Megginson v. The City of New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MICHAEL E. MEGGINSON,

Plaintiff,

– against –

OPINION & ORDER

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LOUIS 23 Civ. 6798 (ER)

MOLINA, CHRISTOPHER MILLER,

LILWANIA GLOVER, and RONALD

MILLER,

Defendants.

RAMOS, D.J.:

Michael E. Megginson, a pretrial detainee at Rikers Island, brings this pro se

action in forma pauperis against the City of New York (the “City”), Louis Molina, Rikers

Island Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Commissioner (“Commissioner Molina”),

Deputy Commissioner Christopher Miller (“Deputy Commissioner Miller”), Assistant

Deputy Warden Lilwannia Glover (“ADW Glover”), and Acting Warden of Rikers Island

West Facility Ronald Miller (“Warden Miller”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Megginson

alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Defendants deprived him of his constitutional

rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, by exercising deliberate

indifference to (1) his medical needs after he fell through a collapsed floor, and (2) the

inhumane and unsafe conditions of his confinement, including a vermin infestation

resulting in a serious infection. Megginson additionally alleges a state law negligence

claim.

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. 14. For the reasons set

forth below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

�e following facts are drawn from allegations contained in the complaint, Doc.

1, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of the instant motion, Walker v. Schult,

717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013), as well as from three other documents filed by

Megginson: his “notice of motion of opposition,” Doc. 19;1 a “motion to request

summary judgment and towards settlement agreement,” Doc. 20; and his surresponse to

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. 26. See Forrest v. City of New York, No. 21 Civ.

10152 (LJL) (BCM), 2023 WL 2432493, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2023), report and

recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2433115 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2023) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted) (“[A]lthough ordinarily a plaintiff may not shore up a

deficient complaint through extrinsic documents submitted in opposition to a defendant’s

motion to dismiss, in a pro se case the court may, in its discretion, consider factual

allegations made in the plaintiff’s opposition papers as supplementing the Complaint, at

least to the extent they are consistent with the allegations in the Complaint.”).

A. Factual Background

Collapsed Floor and Vermin Infestation

Megginson alleges that he was housed in “an unsafe, hazardous, unsecured cell, in

which the floor area by the shower caved in and sunk,” allegedly due to vermin eating the

plaster, causing him to fall into and get stuck in the hole. Doc. 1 at 4. He also alleges

that he was bitten by vermin because the cell was “never . . . properly sealed.” Id. at 5.

�e events at issue occurred between July 10 and July 17, 2023.2 Id. at 4. On

1 �e full title of this document is: “Notice of Motion of Opposition of Response to Defendants[’] Motion.

And a Motion to Overrule Defendants Motion[’] to Dismiss Complaint [and] to [G]rant Summary

Judgment to pro se Litigant.” Doc. 19.

2 �e complaint was submitted via an S.D.N.Y. Prisoner Complaint Form. Doc. 1. �e certification page

was signed and dated on “7/17/2023.” Id. at 6. �e complaint was post-marked on July 27, 2023, then

received and filed by the Court on August 2, 2023. Id. at 1, 7. However, the field of the certification page

titled “Date on which I am delivering this complaint to prison authorities for mailing” was left blank. Id. at

6. It is therefore presumed that the effective date of Megginson’s complaint is July 17, 2023. �is form

also contains the following language on the signature page under “Plaintiff’s Certification and Warnings”:

“I also understand that prisoners must exhaust administrative procedures before filing an action in federal

court about prison conditions, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and that my case may be dismissed if I have not

exhausted administrative remedies as required.” Id. at 6.

July 10,3 Megginson was exiting the shower at the Rikers Island West Facility when he

heard a “large cracking sound” and the floor “caved in and sunk in due to vermin[]

(bug[s]/insects) eating up the plaster, wood, and iron on the floor’s drain area.” Id.

Megginson’s “right knee, calf, and foot fell through the floor.” Id. He was subsequently

stuck in the collapsed floor “for hours” before managing to pull himself free. Id.

Megginson contacted the City’s 311 hotline (hereinafter the “311 System”),4

“B.O.C.,”5 and private defense attorney Jesse Hoberman-Kelly concerning the incident

and his need for “serious medical treatment for possible injuries.” Id. Megginson

additionally claims that at some point after removing himself from the hole, “Alam6 and

[an]other officer . . . call[ed] for a medical emergency” and “311 sent EMS ambulatory

services to respond.” Doc. 19 ¶ 1. However, Megginson alleges Defendants did not

allow EMS to respond, as Warden Miller and ADW Glover told the facility to not allow

EMS in. Id.

Megginson alleges that he was not given medical treatment for days until “[he]

could no longer walk properly.” Doc. 1 at 5. Megginson alleges that Warden Miller

investigated “cell 10-05 in Sprung 9-10”7 on four occasions “throughout the week of July

3 Megginson does not state exactly when the floor collapsed; however, given that he discusses the cracking

of the floor and his fall into it at the start of his complaint, the Court assumes that he fell into the hole on

July 10, the first “date of occurrence” identified in the complaint. Doc. 1 at 4.

4 Incarcerated individuals submit complaints through the Inmate Grievance and Request Program (IGRP),

which provides that an inmate can file a grievance in writing or by calling the City’s 311 customer service

hotline. Doc. 16 at 6 n.1 (citing IGRP, §§ III.A, III.V, available at

https://wwwnyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/Meetings/2018/June-12-

2018/GrievanceAuditReport_Final_2018.11.06.pdf).

5 While Megginson does not define “B.O.C.,” he elsewhere refers to the “Board of Corrections.” For

example, he notes that he contacted “Ms. Glover of the New York City’s Board of Corrections” about his

claims. Doc. 1 ¶ 1. �e New York City Board of Correction is a non-judicial oversight board that monitors

the city’s correctional facilities.

6 Megginson does not identify who “Alam” is.

7 Megginson refers to “cell 10-05,” “cell #10-05,” or “cell (10.05),” as well as “9-10 Spring” or “9-10

Sprung,” at various points across his submissions. Despite the slight variations in spelling, the Court

assumes that all mentions of a cell accompanied by “10-05” or “10.05” refer to the cell that Megginson was

housed in, and that the cell was located in an area called “9-10 Spring” or “9-10 Sprung” in West Facility.

For clarity, the Court will refer to “cell 10-5” and “9-10 Sprung.”

10, 2022.”8 Doc. 26 at 1 ¶ 3. However, Megginson was merely “transferred to NiC9 for

suicide watch.” 10 Doc. 1 at 5. He ultimately saw a medical provider “a while after” that

transfer to NIC.11 Id.

Megginson alleges this was a “frivolous,” “illegal [and] unauthorized suicide

watch,” which lasted no more than 24 hours, after which he was returned to West Facility.

Docs. 19 ¶ 1; 26 at 1–2 ¶ 4. Megginson states he was sent back from NIC before any

medical staff or EMS could respond at West Facility 9-10 Sprung. Doc. 19 ¶ 1.

Upon returning to the West Facility, Megginson was placed back in the same

cell. Doc. 1 at 5. He alleges that, although some Plexiglass had been applied in the

area,12 bugs infiltrated the area and infested the cell. Doc. 26 at 2 ¶ 5. Megginson alleges

he was bitten in his sleep on July 12, 2022, and that as a result his face reacted with

serious swelling and pus, and that he contracted a fever. Id. ¶ 6. Megginson states that

the bites caused a bad infection for which he was eventually “treated by urgent care.”

Doc. 20 at 1.

On July 13, 2023, Megginson was again bitten by vermin in his cell, as it was

never properly sealed.13 Doc. 1 at 5. He alleges that more bugs were able to infiltrate the

cell due to rain as well as flooding caused by a sprinkler malfunction. Id. Megginson

8 Even though Megginson states Warden Miller’s inspections occurred during the week of “July 10, 2022,”

the Court assumes that Megginson meant to write “2023.” Doc. 26 ¶ 3.

9 �e Court takes “NiC” to mean “North Infirmary Command” as indicated by Defendants in their reply

memorandum. Doc. 16 at 2. “NiC” and “NIC” are used interchangeably in this opinion.

10 Megginson provides inconsistent accounts of which defendant placed him on suicide watch. Whereas, in

his memorandum of opposition, Megginson states that it was Deputy Commissioner Miller that placed him

on suicide watch, Doc. 19 ¶ 1, in his surresponse, he states it was Warden Miller that placed him on suicide

watch. Doc. 26 at 1 ¶ 4.

11 Megginson does not indicate precisely when or where he saw a medical provider, but he implies that it

was at least “days” after the incident. See Doc. 1 at 5. He also does not state what kind of care he received.

12 Megginson states “the patch was covered” with Plexiglass, however he does not specify what the “patch”

is—e.g., whether it refers to the hole, a different exposed area in the cell, or something else altogether.

Doc. 26 ¶ 5.

13 Megginson does not make clear what part of the cell was improperly sealed, or whether he refers to the

hole itself.

alleges that DOC failed to contact an exterminator for termites which had caused the hole

into which he fell. Doc. 20 at 1. He alleges that, after days left with an open hole in his

cell, he was bitten on his face and body and “stung by a vermin, bug, or wasp.” Id.

On July 15, 2023, Warden Miller inspected the cell “on camera.” Doc. 19 ¶ 2.

Megginson explained to Warden Miller and “his administration” all of the problems he

was experiencing with his cell. Id. However, he alleges that Warden Miller told him he

“should just deal with such conditions.” Id. ¶ 2. Megginson alleges a 311 System

operator was “still on the line” and heard this exchange.14 Id.

Megginson alleges that, despite his repeated attempts to have his issues addressed,

as further discussed below, his injury was not treated effectively and he was not taken to

the hospital despite the serious nature of his injuries. Doc. 19 ¶ 6. Megginson claims he

(1) ripped the meniscus in his right knee, (2) was infected by the bugs in the cell, and (3)

was left suffering for days in his cell without proper medical attention. Doc. 20 at 1.

Reports and Grievance Efforts

Megginson alleges that he exhausted, and attempted to exhaust, administrative

remedies, in good faith, by contacting the Prisoner Rights Project (“PRP”),15 using the

311 System on numerous occasions, as well as by contacting ADW Glover about his

claims. Doc. 19 ¶ 1; see also Docs. 20 at 1, 26 at 1 ¶¶ 2, 3. Megginson alleges that he

spoke twice to the “Investigations Department” by phone, and the “issue was looked

into,” but he received no notice that it was “fully investigated.” Doc. 19 ¶¶ 4. He

additionally alleges that “the Defendant”—though he does not identify an individual—

failed to complete such investigation due to transferring him between NIC and West

14 Megginson states that he was using his “J-pay tablet” for this conversation. Doc. 19 ¶ 2. See JPay

Incarcerated Individual Services (last visited Mar. 20, 2025), https://www.jpay.com/FriendsFamily.aspx.

�e DOC launched a tablet program for people in custody in 2022. See NYC DOC Press Release (Dec. 13,

2022), https://www.nyc.gov/site/doc/media/tablet-program.page.

15 The Legal Aid Society site describes PRP as “a leading advocate of humane and constitutional conditions

in the New York City jails and State prisons,” and is available at https://legalaidnyc.org/programs-projects-

units/the-prisoners-rights-project/. Although PRP is not part of the administrative grievance process, the

Court infers that Megginson sought guidance or assistance from PRP regarding his complaints.

Facility. Id. ¶ 7. Later, however, Megginson states that Warden Miller “completed the

investigation by himself.” Doc. 26 at 3 ¶ 2. Megginson states that he was transferred to

an upstate prison facility by the time his complaint was filed, and that there were “more

than 21 to 30” calendar days for his incident to be looked into. Doc. 19 ¶ 7.

Megginson additionally claims that, during the relevant time period, the West

Facility had no grievance officer to submit complaints to in order to exhaust his

administrative remedies. Doc. 26 at 1 ¶ 1. He nonetheless states that he filed multiple

departmental complaints through the 311 System, as well as via email to West Facility’s

administration, seeking that the hole and bug-bite incidents be investigated. Id. ¶ 2, 6.

He also filed more complaints by calling B.O.C. and PRP. Id. ¶ 3.

Eventually, Megginson was seen by a doctor and was treated with antibiotics,

although he does not specify on what date this took place. Id. at 2 ¶ 7. Finally,

Megginson alleges that when Warden Miller showed up on July 14, 2022, he requested

that Deputy Warden Glover move Megginson to another cell. Id. ¶ 8.

Request for Relief

Megginson seeks $350,000.00 in compensatory damages for five injuries: (1)

severe infection caused by bug bites, (2) torn muscles in his leg which caused “serious

pain and fluid,” (3) neglect—for being left without assistance or medical attention “for

hours,” (4) pain and suffering, and (5) cruel and unusual punishment and denial of due

process caused by Warden Miller’s failure to take action for one week. Doc. 1 at 5.

B. Procedural History

Megginson filed this action on August 2, 2023. Doc. 1. Defendants filed a

motion to dismiss on March 19, 2024. Doc. 14.

On March 29, 2024, Megginson filed a document responding to Defendants’

motion to dismiss and requesting summary judgment. Doc. 19. Megginson accuses

Defendants of providing arguments that are “malicious, bias[ed], and not base[d] on

factual information.” Id. ¶ 5. On April 1, 2024, Megginson filed an additional document

responding to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, swearing that the statements in his

complaint are factually true, requesting summary judgment, and requesting that the case

move onto settlement or discovery. Doc. 20. �e Court considers both of these

documents as Megginson’s responses to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

On May 7, 2024, Defendants filed a reply memorandum in further support of their

motion to dismiss, which included a request to stay discovery until the instant motion is

resolved. Doc. 22. On May 9, 2024, the Court granted this request to stay discovery,

pending resolution of the motion. Doc. 24.

On June 6, 2024, Megginson filed a surresponse to Defendants’ motion to dismiss,

in which he requests leave to amend his complaint. Doc. 26 at 3 ¶ 4.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, a court accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true and

draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Schult, 717 F.3d at 124. On such

motions, Courts may consider facts stated “on the face of the complaint” and “in

documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference.”

Allen v. WestPoint–Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991). However,

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). �e purpose of

Rule 12(b)(6) “is to test, in a streamlined fashion, the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s

statement of a claim for relief without resolving a contest regarding its substantive

merits.” Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim

is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

�is standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a plausible claim, the plaintiff must “‘raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence’ of the wrongdoing alleged, ‘even if it strikes a savvy

judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.’” Citizens United v. Schneiderman,

882 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If the plaintiff has

not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint

must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

B. Pro Se Plaintiffs

“A pro se litigant’s papers must be construed liberally ‘to raise the strongest

arguments they suggest.’” Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, No. 20 Civ. 10500 (LGS),

2023 WL 5935626, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2023) (quoting Publicola v. Lomenzo, 54

F.4th 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2022)). �e obligation to read a pro se litigant’s pleadings

leniently “applies with particular force when the plaintiff’s civil rights are at issue.”

Jackson v. NYS Dep’t of Labor, 709 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). “However,

even pro se plaintiffs asserting civil right claims cannot withstand a motion to dismiss

unless their pleadings contain factual allegations sufficient to raise a ‘right to relief above

the speculative level.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. DISCUSSION

Megginson asserts three claims: (1) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

unconstitutional conditions of confinement, (2) a violation of § 1983 because Defendants

unconstitutionally failed to provide him with timely medical care,16 and (3) a claim of

16 �e Court construes the § 1983 claims against the City as Monell claims. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social

Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[A] local government may not be sued under §

1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly

be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §

negligence for being left without assistance or medical attention for hours, which the

Court interprets as a state law negligence claim.

Defendants seek dismissal of Megginson’s complaint for (1) failure to exhaust

administrative remedies, (2) failure to allege a basis for municipal liability against the

City, (3) failure to plead constitutional violations, and (4) failure to establish individual

liability, or alternatively, on grounds that the individual defendants are protected by

qualified immunity. Defendants additionally argue that the Court should decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Megginson’s state law negligence claim.

A. Exhaustion

“Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for ‘the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.”

Boyland v. Wing, 487 F. Supp. 2d 161, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). “Section 1983 ‘is not itself

a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal

rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting

Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). �e Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under section 1983 . . . or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,

or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). �erefore, Megginson is required to exhaust

administrative remedies before bringing § 1983 claims.

The Timing of Megginson’s Complaint Indicates Non-Exhaustion

�e exhaustion of administrative remedies must be proper, that is, in compliance

with a prison grievance program’s deadlines and procedural rules. Woodford v. Ngo, 548

U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006). �e applicable prison grievance program here is the New York

1983.”).

City Department of Correction Directive “Inmate Grievance Procedures” (“IGRP”) (No.

3376R-A, effective Dec. 10, 2018).17

“[F]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and . . . inmates

are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones

v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Including within the IGRP system, “when a plaintiff

claims to have filed a grievance, even if he did not ‘plead to have followed all the steps

required,’ nonexhaustion is not apparent.” Howard v. Brown, 15 Civ. 9930 (ER), 2018

WL 3611986, at *2 (July 26, 2018) (quoting Cannon v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ.

8983 (PAE) (JCF), 2013 WL 1234962, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2013), report and

recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1248546 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2013)); see also McCoy

v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 248, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[D]efendants bear the burden

of proof and prisoner plaintiffs need not plead exhaustion with particularity,” and failure

to plead compliance with each administrative step, including appeals, “is not a basis for

dismissal on a motion to dismiss, for Second Circuit law does not require [the plaintiff] to

plead exhaustion to survive a motion to dismiss.”). However, if a plaintiff concedes that

he did not exhaust administrative remedies, or where non-exhaustion is otherwise “clear

from the face of the complaint,” the Court may decide the exhaustion issue on a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Simmons v. Cripps, No. 12 Civ. 1061 (PAC) (DF), 2013 WL

1290268 at *7–8, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013

WL 1285417 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013); see also Shaw v. City of New York, No. 8 Civ.

3997 (SHS) (JCF), 2009 WL 1110789, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2009).

One indicator of whether exhaustion has occurred is the amount of time between

the date of the incident and the date in which a plaintiff files a complaint in Court, as

enough time must have elapsed for the administrative remedies to be exhausted prior to

filing. A period of at least twenty (20) days has been deemed sufficient for the

17 Available at: https://wwwnyc.gov/assets/doc/downloads/directives/Directive_3376R-A.pdf (last visited

Mar. 24, 2024).

Department of Corrections to process an inmate’s complaint in compliance with IGRP

procedures. See Brown v. City of N.Y., No. 21 Civ. 4632 (PGG) (SLC), 2023 WL

2908661, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2023) (dismissal warranted where federal complaint

was filed “16 days after the First Grievance, and five days after the Second Grievance,

less than the 20 days or more that courts have recognized is necessary to afford the DOC

an opportunity to complete the IGRP process”); Miller v. Annucci, No. 17 Civ. 4698

(KMK), 2019 WL 4688539, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2019) (noting courts “have

dismissed claims . . . because it would have been temporally impossible for the plaintiffs

to have exhausted their administrative remedies before filing the complaints,” where “the

period between the date of the alleged incident and the filing of the complaint was 21 or

fewer days.”) (collecting cases).

Megginson asserts that he, “in good faith,” exhausted administrative remedies by

contacting the B.O.C. and ADW Glover, and by making “multiple complaints” through

the 311 System. Docs. 19 ¶ 1; see also Docs. 20 at 1, 26 at 1 ¶¶ 2, 3. Defendants,

however, argue that Megginson could not have complied with the grievance procedures

contained in the IGRP before filing his complaint in this Court. Doc. 16 at 7, 8.

Defendants argue that the IGRP rules and procedures take “many weeks to complete . . .

�us, where an inmate files a federal action within mere days (or a few weeks) of an

alleged incident, as here, it is evident from the face of the complaint that the inmate has

failed to exhaust his/her remedies under the IGRP.” Id. at 7–8. Defendants include the

following summary of relevant IGRP procedures that would have to be completed before

a prisoner can bring a § 1983 claim:

In summary, (1) the inmate must submit a grievance within ten days

of the complained-of incident either on the required form or through

a 311 call. IGRP, §§ III.A and III.V; (2) the Grievance Coordinator

has seven business days to investigate and render a resolution. IGRP

§ VI.A.1; (3) if the inmate disagrees with the proposed resolution,

the inmate may appeal to the facility’s commanding officer. IGRP,

§ VI.6.a.ii;3 (4) after receipt of the appeal through channels (which

may take one business day), the facility’s commanding officer has

five business days to issue a determination. IGRP, § VII.B; (5) if the

inmate disagrees with the commanding officer’s disposition, the in-

mate has two business days to appeal to the facility’s division chief.

IGRP, § VII.D; (6) the facility’s division chief must issue a disposi-

tion within five business days of receipt of the appeal through chan-

nels. IGRP, § VIII, B; (7) if the inmate disagrees with the proposed

disposition, she must appeal to the Central Office Review Commit-

tee (“CORC”) within two business days of receipt of the division

chief’s determination. id., and (8) members of CORC must submit

to CORC’s chairperson, the Director of Constituent and Grievance

Services, their respective decisions within five business days of re-

ceiving the appeal through channels. IGRP, § IX, F.1.b.

Id. at 6–7.

While the Complaint does not make clear exactly when Megginson made each

internal complaint, Megginson did sign and date his civil complaint in the instant action

on July 17, 2023. Doc. 1 at 4, 6. Even giving Megginson the most generous reading of

this timeline—July 10 as the first possible date of incident, seven days before he signed

his complaint on July 17—this affords the DOC only one week to have fully undertaken

the IGRP grievance procedures. One week is much shorter than the amount of time that

Courts in this jurisdiction have considered sufficient for the DOC to adequately address

grievances. See Brown v. City of New York, 2023 WL 2908661 at *11; Miller, 2019 WL

4688539, at *12. �erefore, it is “clear from the face of the complaint” that Megginson

has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. Shaw, 2009 WL 1110789, at

*3–4.

The “Special Circumstances” Exception to Non-Exhaustion Applies

Even where non-exhaustion is apparent, however, there are “special

circumstances” in which a plaintiff’s failure to comply with administrative procedural

requirements is justified. Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2004); see also

Collins v. Goord, 438 F. Supp. 2d 399, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Giano v. Goord, 380

F.3d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Second Circuit has cautioned that ‘while the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement is “mandatory,” certain caveats apply.’”). “Special circumstances

may excuse an inmate from exhausting his administrative remedies where circumstances

‘might understandably lead usually uncounselled prisoners to fail to grieve in the

normally required way.’” Kendall v. Cuomo, No. 12 Civ. 3438 (ALC) (RLE), 2013 WL

5425780, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) (finding that plaintiff’s reasonable belief that

“his claims were not eligible for the grievance process,” based on a statement by a DOC

hearing officer that his claims were not “administrative in nature” and had to be taken to

federal court, constituted “special circumstances” that justified his failure to exhaust

administrative remedies).

�e Second Circuit utilizes a “three-part inquiry” to determine whether an inmate

is excused from the otherwise non-waivable exhaustion requirement. Hemphill v. New

York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004). It considers: “(1) whether the administrative

remedies were available to the inmate; (2) whether defendants did not preserve the

defense, or whether defendants’ actions inhibited exhaustion thereby estopping

defendants from raising the defense; and (3) whether special circumstances justify the

inmate’s failure to comply with the exhaustion requirement.” Tyler v. Argo, No. 14 Civ.

2049 (CM) (DCF), 2014 WL 5374248, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014) (citing Hemphill,

380 F.3d at 686). Moreover, “a ‘good-faith effort to exhaust’ all of the administrative

requirements has been deemed an implicit factor in considering whether an inmate should

be denied an opportunity to pursue his claim in federal court for failure to comply with

administrative procedures.” Id. (finding plaintiff did not qualify for the exception where

he claimed only that he did not know how to appeal a grievance, and stating that mere

“‘lack of knowledge or understanding of the process,’ without a plausible claim that

Defendants kept him from acquiring information about the grievance process” does not

excuse a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust); see also Torres v. Carry, 672 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345

(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (where plaintiff had not exhausted administrative remedies because the

administrative committee to which he filed an appeal had not rendered a final

determination, finding that he should nonetheless “not be denied the opportunity to

pursue his grievance in federal court” given he “complied with all of the administrative

requirements and made a good-faith effort to exhaust.”).

�e Court determines that there are “special circumstances” justifying

Megginson’s non-exhaustion here. McGinnis, 380 F.3d at 667. Megginson alleges that

he made multiple substantial, good-faith attempts to comply with the exhaustion

procedures, and faced significant barriers to compliance. See, e.g., Doc. 19 ¶ 1, Doc. 26

at 1 ¶ 1. Megginson claims, and Defendants do not contest, that the West Facility had no

grievance officer with whom to file complaints during the relevant time period. Doc. 26

at 1 ¶ 1. Nonetheless, he filed multiple complaints with the 311 System, via email to the

West Facility’s administration, and by calling the B.O.C. Docs. 19 ¶ 1, 20 at 1, 26 at 1 ¶¶

2, 3. �en, after being bitten in his sleep on July 12, 2023, Megginson alleges he again

“contacted 311 for another complaint and medical service.”18 Doc. 26 at 2 ¶ 6. In

addition to the absence of a grievance officer, Megginson faced the additional hurdle of

unclear information as to how, if at all, his complaints were progressing through the

grievance system. Megginson claims he twice spoke to the “Investigations Department”

by phone, and understood the issue was looked into, however he received no notice that it

was “fully investigated.” Doc. 19 ¶¶ 4. Megginson then states that “the Defendant”

failed to complete such investigation due to transferring him between NIC and West

Facility. Id. ¶ 7. Later, Megginson states that Warden Miller “completed the

investigation by himself.” Doc. 26 at 3 ¶ 2. Construing Megginson’s papers “to raise the

strongest arguments they suggest,” Jules, 2023 WL 5935626, at *2, Megginson was given

conflicting information as to whether the investigation into his claims had concluded, or

whether it was merely stalled. Evidently, Megginson faced barriers beyond his control,

and he nonetheless made multiple good-faith efforts, through various means, and on

multiple occasions, to pursue the administrative remedies available to him.

18 As previously discussed, Megginson does not provide on what specific dates he filed these various

complaints. However, Megginson implies that he made complaints on several dates.

Applying the Second Circuit’s “three-part inquiry,” the Court finds that although

(1) administrative remedies were available to Megginson, and (2) Defendants did not fail

to preserve their exhaustion defense nor inhibit exhaustion to the point of being estopped

from raising the defense, (3) the “special circumstances” exception applies to Megginson

in light of the barriers he faced and his “good-faith efforts” to file and move his claims

forward notwithstanding them. Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 689.

�erefore, Megginson’s federal claims under § 1983 may proceed.

B. Municipal Liability

Defendants argue that Megginson’s claims against the City should be dismissed,

as Megginson fails to plead a Monell claim against it. Doc. 16 at 16.

Monell liability is a particular theory of liability for § 1983 claims against

municipalities. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S.

658, 694 (1978) (“[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts

the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983”); see also

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government

may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person

to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”)

(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 692)). “[T]o hold a city liable under § 1983 for the

unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three

elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to

(3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d

Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

A plaintiff may satisfy the “custom or policy” requirement by alleging:

(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by

government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that

caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent

and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or

usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4)

a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to

subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the

rights of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.

McCormick v. County of Westchester, 19 Civ. 2916 (KMK), 2023 WL 2632204, at *9

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24 2023) (citation omitted). Under any of these theories, “a plaintiff must

show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and

must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of

federal rights.” Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). In the context of a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff must make

factual allegations that support a plausible inference that the constitutional violation took

place pursuant either to a formal course of action officially promulgated by the

municipality’s governing authority or the act of a person with policymaking authority for

the municipality.” Missel v. County of Monroe, 351 F. App’x 543, 545 (2d Cir. 2009)

(summary order). Lawsuits brought against state officials in their official capacity are

treated as cases against the State and “the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have played a

part in the violation of federal law.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (citation

omitted).

Megginson nowhere claims that any of the alleged constitutional violations took

place as a result of a City policy, practice or custom, a failure to train or supervise its

employees, nor an action “taken by government officials responsible for establishing the

municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in question.” McCormick, 2023

WL 2632204, at *9. �erefore, Megginson has not adequately pleaded a Monell claim

against the City, and his claims against it are dismissed.

Defendants argue that the Complaint is silent as to whether the individual

defendants are “being sued in their official or individual capacities.” Doc. 16 at 17. If

the individuals were being sued in their official capacities, then to the extent they qualify

as “state officials,” Megginson’s claims against them would be dismissed based on the

same failure to plead Monell liability. See Melo, 502 U.S. at 25 (“Suits against state

officials in their official capacity . . . should be treated as suits against the State.”).

However, the Court will construe the complaint as suing the individual defendants in

their personal capacities.

C. Conditions of Confinement and Denial of Medical Care

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “that the conduct

complained of was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law, and

that the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution.” Newton v. City of New York, 566 F. Supp. 2d 256, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

(citing Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2004)). Section 1983 does not create

substantive rights and instead provides “a procedure for redress for the deprivation of

rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993). �e

conduct complained of must have “deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Wimmer v. Suffolk County

Police Dep’t, 176 F.3d 125, 136–37 (2d Cir. 1999).

Megginson alleges violations of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment arising

from (1) the conditions of his confinement, and (2) Defendants’ failure to provide him

with medical assistance.

Conditions of Confinement

“A pretrial detainee’s claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement are

governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Cruel

and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eight[h] Amendment.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849

F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). �is is so because “[p]retrial detainees have not been

convicted of a crime and thus may not be punished in any manner—neither cruelly and

unusually nor otherwise.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). �at said,

“[a pretrial] detainee’s rights are ‘at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections

available to a convicted prisoner.’” Id. (quoting City of Revere v. Massachusetts General

Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)).

“A pretrial detainee may establish a § 1983 claim for allegedly unconstitutional

conditions of confinement by showing that the officers acted with deliberate indifference

to the challenged conditions.” Id. Two prongs must be satisfied: “an ‘objective prong’

showing that the challenged conditions were sufficiently serious to constitute objective

deprivations of the right to due process, and a ‘subjective prong’—perhaps better

classified as a ‘mens rea prong’ or ‘mental element prong’—showing that the officer

acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions.” Id.

a. Objective Prong

�ere is not a “static test” for determining whether conditions are “sufficiently

serious” to satisfy the objective component; rather, “the conditions themselves must be

evaluated in light of contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 30 (quoting Blissett v.

Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531, 537 (2d Cir. 1995)). �e Second Circuit has “held that prisoners

may not be deprived of their basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical

care, and reasonable safety—and they may not be exposed to conditions that pose an

unreasonable risk of serious damage to [their] future health.” Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2012)).

Unsanitary conditions of confinement are analyzed on a case-by-case basis, “with

reference to their severity and duration, not the detainee’s resulting injury.” Id. (citing

Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 68 (2d Cir. 2015)). �ere is no “bright-line durational

requirement for a viable unsanitary-conditions claim” nor a “minimal level of

grotesquerie required.” Id. at 31 (quoting Willey, 801 F.3d at 68). “�e severity of an

exposure may be less quantifiable than its duration, but its qualitative offense to a

prisoner’s dignity should be given due consideration.” Willey, 801 F.3d at 68. “Although

the seriousness of the harms suffered is relevant to calculating damages and may shed

light on the severity of an exposure, serious injury is unequivocally not a necessary

element of an Eighth Amendment claim.” Id.; see Ackridge v. Aramark Correctional

Food Services, No. 16 Civ. 6301 (KMK), 2018 WL 1626175, at *19 n.19 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.

30, 2018) (“[T]he objective prong . . . is evaluated the same way under both the Eighth

Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment.”).

�e Court determines that Megginson’s conditions of confinement, as alleged,

were “sufficiently serious” to satisfy the objective prong. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30.

Megginson was allegedly housed in an unsafe, hazardous cell, in which the floor by the

shower area caved in, allegedly due to vermin eating the plaster. Doc. 1 at 4. Upon his

return to the West Facility, Megginson was placed back in the same cell, which continued

to be infiltrated and infested by bugs. Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 26 at 2 ¶ 5. Megginson was

bitten by vermin on his face and body, including during his sleep, leading to swelling,

pus, and a fever. Doc. 26 at 2 ¶ 6. Megginson ultimately contracted a bad infection for

which he was treated with antibiotics.19 Docs. 20 at 1, 26 at 2 ¶ 7.

Although Megginson does not claim that these conditions of confinement had a

long duration—the timespan of his allegations is between one week, Doc. 1 at 4, and 30

days, Doc. 19 ¶ 7—the Court finds his exposure to the vermin infestation was sufficiently

serious to survive dismissal. Megginson did not merely observe that bugs were present in

his cell; rather, the vermin “infested” the cell where he was housed, they bit him during

his sleep, and they actually harmed him physically to the point of causing a “bad

infection” that required medical care. Docs. 26 at 2 ¶ 5, 20 at 1. �e alleged conditions

are more serious than those in which courts have found no constitutional violations. Cf.

Clay v. Lee, No. 13 Civ. 7662 (KMK), 2019 WL 1284290, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2019)

(presence of cockroaches not enough to withstand dismissal of conditions of confinement

claim where plaintiff did not allege he was “actually harmed” by cockroaches, and where

19 Defendants argue that “Plaintiff simply states that he sustained a severe infection. However, he provides

no further details as to when he saw a medical provider, what treatment he received, and whether he

received an official diagnosis.” Doc. 16 at 14. As previously discussed, at the motion to dismiss stage, the

Court accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor. Walker, 717 F.3d at 124. Additionally, “in a pro se case the court may, in its discretion,

consider factual allegations made in the plaintiff’s opposition papers as supplementing the Complaint.”

Forrest, 2023 WL 2432493, at *5. �erefore, Megginson’s allegations that he contracted a “bad infection,”

and that he was ultimately prescribed antibiotics, are sufficient at this stage. Docs. 20 at 1, 26 ¶ 7.

plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of extreme disgust, statement that the cockroaches

“terrorized” him, and vague allusions to mental health issues were insufficient allegations

that the cockroaches “presented a danger to his well-being”); Butler v. Suffolk County,

No. 11 Civ. 2602 (JS) (ST), 2023 WL 5096218, at *42 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2023) (at

summary judgment, finding “limited sightings of mice and flies reported in Dorm

Inspection Reports . . . without more, does not support an objective finding that said

exposure violated the Plaintiffs’ conditions-of-confinement”); Benjamin v. Fraser, 161 F.

Supp. 2d 151, 173–74, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (emphasis added) (finding “no ongoing

violation of federal law” with regards to vermin, in part because the housing areas were

largely “free from vermin activity,” and most residential areas did not have a “vermin

infestation” even if they had “vermin activity,” and denying in part and granting in part

defendants’ motion to terminate provisions of Consent Decrees), aff’d in part, vacated in

part, 343 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2003).

Moreover, the severity of Megginson’s contact with vermin was plausibly

exacerbated by the other unsanitary conditions he identifies: an exposed drain area where

the floor had caved in, as well as flooding in his improperly sealed cell which aggravated

the bug infestation. Doc. 1 at 4, 5. See Fraser, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 173 (quoting Hoptowit

v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985)) (referencing the Ninth Circuit’s finding in

Hoptowit v. Spellman that “[t]he health hazard caused by vermin at [a] penitentiary [was]

exacerbated by the plumbing and ventilation inadequacies,” and crediting plaintiff’s

argument that “[v]ermin carry disease . . . �eir secretions are malodorous, and their

saliva and hairs and certain body parts or feces may evoke allergic reactions and

exacerbate asthmatic conditions.”).

�erefore, Megginson’s conditions of confinement were objectively severe

enough to satisfy the objective prong of the Fourteenth Amendment claim.

b. Subjective Prong

Under the subjective prong, plaintiffs must “show[] that the officer[s] acted with

at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29. Of

note, the requisite mens rea to establish deliberate indifference in cases involving pretrial

detainees (and thus, the Fourteenth Amendment) diverges from the mens rea requirement

in cases involving convicted persons (and thus, the Eighth Amendment). Id. at 34–35.

The Eighth Amendment imposes a subjective mens rea standard: to be liable, the prison

official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id.

at 32 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). In contrast, however, the

Fourteenth Amendment applies an objective mens rea standard: the official need only

“recklessly fail[] to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed

to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known,

that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Id. at 35 (citing Kingsley

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015)). “Therefore, the detainee need not show that any

defendant was subjectively aware of the harmfulness associated with the conditions.”

Singleton v. City of New York, No. 20 Civ. 8570 (ALC), 2022 WL 4620174, at *5

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022).

As an initial matter, the City argues that the claims against Commissioner Molina,

Deputy Commissioner Miller, and ADW Glover in their individual capacities should be

dismissed because the complaint fails to allege that they were personally involved in the

alleged constitutional violations. Doc. 16 at 17–18. In a § 1983 action, a defendant “may

not be held liable for damages for constitutional violations merely because [he or she]

held a high position of authority.” Gil-Cabrera v. Dep’t of Corrections, 20 Civ. 9493

(LTS) (SDA), 2021 WL 5282620, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2021) (alteration in original)

(quoting Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996)), report and recommendation

adopted sub nom. Gil-Cabrera v. City of New York, 20 Civ. 9493 (LTS) (SDA), 2021 WL

5910055 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2021). Instead, “[t]o hold a state official liable under §

1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional

violation directly against the official.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tangreti v.

Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020)). Here, Megginson does not specifically

allege that Commissioner Molina, Deputy Commissioner Miller, or ADW Glover failed

to address his conditions of confinement, nor that they were otherwise personally aware

of or involved in that alleged constitutional violation. Megginson’s only allegation

specific to Commissioner Miller is that he placed Megginson on an illegal suicide watch,

Doc. 19 at 2—however, Megginson elsewhere claims it was Warden Miller who placed

him on suicide watch, Doc. 26 at 1 ¶ 4. His only allegations specific to ADW Glover are

that he contacted her about his claims, and that she, along with Warden Miller, told the

facility to not allow EMS in after Megginson reported his fall, Doc. 19 ¶ 1.20 Beyond

these statements, Megginson makes only a general claim that Commissioner Molina,

Deputy Commissioner Miller, and ADW Glover—along with the other defendants—

violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to inhumane living conditions, Doc. 1

at 4. These statements, without more, are insufficient to assert the subjective prong as it

pertains to Commissioner Molina, Deputy Commissioner Miller, and ADW Glover.

Therefore, Megginson’s conditions of confinement claim against them is dismissed.

As to Warden Miller, Defendants acknowledge that Megginson makes specific

allegations against him personally, however they argue Megginson still “does not

sufficiently allege how Warden Miller participated in the alleged constitutional

violations.” Id. The Court disagrees. First, Megginson provides that Warden Miller

investigated his cell four times during the week of July 10, that Megginson explained “all

issues of that cell” to Warden Miller, and that Warden Miller inspected the cell “on

camera” on July 15. Docs. 26 at 1 ¶ 3, 19 ¶ 2. Therefore, Megginson plausibly pleads

20 Megginson additionally mentions ADW Glover in stating that, when Warden Miller showed up on July

14, 2022, he requested that ADW Glover move Megginson to another cell. Doc. 26 ¶ 8. However, this

statement does not appear to constitute an allegation of unconstitutional activity against ADW Glover.

that Warden Miller “knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive

risk to health or safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. Second, Megginson pleads that

Warden Miller instructed him to “just deal” with his conditions of confinement, which

plainly reflects a “deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions,” sufficient to

satisfy the subjective prong of the Fourteenth Amendment claim at this stage. Therefore,

Megginson plausibly pleads that Warden Miller “recklessly failed to act with reasonable

care to mitigate the risk” that the infestation posed to him. Id. Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Megginson’s conditions of confinement claim against Warden Miller is denied.

Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

Megginson alleges that, following his fall into the collapsed floor, he was denied

proper medical treatment for days until he could no longer walk properly. Doc. 1 at 4, 5.

In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate medical care, a

detainee must show the defendants exhibited a “deliberate indifference to [his] serious

medical needs.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (alteration in

original) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). �at is, plaintiff must

allege that: (1) objectively, he suffered a sufficiently “serious medical condition,” and (2)

relevant prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference to that serious medical need.”

Chavis v. Kienert, No. 3 Civ. 39 (FJS) (RFT), 2005 WL 2452150, at *22 (N.D.N.Y. Sep.

30, 2005) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834–35). For pretrial detainees, the mens

rea element of a claim for deliberate indifference of medical needs “is judged by the same

‘deliberate indifference’ standard articulated in Darnell,” that is, “whether the official

knew, or should have known, that his or her conduct posed an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s

health or safety.” Sanders v. City of New York, No. 16 Civ. 7426 (PGG), 2018 WL

3117508, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018) (first citation omitted) (quoting Darnell, 849

F.3d at 35).

Under the first, objective prong, the Second Circuit has held that a medical

condition is “sufficiently serious” if it presents a “condition of urgency that may result in

degeneration or extreme pain,” it “significantly affects daily activities,” or it involves

“chronic and substantial pain.” Mallet v. New York State Dep’t of Corrections and

Community Supervision, 126 F.4th 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal citations omitted).

While the condition does not need to be “life-threatening” or “at the limit of human

ability to bear,” “it must be more than simply ‘uncomfortable and annoying.’” Id. (citing

Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2003). “Where temporary delays or

interruptions in the provision of medical treatment have been found to satisfy the

objective seriousness requirement in this Circuit, they have involved either a needlessly

prolonged period of delay, or a delay which caused extreme pain or exacerbated a serious

illness.” Morgan v. Shivers, No. 14 Civ. 7921 (GHW), 2018 WL 618451, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.

Jan. 29, 2018) (citation omitted). “Although a delay in providing necessary medical care

may in some cases constitute deliberate indifference, [the Second Circuit] has reserved

such a classification for cases in which, for example, officials deliberately delayed care as

a form of punishment; ignored a ‘life-threatening and fast-degenerating’ condition for

three days; or delayed major surgery for over two years.” Feliciano v. Anderson, No. 15

Civ. 4106 (LTS) (JLC), 2017 WL 1189747, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017) (quoting

Demata v. New York State Correctional Dep’t of Health Services, 198 F.3d 233 (2d Cir.

1999) (unpublished)).

Here, Megginson’s injuries resulting from his fall into the collapsed floor are not

“sufficiently serious” to meet the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment claim.

Mallet, 126 F.4th at 132. Megginson’s “serious pain and fluid” from torn muscles in his

leg, Doc. 1 at 5, his “ripped” meniscus, Doc. 20 at 1, and his inability to “walk properly”

after not receiving “proper medical treatment for days,” Doc. 1 at 5, while not

insignificant, do not amount to a “condition of urgency, one that may produce death,

degeneration, or extreme pain.” Horace v. Gibbs, 802 F. App’x 11, 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2020)

(summary order) (agreeing with district court that a detainee’s “low blood sugar

and/or high blood pressure,” “swelling and cuts” due to tight handcuffs, and “back and

knee pain . . . from sitting in an uncomfortable position in the parole car” were not

“sufficiently serious to meet the objective prong,” and affirming dismissal of deliberate

indifference claim); cf. Houston v. County of Westchester Dep’t of Correction, No. 6 Civ.

3395 (DC), 2006 WL 3498560, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2006) (on motion to dismiss,

where detainee “injured his right hand while sitting on a plastic chair that crumbled,” and

was first told by a doctor that he had a sprain, then later told he had a fracture, stating that

the “fracture presented a ‘condition of urgency,’” and thus “the objective prong of the

inadequate medical care inquiry [wa]s satisfied”); see also Culp v. Koenigsmann, No. 99

Civ. 9557 (AJP), 2000 WL 995495, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000) (“Meniscal tears are

very common conditions in the knee. �ey can be present for years without causing any

symptoms. Many patients ‘live’ with meniscal tears without ever having surgery.”);

Espinal v. Coughlin, No. 98 Civ. 2579 (RPP), 2002 WL 10450, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,

2002) (at summary judgment, denying claim of delayed medical care and finding knee

injury was not “a sufficiently serious medical condition for purposes of the Eighth

Amendment,” in part based on evidence that “a rupture of the ACL is a common knee

injury and is often a chronic condition with which people may function well without

operative intervention.”). In fact, Megginson alleges that it was days after he suffered the

injury that he was not able to walk properly, and that he thereafter received medical

attention.

Because Megginson does not meet the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment

claim, the Court does not analyze the subjective, “deliberate indifference” prong, and it

dismisses Megginson’s § 1983 claim of inadequate medical care as to all Defendants.

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that, even if the Court finds that the individual defendants were

personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations, the Court should dismiss

the claims against them based on qualified immunity. Doc. 16 at 18–19. The only

§ 1983 claim that remains against an individual defendant is the conditions of

confinement claim against Warden Miller.

The doctrine of qualified immunity generally shields “government officials from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). “[Q]ualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money

damages unless [the] plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time

of the challenged conduct.” Sabir v. Williams, 52 F.4th 51, 58 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation

omitted). When a qualified immunity defense is asserted at the pleadings stage,

defendants face a “more stringent standard,” whereby “the facts supporting the defense

[must] appear on the face of the complaint,” or in the “documents incorporated by

reference.” Id. at 63–64 (quoting McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2004)

and DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010)). Plaintiffs are

“entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged, not only those that support

[their] claim, but also those that defeat the immunity defense.” Id. at 64. Thus, the

Second Circuit has made clear that while a qualified immunity defense can succeed on a

motion to dismiss, “such a defense ‘faces a formidable hurdle . . . and is usually not

successful.” Id. (quoting Field Day, LLC v. County of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 191–92 (2d

Cir. 2006)).

Here, Defendants argue that Warden Miller is entitled to qualified immunity

because Megginson states in his complaint that Warden Miller “assess[ed] then

address[ed]” the complaint after about one week, Doc. 1 at 5, and thus Megginson “only

takes issue with the timing of the Warden’s actions.” Doc. 16 at 19. Defendants also

state that Warden Miller did not violate a “clearly established constitutional right,” and

that “a reasonable official in Warden Miller’s role would not have believed that his

actions violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id.

�e Court determines that Warden Miller is not entitled to qualified immunity at

this stage. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Megginson’s favor, his statement that

Warden Miller failed to take action for one week, Doc. 1 at 5, is not a concession that

Warden Miller adequately addressed the conditions of his confinement, nor that the only

issue was Warden Miller’s “timing,” as Defendants suggest. As previously discussed,

Warden Miller explicitly told Megginson to “just deal with” the conditions in his cell,

even after inspecting the cell multiple times and being informed by Megginson as to “all

issues of that cell.” Doc. 19 ¶ 2. �erefore, Warden Miller explicitly declined to take

action, exhibiting deliberate indifference. Moreover, Defendants do not substantiate their

claims that there was no “clearly established constitutional right” and that “a reasonable

official in Warden Miller’s role would not have believed that his actions violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Doc. 16 at 19.

Based on the pleadings, Warden Miller’s actions violated Megginson’s “clearly

established right to remain incarcerated in reasonably safe conditions,” Randle v.

Alexander, 960 F. Supp. 2d 457, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), and it was not “objectively

reasonable” for Warden Miller “to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the

challenged act.’” Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 199 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, Warden Miller is not entitled to qualified immunity.

E. Negligence Claim

Megginson’s complaint lists, as one of his alleged injuries, “neglect” for being left

without medical assistance for hours after his accident. Doc. 1 at 5. �erefore, in

addition to Megginson’s § 1983 claims, his complaint may be liberally construed to

allege a negligence claim under state law.

Federal district courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law

claims “that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that

they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States

Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger,

604 U.S. 22, 27 (2025) (stating that, under § 1367(a), as under Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715 (1966), supplemental jurisdiction applies to state-law claims that arise

“from the same facts” as a federal-law claim over which a court has original jurisdiction).

Supplemental jurisdiction represents “a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.”

Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hospital, 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). Section 1367(c) lists

circumstances in which a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over a claim under subsection (a)[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). One such circumstance is

where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

Id. § 1367(c)(3). Subject matter jurisdiction in the instant action is based on federal

question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Although the Court is not dismissing all of Megginson’s claims over which it has

original jurisdiction in the instant action, it is dismissing the § 1983 claim that is

premised on the same set of facts as the state law negligence claim: Defendants’ delay in

providing Megginson with medical care. Having dismissed that federal claim under Rule

12(b)(6), the Court declines to adjudicate the state law negligence claim. See Royal

Canin, 604 U.S. at 33, 39 (explaining that “with any federal anchor gone, supplemental

jurisdiction over the residual state claims disappears as well,” and holding that when a

plaintiff amends a complaint to excise the federal claims, leaving the complaint with only

state claims, the plaintiff “divests the federal court of adjudicatory power”); see also

Cohen v. Postal Holdings, LLC, 873 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2017) (Calabresi, J.

concurring) (noting that “after all federal claims have been dismissed, the default rule is

that federal courts should not decide related state–law claims unless there is good reason

for doing so”); Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (“Needless decisions of state law should be

avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by

procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law . . . [I]f the federal claims are

dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.”). �erefore,

Megginson’s state negligence claim is dismissed.

F. Leave to Amend the Complaint

In his surresponse, Megginson requests that the Court allow him to “amend the

complaint to specify more detail to the complaint.” Doc. 26 at 3 ¶ 4.21

As a general rule, leave to amend a complaint should be freely granted. Jin v.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 310 F.3d 84, 101 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2) (“�e court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”).

District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.

Pasternack v. Laboratory Corp. of America, 892 F. Supp. 2d 540, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

For pro se litigants, the Court should generally not dismiss a complaint without granting

leave to amend, if a valid claim could be stated. Clifton v. Hra Nyc Govt, No. 16 Civ.

1753 (RRM) (CLP), 2016 WL 4203486, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2016) (citing Cuoco v.

Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)). �e Court may decline to provide the

opportunity to amend if the court finds that the plaintiff “cannot correct the defects in the

federal claims” and therefore “any attempt to amend the pleading . . . would be futile.”

Shorter v. Rice, No. 12 Civ. 111 (JFB) (ETB), 2012 WL 1340088, at *4, *5 (E.D.N.Y.

Apr. 10, 2012); see also Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112 (“�e problem with [the plaintiff’s]

causes of action is substantive; better pleading will not cure it. Repleading would thus be

futile. Such a futile request to replead should be denied.”).

In the instant case, Megginson provides new details about the events surrounding

his injuries and Defendants’ actions in his memorandum of opposition, Doc. 19, his

“motion to request summary judgment and towards settlement agreement,” Doc. 20, and

his surresponse to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. 26. For example, whereas in his

21 Because Megginson makes this request in his surresponse, Defendants do not respond to the request.

complaint, Megginson states that he notified the 311 System of his need for “serious

medical treatment for possible injuries” after his fall but was “given no proper medical

treatment,” Doc. 1 at 4–5, he adds in his opposition that “311 sent EMS ambulatory

services to respond,” but Defendants told the facility to not allow EMS in. Doc. 19 ¶ 1.22

Also, whereas in his complaint, Megginson notes he had torn muscles in his leg, Doc. 1 at

5, he specifies in a later filing that he suffered from a “ripped” meniscus, Doc. 20 at 1.

�is iterative expansion and clarification of the record demonstrates that Megginson may

be able to provide a more complete accounting of his allegations if given the opportunity

file an amended complaint.

Further, Megginson makes certain general allegations for which it is unclear

whether he is referring to one of the individual defendants, such as the statements that

“Alam and [an]other officer . . . call[ed] for a medical emergency,” Doc. 19 ¶ 1

(emphasis added), and that “[t]he Defendant” failed to complete the investigation, id. ¶ 7

(emphasis added). If Megginson wishes to continue to assert claims against the

individual Defendants named in the initial Complaint, he should clarify whether any of

his existing allegations refer to any particular Defendant, and he must add additional facts

that allege personal involvement of the Defendants in depriving him of his rights.

Finally, Megginson’s pleadings contain certain informational gaps, which if

clarified, could help cure the defects in his claims. For example, Megginson does not

explain the nature of his injuries immediately following his fall into the hole, which

precipitated “Alam and [an]other officer . . . calling for a medical emergency.” Doc. 19 ¶

1. He also does not describe in detail to what extent or in what way he “could no longer

walk properly” after days of not receiving medical attention, Doc. 1 at 5. Adding such

details could shed light on how much—and how quickly—his medical condition

22 �e Court does not view these as “contradictory allegations,” as Defendants do, see Doc. 22 at 8, but

rather as supplementary information and detail. �e only clear contradiction that the Court identifies in

Megginson’s filings is that he first identifies Deputy Christopher Miller as having placed him on suicide

watch, then he later identifies Warden Miller as having done so. Compare Doc. 19 ¶ 1 with Doc. 26 ¶ 4.

deteriorated after the initial fall into the hole. Megginson also does not specify whether

adequate medical treatment was eventually provided to him, and if so, at what point.

Megginson should include all of the information in the amended complaint that he wants

the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief

for a denial of appropriate medical care.

Essentially, Megginson’s amended complaint should tell the Court: specifically

who violated his federally protected rights; when and how such violations occurred; and

why he is entitled to relief.

Because Megginson’s amended complaint will completely replace, not

supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that he wants to include from the

original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part.

e The § 1983 conditions of confinement claim against Warden Miller is not

dismissed, but the § 1983 claim of denial of medical care is dismissed as

to Warden Miller.

e All § 1983 claims are dismissed as to the City, Commissioner Molina,

Deputy Commissioner Miller, and ADW Glover.

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

negligence claim.

Megginson must file his Amended Complaint, if at all, by April 22, 2025.

The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion, Doc. 14.

It is SO ORDERED.

ae Now York, New York ad WL

~ EDGARDO RAMOS, U.S.DJ.

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