The opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
NOVEMBER 1997 SESSION
December 17, 1997
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
DONNIE CARPENTER, )
) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9703-CC-00114
Appellant, )
) MAURY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JAMES L. WEATHERFORD,
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Post-conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
SHARA FLACY JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
WILLIAM C. BRIGHT CLINTON J. MORGAN
Asst. Public Defender Counsel for the State
P.O. Box 1208 450 James Robertson Pkwy.
Pulaski, TN 38478 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
MIKE BOTTOMS
District Attorney General
ROBERT C. SANDERS
Asst. District Attorney General
P.O. Box 1619
Columbia, TN 38401
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN H. PEAY,
Judge
OPINION
The petitioner pled guilty to first-degree murder on September 23, 1986.
He received a sentence of life imprisonment. On August 21, 1991, he filed a petition for
post-conviction relief. Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed on
November 20, 1996. The petition was dismissed the following day because it was filed
outside the statute of limitations. The petitioner now appeals and argues that the post-
conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. We disagree and affirm the
judgment of the court below.
In his post-conviction petition, the petitioner alleges that his trial counsel
was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not entered freely and voluntarily. He alleged
in his petition that his counsel told him he would be out of prison in six years when in
actuality, he would have to serve seventeen years before becoming eligible for parole.
He further alleged that because he only has a seventh grade education, he was unaware
that he had to bring these complaints before the court within three years of his conviction
becoming final. Thus, he argues that his petition should not be barred for falling outside
the statute of limitations.
At the time the petitioner was convicted, he had three years from the date
his conviction became final to file his post-conviction petition. T.C.A. § 40-30-102
(1990).1 His petition was filed nearly five years after he pled guilty; thus he is clearly
outside the limitations period. However, the petitioner urges this Court to dispense with
the timing requirement because the petitioner was ill-educated and was unable to hire an
attorney to help him understand the legal process. This Court has previously held that
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As of M ay 10, 199 5, the tim ing for filing su ch a pe tition was re duced to one yea r from the date
the c onvic tion b eca me final.
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ignorance of the statute of limitations is not an excuse for failing to timely file a post-
conviction petition. Brown v. State, 928 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). We
have also held that the statute of limitations is not affected by when a petitioner “learns”
that his constitutional rights might have been violated. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d
619, 625 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). As this Court has previously stated,
The Post-Conviction Procedure Act is not a constitutionally
mandated procedure and this Court has repeatedly held that
the legislature could properly impose limitations upon the
time in which the cause of action arising under the act must
be brought. There is nothing in the act to indicate that the
legislature intended for this provision to apply only to certain
petitioners. For this Court to now attempt to carve
exceptions would defeat the purpose of the act. We are not
prepared to hold that the facts alleged by the petitioner tolled
the running of the three year limitation.
Melvin Douglas Boyle v. State, No, 02C01-9201-CC-00003, Fayette County (Tenn. Crim.
App. filed Nov. 18, 1992, at Jackson).
Thus, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition due to its having
been filed outside the statute of limitations.
_________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
______________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, Judge
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