Opinion

Zvolensky v. City of Scranton

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Mar 25, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.6%

“Our cases interpreting have suggested that § 1983 malicious prosecution claims may be predicated on constitutional provisions other than the Fourth Amendment, such as procedural due process.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Our cases interpreting have suggested that § 1983 malicious prosecution claims may be predicated on constitutional provisions other than the Fourth Amendment, such as procedural due process.”
  • holding that pre-trial proceedings, including attendance at hearings, are not seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
  • ruling that the defendant officer was “entitled to qualified immunity with respect to [the] plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim under the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process clause.”
  • reiterating that appearances at court proceedings do not amount to a deprivation of liberty under the Fourth Amendment

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMBER ZVOLENSKY,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-01722

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

JUSTIN BUTLER,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

This is a federal civil rights action. In her second amended

complaint (Doc. 25), the plaintiff, Amber Zvolensky, alleges that Justin

Butler of Scranton’s Police Department violated her civil rights in

connection with an allegedly unlawful seizure of her person and her

subsequent arrest for recklessly endangering the welfare of a child. The

matter is now before the court on a motion to dismiss by the defendant.

(Doc. 26). The parties have fully briefed the matter (Doc. 29; Doc. 30; Doc.

31).

I. Background1

In her second amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that on

February 17, 2022, she was visiting her husband, Mark Zvolenksy, at his

residence located at 2132 Dorothy Street, in Scranton, Pennsylvania. The

plaintiff alleges she did not reside at the location. The plaintiff and Mr.

Zvolensky attempted to move their vehicle while their two-year-old child

sat on the porch of the residence. At some point, Mr. Zvolensky started

his car and began to back it up. The child, however, unbeknownst to the

plaintiff or Mr. Zvolensky, had left the porch and wandered behind the

vehicle. The child was then struck by the car. The Scranton Police

Department arrived on the scene and followed the plaintiff and Mr.

Zvolensky to the hospital where the child was treated. Unfortunately, the

child died only a few hours later.

The Lackawanna County Office of Youth and Family Services (CYS)

investigated the plaintiff for wrongdoing in the death of her child, but

closed its case on May 10, 2022. However, on June 22, 2022, the defendant

arrested the plaintiff for recklessly endangering the welfare of her child.

1 All facts are taken from the plaintiff’s second amended complaint.

(Doc. 25).

Mr. Zvolensky was subsequently arrested on that same date for the

child’s death.

The plaintiff alleges that she was arrested without probable cause,

contending she was arrested to force Mr. Zvolensky to plead guilty to two

separate charges: (1) charges from his June 22, 2022, arrest; and (2)

charges arising from a previous arrest on February 18, 2022, for

furnishing drug free urine and obstruction of administration of law.2 The

plaintiff further contends that she was told throughout a multitude of

preliminary hearings that her arrest, and subsequent prosecution,

stemmed from keeping pressure on Mr. Zvolensky. For example, she

alleges that she was advised “the Scranton Police Department would

withdraw the criminal charges against the Plaintiff if [her] husband pled

guilty to the charges of killing his minor child.” (Doc. 25, ¶ 19). Her

preliminary hearing was continued from July 19, 2022, to November 1,

2022, to “keep pressure on Mark Zvolensky to finish his treatment.” ( ,

¶ 18). The plaintiff alleges that the Scranton Police Department and

Lackawanna County District Attorney’s Office conspired and agreed not

2 These charges stemmed from the Scranton Police Department’s

request for a urine sample after being informed Mr. Zvolensky used

illegal drugs.

to dismiss the charges against the plaintiff.3 The criminal charges were

ultimately dismissed against the plaintiff, however, on April 25, 2023.

Mr. Zvolensky was then sentenced on April 26, 2023.

The plaintiff alleges she suffered extreme trauma, emotional stress,

and depression from the loss of her child. She further alleges that her

arrest by the defendant “amplified and aggravated” “the extreme loss of

life of her child.” (¶ 28). Moreover, she alleges that she was subjected to

numerous harassment measures by CYS because of her arrest. The

plaintiff has thus sued the defendant on four counts under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 in this action: (1) malicious prosecution; (2) malicious use and abuse

of process; (3) false arrest; and (4) false imprisonment. (Doc. 25). The

defendant has subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s

second amended complaint in its entirety. (Doc. 26).

II. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a

defendant to move to dismiss “for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Moreover, “a motion to

3 Neither the Scranton Police Department nor the Office of the

District Attorney of Lackawanna County are parties to the second

amended complaint.

dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in

the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.”

643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing

, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)). Courts may

consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint in addition to

“documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of

which a court may take judicial notice.”

, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). While it must accept all allegations

in the complaint as true, the Court does not have to accept “unsupported

conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as

a factual allegation.” , 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013)

(quoting 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).

III. Discussion

The plaintiff has asserted four different claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against the defendant: (1) malicious prosecution; (2) malicious use

and abuse of process; (3) false arrest; and (4) false imprisonment. (Doc.

25). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or

the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress….

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but

instead provides remedies for rights established elsewhere.

, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To establish a § 1983 claim,

the plaintiff must establish that the defendants, acting under color of

state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States

Constitution. , 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.

1995). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a civil rights

complaint must state the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible

for the alleged civil rights violations. , 423 F.3d 347, 353

(3d Cir. 2005).

The defendant has moved to dismiss each count for a failure to state

a claim. (Doc. 26). We shall analyze each of the plaintiff’s claims

individually. We must note, however, that the plaintiff has asserted all

claims in violation of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. As set forth below, many of these claims are incorrectly pled, and

thus, we must dismiss those claims with prejudice.4

A. Malicious Prosecution

The plaintiff alleges malicious prosecution claims under § 1983 in

violation of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Before

we look at the merits of each party’s contention, however, we must briefly

note that the plaintiff has failed to provide any support that the Fifth

Amendment provides a claim for malicious prosecution. Therefore, we

will dismiss the claim with prejudice without further analysis.

Nonetheless, the plaintiff additionally alleges a malicious

prosecution claim under § 1983 in violation of her Fourth Amendment

rights. To prove malicious prosecution under § 1983 for a Fourth

Amendment violation, a party must show that:

(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2)

the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the

proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the

defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than

bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff

4 The plaintiff’s complaint makes difficult our ability to ascertain

exactly which of the plaintiff’s facts pertain to each of the plaintiff’s

claims. When read broadly, the complaint makes plausible some of the

plaintiff’s claims at the pleading stage. Nonetheless, we must

additionally note that the factual support relied upon for those claims at

this stage is tenuous at best, and thus, the plaintiff must provide

significantly more support for her claims to survive at the summary

judgment stage.

suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the

concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003).

, 407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005). The

defendant argues that the Court should dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for

failure to allege a deprivation of liberty consistent with a seizure. (Doc.

29). Moreover, the defendant argues that even if the plaintiff has

adequately alleged a deprivation of liberty consistent with a seizure, the

defendant is protected by qualified immunity and thus, the plaintiff’s

claim should be dismissed.

The plaintiff has alleged various deprivations of liberty throughout

her complaint, many of which do not constitute a deprivation for purposes

of her malicious prosecution claim. (Doc. 25). For example,

the plaintiff argues that she “was falsely held against her will” and “also

deprived of her liberty.” (Doc. 25, ¶¶ 38, 39). These allegations, however,

constitute “threadbare recitals of a cause of action” that fail to “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” , 556 U.S.

662, 663 (2009) (quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)).

Without any additionally supporting facts, we cannot discern the

plaintiff’s alleged seizure and her alleged liberty deprivation. Moreover,

it appears that the plaintiff argues her participation in preliminary

hearings consists of a valid deprivation of liberty. (Doc. 25, ¶¶ 17, 24,

25, 30). Nonetheless, courts have held that attendance at preliminary

hearings does not qualify as a seizure for purposes of malicious

prosecution claims. , 752 F. Supp. 2d 643, 659

(W.D. Pa. 2010) (holding that pre-trial proceedings, including attendance

at hearings, are not seizures within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment); , 353 F. Supp. 3d 357, 368 (M.D.

Pa. 2018) (reiterating that appearances at court proceedings do not

amount to a deprivation of liberty under the Fourth Amendment).

In turn, the plaintiff’s only viable contention of a seizure lies in her

arrest allegation, as the Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that

“the arrest of a person is quintessentially a seizure.” ,

592 U.S. 306, 312 (2021) (quoting , 445 U.S. 573, 585

(1980)). The defendant has moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim on the

basis that the “[p]laintiff has failed to show that she suffered a

deprivation of liberty for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim”

because “she has failed to allege that she was taken into custody at any

point prior to the time that charges were lodged against her.” (Doc. 29, at

28). The plaintiff alleges that she was arrested on June 22, 2022, (Doc.

25, ¶ 15), and at some point she “was falsely held against her will.” (

¶ 34). Indeed, while the defendant may disagree with the plaintiff’s

allegations,5 at the pleading stage we must simply determine whether

the plaintiff’s allegations can “raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence of” the plaintiff’s claims.

, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting

, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). We find here that plaintiff’s

allegations have raised that reasonable expectation and thus, the

plaintiff has provided sufficient information to sustain her malicious

prosecution claim in violation of the Fourth Amendment at the pleading

stage.

Even so, the defendant additionally maintains that he is entitled to

qualified immunity for the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims based

on probable cause. (Doc. 29, at 31, 46). We acknowledge that a police

officer who “reasonably but mistakenly conclude[s] that probable cause

is present” is entitled to qualified immunity. , 502

5 The defendant maintains that the plaintiff was never subjected to

any custodial detention for purposes of her claims. (Doc. 31, at 3).

U.S. 224, 227 (1991). Nonetheless, the Third Circuit has cautioned, “it is

generally unwise to venture into a qualified immunity analysis at the

pleading stage as it is necessary to develop the factual record in the vast

majority of cases.” , 328 F. App’x 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir.

2009) (per curiam). For that reason, taking the allegations of the

complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, we find that dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim is inappropriate

at this time.

The plaintiff, however, additionally pleads malicious prosecution

under § 1983 in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This claim

requires an independent analysis. “[T]he status of a Fourteenth

Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution is murky.”

, 676 F. Supp. 3d 364, 375 (E.D. Pa. 2023).

The Supreme Court ruled in , 510 U.S. 266 (1994), that

malicious prosecution claims could not fall within substantive due

process. at 272. It reasoned that because “[t]he protections of

substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to matters

relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily

integrity,” they did not fit neatly for a “claim to be free from prosecution

except on the basis of probable cause.” , 676 F. Supp. 3d at 375

(quoting , 510 U.S. at 272). However, it “did not address whether

such a claim could fall under the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural

due process protections because ‘the only deprivation of life, liberty or

property [in the case], if any, consisted of petitioner’s pretrial arrest.’”

(quoting , 510 U.S. at 272 (Scalia, J., concurring)).

Since the decision, the Third Circuit has yet to definitively

provide an answer on whether malicious prosecution claims can find

support under the Fourteenth Amendment. Some cases within the Third

Circuit have implied a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim can be found

in the Fourteenth Amendment. , 163 F.3d 169,

172 (3d Cir. 1998) (“ stands for the broader proposition that a

section 1983 claim may be based on a constitutional provision other than

the Fourth Amendment. However, we note that commands that

claims governed by explicit constitutional text may not be grounded in

substantive due process.”); , 552 F. App’x

169, 174 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Our cases interpreting have

suggested that § 1983 malicious prosecution claims may be predicated on

constitutional provisions other than the Fourth Amendment, such as

procedural due process.”). Other cases, however, have rejected that

notion. 750 F.3d 273, 290 n.14 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing

, 161 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998)) (identifying

that “Supreme Court case law leaves only the Fourth Amendment as [a]

potential source of malicious prosecution claims.”).6

Nevertheless, regardless of the uncertainty surrounding whether

malicious prosecution claims can be grounded in procedural due process,

courts have ruled that qualified immunity applies in similar situations

as procedural due process rights against malicious prosecution are not

clearly established; government officials are only immune from personal

liability under qualified immunity for conduct concerning clearly

6 Many courts have acknowledged that the Third Circuit appears to

support a potential Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claim

based on its ruling in , where it draws a line between the Fourth

Amendment’s protections and the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection.

, 750 F.3d at 291 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment forbids a detention

without probable cause … But this protection against unlawful seizures

extends only until trial … The guarantee of due process of law, by

contrast, is not so limited as it protects defendants during an entire

criminal proceeding through and after trial.”);

, 290 F. Supp. 3d 371, 382 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (stating that the

Third Circuit’s distinction “suggests that a procedural due process right

against malicious prosecution may exist”); , 676 F. Supp. 3d at

376 (noting that “there is significant theoretical support for [a procedural

due process right against malicious prosecution]”).

established constitutional rights. , 598

F. Supp. 3d 253, 266 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (holding that the defendants were

entitled to qualified immunity as “between 1992 and 1996 … it was not

clearly established that the Fourteenth Amendment provided for

procedural due process rights against malicious prosecution.”); ,

290 F. Supp. 3d at 380 (“[A]ny procedural due process right is not (and

was not at the relevant time) clearly established, meaning that the

officers are entitled to qualified immunity….”); , 353 F. Supp.

3d at 364 (ruling that the defendant officer was “entitled to qualified

immunity with respect to [the] plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process clause.”). In

short, even if a procedural due process right against malicious

prosecution exists, the defendant is still entitled to qualified immunity

because this right is not clearly established. For this reason, we shall

dismiss the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim based upon the

Fourteenth Amendment.

B. Malicious Abuse of Process

The plaintiff next alleges malicious abuse of process under § 1983

in violation of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. A

malicious abuse of process claim, however, is founded in the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. No. CV 24-0431, 2024

WL 3460112, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2024) (citing ,

567 F.2d 1213, 1220 (3d Cir. 1977)) (“An abuse of process is by definition

a denial of procedural due process.”). Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims

concerning violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment will be

dismissed with prejudice. “[A] section 1983 claim for malicious abuse of

process lies where prosecution is initiated legitimately and thereafter is

used for a purpose other than intended by law.” (citing ,

871 F.2d 331, 350 n.17 (3d Cir. 1989)). Courts have held “[w]hen process

is used to effect an extortionate demand, or to cause the surrender of a

legal right, or is used in any way not so intended by proper use of the

process, a cause for abuse of process can be maintained.”

, 80 F. Supp. 2d 421, 423 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (citing

, 675 F. Supp. 287, 290 (W.D. Pa. 1987)).

We first note that the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution and

malicious abuse of process claims appear contradictory. An abuse of

process claim arises when a prosecution is initiated while a

malicious prosecution claim arises with the of the

legal process. No. 06-1368, 2007 WL

1965296, at *6 (W.D. Pa. July 3, 2007), , 407 F. App’x 578 (3d Cir.

2010) (“[A] claim for abuse of process differs from a malicious prosecution

claim in that a malicious prosecution claim has to do with the wrongful

initiation of the legal process, i.e., without probable cause and with a bad

motive, whereas an abuse of process arises when a prosecution is

initiated legitimately but thereafter is used for a purpose other than

intended by law.”). Nonetheless, when a party alleges both claims, courts

have viewed them as alternative counts rather than dismissing them for

their contradictory nature. 2024 WL 3460112, at *10 (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)) (“A party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim

or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or

defense or in separate ones. If a party makes alternative statements, the

pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.”); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). We shall

therefore view the plaintiff’s abuse of process claim as an alternative

count.

The plaintiff, assuming her prosecution was initiated legitimately

for purposes of her claim, alleges that her proceedings were used solely

to “put pressure” on her husband, Mark Zvolensky, and force him to plead

guilty to his charges. (Doc. 25, ¶ 18). She alleges at various points that

unidentified representatives of the Scranton Police Department conveyed

to her that they would withdraw the charges against her if her husband

pled guilty to the charges of killing his minor child. ( , ¶ 19).

Her charges would officially be dismissed, she contends, when Mr.

Zvolensky was sentenced. ( , ¶ 21). While “[i]ncidental motive[s] or

spite[s] or ulterior purpose[s]” are not conclusive in showing a misuse or

process, , 407 F. App’x at 582 (citations and quotations omitted),

“[c]ourts have held that when process is used to effect an extortionate

demand … or is used in any other way not so intended by proper use of

the process, a cause of action for abuse of process can be maintained.”

, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 431. We find that the plaintiff’s allegations

sufficiently make plausible the existence of actions used for a purpose

other than intended by law. Indeed, “[t]he usual case of abuse of process

is one of some form of extortion, using the process to put pressure upon

[the accused] to … take some other action or refrain from it.” 2024

WL 3460112, at *9 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 (1977)).

We hold that this rationale additionally applies to those abusing process

to put pressure upon an additional party to take or refrain from any

action, as the plaintiff has alleged in her complaint. For this reason, we

find that the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an abuse of process claim

under § 1983 in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Nonetheless, the defendant contests that even if the plaintiff can

successfully plead an abuse of process claim, he is still protected by

qualified immunity. (Doc. 29). We have already found that the plaintiff

has sufficiently alleged a violation of her rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment for purposes of her abuse of process claim. For qualified

immunity to apply to the defendant, we must find that this right was

“clearly established.” , 598 F. Supp. 3d at 266. In other words, that

right must have been one that is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable

official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”

, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting , 566

U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). Nonetheless, as we noted above, an analysis of

qualified immunity at the pleading stage is often “in tension with the

reality that factual disputes often need to be resolved before determining

whether [a] defendant’s conduct violated a clearly established right.”

, 299 F. Supp. 3d 658, 669 (E.D.

Pa. 2017) (citing , 298 F.3d 271, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2002)).

Therefore, the resolution of the issue of qualified immunity is premature

at this stage. (citing , 298 F.3d at 278) (noting that a decision

on qualified immunity is “premature when there are unresolved disputes

of historical facts relevant to the immunity analysis.”). Thus, we must

dismiss the defendant’s motion on this claim.

C. False Arrest

The plaintiff alleges false arrest claims under § 1983 in violation of

her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. False arrest claims

under § 1983 are grounded in the Fourth Amendment guarantee against

unreasonable searches, not the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

, 155 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2001)

(citing , 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995));

, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000)

(“The Fourth Amendment prohibits arrest without probable cause.”). We

will thus dismiss the plaintiff’s alleged-false arrest claims in violation of

her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rights with prejudice. To

maintain a false arrest claim in violation of the Fourth Amendment, “a

plaintiff must show that he or she was arrested and the arresting officer

‘lacked probable cause to make the arrest.’” , No. CV

3:20-1911, 2021 WL 2784817, at *8 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2021) (quoting

, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 265). Indeed, we need not undertake a

significant analysis on the plaintiff’s false arrest claim. We have held

above that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make plausible that

she was arrested without probable cause. (Doc. 25, ¶ 15) (alleging

that the plaintiff was arrested on June 22, 2022, without probable cause).

Moreover, we have additionally articulated that while the defendant may

disagree on those facts, we must only analyze whether the plaintiff’s

allegations “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of” those claims.” , 515 F.3d at 234. Here, we have found

that the plaintiff has done so and has therefore pled sufficient facts for

her false arrest claim in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

We must briefly address the defendant’s contention that he is

entitled to qualified immunity under this claim based on probable cause.

(Doc. 29, at 31, 46). As we held in the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution

claim, while we acknowledge that a police officer who “reasonably but

mistakenly conclude[s] that probable cause is present” is entitled to

qualified immunity, , 502 U.S. at 227 (1991), we must reiterate

that Third Circuit has cautioned, “it is generally unwise to venture into

a qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is necessary to

develop the factual record in the vast majority of cases.” , 328 F.

App’x at 791 n.3. Therefore, taking the allegations of the complaint as

true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find

that dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim under qualified immunity is

inappropriate.

D. False Imprisonment

The plaintiff alleges false imprisonment claims under § 1983 in

violation of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Similar to a false arrest claim, a false imprisonment claim is additionally

grounded in the Fourth Amendment. , 155 F. Supp. 2d at 265

(citing , 47 F.3d at 636). We will thus dismiss the plaintiff’s

alleged-false imprisonment claims with prejudice in violation of her Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments. To state a false imprisonment claim under

the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that she was

detained; and (2) that the detention was unlawful.”

, 700 F.3d 675, 682–83 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing ,

549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007)). The defendant has moved to dismiss the

plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim on the same basis as the plaintiff’s

malicious prosecution and false arrest claims by arguing that the plaintiff

was never subjected to any custodial detention for purposes of her claims.

(Doc. 31, at 3). Nonetheless, as we have held in those same contested

claims, we find that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make

plausible that she was unlawfully detained. Indeed, the plaintiff has

alleged that she was “confined against her will,” “imprisoned,” and

“incarcerated” at some point in time. (Doc. 25, ¶¶ 56, 57). Although the

plaintiff has not provided all the details of the alleged imprisonment at

the pleading stage, the plaintiff only needs to allege facts to make

plausible her false imprisonment claim. We find that she has done so

here. Moreover, the defendant’s request for dismissal on the basis of

qualified immunity proves premature for the same reasons that we have

previously articulated. We will deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss on

qualified immunity grounds because it is premature at this stage.

E. Declaratory Judgment

The defendant moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s requested

declaratory judgment that defendant Butler violated her rights under the

United States Constitution. We will grant the defendant’s request for two

reasons. First, as the defendant notes, a declaratory judgment is

unavailable “solely to adjudicate past conduct” or to “proclaim that one

party is liable to another.” , 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir.

2006). Here, the plaintiff has attempted to seek a declaration concerning

defendant Butler’s past actions. Second, the plaintiff has failed to address

the defendant’s contention concerning her request for a declaratory

judgment and thus, the plaintiff has waived these claims.

., 301 F. Supp. 3d 486, 511–12 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (finding

claims and arguments to be abandoned due to a failure to respond to

those made in opposition).

IV. Conclusion7

For these reasons, the defendant’s motion will be granted in part

and denied in part.

The plaintiff’s following claims will be dismissed with prejudice as

leave to amend would be futile: (1) malicious prosecution in violation of

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) malicious use and abuse of

7 The defendant additionally argues that the plaintiff’s claim for

injunctive relief is moot. (Doc. 29, at 23); (Doc. 31, at 2). A review of the

operative complaint reflects that the plaintiff has not requested

injunctive relief. (Doc. 25).

process in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; (3) false arrest

in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) false

imprisonment in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and

(5) the plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment.

We will allow the following claims to proceed: (1) malicious

prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) malicious use and

abuse of process in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment; (3) false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment;

and (4) false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: March 25, 2025

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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