Campbell v. The City of Morgantown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CLARKSBURG

CHARLES D. CAMPBELL et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-CV-74

(KLEEH)

THE CITY OF MORGANTOWN,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND [ECF NO. 7]

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [ECF

No. 7]. For the reasons discussed herein, that motion is GRANTED,

and this matter is hereby REMANDED to the Circuit Court of

Monongalia County, West Virginia, for any further proceedings.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the Circuit Court of

Monongalia County, West Virginia, on July 1, 2024. ECF No. 1 at ¶

1. In their Complaint, members of the City of Morgantown Fire

Department, allege several causes of action including violations

of the West Virginia Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Standards

(“WVMWMH”), W. Va. Code § 21-5C-1; violations of the West Virginia

Wage Payment and Collection Act (“WPCA”), W. Va. Code § 21-5-1,

et. seq.; and breach of employment agreement. ECF No. 1-3. On

August 2, 2024, Defendant City of Morgantown removed the matter to

this Court claiming jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

ECF No. 1 at ¶ 7. On August 9, 2024, Defendant filed The City of

Morgantown’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint, or, in the

Alternative, For Summary Judgment in Favor of the City of

Morgantown or a Stay of Proceedings. ECF No. 3. Plaintiffs

responded in opposition to Defendant’s Motion on August 23, 2024

[ECF No. 5] and Defendant replied in support on August 30, 2024

[ECF No. 6].

On September 6, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the subject Motion to

Remand. ECF No. 7. The City of Morgantown responded in opposition

to the remand on September 20, 2024 [ECF No. 9], and Plaintiffs

replied in support of their motion to remand on September 27, 2024

[ECF No. 10]. This Motion is thus fully briefed and ripe for

review. Because Plaintiffs’ Motion [ECF No. 7] challenges the

Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this case, it must be

addressed prior to Defendant’s Motion [ECF No. 3].1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff Charles D. Campbell is a Lieutenant in the

Morgantown Fire Department and serves as the President of IAFF

1 Boczek v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, No. 1:23-CV-43, 2024 WL

4804982, at *2, n. 2 (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 15, 2024) (“‘“The existence

of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue” which a Court

must address prior to reaching the merits of a case.’ Linton v.

Rollo, No. CIV.A. 1:07CV72, 2007 WL 3408247, at *1 (N.D.W. Va.

Nov. 15, 2007) (citing Jones v. American Postal Workers Union, 192

F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999)).”).

2 All facts recited herein are found in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. ECF

No. 1-3.

Local 313 (Morgantown). ECF NO. 1-3 at ¶. 1. Plaintiff is employed

as a professional firefighter with the Defendant City of

Morgantown. Id. The remaining Plaintiffs in this case are current

or former Morgantown firefighters:

1. Beall, Mitchell

2. Bailey, Brandon

3. Benson, Michael

4. Bishop, Hunter

5. Borzik, John

6. Bragg, Joseph R.

7. Calvert, George

8. Chisler, Matthew

9. Close, Michael

10. Connery, Klint

11. Dalton, Tanner

12. Dalton, Thadius

13. Daniels Douglas A. Jr.

14. Davis, Bryan

15. DeBerry, Christopher

16. Freshour, Gary

17. Ganoe, Jason

18. Giles, Aaron

19. Hagedorn, Larry

20. Hatfield, Jason

21. Horbachewski, Dan

22. Izzo, Brian

23. Jenkins, Ashley

24. Laskody, Chad

25. Lyons, William

26. Martin, Anthony

27. McClain, Bailey

28. Mergenthaler, Brent

29. Moore, John

30. Morgan, Joshua

31. Morris, Nicholas L.

32. Nicewarner, Jayson

33. Nickelson, Eric

34. Nypaver, Joshua

35. Olszewski, Roman

36. Pantalo, Marco

37. Paugh, Brett

38. Peery, Matt

39. Pickenpaugh, Trevor

40. Porter, Derek

41. Ross, David

42. Sharpe, Douglas

43. Smith, Travis

44. Stake, Anthony

45. Thalman, Mark

46. Thomas, Travis

47. Turner, Lucas

48. Ware, Colby

49. Watson, Keith

50. Waxman, Andrew

51. Whiten, Sean R.

52. Wolfe, Robert

53. Wright, Nicholas

54. Zaroda, Devon J.

55. Zimmerman, Robert

Id. at ¶ 2. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the

City of Morgantown failed to promptly and correctly pay them their

regular rate of pay and overtime compensation. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.

They further allege both Defendant and they collectively are

covered under the WVMWMH and the WPCA. Id. at ¶¶ 40-41, 55-56. In

Count One, Plaintiffs allege the City of Morgantown violated the

WVMHMW by improperly calculating the firefighters’ regular rate of

pay and not paying overtime compensation. Id. at ¶¶ 38-53. In Count

Two, Plaintiffs allege the City of Morgantown violated the WCPA by

failing to properly calculate the firefighters’ regular rate of

pay and overtime rate of pay. Id. at ¶¶ 54-68. In Count Three,

Plaintiffs allege the City of Morgantown violated the WCPA by

failing to promptly pay wages due and owed to the firefighters.

Id. at ¶¶ 69-82. In Count Four, Plaintiffs assert they are entitled

to liquidated damages under the WCPA. Id. at ¶¶ 83-89. In Count

Five, Plaintiffs allege the City of Morgantown breached the

firefighters’ employment agreement by failing to properly

calculate the Plaintiffs’ regular rate of pay and overtime rate of

pay. Id. at ¶¶ 90-99. Plaintiffs seek an array of damages for these

claims. Nowhere does Plaintiffs’ Complaint cite or mention any

federal law – constitutional, statutory, or otherwise.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Removal Jurisdiction

Defendants in civil actions may remove a matter from state to

federal court if the latter forum has original subject matter

jurisdiction. This requirement can be based upon diversity

jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441. A federal district court has diversity jurisdiction over

cases between citizens of different states where the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.3 Further, a federal district court has federal

question jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331. This jurisdiction must inhere in the plaintiff’s claim,

rather than be based on a defense or counterclaim. See Louisville

& Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).

3 Defendant does not suggest diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332 exists here; therefore, the Court will not address that

potential jurisdictional basis. Defendant must therefore

demonstrate federal question jurisdiction is present.

The burden of demonstrating jurisdiction generally resides

with the defendant. See Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257

U.S. 92 (1921). Likewise, the plaintiff’s role in the context of

disputes about removability is also clearly defined: the plaintiff

is the master of his or her claim. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v.

Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989). This means that “if [the plaintiff]

chooses not to assert a federal claim . . . or properly joins a

nondiverse party, defendants cannot remove the action to federal

court on the ground that an alternative course of conduct available

to the plaintiff would have permitted removal of the case.” 14B

Charles Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3721, p. 59

(2009). Moreover, as the Fourth Circuit has indicated, if federal

jurisdiction is doubtful, the case must be remanded. See Mulcahey

v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).

Federal question jurisdiction exists if “a federal question

is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded

complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392

(1987); see also W. Va. State Univ. Bd. of Governors v. Dow Chem.

Co., 23 F.4th 288, 297 (4th Cir. 2022) (referencing “the well-

pleaded complaint rule, which, absent diversity, prohibits removal

unless a federal question appears on the face of the complaint”).

As such, a defendant may not rely on a federal defense to a state

law claim as a basis for removal. See Topeka Housing Auth. v.

Johnson, 404 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 2005). Thus, the well-

pleaded complaint rule makes the plaintiff “the master of the

claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive

reliance on state law.” Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392.

Even a cursory reading of Plaintiffs’ complaint reveals the

complete absence of any semblance of a federal claim on that

pleading’s face. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a multitude

of causes of action against their employer under West Virginia

law: violation of the WVMWMH, W. Va. Code § 21-5C-1 et seq.;

violations of the WPCA, W. Va. Code § 21-5-1 et seq.; and a common

law claim for breach of an employment agreement under West Virginia

law. See generally Compl.

B. Embedded Federal Question

As Plaintiffs accurately state in their pending motion,

Defendant fails to cite any provision of the Complaint to support

its claim a federal question exists here. Instead, Defendant argues

Plaintiffs’ claim in Count One for violation of the WVMWMH actually

arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §

203. ECF No. 9 at p. 1. Defendant thus urges this Court to find an

“embedded federal question” in Plaintiffs’ WVMWMH claim and assert

jurisdiction in this matter. Id. at p. 6.

“[W]hen a claim finds its origins in state rather than federal

law, federal courts have identified a ‘special and small category’

of cases in which arising under [federal question] jurisdiction

still lies.” W. Va. State Univ. Bd. of Governors, 23 F.4th at 307

(citing Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S.

677, 699 (2006)). Exceptions to the well-established “arising

under” standard of federal law are “extremely rare.” Gunn v.

Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013). Defendant claims one such

exception – under Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue

Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005) — applies here. ECF No. 1

at ¶¶ 8-9.

Under that limited exception, courts must assess whether the

“state-law claim necessarily raises a stated federal issue,

actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may

entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance

of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable, 545 U.S.

at 314. “[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if

a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed,

(3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court

without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by

Congress.” Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258. If all four of these requirements

are met, then jurisdiction is proper because there is a “‘serious

federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent

in a federal forum,’ which can be vindicated without disrupting

Congress’s intended division of labor between state and federal

courts.” Id. (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 313–314). However, “[t]he

mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does

not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction.” Merrell

Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986). Likewise,

“the mere assertion of a federal interest [is] not enough to confer

federal jurisdiction.” Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 701.

The Fourth Circuit has also provided guidance on this limited

exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Even if state law

creates the claims asserted by the plaintiff, federal question

jurisdiction nonetheless is proper in cases in which “the

plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of

a substantial question of federal law, in that federal law is a

necessary element of one of the well-pleaded . . . claims.” Pinney

v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 442 (4th Cir. 2005). To remove a

case in which state law creates the plaintiff’s cause of action,

a defendant “must establish two elements: (1) that the plaintiff's

right to relief necessarily depends on a question of federal law,

and (2) that the question of federal law is substantial.” Dixon v.

Coburg Daily, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004).

1. Necessarily Raised

Turning to the Grable factors, the first prong of the analysis

requires the court to consider whether the “state-law claim

necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue.” 545 U.S. at 314

(emphasis added). This is satisfied when “it appears that

some . . . disputed question of federal law is a necessary element

of one of the well-pleaded state claims.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463

U.S. at 13.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ WVMWMH claim necessarily

raises a federal issue because Plaintiffs must demonstrate that

the City of Morgantown is a covered employer under the WVMWMH law,

which implicates the FLSA’s 80-percenter rule. Id. at pp. 6-11.

Pursuant to the WVMWMH law, an “employer” includes:

the State of West Virginia, its agencies,

departments, and all its political

subdivisions

...

That after December 31, 2014, for the purposes

of § 21-5C-3 of this code, the term “employer”

does not include any individual, partnership,

association, corporation, person or group of

persons, or similar unit if 80 percent of the

persons employed by him or her are subject to

any federal act relating to maximum hours and

overtime compensation.

W. Va. Code § 21-5C-1. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West

Virginia has held that all entities qualifying as an employer under

the WVMWMH, including a city as a political subdivision of the

State, are entitled to the exemption from the WVMWMH “provided

that eighty percent of their employees are subject to federal wage

and hour laws. Adkins v. City of Huntington, 191 W. Va. 317, 320,

445 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1994).

Thus, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs must establish as a

threshold matter whether the City of Morgantown is subject to the

WVMWMH, which necessarily implicates determining whether 80% or

more of the City of Morgantown’s employees are subject to the FLSA.

ECF No. 9 at p. 7. Defendant relies heavily upon Harper v. Massey

Coal Services, Inc., No. 2:10-0894, 2011 WL 322558 (S.D.W. Va.

Feb. 2, 2011), to support its position. In Harper, Judge Copenhaver

addressed whether an employee’s claims under the West Virginia

Minimum Wage and Maximum Hour Standards, W. Va. Code § 21-5C-1 et

seq., presented an embedded federal question such that removal,

despite the absence of a federal claim on the complaint’s face,

was proper. He reasoned that because the plaintiffs’ claim depended

upon their ability to satisfy the statutory definition of

“employer,” which expressly relies upon federal wage and hour law,

the Grable-Pinney factors were satisfied such that the Southern

District of West Virginia had “arising under” jurisdiction.

Specifically, Judge Copenhaver noted the plaintiffs bore the

burden to prove they brought their claim against a “covered

employer” triggering the statute’s application and, should the

plaintiffs fail there, no claim under the Minimum Wage and Maximum

Hour Standards would lie. He found that definition so dependent

upon federal law that its determination was necessary, disputed,

and substantial and that exercising jurisdiction would not disturb

the balance between federal-state judicial responsibilities.

In contrast, Plaintiffs argue that there is no embedded

federal question raised in their Complaint. ECF No. 7 at p. 19.

Plaintiffs argue that the claimed presence of the FLSA’s policy in

this action is insufficient to justify federal question

jurisdiction, in part, because the Grable factors are not met to

justify the “extremely rare exception”. Id. at pp. 20-21.

Plaintiffs rely heavily upon Craddock v. Adon Network, Inc., No.

2:10-CV-01401, 2011 WL 1601331, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 27, 2011)

to support remanding this matter to the Circuit Court of Monongalia

County, West Virginia. Id.

In Craddock, an employer removed an action to the Southern

District of West Virginia, asserting the Court had federal question

jurisdiction pursuant to the FLSA even though the Complaint alleged

only State law causes of action. Craddock, 2011 WL 1601331, at *1.

Like the case presently before the Court, the employer argued

federal question jurisdiction existed, because the plaintiff's

claims under the Minimum Wage Act necessarily raised, as an element

of the claim, the issue of whether more than eighty percent of the

defendant's employees were covered by the FLSA. Id. Judge Goodwin,

acknowledging Judge Copenhaver’s prior decision in Harper, assumed

without deciding that “defendant's status as an FLSA ‘eighty-

percenter’ is a necessary element of a well-pleaded complaint under

W. Va. Code § 21–5C–3.” Id. at *5. However, as discussed in more

detail below, Judge Goodwin ultimately remanded the case to the

Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia after finding the

federal issue was not “substantial” under federal law for purposes

of removal jurisdiction. Id. at *5-6.

Having considered the arguments of the parties along with the

persuasive decisions from the Southern District of West Virginia,

the Court assumes without deciding that the FLSA eighty-percenter

rule is necessarily raised in a WVMWMH claim, and thus the first

Grable factor supports federal question jurisdiction.

2. Substantial Federal Issue

Turning to the “substantial” factor, the Court finds

Defendant fails to satisfy the second Grable prong. As Judge

Goodwin of the Southern District of West Virginia summarized,

the Supreme Court in Empire Healthchoice

outlined the factors “that affect the

‘substantiality’ [i.e., the second Grable

prong] of a federal interest in that case or

issue: (1) whether the case includes a federal

agency, and particularly, whether that

agency’s compliance with the federal statute

is in dispute; (2) whether the federal

question is important (i.e., not trivial); (3)

whether a decision on the federal issue will

resolve the case (i.e., the federal question

is not merely incidental to the outcome); and

(4) whether a decision as to the federal

question will control numerous other cases

(i.e., the issue is not anomalous or

isolated).

Craddock, 2011 WL 1601331, at *4 (citing Mikulski v. Centerior

Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 570 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Defendant asserts that the implication of the eighty-

percenter rule is actually disputed4 and substantial in this case.

4 The matter is actually disputed because Plaintiffs argue both

that the eighty-percenter rule does not exempt public employers

ECF No. 9 at p. 11. Defendant argues “[t]he need for uniformity in

the interpretation and application of the FLSA with regard to its

coverage of employees, not just for the parties in this case but

for all employers and employees whom this federal issue affects,

creates the substantial federal interest justifying the exercise

of this Court's jurisdiction.” Id. at p. 13. Again, Defendant

relies on the Harper decision which found the need for uniform

interpretation of the FLSA to be constitute a substantial federal

interest. Id. at p. 11; Harper, 2011 WL 322558 at *6.

In contrast, Plaintiff argues that the second Grable prong is

not satisfied because the eighty-percenter rule does not qualify

as a substantial federal question. ECF No. 7 at p. 23. Plaintiffs

contend that no federal agency is party to this litigation nor is

any such agency’s compliance with federal law at issue. Further,

Plaintiffs argue that the Circuit Court of Monongalia County is

competent to apply any federal law to the extent it is necessary

in adjudicating the state cause of action. Id.; Empire Healthchoice

Assur., Inc.,547 U.S. at 701 (2006). Plaintiff similarly relies

upon the reasoning in the Craddock decision, in urging the Court

to find the eighty-percenter rule does not raise a substantial

question of law. Id.

from the WVMWMH and in the alternative that the City of Morgantown

does not meet the 80% threshold for exemption. ECF No. 7.

Regarding the second Grable prong, the Craddock Court

reasoned that the eighty-percenter issue was not a substantial

one, after consideration of the four factors outlined in Empire

Healthchoice Assur., Inc., Craddock, 2011 WL 1601331, at *5-6.

Here, the first factor does not counsel in favor of finding

a substantial federal issue at play here because no federal agency

is party to this litigation nor is any such agency’s compliance

with federal law at issue. Rather, the parties are a municipality

and professional firefighters.

The Court acknowledges that the second factor is a closer

call. The FLSA is undoubtably an important federal statute. The

particular question at issue here – who is covered by the FLSA –

is a complex question and is often litigated. See Harper, 2011 WL

322558, at *6. “Nevertheless, although the federal government

certainly has an interest in ensuring that there is uniformity in

the application of federal statutes, the question does not

necessarily implicate ‘broader or more substantial issues.’”

Craddock, 2011 WL 1601331, at *6 (quoting Mikulski, 501 F.3d at

571). Furthermore, resolution of the coverage issue in this case

will not have any binding impact on the federal government; at

most – it could be cited in future litigation involving the City

of Morgantown as an employer. Thus, the second factor does not

support that the eighty-percenter rule is substantial.

With respect to the last two factors, this Court has also

previously considered the expansion of removal jurisdiction under

the Grable rubric. As Judge Bailey summarized,

The Supreme Court of the United States has

distinguished cases that involve “nearly ‘pure

issue[s] of law’ . . . ‘that [can] be settled

once and for all’” from those that are “fact-

bound and situation specific.” Id. at 700–01.

Or, as Justice Cardozo put it, a “common-sense

accommodation of judgment to [the]

kaleidoscopic situations” that present a

federal issue, in “a selective process which

picks the substantial causes out of the web

and lays the other ones aside.” Gully v. First

Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117–18

(1936).

Adkins Energy, Inc. v. Dominion Transmission Inc., No. 5:16-CV-

151, 2017 WL 462009, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 2, 2017) (Bailey, J.).

The final factor “requires the court to determine whether

resolution of the alleged federal issue would control numerous

other cases, not whether resolution of the question of federal

subject-matter jurisdiction will govern numerous other cases.”

Craddock, 2011 WL 1601331, at *6 n.1. This case, like many wage

and hour claims, whether brought expressly under the FLSA or state

law like the WVMWMH, is quite “fact-bound and situation-specific.”

Empire Healthcare, 547 U.S. at 700. The Complaint sets out a

lengthy and detailed factual chronology upon which Plaintiffs rely

here. Defendant argues that application of the eighty-percenter

rule is dispositive. However, this is only true if the issue is

decided in favor of Defendant. See Craddock, 2011 WL 1601331, at

*6. “Here, at most, the federal issue represents but one element

of one of the plaintiff's claims, all of which are based in state

law.” Id. There is no “pure” question of federal law that would

resolve not only this dispute but others in the future. Each case

would require a specific determination as to whether a particular

defendant qualifies as an employee under the WVMWMH. Thus, The

third and fourth factors likewise weigh against finding a

substantial federal question that requires exercise of

jurisdiction under Grable-Pinney.

3. Federal-State Judicial Balance

Lastly, the Court must consider whether Defendant can satisfy

the final prong: “that removal of this state-law case and the

multitude of cases just like it would be consistent with the

congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial

responsibilities.” Burrell, 918 F.3d at 386 (citing Grable, 545

U.S. at 314). “The Supreme Court has ‘consistently emphasized that,

in exploring the outer reaches of [section] 1331, determinations

about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about

congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.’”

Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. N. Carolina Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res.,

131 F. Supp. 3d 496, 504 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (quoting Merrell Dow, 478

U.S. at 810).

Defendant’s proposed exercise of jurisdiction here would

inappropriately upset the balance between federal and state

courts. Plaintiffs arguably could have asserted certain of their

grievances, in this case, under the auspices of the FLSA.5 They

consciously chose a different path. Here, Defendant seeks to usurp

that choice via an “extremely rare” gambit – injecting a federal

question into a Complaint devoid of any such issue but overflowing

with state law causes of action.

To sanction this procedural maneuver would be to “federalize”

any claim under the WVMWMH. See, e.g., Hanna v. CFL Pizza, LLC,

No. 6:11-CV-1837-ORL-22, 2012 WL 515875, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30,

2012); Fabro v. Aqua-Aston Hospitality, LLC, No. CV 16-00467 DKW-

RLP, 2017 WL 449587, at *4 (D. Haw. Feb. 2, 2017). This would

offend any concept of federalism and potentially prompt a flood of

state-law WVMWMH and garden-variety employment claims being

removed to a federal forum in the absence of express federal

question jurisdiction when the circuit courts of West Virginia are

more than capable of adjudicating such disputes. See Empire

Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 701 (“The state court in which

the . . . suit was lodged is competent to apply federal law, to

the extent it is relevant . . .”). This factor likewise requires

remand here.

5 The Court is aware that Plaintiffs have filed a separate cause

of action pursuant to the FLSA. See Campbell, et al. v. The City

of Morgantown, Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-66 (N.D.W. Va. June 28,

2024).

Courts “are obliged to construe removal jurisdiction strictly

because of the ‘significant federalism concerns’ implicated. . . .

Therefore, if federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand to state

court is necessary.” Maryland Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe Becket Inc.,

407 F.3d 255, 260 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). There is no doubt here after assessing the

relevant factors.

The Court finds Defendant has failed to satisfy the Grable

factors demonstrating an embedded federal question exists in

Plaintiffs’ Complaint investing this Court with jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs’ claims do not necessarily raise a

disputed and substantial federal issue. Moreover, asserting

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims would

inappropriately affect the balance between federal and state

courts. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

and remand is necessary.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

In addition to their request for remand, Plaintiffs also ask

this Court to award them their attorneys’ fees. “An award of

attorneys’ fees under § 1447 is not automatic but should only be

awarded where ‘the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable

basis.’” Henry v. Kingwood Mining Co., LLC, No. 1:09CV16, 2009 WL

10676866, at *1 (N.D.W. Va. June 15, 2009) (Keeley, J.) (quoting

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140 (2005)).

Although the Court granted Plaintiffs’ remand motion, the Court

does not believe that Defendant so lacked an objectively reasonable

basis in seeking removal that an award of fees and costs is

warranted here. There exists a divergence of thought on whether

other West Virginia statutes present sufficiently substantial

federal questions to constitute “arising under” jurisdiction.

Compare Harper, 2011 WL 322558, with Craddock, 2011 WL 1601331.

Considering all relevant circumstances, Defendant’s removal does

not satisfy the lofty standard required to impose an award of

attorneys’ fees and costs despite the Court’s remanding the matter

to the Circuit Court of Monongalia County. Plaintiffs’ request for

attorneys’ fees is DENIED.

D. Other Pending Motions

On August 9, 2024, Defendant filed The City of Morgantown’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint, or, in the Alternative,

For Summary Judgment in Favor of the City of Morgantown or a Stay

of Proceedings. ECF No. 3. This Court has no authority to consider

this motion. “Unfortunately, however, without either diversity or

federal question jurisdiction, any judgment rendered by this Court

would be immediately vacated on appeal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.” Inkrote v. Prot. Strategies Inc., No. 3:09-CV-51,

2009 WL 3295042, at *8 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 13, 2009). Thus, the Court

directs the Clerk to TERMINATE the motion to dismiss from the

Court’s docket.

IV CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Motion to Remand [ECF

No. 7] is GRANTED. This action is hereby REMANDED to the Circuit

Court of Monongalia County, West Virginia.

The Clerk shall STRIKE this action from the Court’s active

docket and TERMINATE Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 3] as

the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to decide it.

It is so ORDERED.

The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Order to

counsel of record and the Circuit Clerk of Monongalia County, West

Virginia.

DATED: March 27, 2025

Tn B Blade

THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

21