The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
BENJAMIN YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 2:23-cv-02327-MSN-tmp
JURY DEMAND
MYLES GREENE and
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”) and Myles Greene’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 33), filed January 26, 2024. Plaintiff Benjamin
Young filed a Response in Opposition on February 12, 2024 (ECF No. 37). For the reasons stated
below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action on May 22, 2023 (ECF No. 1), and filed his First Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 11) on July 11, 2023, asserting claims against UPS and Mr. Greene for
defamation (slander), tortious interference with a business relationship, retaliation under the
Tennessee Disability Act (“TDA”), and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”) Defendants filed their Answer (ECF No. 31) on October 12, 2023.
On February 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss Defendant Myles Greene1 (ECF
No. 35) and a Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF
No. 34). Due to electronic signature deficiencies, the Clerk issued a Deficiency Notice (ECF No.
36). While Plaintiff properly refiled his Response (ECF No. 37), Plaintiff never corrected the
Motion to Dismiss. Similarly, Plaintiff’s attempted filing of a Second Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 38) on April 21, 2024, contained deficiencies that were never corrected. Under Electronic
Case File Policies & Procedures § 12.3, these uncorrected filings are not before the Court.
B. Plaintiff’s Claims
According to the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff, a former UPS employee, alleges he
was wrongfully terminated following an internal complaint made by Mr. Greene. (ECF No. 11 at
PageID 11–13.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that in June 2022, Mr. Greene falsely reported to
UPS management that Plaintiff had used racial slurs, ultimately leading to Plaintiff’s termination
on July 17, 2022. (Id.)
Plaintiff further alleges that he has diabetes, which substantially limits his ability to eat and
work, and that UPS regarded him as disabled. (Id. at PageID 13.) He contends he could perform
his job’s essential functions with certain accommodations, including intermittent medical leave.
(Id. at Page ID 13 & 15.) Plaintiff claims UPS terminated him in retaliation for requesting
accommodations while treating similarly situated non-disabled employees more favorably,
specifically citing Willie Isom, a black manager without a disability who allegedly engaged in
misconduct but was retained. (Id. at Page ID 13–15.)
1 Plaintiff sought to voluntarily dismiss his claims against Defendant Myles Greene without
prejudice under Rule 41(a)(3), citing jury confusion and Mr. Greene’s alleged inability to pay a
judgment (ECF No. 35 at PageID 93), that motion was never properly filed. The Court’s ruling
on the present motion effectively achieves the dismissal of Mr. Green albeit with prejudice through
Rule 12(c).
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts he took intermittent FMLA leave for his diabetes and shortly
before his termination, requested FMLA leave to care for his father who had dementia. (Id. at
PageID 14–15.) He alleges UPS failed to provide proper FMLA notices, made negative comments
about his protected absence, and terminated him in retaliation for exercising FMLA rights. (Id. at
PageID 14–15.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but
early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard
as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 639 (6th Cir. 2016); Fritz
v. Charter Twp. Of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010); Hunter v. Ohio Veterans Home,
272 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court accepts the plaintiff’s “plausible factual allegations as true and draw[s] all reasonable
inferences” in the plaintiff’s favor. Marchek v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 118 F.4th 830, 833 (6th
Cir. 2024); Cook v. Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 961 F.3d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 2020). Using this
framework, the court determines whether the complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its
face if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). A complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations; however, a plaintiff’s
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556). In other words, “a plaintiff must allege facts that, when taken as true, state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face and that rises above the speculative level.” Bray v. Bon Secours Mercy
Health, Inc., 97 F.4th 403, 410 (6th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). If a court decides, in light of its
judicial experience and common sense, that the claim is not plausible, the case may be dismissed
at the pleading stage. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
A district court is not permitted to consider matters beyond the complaint” when
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Mediacom Se. L.L.C. v. BellSouth Telcoms.,
Inc., 672 F.3d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 2012). If a court considers material outside of the pleadings, the
motion to dismiss must be converted into a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, “and all parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all material
pertinent to the motion.” Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 680 (6th Cir.
2011). A court may, however, consider exhibits attached to the petition as well as exhibits attached
to the motion to dismiss “so long as they are referred to in the [c]omplaint and are central to the
claims contained therein,” without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Bassett
v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).
DISCUSSION
A. Defamation (Slander) Claim
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s defamation claim fails for two reasons: (1) it is barred by
the six-month statute of limitations under T.C.A. § 28-3-10, and (2) the alleged statements
constitute intra-corporate communications that do not qualify as “publication” for defamation
purposes. (ECF No. 33 at Page ID 78–79.) In response, Plaintiff does not address the statute of
limitations argument and contends that Defendants’ “gamesmanship in waiting to file under Rule
12(c) should be rejected. (ECF No. 37 at PageID 97.)
Under Tennessee law, to establish a claim for defamation a plaintiff must prove: (1) a party
published the statement; (2) with knowledge that the statement is false and defaming to the other;
or (3) with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement or with negligence in failing to ascertain
the truth of the statement. Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
Sullivan v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tenn. 1999)).
Publication requires communication of the defamatory matter to a third person. Brown v.
Christian Bros. Univ., 428 S.W.3d 38, 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Quality Auto Parts Co. v.
Bluff City Buick Co., 876 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tenn. 1994)). In the case of slander, publication occurs
when the defamatory matter is spoken. Id. However, Tennessee courts have recognized an
exception for certain “intra-corporate communications,” which do not constitute publication. Z.J.
v. Vanderbilt Univ., 355 F. Supp. 3d 646, 687 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (quoting Woods v. Helmi, 758
S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)). Under this doctrine, "where a communication is made
to a servant or business associate in the ordinary and natural course of business, there is no
actionable defamation." Clark v. Hoops, LP, 709 F. Supp. 2d 657, 671 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (quoting
Freeman v. Dayton Scale Co., 159 Tenn. 413, 19 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tenn. 1929) (cleaned up)).
Even if a plaintiff establishes the elements of defamation, Tennessee law imposes a statute
of limitations on such claims. For oral defamation (slander), an action must be commenced within
six months after the words are uttered. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-103 ("Actions for slanderous
words spoken shall be commenced within six (6) months after the words are uttered.").
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s defamation claim fails for two independent reasons. First,
the claim is clearly time-barred. Here, the Amended Complaint explicitly states that Mr. Greene
made the allegedly defamatory statements in June 2022. (ECF No. 11 at PageID 12.) However,
Plaintiff did not file this action until May 2023. (ECF No. 1), approximately eleven months later
and well beyond the statutory deadline. Plaintiff has not contested this timing or argued for any
tolling.
Second, Mr. Greene’s report to UPS management falls within the intra-corporate
communications doctrine. Such internal reports of potential misconduct are the type of business
communication this doctrine is meant to protect. The fact that the report led to adverse action does
not remove it from this protection.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s defamation claim. Those
claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship Claim
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts showing improper motive or
means. (ECF No. 33 at Page ID 79–81.) Plaintiff responds generally that his allegations satisfy
notice pleading standards. (ECF No. 37 at PageID 97–98.)
Under Tennessee law, to establish tortious interference with a business relationship, a
plaintiff must prove: (1) an existing business relationship with specific third parties or a
prospective relationship with an identifiable class of third persons; (2) the defendant’s knowledge
of that relationship; (3) defendant’s intent to cause the breach or termination of the business
relationship; (4) the defendant’s improper motive or means; and (5) damages resulting from the
tortious interference. Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 701 (Tenn. 2002).
The fourth element—improper motive or means—requires particular scrutiny. When
alleging improper motive, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s predominant purpose
was to injure the plaintiff. Lamdin v. Aerotek Commer. Staffing, No.: 3:10-CV-280, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 105306, at *20 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2010) (citing Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 701 n.5 (Tenn. 2002)). Mere speculation and conclusory allegations that
a defendant acted with intent are sufficient to satisfy this element. Ingram v. Tenn. Dep’t of Health,
No. 3:17-cv-01565, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148840, at *55 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 9, 2021).
Alternatively, a plaintiff may establish the fourth element by proving improper means.
Lamdin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105306, at *20–21 (citing Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 701 n.5 (Tenn. 2002)). As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained, while
“precise, all-encompassing definition of the term ‘improper’ is neither possible nor helpful,”
improper means generally encompasses conduct that is illegal or independently tortious. Trau-
Med of Am., Inc., 71 S.W.3d at 701 n.5. Examples include:
violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law rules, violence,
threats or intimidation, bribery, unfounded litigation, fraud, misrepresentation or
deceit, defamation, duress, undue influence, misuse of inside or confidential
information, or breach of a fiduciary relationship, and those methods that violate
an established standard of a trade or profession, or otherwise involve unethical
conduct, such as sharp dealing, overreaching, or unfair competition.
Id. (cleaned up).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim. While
Plaintiff conclusory asserts Mr. Greene acted “in an intentional attempt to get Plaintiff fired.”
(ECF No. 11 at PageID 12.) Plaintiff pleads no facts suggesting Mr. Greene’s predominant purpose
was to injure him rather than report perceived misconduct. Similarly, Plaintiff identifies no
improper means beyond the alleged defamation, which fails for the reasons stated above.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s tortious interference
claim. Those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
C. Retaliation Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103(b)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails because Plaintiff admits to being
terminated for non-retaliatory reasons, using racial slurs. (ECF No. 33 at PageID 81–82.) Plaintiff
responds that this mischaracterizes his allegations, which state UPS’s reason was pretextual. (ECF
No. 37 at PageID 99.)
The TDA, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103, prohibits employers from
discriminating against employees “based solely upon any physical, mental or visual disability of
the applicant, unless such disability to some degree prevents the applicant from performing the
duties required by the employment sought or impairs the performance of the work involved.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103(b). Tennessee law also prohibits retaliation against people who
oppose discriminatory practices or participate in related investigations or proceedings. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 4-21-301(a)(1); Chapman v. Olymbec USA, L.L.C., No. 2:18-cv-02842, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73083, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 23, 2020).
To establish a prima facie case under the TDA, a plaintiff must show: (1) that plaintiff
engaged in an activity protected by the relevant statutes; (2) that the exercise of his civil rights
were known by the defendant; (3) that, thereafter, the defendant took an employment action
adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action. Cardenas-Meade v. Pfizer, Inc., 510 F. App'x 367, 372 (6th
Cir. 2013) (citing Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 661 (6th Cir. 1999)). Courts interpret and
apply TDA claims under the same analytical framework as claims brought under the Americans
with Disabilities Act. Id. at 369 n.2 (citing Sasser v. Quebecor Printing Corp., 159 S.W.3d 579,
584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)).
The Court finds Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim. Contrary to Defendants’
characterization, the Amended Complaint does not admit Plaintiff used racial slurs but rather
alleges this was a false pretext for discrimination. (ECF No. 11 at PageID 13–14.) Plaintiff alleges
he requested disability accommodations, was qualified to perform his job with such
accommodations, and was terminated while similarly situated non-disabled employees who
engaged in misconduct were retained. (Id.) These allegations, accepted as true at this stage,
sufficiently state a claim.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Tennessee Disability Act
retaliation claim.
D. Retaliation Under the Family and Medical Leave Act
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim fails because his termination was
unrelated to any protected activity. (ECF No. 33 at PageID 82–83.) Plaintiff responds by pointing
to specific allegations regarding his FMLA requests, UPS’s failure to provide proper notices,
negative comments about his absence, and temporal proximity to his termination. (ECF No. 37 at
PageID 100.)
To establish FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) exercise of FMLA rights, (2)
adverse employment action, and (3) causal connection. Alexander v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 674 F.
App'x 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2017).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible FMLA retaliation claim. The Amended
Complaint alleges that Plaintiff took FMLA leave for his diabetes, requested additional FMLA to
care for his father with dementia, and was terminated shortly thereafter. (ECF No. 11 at PageID
14–15.) As with his TDA claim, Plaintiff denies the proffered reasons for his termination were
legitimate. These allegations sufficiently suggest a retaliatory motive at the pleading stage.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No.
33) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s defamation and tortious interference
claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s retaliation claims under the Tennessee
Disability Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act shall proceed.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 26th day of March, 2025.
s/ Mark S. Norris
MARK S. NORRIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE