“[A] single incident in a complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policy-making level, does not suffice to show a municipal policy.”
How later courts described this case
- “[A] single incident in a complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policy-making level, does not suffice to show a municipal policy.”
- “[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
- in reviewing a pro se complaint for sua sponte dismissal, a court is required to accept the material allegations in the complaint as true
- dismissing Monell claim for lack of a municipal policy or custom underlying the challenged conduct
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------------------------X
WESLEY C. JONES,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-0711(JMA)(ST)
-against- FILED
CLERK
JOHN DOE, P.O./DET. #1 and JOHN DOE, P.O./DET. #2; 3/24/202 5 4:23 pm
JANE DOE, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE, KEW GARDENS, QUEENS; THE COUNTY U.S. DISTRICT COURT
OF QUEENS, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------------------------X
AZRACK, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is the civil rights complaint filed by incarcerated pro se plaintiff Wesley
C. Jones (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the County of Queens
and various unidentified individuals involved in Plaintiff’s arrest and the related, on-going state
court criminal prosecution.1 (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) and the required Prisoner Litigation Authorization form. (ECF Nos. 2-3.) For
the reasons that follow, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP application and dismisses Plaintiff’s
Section 1983 claims other than those alleging false arrest without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). The Court stays Plaintiff’s false arrest claims pending
the conclusion of his state court criminal proceeding as set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND2
The Complaint, filed while Plaintiff is detained at the Suffolk County Correctional Facility,
is brought pursuant to Section 1983 and seeks to challenge his October 22, 2024 arrest, pre-trial
1 Plaintiff alleges he was arraigned under case number Q24648751M on October 23, 2024 and, as of the filing of his
Complaint in this Court, the prosecution is pending. (ECF No. 1 at 4.)
2 All material allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of this Order. See, e.g., Rogers v.
City of Troy, New York, 148 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (in reviewing a pro se complaint for sua sponte dismissal, a
court is required to accept the material allegations in the complaint as true).
No. 1.) Plaintiff names as Defendants two detectives alleged to work from the Kew Gardens
Precinct (“John Doe #1” and “John Doe #2”), the Assistant District Attorney allegedly employed
at the Queens District Attorney’s Office (“Jane Doe”), and the County of Queens (“Queens
County” and collectively, “Defendants”) (Id. at 1, 3.) Plaintiff alleges that, on October 22, 2024,
he was arrested while leaving the First District Court in Suffolk County having been released on
his own recognizance on charges unrelated to the challenged arrest. Plaintiff claims that he was
told that there was a “hold” on him and he was then “held in custody in the back holding pen, until
two plain clothes Police/Detectives came from Queens, (Kew Gardens) all the way to Suffolk
County 1st District Court” and handcuffed him. (Id. at 4.)3 Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in
an unmarked car and driven to Queens where he was placed in the “Kew Gardens Precinct lock-
up” until his arraignment the following day. (Id.) According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was moved
“during the night” to another cell with approximately 18 to 25 other pre-trial detainees “with no
mattress, no change of clothes, and only one toilet.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the floor was “nasty,
filthy, un-mopped, blood and vomit stained.” (Id.) In the morning, Plaintiff was called in the
courtroom after consulting with an attorney who was representing him at the arraignment, and
learned that he was being charged with a “brutal[] rape and physical[] attack” on “some woman I
can’t possible know nor have I ever met.” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff claims that he “has been Falsely
Arrested, Illegal and Unlawful imprisonment, and is still being Maliciously Prosecuted for the
charges of Rape, Robbery and strangulation under case number Q24648751M.” (Id.)
In the space that calls for a description of any injuries sustained and any medical treatment
required and/or provided, Plaintiff wrote:
3 Excerpts from the complaint are reproduced herein exactly as they appear in the original. Errors in spelling,
punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected or noted.
2
arrest, illegal and unlawful imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The
Defendant’s: Police Detectives #1 and #2, the A.D.A. of Queens County and the
County of Queens are all liable due to the lack of probable cause in arresting
claimant and violating plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights along with the
Municipal Liability plaintiff/claimant was caused and did sustain humiliation and
embarrassment, severe emotional and mental distress, moral indignity and disgrace,
personal injury, inconvenience, pain and suffering, disturbance and disruption of
his life. And while no real physical medical treatment was not required,
claimant/plaintiff has consulted and been counseled several times by different
Psychologist and Psychiatry to aid or help him gain some perspective and balance
out the traumatic experience he has suffered!
(Id. at 5.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks to recover a monetary award in the sum of $280,000 in
compensatory damages and an additional unspecified sum as punitive damages that he “shall allow
the Court or the Jury to decide.” (Id. at 5-6.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Leave to Proceed IFP
To qualify for IFP status, the Supreme Court has long held that “an affidavit is sufficient
which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs [inherent in
litigation] and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins
v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The purpose of the statute permitting litigants to proceed IFP is to ensure that indigent persons
have equal access to the judicial system. Davis v. NYC Dep’t of Educ., 10-CV-3812, 2010 WL
3419671, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. August 27, 2010) (citing Gregory v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., 07-
CV-1531, 2007 WL 1199010, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2007)). The determination of whether an
applicant qualifies for IFP status is within the discretion of the district court. DiGianni v. Pearson
Educ., 10-CV-0206, 2010 WL 1741373, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2010) (citing Choi v. Chemical
Bank, 939 F. Supp. 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
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The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a district court to screen a civil complaint
brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or its agents and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if the complaint is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Similarly, the IFP statute requires a court
to dismiss an action upon determination that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must dismiss the action as
soon as it makes such a determination. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
C. Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and
federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see Thomas
v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
two elements: (1) ‘the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States,’ and (2) ‘the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.’” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004)); see Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 78
(2d Cir. 2023); see also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (“[T]he
under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no
matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
4
Pro se submissions are afforded wide interpretational latitude and should be held “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). In
addition, the Court is required to read a plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as
raising the strongest arguments it suggests. United States v. Akinrosotu, 637 F.3d 165, 167 (2d
Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).
The Supreme Court has held that pro se complaints need not even plead specific facts;
rather the complainant “need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do
justice.”). However, a pro se plaintiff must still plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. While “‘detailed factual
allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
5
A. Plaintiff’s IFP Application is Granted
Upon review of Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP, the Court finds that Plaintiff is
qualified to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) is granted.
B. Municipal Liability
Plaintiff’s claims against Queens County are deficient. A claim for municipal liability
under Section 1983 must comply with Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658 (1978) and its progeny. “Monell expressly prohibits respondeat superior liability for
municipalities . . . meaning that a plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘through its deliberate conduct,
the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged.’” Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). This requires Plaintiff to “show that he suffered the denial of a
constitutional right that was caused by an official municipal policy or custom.” Frost v. New York
City Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 257 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). A policy or
custom may be established by any of the following:
(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by
government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that
caused the particular constitutional deprivation in question; (3) a practice so
consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a
custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or
(4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to
subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights
of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.
Alwan v. City of New York, 311 F. Supp. 3d 570, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal quotations
omitted); see Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F. Supp. 3d 578, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (similar).
“[A] single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell,
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municipal policy that can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.” Mitchell v. City of N.Y., 841
F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)
(plurality)) (brackets omitted); see DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] single
incident in a complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policy-making level, does
not suffice to show a municipal policy.”).
Here, even affording the pro se complaint a liberal construction, there are no factual
allegations from which the Court may reasonably infer that the conduct or inaction of which
Plaintiff complains was caused by a policy or custom of Queens County. See Mitchell, 841 F.3d
at 80 (dismissing Monell claim for lack of a municipal policy or custom underlying the challenged
conduct); see also Santos v. New York City, 847 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[A]
plaintiff must allege facts tending to support, at least circumstantially, an inference that such a
municipal policy or custom exists.”). Accordingly, any Section 1983 claim asserted in the
complaint against Queens County fails to state a claim and is thus implausible because Plaintiff
has not alleged the existence of a relevant municipal policy or custom. Thus, this claim is
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
C. Heck’s Delayed Accrual Rule
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims challenge his arrest, detention and prosecution. (Compl. at
4-5.) However, success on these claims would impugn the validity of a criminal conviction in
state court. In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held that “when a state prisoner
seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,” the district court must dismiss the complaint if “a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence” and the
“conviction or sentence has [not] already been invalidated.” 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Interpreting
Heck, the Second Circuit has long held that “if success on a § 1983 claim would necessarily imply
7
long as the potential for a judgment in the pending criminal prosecution continues to exist.”
Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and alterations omitted).
Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee. As is readily apparent, success on Plaintiff’s claims
challenging his arrest, detention, and prosecution would impugn the validity of a subsequent
conviction. Thus, these claims are premature. See, e.g., Pascual v. New York State, No. 24-CV-
6723, 2024 WL 5046675, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2024); Roberties v. Huff, No. 11-CV-521, 2012
WL 1113479, at *4 (W.D.N. Y Mar. 30, 2012) (dismissing as premature “plaintiff’s claims for due
process, conspiracy to prosecute, obstruction of justice, fabrication of evidence and equal
protection”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are barred by Heck and its progeny and
are thus not plausible at this time and are thus dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1) with the exception of his false arrest claims.
With respect to Section 1983 false arrest claims, the Supreme Court limited the delayed
accrual rule of Heck in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). In declining to apply Heck’s delayed
accrual rule to false arrest claims because the statute of limitations for such claims “begins to run
at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process,” the Court instructed:
If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any
other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated
criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with
common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of
criminal case is ended.
Id. at 393–94. Here, Plaintiff’s false arrest claims implicate Wallace’s modification of Heck’s
delayed accrual rule. Thus, pursuant to Wallace, Plaintiff’s false arrest claims are stayed pending
the resolution of the underlying criminal prosecution. That said, if he is convicted, Plaintiff’s
8
of the claim. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394 (citations omitted).
Given the stay, Plaintiff shall request, in writing, that the stay be lifted within the two (2)
weeks following the conclusion of his state court criminal proceeding, if so warranted at that time.
In addition, should Plaintiff seek to pursue any other constitutional claims at that time, including
those dismissed without prejudice as set forth above, he shall file an amended complaint also
within the two (2) weeks following the conclusion of his state court criminal proceeding. That
amended complaint shall be clearly labeled “Amended Complaint” and shall bear the same docket
number as this Memorandum and Order, 2:25-CV-00711(JMA)(ST).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP is granted. However,
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims other than those alleging false arrest are dismissed without
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff’s false arrest
claims are stayed and Plaintiff shall request, in writing, that the stay be lifted within the two (2)
weeks following the conclusion of his state court criminal prosecution, if warranted at that time.
In addition, should Plaintiff seek to pursue any other constitutional claims at that time, he shall file
an amended complaint also within the two (2) weeks following the conclusion of his state court
criminal proceeding.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
Memorandum and Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status
is denied for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45
(1962).
9
address of record in an enveloped marked “Legal Mail” and to note such mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 24, 2025
Central Islip, New York
/s/ JMA
JOAN M. AZRACK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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