The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
CHANCE TURNER BROWN IV, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. No. 2:25-cv-02323-SHL-cgc
)
)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
)
Defendant. )
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR EX PARTE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Plaintiff Chance Turner Brown seeks an ex parte temporary restraining order compelling
Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to immediately accept and process a Bill of Exchange drawn
against the United States Treasury. (ECF No. 2.) He filed a contemporaneous petition for
enforcement of the Bill of Exchange that asserts claims against Wells Fargo for breach of
contract, negligence, tortious interference, wrongful account closure, improper characterization
of financial instrument, and discrimination in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. (Id.
at PageID 4–5.) Because Brown has not satisfied the procedural requirements for requesting a
TRO, and because he is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim, his motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND1
Brown identifies as a “Non-Citizen National.” (ECF No. 2 at PageID 4.) He states that
he is an “Individual Bank empowered under federal law to issue negotiable instruments backed
by U.S. obligations,” and he “represents the integration of the individual participation in the
banking framework established by Congress during” the Great Depression. (Id. at PageID 3.)
1 The facts are solely taken from Brown’s petition.
On March 7, 2025, he issued a Bill of Exchange “backed by the full faith and credit of the United
States Treasury” directing Wells Fargo to pay him $8,250,000.00. (ECF No. 3 at PageID 23
(sealed).) On March 14, he presented the Bill of Exchange to Wells Fargo for deposit into his
account. (ECF No. 2 at PageID 4.)
Bridgette N. Todd Jones, an Associate Personal Banker at Wells Fargo, told Brown that
she would not accept the Bill. (Id.) According to him, he repeatedly attempted to force her to
review the documents, and “she persistently refused to process the instrument.” (Id.) Brown
alleges that he called a corporate representative and placed the call on speakerphone so that the
representative could talk to Jones. (Id.) Jones asserted that she did not recognize the telephone
number. (Id.) Bank security intervened and asked Brown to provide identification. (Id.) He
alleges that they harassed him. (Id.)
On March 20, Wells Fargo emailed Brown, citing its Deposit Account Agreement as
justification for its refusal to process the Bill. (Id.) Wells Fargo also asserted that the Bill was
suspicious. (Id.) The next day, Wells Fargo notified Brown that his account was being closed
without explanation. (Id.) In response, Brown sent Wells Fargo2 a “Notice of Dishonor” stating
that he would pursue “further legal action” if it failed to accept and process the Bill and provide
written confirmation of compliance within three business days. (ECF No. 2-1 at PageID 7–8.)
Wells Fargo did not do so. True to his word, Brown filed his petition for enforcement three days
later on March 23, and he requests an ex parte temporary restraining order forcing Wells Fargo
to process the Bill. (Id. at PageID 5.)
2 Copies of the notice were also forwarded to the United States Treasury and the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. (ECF No. 2-1 at PageID 8.)
APPLICABLE LAW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs injunctions and restraining orders. The Rule
provides that preliminary injunctions may be issued “only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). At the same time, “[t]he only type of injunctive relief that a district court
may issue ex parte [without notice] is a temporary restraining order.” Hancox v. Citimortgage,
No. 13-2629-STA-dkv, 2013 WL 12049113, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 15, 2013) (quoting First
Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 650 (6th Cir. 1993)). Courts may only issue
TROs without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney if two conditions are met.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). First, “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint [must]
clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant
before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Second, “the
movant’s attorney [must] certif[y] in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why
it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B). “The normal circumstance for which the
district court would be justified in proceeding ex parte is where notice to the adverse party is
impossible, as in the cases where the adverse party is unknown or is unable to be found.” First
Tech. Safety, 11 F.3d at 650 (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
Brown attaches his Notice of Dishonor to show that he notified Wells Fargo of his intent
to pursue immediate legal action if it failed to comply with his demands. But Rule 65 requires
more than that—Brown must certify in writing any efforts made to give notice of pursing this
extraordinary relief and the reasons it should not be required. He did not do so. But even if he
had, he would still not be entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks. He did not submit a
verified complaint or an affidavit swearing that he would suffer immediate and irreparable injury
absent the issuance of a TRO before Wells Fargo could be heard in opposition.3 While his
petition contains a verification at the end, he does not swear that his statements are true under the
penalty of perjury.
“When courts consider irreparable harm, ‘the key word is irreparable’ and ‘the possibility
that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date weighs
heavily against the claim.’” Ward v. Coleman-Ward, No. 1:19-CV-1119-STA-jay, 2019 WL
5212901, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 16, 2019) (quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974)
(cleaned up)). Brown alleges that he would suffer irreparable harm absent the TRO because he
is being denied access to $8,250,000. But this kind of compensatory relief can be provided at a
later date if he is entitled to it, and there is nothing to indicate Brown needs immediate access
before Wells Fargo can be heard.
In addition to the procedural shortcomings in his motion, Brown’s argument also fails on
the merits. “The Court considers four factors when determining whether to grant a temporary
restraining order: (1) whether the movant has a ‘strong’ likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
whether the movant would otherwise suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of [a TRO]
would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by
issuance of [a TRO].” Thomas v. Schroer, 116 F. Supp. 3d 869, 874 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (citation
and internal quotations omitted). All the factors must be balanced, as no single factor is
dispositive. Id. (citing In re De Lorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985)). Still,
while “[n]o single factor is determinative . . . “a finding that there is simply no likelihood of
success on the merits is usually fatal.” Hancox , 2013 WL 12049113, at *2 (quoting Ohio
3 Brown submitted a “Declaration of Trust and Presentment of Bill of Exchange” in which he
swears that his Bill of Exchange is lawful. (ECF No. 2-1 at PageID 9–10.) But this Declaration
does not state how he would suffer immediate and irreparable harm absent an ex parte TRO.
Republican Party v. Brunner, 543 F.3d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2008)). “The burden of persuasion is
on the party seeking the injunctive relief.” Id. (citing Stenberg v. Cheker Oil Co., 573 F.2d 921,
925 (6th Cir. 1978)).
As explained above, Brown cannot demonstrate that he would suffer irreparable injury,
but, even more fundamentally, he has not shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits.
Brown has not provided anything that supports his allegation that he is authorized to issue Bills
of Exchange drawn on the United States Treasury. Indeed, other courts have found these kinds
of bills to be “nothing more than a string of words that sound as though they belong in a legal
document, but which, in reality, are incomprehensible, signifying nothing.” In re Fisher, No. 15–
10386, 2015 WL 4041335, at *6 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2015) (quoting McElroy v. Chase
Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 134 Cal. App. 4th 388, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)). Even the United
States Treasury Department has warned the public that bills of exchange drawn on the Treasury
“are worthless.” TreasuryDirect, Bogus Sight Drafts/Bills of Exchange Drawn on the Treasury,
https://treasurydirect.gov/laws-and-regulations/fraud/bogus-sight-draft/ (“Drawing such drafts on
the U.S. Treasury is fraudulent and a violation of federal law.”).
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, Brown’s motion for an ex parte TRO is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 25th day of March, 2025.
s/ Sheryl H. Lipman
SHERYL H. LIPMAN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE