunk at the back of the cell, so it would

have been difficult to see him through the window. Id. Soon after Officer Robinson’s cell

check, detainees started yelling that they had found Lynch dead in the cell. Id. ¶¶ 57, 61–

62. It took several minutes after that for personnel to arrive at the cell. Id. ¶ 34. The

medical examiner who conducted Lynch’s autopsy concluded that he died because of aortic

valve endocarditis with myocardial abscess. Id. ¶ 60. This is a treatable condition, and

Lynch would have survived if he had received appropriate medical intervention. Id.

Carswell alleges that several of the County’s practices contributed to Lynch’s death,

including (1) failing to provide emergency or necessary medical care; (2) failing to monitor

detainees; (3) failing to staff the facility adequately; (4) failing to communicate medical

needs between shifts; and (5) failing to train personnel. Id. ¶ 84. Additionally, the Texas

Commission on Jail Standards (“TCJS”) has determined on several occasions that Hunt

County Jail was not in compliance with minimum jail operations standards. Id. ¶¶ 85–99.

Further, eight other detainees with serious physical or mental health conditions have died

in Hunt County Jail between 2006 and 2024. Id. ¶¶ 100–08.

Carswell now brings a section 1983 cause of action against Hunt County for the

violation of Lynch’s Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care under Monell,

conditions-of-confinement, episodic-act-or-omission, and failure-to-train theories.2 Id.

¶¶ 7, 113. Hunt County now moves to dismiss Carswell’s claims. See generally Def.’s

Mot. Dismiss [119].

2 Carswell originally brought claims against several jail personnel as well but has since

moved to dismiss them with prejudice, which the Court granted. See Order (May 24, 2024)

[115].

II. RULE 12(B)(6) LEGAL STANDARD

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether

the plaintiff has asserted a legally sufficient claim for relief. Blackburn v. City of Marshall,

42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). A viable complaint must include “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). To meet this “facial plausibility” standard, a plaintiff must plead “factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court generally

accepts well-pleaded facts as true and construes the complaint in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012). But a

plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption

that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations

omitted).

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court generally limits its review to the face

of the pleadings, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts and viewing them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999).

However, a court may also consider documents outside of the pleadings if they fall within

certain limited categories. First, a “court is permitted . . . to rely on ‘documents

incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial

notice.’” Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)). Second, a “written

document that is attached to a complaint as an exhibit is considered part of the complaint

and may be considered in a 12(b)(6) dismissal proceeding.” Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484

F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007). Third, a “court may consider documents attached to a

motion to dismiss that ‘are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the

plaintiff’s claim.’” Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003)). Finally, in

“deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may permissibly refer to matters of public

record.” Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., Funk v.

Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating, in upholding district court’s

dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), that the “district court took appropriate judicial notice

of publicly-available documents and transcripts produced by the FDA, which were matters

of public record directly relevant to the issue at hand”).

III. THE COURT GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART THE MOTION TO DISMISS

Carswell alleges that Hunt County violated Lynch’s Fourteenth Amendment right

to medical care. Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 110. Her theories of liability against the

County include Monell, conditions-of-confinement, episodic-act-or-omission, and failure-

to-train. See id. ¶¶ 78, 84. The Court addresses each of these theories in turn.3

3 Hunt County argues that Carswell’s claims are barred by res judicata, waiver, or Heller.

Def.’s Mot. 4–5. The County asserts that because the Court granted Carswell’s motion to

dismiss her claims against the individual-employee defendants with prejudice, she cannot

state an underlying constitutional violation by a County employee, so she fails to state a

constitutional violation in support of her claims against the County. Id. at 4. The Court

disagrees. Carswell’s decision to dismiss her claims against the individual-employee

A. Legal Standards for Monell Claims and Conditions-of-Confinement Claims

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, every “person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected,” any

person to the deprivation of any federally protected rights, privileges, or immunities, shall

be civilly liable to the injured party. “Municipalities can be held liable for violating a

person’s constitutional rights under § 1983.” Est. of Bonilla v. Orange County, 982 F.3d

298, 308 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).

However, a municipality cannot be held liable solely on a respondeat-superior theory.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

To state a claim for municipal liability under Monell, a plaintiff must plead facts

that plausibly establish three elements: (1) a policymaker; (2) an official custom or policy;

and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy or custom.

Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell, 436 U.S.

at 694). Similarly, to state a conditions-of-confinement claim, “a plaintiff must plead facts

that plausibly establish ‘(1) a condition — a rule, a restriction, an identifiable intended

condition or practice, or sufficiently extended or pervasive acts or omissions of jail

officials — (2) that is not reasonably related to a legitimate government objective and (3)

that caused the constitutional violation.’” Rangel v. Wellpath, LLC, 2024 WL 1160913, at

*6 (N.D. Tex. 2024) (quoting Sanchez v. Young County, 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020)

(cleaned up)).

defendants does not constitute an admission that jail personnel did not participate in the

alleged violation of Lynch’s constitutional rights.

The Fifth Circuit has observed that there is “no meaningful difference between the[]

showings” required for Monell and conditions-of-confinement claims. See Bonilla, 982

F.3d at 308 (quoting Duvall v. Dallas County, 631 F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 2011)). Further,

the standards of causation appear to be the same for both kinds of claims. Id. “The key

difference is that a Monell claim requires the plaintiff to show that the ‘municipal decision

reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or

statutory right will follow the decision,’” while a conditions-of-confinement claim does

not require a showing of deliberate indifference. Rangel, 2024 WL 1160913, at *6 (first

quoting Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 2010), then citing Duvall,

631 F.3d at 207).

B. Carswell Does Not Plausibly Allege a Monell Claim

First, the Court analyzes Carswell’s Monell claim against Hunt County. The Court

addresses each element of Monell liability in turn.

1. Policymaker — Carswell identifies the sheriff of Hunt County as the relevant

policymaker over the policies at issue. See Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 112. “In Texas,

the sheriff is a county’s ‘final policymaker in the area of law enforcement’ and in county

jails.” Guerra v. Childress County, 2024 WL 4673928, at *4 (N.D. Tex. 2024) (quoting

Colle v. Brazos County, 981 F.2d 237, 244 (5th Cir. 1993) and citing Feliz v. El Paso

County, 441 F. Supp. 3d 488, 503 (W.D. Tex. 2020)). And “‘the specific identity of the

policymaker is a legal question that need not be pled’ in the complaint to survive a motion

to dismiss.” Balle v. Nueces County, 952 F.3d 552, 559 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Groden

v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 2016)). Accordingly, the Court determines

that Carswell has sufficiently alleged the policymaker element of the Monell claim.

2. Official Custom or Policy — Next, there are three ways to establish a

municipality’s official custom or policy: (1) “written policy statements, ordinances, or

regulations,” (2) “a widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute

a custom that fairly represents municipal policy,” and (3) “a single decision . . . when the

official or entity possessing final policymaking authority for an action performed the

specific act that forms the basis of the § 1983 claim.” St. Maron Props., L.L.C. v. City of

Houston, 78 F.4th 754, 760 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Webb v. Town of St. Joseph, 925 F.3d

209, 214–15 (5th Cir. 2019)).

Here, Carswell alleges that Hunt County had four types of widespread practices

constituting official customs giving rise to the Monell claim: (1) failing to provide

emergency or necessary medical care; (2) failing to monitor detainees; (3) failing to staff

the facility adequately; and (4) failing to communicate medical needs between shifts.4 Pl.’s

Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 79, 81, 84.

First, Carswell alleges facts that, if true, support her claim that Hunt County had a

policy of failing to provide emergency or necessary medical care to detainees. She pleads

that throughout Lynch’s detainment, jail personnel ignored Lynch’s worsening condition,

Lynch’s complaints about his health, and fellow detainees’ concerns regarding Lynch’s

4 Carswell also alleges that Hunt County had a policy of failing to train personnel. Because

a separate analytical framework applies to failure-to-train policies, the Court analyzes the

alleged failure-to-train policy separately.

health. Id. ¶¶ 14–15, 21–24, 26, 41, 45, 51–54. Moreover, Carswell alleges that Hunt

County “refuse[s] to provide medical treatment and always denies [detainees] from going

to the hospital seeking medical [treatment].” Id. ¶ 41 (cleaned up). Carswell also pleads

that other detainees at Hunt County have died from the County’s failure to provide

emergency or necessary medical care. See id. ¶¶ 102–04, 108. And inspections by TCJS

found that not “all jailers were receiving life safety training.” Id. ¶ 91. Taken together, the

Court determines that these pleadings are sufficient to support a reasonable inference that

Hunt County had a custom of failing to provide emergency or necessary medical care to

detainees.

Second, Carswell alleges facts that, if true, support her claim that Hunt County had

a widespread practice of failing to monitor detainees, and relatedly, failing to communicate

medical needs between shifts. She pleads that jail personnel did not conduct blood pressure

checks faithfully, and at times even fabricated such checks. Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶

25, 72. Further, floor checks constituted merely “pulling back a curtain and briefly

glancing through a window” into multiperson cells, which was not thorough enough to

monitor detainees’ medical needs. Id. ¶¶ 47, 56, 70. Personnel even directed detainees to

monitor other detainees’ medical conditions instead of monitoring the detainees

themselves. Id. ¶¶ 23, 36. Relatedly, Hunt County failed TCJS inspections for not adhering

to minimum standards related to medical documentation and for failing to log observations

of detainees adequately or faithfully. Id. ¶¶ 92–94. These pleadings support an inference

that Hunt County regularly failed to monitor detainees and communicate detainees’

medical needs between shifts. See Sanchez, 956 F.3d at 793 (finding failing to monitor

and covering up a failure to monitor can be evidence of extensive or pervasive misconduct).

Accordingly, Carswell has sufficiently pled that these practices constitute customs that

fairly represent Hunt County policies.

Third, Carswell’s pleadings related to failure to monitor and failure to communicate

between shifts support an inference that the County failed to staff the jail adequately as the

failure to staff the jail adequately likely contributed to the pervasiveness of the other

practices. Carswell also alleges that the TCJS inspections showed that the several shifts

were understaffed. Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 94. Accordingly, the Court determines that

Carswell alleges facts that, if true, support her claim that Hunt County had a widespread

practice of failing to staff the jail adequately.

Thus, construing the complaint in the light most favorable to Carswell, the Court

holds that Carswell has alleged the official-custom-or-policy element of her Monell claim.

3. Moving Force — Monell liability further requires that the challenged customs

be the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violation. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at

580. Accordingly, Carswell must plead “a direct causal link between the municipal policy

and the constitutional deprivation.” Id.

Here, Carswell states that the County’s customs — failing to provide emergency

medical care; failing to monitor detainees; failing to staff the facility adequately; and failing

to communicate medical needs between shifts — “worked individually or in the alternative

together to cause [Lynch’s] death.” Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 82. This is plausible given

Carswell’s allegation that the “illness that caused Gary’s death was curable, and there were

signs of that illness for days before he died.” Id. ¶ 44. And she pleads several examples

of County employees failing to monitor Lynch properly or provide him with the medical

attention he needed. See id. ¶¶ 21–26, 41, 45, 47, 51–56, 70, 72. The Court determines

that Carswell’s allegations support her theory that Hunt County Jail’s customs of failing to

monitor and treat detainees with emergency or necessary medical needs — and relatedly,

failing to staff the facility adequately — caused Lynch’s death.5 See Shepherd v. Dallas

County, 591 F.3d 445, 453 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding plaintiff’s injuries were the direct and

inevitable result of the jail’s gross inattention to needs of inmates with chronic illness);

Nichols v. Brazos County, 2020 WL 956239, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 2020) (finding pleading

that policy resulted in plaintiff not receiving medication, which led to plaintiff’s death, was

sufficient for moving force element); Feliz, 441 F. Supp. 3d at 504 (finding allegation that

de facto policy of denying medical care to mentally ill detainees was moving force behind

plaintiff’s death).

Thus, Carswell has plausibly alleged that a direct causal link exists between the

County’s policies and the violation of Lynch’s constitutional rights.

4. Deliberate Indifference — Lastly, Carswell must plead that “the municipal

action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability,” which is “‘deliberate indifference

to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory remedy will follow’ the

officials’ decisions.” Guerra, 2024 WL 4673928, at *5 (quoting Bd. of the Cnty.

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 411 (1997)). This is an “extremely high standard

5 Claims based on jail conditions or customs “can be based on multiple interacting policies”

if the interacting policies “have ‘a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation

of a single, identifiable human need.’” See Sanchez, 956 F.3d at 795–96 (quoting Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)).

to meet.” Austin v. City of Pasadena, 74 F.4th 312, 328 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Domino

v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001)).

Carswell may plead deliberate indifference in two ways. First, she may show

deliberate indifference through “‘a pattern of similar violations’ that come from a policy

or custom ‘that is so clearly inadequate as to be obviously likely to result in a constitutional

violation.’” Guerra, 2024 WL 4673928, at *5 (quoting Burge v. St. Tammary Par., 336

F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003)). Second, she may show it through “a single incident . . . if

‘the facts giving rise to the violation are such that it should have been apparent to the

policymaker that a constitutional violation was the highly predictable consequence of a

particular policy.’” Id. (quoting Burge, 336 F.3d at 373). For either way, “showing ‘simple

or even heightened negligence will not suffice.’” Id. (quoting Valle, 613 F.3d at 542).

The Court finds that Carswell has not sufficiently alleged municipal deliberate

indifference regarding the four County customs. First, Carswell has not alleged a pattern

of similar violations caused by the customs. Although she provides descriptions of eight

other detainees dying at Hunt County Jail, she has not pled how the four County customs

caused those deaths. For example, Carswell’s allegations regarding one of the deaths

consists of:

On November 21, 2012, Melanie Lynn Smith died after being in the

Hunt County jail. On November 13, 2012, at approximately 6:00 p.m.,

Smith complained of knee pain. A medical supervisor spoke with

Smith and determined that no medical attention was allegedly

necessary. Smith was eventually transported to the Hunt Regional

Medical Center in Greenville, Texas. She died after a determination

that she needed dialysis that the local hospital was unable to provide.

Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 103. In Smith’s situation, a medical supervisor spoke with

Smith, and the County sent Smith to a medical center, unlike in Lynch’s situation, where

the County did not send him to a medical center. And Carswell does not otherwise explain

how the County’s four customs contributed to Smith’s death. Moreover, several of the

other detainees who passed away had severe mental illness, which is distinguishable from

Lynch’s physical illness, and it is not clear that the County customs at issue here caused

their deaths. Id. ¶¶ 101, 105–07. These deaths do not demonstrate a pattern of similar

constitutional violations sufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference on the part of the

Hunt County sheriff.6 Second, Carswell has not made allegations supporting that Lynch’s

death falls within the single-incident exception; it is not reasonably inferable from the

pleadings that it would have been apparent to the sheriff that Lynch’s death was the highly

predictable consequence of the four County customs.

Because Carswell has not met the “extremely high standard” for pleading deliberate

indifference, Austin, 74 F.4th at 328, her Monell claim against Hunt County fails.

C. Carswell Plausibly Alleges a Conditions-of-Confinement Claim

Next, the Court addresses Carswell’s conditions-of-confinement claim. A

conditions-of-confinement claim is a “constitutional attack on ‘general conditions,

practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement.’” Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 308 (quoting

Flores v. Hardeman County, 124 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1997)). The “proper inquiry is

6 Further, Carswell has not specifically alleged that the County’s failed TCJS inspections

— which support the official-policy-or-custom element of the Monell claim — caused a

pattern of similar constitutional violations, so the failed TCJS inspections do not bolster

the deliberate indifference element of the Monell claim.

whether those conditions amount to a punishment of the detainee.” Id. (citation omitted).

The only meaningful difference between the Monell and conditions-of-confinement

standards is that a Monell claim requires the plaintiff to show deliberate indifference, while

a conditions-of-confinement claim does not. See supra Section III.A.

As the Court discussed in Section III.B.2, Carswell has identified four practices of

Hunt County Jail — failing to provide emergency or necessary medical care; failing to

monitor detainees; failing to staff the facility adequately; and failing to communicate

medical needs from one shift to another. The Court determines that these practices amount

to a condition leaving detainees with no avenue to access emergency medical care, which

cannot be reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. See Albritton v.

Henderson County, 2024 WL 1776380, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2024). And, as discussed in

Section III.B.3, Carswell has sufficiently pled that these practices caused Lynch’s death.

As a result, the Court holds that Carswell has plausibly alleged all elements of the

conditions-of-confinement claim.

D. Carswell Does Not Plausibly Allege an Episodic-Act-or-Omission Claim

Alternatively, Carswell brings an episodic-act-or-omission claim against Hunt

County. Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 83. “Under an episodic-acts-or-omissions theory, ‘a

plaintiff must show (1) that the municipal employee violated [the pretrial detainee’s]

clearly established constitutional rights with subjective deliberate indifference; and (2) that

this violation resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted and maintained with

objective deliberate indifference.’” Rangel, 2024 WL 1160913, at *13 (quoting Cadena v.

El Paso County, 946 F.3d 717, 727 (5th Cir. 2020)). For the first prong, subjective

deliberate indifference requires that the “jail official must have ‘had subjective knowledge

of a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee and responded to that risk with

deliberate indifference.’” Id. (quoting Est. of Henson v. Wichita County, 795 F.3d 456,

464 (5th Cir. 2015)). Such subjective knowledge “requires that the official be ‘aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’

and then actually ‘draw the inference.’” Id. (quoting Est. Of Henson v. Krajca, 440 F.

App’x 341, 343 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpub.)); see also Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 641

(5th Cir. 2013) (“The state actor’s actual knowledge is critical to the inquiry.” (citation

omitted)).

Here, Carswell has alleged that the jail personnel were aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed to Lynch;

Lynch’s declining condition was observable, he told personnel about his symptoms, and

other detainees raised concern to personnel about Lynch’s health. Pl.’s Second Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 14–15, 21–24, 26, 41, 45, 51–54. However, Carswell has not alleged that any

personnel who failed to procure emergency medical treatment for Lynch actually drew the

inference that there was a substantial risk of serious harm to him and then were deliberately

indifferent to that risk. As a result, the Court dismisses Carswell’s episodic-act-or-

omission claim.

E. Carswell Does Not Plausibly Allege a Failure-to-Train Claim

Lastly, the Court addresses Carswell’s failure-to-train claim. “A municipality’s

culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on failure

to train.” Taylor v. Hartley, 488 F. Supp. 3d 517, 535 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (quoting Connick

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)). To state a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must

plead that (1) “the training procedures of the municipality’s policymaker were inadequate,”

(2) “the policymaker was deliberately indifferent in adopting the training policy,” and (3)

“the inadequate training policy directly caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. (citing Conner v.

Travis County, 209 F.3d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 2000)); see also Benfer v. City of Baytown, 120

F.4th 1272, 1286–87 (5th Cir. 2024). Regarding the first element, the focus is on the

“adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the particular officer must

perform,” and “the plaintiff must allege with specificity how the training program is

defective in this regard.” Taylor, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 535 (citing Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142

F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998), then citing Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 293

(5th Cir. 2005)).

Here, Carswell pleads that Hunt County did not (1) train personnel on suicide

prevention training properly; and (2) did not train Landers— a nurse — properly because

she was “below average in her knowledge of jail standards, department policy and

procedure, and detainee rules.” Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 84. First, the Court determines

that Carswell has failed to allege how the inadequate suicide prevention training policy

caused Lynch’s death; Carswell did not plead that Lynch had a mental illness or died by

suicide. Second, the Court finds that Carswell failed to allege how the County’s training

program was inadequate in relation to the tasks that Landers performs. Moreover,

regarding both the suicide prevention and nurse training policies, Carswell has not pled

facts supporting an inference that the Hunt County sheriff was deliberately indifferent in

adopting either policy. Accordingly, the Court holds that Carswell has failed to plausibly

allege that Hunt County is liable under a failure-to-train theory.

CONCLUSION

Because Carswell has stated a plausible conditions-of-confinement claim against

Hunt County, the Court denies the County’s motion to dismiss that claim. However,

because Carswell has not stated plausible Monell, episodic-act-or-omission, and failure-to-

train claims against the County, the Court grants the motion to dismiss those claims with

prejudice. Moreover, because Carswell has already amended her complaint twice, the

Court denies her request for leave to amend the complaint.

Signed March 26, 2025.

David C. Godbey

United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER — PAGE 17