Nwachukwu v. U-Haul Co. of Louisiana

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

STANISLAUS NWACHUKWU, CIVIL ACTION

ET AL.

VERSUS NO. 23-1864

U-HAUL CO. OF LOUISIANA SECTION “R” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is defendant U-Haul Co. of Louisiana’s (“UHLA”)

motion for summary judgment.1 For the following reasons, the Court grants

defendant’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of plaintiff Stanislaus Nwachukwu’s rental of a U-

Haul truck.2 Plaintiffs allege that defendant UHLA filed a false police report,

leading to a wrongful arrest, for Stanislaus’s failure to timely return the

rented van. Plaintiffs filed suit in state court against UHLA on April 28,

2023, asserting claims for defamation, discrimination, negligence, false

imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional

1 R. Doc. 31.

2 R. Doc. 1-1.

infliction of emotional distress.3 Defendant removed the case to federal court

on the grounds of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.4 Defendant now moves

for summary judgment on all claims,5 which plaintiffs oppose.6

The Court considers the motion below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,

1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). “When assessing whether a

dispute to any material fact exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence

in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or

weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness

Ins., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); and Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). All reasonable

3 Id.

4 R. Doc. 1.

5 R. Doc. 31.

6 R. Doc. 55.

inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but “unsupported

allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and

conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for

summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216

(5th Cir. 1985) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 2738 (2d ed. 1983)); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075

(noting that the moving party’s “burden is not satisfied with ‘some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ by ‘conclusory allegations,’ by

‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence” (citations

omitted)). “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” EEOC

v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).

If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear

the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by

pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at

325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by

submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a

genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the

pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for

resolution. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 ‘mandates the entry

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court has reviewed the record, and the undisputed facts are as

follows. On December 29, 2022, plaintiff Stanislaus Nwachukwu and UHLA

entered into an equipment rental contract, numbered 71524497, for a

moving van from UHLA rental center, Acadia Services, LLC (“Acadia”).7

Stanislaus picked the van up from Laplace, Louisiana, and the contract noted

that the van was due to be returned on January 1, 2023, in Atlanta, Georgia.8

The contract listed Stanislaus’s contact information, including a phone

number.9 Acadia gave Stanislaus a copy of the contract when he rented the

7 R. Doc. 31-4 at 1.

8 Id.

9 Id. The phone number listed on the contract begins in (504), id., but

this was a mistake. Stanislaus’s actual area code began with (404).

R. Doc. 55-1 at 126. At the time of contracting, neither he, nor UHLA,

recognized that the number listed was incorrect.

van.10 Stanislaus provided the phone number of an alternative person to

contact in Georgia.11

Stanislaus did not return the van on January 1, 2023.12 He did not

contact UHLA or a U-Haul rental center, prompting U-Haul employees to try

to reach him.13 U-Haul’s equipment rental contract notes show that, over a

19-day period, various U-Haul employees attempted to reach Stanislaus by

phone, by EAlert, and by demand letter.14 U-Haul issued the demand letter

by certified mail on January 12, 2023.15 On January 19, 2023, Stanislaus

received the demand letter.16 After sending the demand letter, U-Haul

attempted to contact Stanislaus two more times, with no success.17

On January 19, 2023, U-Haul indicated on the equipment rental

contract notes that the dispatching location will have to report the van

stolen.18 On January 20, 2023, at 11:20 a.m., Stanislaus contacted U-Haul in

10 R. Doc. 31-5 at 10.

11 R. Doc. 51-1 at 107.

12 R. Doc. 31-6 at 4–5.

13 Id.

14 Id. at 4. Because the contract listed the incorrect phone number for

Stanislaus, see supra note 9, Stanislaus asserts that he did not receive

the calls. R. Doc. 55-1 at 124. The U-Haul call notes indicate that the

individual identified as an alternative contact denied knowing

Stanislaus. R. Doc. 31-6 at 4; R. Doc. 51-1 at 107.

15 Id.

16 R. Doc. 55-1 at 115, 118–19; see also R. Doc. 31-6 at 4.

17 R. Doc. 31-6 at 4.

18 Id.

Georgia to extend his contract.19 He was told to go to a U-Haul location to

have the van checked and rented back to him, because the van was about to

be marked as stolen.20 At 12:27 p.m., a UHLA employee, unaware of any

contemporaneous efforts by Stanislaus to return or re-lease the van,21 filed

an incident report with the St. John the Baptist Parish Sheriff’s Office for the

unauthorized use of a movable under La. Rev. Stat. § 14:68.22 The incident

report noted that the deputy would apply for a warrant under La. Rev. Stat.

§ 14:68.

At 2:45 p.m. on January 20, Stanislaus went to the U-Haul location on

Northeast Expressway in Chamblee, Georgia to settle with U-Haul and

return and re-rent the van. He paid for the extra days he kept the van and

closed his initial rental contract.23 Stanislaus then asked to re-rent the same

van because it still had his possessions in it.24 At 3:50 p.m., the U-Haul rental

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 R. Doc. 69-1 at 2.

22 R. Doc. 31-10 at 3. U-Haul noted in its file that the request to file a

stolen report was sent to equipment recovery at 12:06 p.m. R. Doc. 31-

6 at 4. Plaintiffs state that a UHLA employee submitted the police

report at 4:51 p.m. R. Doc. 55 at 8. On the police report, 4:51 p.m. is

the “disposition” time, at which point a warrant was submitted, and

Stanislaus’s arrest was pending. R. Doc. 31-10 at 3. The police report

clearly indicates that the UHLA began submitting the report at 12:27

p.m. and completed submitting the report at 12:52 p.m. Id. at 3–4.

23 R. Doc. 31-4 at 2.

24 R. Doc. 31-5 at 17.

center in Chamblee, Georgia rented him the same van, due at the same

location by February 3, 2023, under contract number 73859115.25

On January 29, 2023, an officer with the Chamblee Police Department

ran the tags of the parked U-Haul van and discovered that it was associated

with an open incident report from St. John the Baptist Parish Sheriff’s

Office.26 There was also an active arrest warrant for Stanislaus.27 Ijeoma

Nwachulwu told the officer that the issue was resolved with U-Haul and

showed the officer the new rental agreement.28 Nonetheless, after

confirming the warrant, the officer arrested Stanislaus and had the U-Haul

impounded.29

On Monday, January 31, 2023, Ijeoma informed a U-Haul Co. of

Georgia employee that her husband had been jailed at DeKalb County Jail

since January 29, 2023.30 A U-Haul representative contacted the Chamblee

Police Department to determine the steps to obtain his release.31 On

February 2, the representative contacted the St. John the Baptist Parish

25 R. Doc. 31-8 at 1.

26 R. Doc. 31-9 at 3.

27 Id.

28 Id.

29 Id. at 3–4.

30 R. Doc. 31-11 at 1.

31 Id. at 2.

Sheriff’s Office to have the warrant and charges rescinded.32 The warrant

was recalled on February 2.33

The Court considers defendant’s motion as to each of plaintiffs’ claims

below.

A. Defamation

Plaintiffs asserted a claim for defamation under Louisiana law.34 To

establish a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must prove the following

elements: “(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an

unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on

the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.” Kennedy v. Sheriff of

East Baton Rouge, 935 So.2d 669, 674 (La. 2006). A plaintiff must allege

“with reasonable specificity the defamatory statements allegedly published

by defendant.” Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 737 So.2d 706, 713 (La. 1999) (quoting

Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So.2d 552, 559 (La. 1997)). And while a plaintiff

need not “state verbatim the words on which he bases his cause of action,”

he “must name the individual offenders and allege separate acts of

32 Id.

33 R. Doc. 55-2.

34 R. Doc. 1-1 at 3.

defamation as to each, including specific defamatory statements.” Badeaux

v. Sw. Computer Bureau, Inc., 929 So.2d 1211, 1218 (La. 2006).

UHLA argues it is entitled to a conditional privilege on this claim.

Conditional privilege is a defense to defamation in Louisiana. Holmes v. Lea,

250 So.3d 1004, 1010 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2018). Louisiana courts have

recognized that “the public has an interest in possible criminal activity being

brought to the attention of the proper authorities, and have extended a

qualified privilege to remarks made in good faith.” Kennedy v. Sheriff of E.

Baton Rouge, 935 So.2d 669, 683 (La. 2006)); see also id. (“[V]ital to our

system of justice is that there be the ability to communicate to police officers

the alleged wrongful acts of others without fear of civil action for honest

mistakes.”). Statements challenged as defamatory are subject to a

conditional privilege when (1) as a matter of law, “the circumstances in which

a communication was made satisfy the legal requirements for invoking the

conditional privilege,” and (2) the privilege was not abused. Holmes, 250

So.3d at 1010. The defendant has the burden to prove that the circumstances

of the communication entitle it to assert the privilege, the first step of the

test. Kennedy, 935 So.2d at 687. Then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

establish the second step, abuse of the privilege. Id.

The UHLA employee reported Stanislaus’s failure to timely return the

leased van, in violation of Louisiana law. Further, he made the complaint to

the proper authorities. Therefore, the Court finds the first step satisfied,

because UHLA made the communication in circumstances that satisfy legal

requirements for invoking a qualified privilege. See id. (defendant confirmed

the existence of the conditional privilege when its employees reported the

possible commission of a crime to police); see also Holmes, 250 So.3d at 1010

(defendant’s communication about the possible commission of a crime to a

sheriff’s deputy, who was the proper official authorized to protect the public

from such an act, satisfied the legal requirement for conditional privilege);

see also Talbert v. Affordable Rent-To-Own of Thibodaux, L.L.C., 370 So.3d

1, 13 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2023) (a complaint to a city prosecutor, who was the

proper official authorized to protect the public from the alleged crime,

established the first step of the conditional privilege analysis).

Plaintiffs now bear the burden to rebut the qualified privilege by

establishing that defendant abused the privilege. Kennedy at 689; see id.

(“Once the privilege was established, it was the plaintiff’s burden to

demonstrate abuse.”). To do so, plaintiffs must submit evidence that the

statements were made knowing they were false or with reckless disregard for

whether they were true or false. Kennedy, 935 So.2d at 684. Mere

negligence as to falsity is not sufficient to prove abuse of the conditional

privilege. Id. at 684. Only false statements made with a high degree of

awareness of their probable falsity meet the reckless disregard standard. Id.

at 688 (plaintiff must provide “evidence that defendant was highly aware

that the statements were probably false”). In other words, plaintiffs must

submit “sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in

fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” Id. Under

this standard, “even proof of gross negligence in the publication of a false

statement is insufficient to prove reckless disregard.” Id.

Plaintiffs fail to come forward with evidence that defendant abused the

privilege. Plaintiffs argue that UHLA acted with malice or lack of good faith,

and thus fails the second stage of the privilege analysis, because it “push[ed]

for the arrest” of Stanislaus, and because UHLA knew or should have known

that the van was re-leased to Stanislaus at the time it was reported stolen to

police.35 The evidence does not support these assertions.

No evidence that could be made admissible supports plaintiffs’

assertion that a representative of UHLA pushed for Stanislaus to be arrested.

Plaintiffs rely on inadmissible hearsay from Stanislaus’s deposition in which

he testified that he heard the Georgia arresting officer say that he would call

35 R. Doc. 55 at 6–7.

U-Haul to gather more information before arresting Stanislaus.36 This

evidence is not only inadmissible hearsay, but it also does not demonstrate

that the arresting officer spoke to UHLA. Additionally, plaintiffs cite to

Georgia police’s arrest incident report. The arrest report, even if admissible,

indicates only that the arresting officer confirmed through police channels

that there was an open warrant, not that he communicated with U-Haul or

any representative of UHLA.37 In fact, the UHLA employee, who plaintiffs

assert spoke with Georgia police, submitted an affidavit stating that he never

made any statement to Georgia law enforcement officials indicating that he

wanted Stanislaus to be arrested or the van impounded.38 Plaintiffs provide

no deposition testimony from the arresting officers or from any U-Haul or

UHLA employees to rebut this. Plaintiffs’ evidence does not show that the

officers communicated with UHLA by any means or that UHLA instructed

the officers to arrest Stanislaus. Nor does it show that UHLA’s employees

made any statement with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for its

truth or falsity.

Plaintiffs also fail to establish that UHLA knew or was highly aware of

the probability that Stanislaus renewed the contract in Georgia before UHLA

36 R. Doc. 55-1 at 155.

37 R. Doc. 31-9 at 3–4.

38 R. Doc. 39-1 at 3.

filed the police report in Louisiana. Even if the chronology asserted by

plaintiffs were supported by the record,39 which it is not,40 pointing to a

timeline of events involving actors in two different states, with no evidence

that they communicated with each other, is insufficient to show that UHLA

made the police report with knowledge of or reckless disregard for of its

probable falsity.41 Moreover, the UHLA employee who made the police

report stated in his affidavit that, at the time he made the report, he did not

know about any contemporaneous efforts by Stanislaus to return and re-

lease the U-Haul van.42

39 R. Doc. 55 at 8.

40 See infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.

41 Furthermore, UHLA, the only defendant in this case, is a Louisiana

business corporation, and there is no evidence that it had any

operations or employees in Georgia.

42 R. Doc. 69-1 at 2. Plaintiffs assert that the UHLA employee who made

the police report was the one who charged Stanislaus’s card for the van

extension, thus he must have known about the extension. R. Doc. 55

at 7. There is no evidence in the record to support this. Plaintiffs cite

Stanislaus’s deposition for this assertion, but the cited lines

demonstrate that Stanislaus had a Visa card that was charged $738.27

on the same day as the initial rental. R. Doc 55-1 at 65–66 & 72–73.

This was the amount charged under the first contract, numbered

71524497. R. Doc. 31-4. This was not the amount charged on January

20 at the Georgia U-Haul rental center for the extra days Stanislaus

had the van or to re-lease the van. On that day, Stanislaus paid

$1,167.48 for the 19 extra days, id. at 2, and $572.18 to re-lease the van,

R. Doc. 31-8 at 1. Further, the UHLA employee swore that he never

made a charge, or contemporaneously knew of any charges, having to

do with Stanislaus’s extension of his rental of the van in Georgia. R.

As to the chronology of events, the record reflects that UHLA made the

police report by 12:52 p.m. on January 20, 2023.43 The U-Haul office in

Georgia closed the initial contract at 2:40 p.m. on the same day.44 Stanislaus

re-rented the same van an hour later at 3:50 p.m.45 Even if the Georgia

transactions occurred in Eastern Time, and UHLA made the police report in

Central Time, the one-hour time difference would not change the above

order of events. At the time UHLA filed the police report with the Sheriff’s

Office, the van was unaccounted for and 19-days late, and the police report

was completed before the van was returned.

Plaintiffs fail to submit evidence that UHLA made the police report

with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard as to its probable falsity.

They thus fail to demonstrate that defendant abused the privilege.

Therefore, the Court finds that defendant’s statements were conditionally

privileged and that the privilege was not abused. The Court grants

defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ defamation claim.

Doc. 39-1 at 3–4. Plaintiffs fail to point to any evidence that a UHLA

employee was involved in any way with the van’s re-leasing.

43 R. Doc. 31-10 at 3.

44 R. Doc. 31-4 at 2.

45 R. Doc. 31-8 at 1.

B. Discrimination

Defendant also moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs’

discrimination claims asserted under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000a; La. Rev. Stat. § 51:2247; and Section 1981 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.46

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, “All persons [are] entitled to the full and

equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and

accommodations of any place of public accommodation, . . . without

discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or

national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). Under La. Rev. Stat § 51:2247, “it is

a discriminatory practice for a person to deny an individual the full and equal

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and

accommodations of a place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement,

. . . on the grounds of race.” La. Rev. Stat. § 51:2247. A “[d]iscriminatory

practice in connection with public accommodations” is “any direct or indirect

act or practice of exclusion, distinction, restriction, segregation, limitation,

refusal, denial, or any other act or practice of differentiation or preference in

the treatment of a person or persons because of race.” La. Rev. Stat. §

51:2232(5).

46 R. Doc. 1-1 at 1–2.

The U.S. Fifth Circuit has held that La. Rev. Stat. § 51:2247 “is

substantively similar to Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §

2000a(a).” Semien v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 204 F.3d 1115, 1115 (5th Cir.

1999). The Court looks to Title II jurisprudence to determine whether

defendant’s actions constituted a “discriminatory practice” under La. Rev.

Stat § 51:2247. Title II claims may be proved by direct or circumstantial

evidence. Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir.

2008). Direct evidence is “evidence that, if believed, proves the fact of

discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.” Rodriguez v. Eli

Lilly & Co., 820 F.3d 759, 765 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Sandstad v. CB

Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 897 (5th Cir. 2002)). Evidence is

circumstantial if an inference is required for the evidence to be probative as

to defendant’s discriminatory animus. Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 897–98.

UHLA argues that plaintiffs have submitted no evidence of any

discrimination.47

Plaintiffs argue that UHLA discriminated against Stanislaus because

its employee identified Stanislaus as a Black man when he made the police

report.48 Plaintiffs point to the St. John the Baptist Parish police report

47 R. Doc. 31-3 at 12–15.

48 R. Doc. 55 at 9.

where the reporting officer noted that a UHLA employee indicated that

Stanislaus was Black.49 Plaintiffs also argue there was discrimination

because UHLA improperly reported the van as “stolen.”50 In support of this,

plaintiffs cite the Georgia arrest report, in which the offense was classified as

a “Stolen, converted, recovered and unclaimed vehicle[],” and the incident

was classified as “Stolen Vehicle Recovery.”51

Plaintiffs point to no direct evidence of race discrimination. That the

UHLA employee indicated in his statement to the police that Stanislaus was

a Black man52 is not direct evidence of discrimination, because it does not

prove discriminatory animus “without inference or presumption.”

Rodriguez, 820 F.3d at 765. Further, the UHLA employee explained in his

affidavit that he was asked what Stanislaus’s race was by the Sheriff’s Office,

and he answered accordingly.53

Absent direct evidence, plaintiffs must submit circumstantial evidence

supporting a claim of discrimination. The Court finds that plaintiffs failed to

do so here. Plaintiffs’ argument rests on the assertion that the UHLA

employee, who identified Stanislaus as a Black man to police, improperly

49 R. Doc. 31-10 at 4.

50 Id. at 10.

51 R. Doc. 31-10 at 5.

52 R. Doc. 31-10 at 4.

53 R. Doc. 69-1 at 2.

reported the van as “stolen” or as a “theft” to the authorities.54 On the

contrary, the St. John the Baptist Parish police report shows that the UHLA

employee reported that Stanislaus “never brought the truck in,” and that the

crime was for the unauthorized use of a movable.55 The St. John the Baptist

Parish police report lists the reported offense as La. Rev. Stat. § 14:68

Unauthorized Use of a Movable, which “is the intentional taking or use of a

movable which belongs to another, either without the other’s consent, or by

means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations, but without any

intention to deprive the other of the movable permanently.”56 La. Rev. Stat.

§ 14:68(A). This was an accurate report at the time, given that the van had

been intentionally taken for 19 days without UHLA’s consent, although

without an intention to deprive UHLA of the property permanently. Further,

the UHLA employee denied under oath that he told the St. John the Baptist

Parish Sheriff’s Office that the van was stolen.57 And, there is no evidence

that UHLA communicated with Georgia police as to how to classify

Stanislaus’s offense.

54 R. Doc. 55 at 9–10.

55 R. Doc. 31-9 at 3–4.

56 R. Doc. 31-10 at 3–4.

57 R. Doc. 69-1 at 2.

Further, Stanislaus noted that he never felt like his race was an issue

when dealing with this UHLA employee.58 After drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of plaintiffs, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed to raise

a material issue of fact suggesting that UHLA’s actions were motivated by

plaintiffs’ race. Plaintiffs’ assertions of racial bias are conclusory and

speculative. The Court therefore grants defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on the Title II and the LHRA claims.

In its complaint, plaintiffs asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but

plaintiffs do not oppose defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this

claim. In the Fifth Circuit, a district court may not grant a “default” summary

judgment on the ground that it is unopposed. See Morgan v. Fed. Express

Corp., 114 F. Supp.3d 434, 437 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (collecting cases). Even in

the context of unopposed motions for summary judgment, the movant must

still show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled

to summary judgment as a matter of law. Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,

50 F.3d 360, 363 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hibernia Nat. Bank v.

Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir.

1985)). When a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, a court may

accept the movant’s evidence as undisputed. Morgan, 114 F. Supp.3d at 437

58 R. Doc. 55-1 at 169.

(quoting UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Long, 227 F. Supp.2d 609 (N.D. Tex.

2002)). Nevertheless, if the moving party fails to meet its burden, the Court

must deny its motion for summary judgment. Hetzel, 50 F.3d at 362 n.3.

Section 1981 provides as follows:

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have

the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce

contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and

equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of

persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Section 1981 generally forbids racial discrimination in

the making and enforcement of private contracts, regardless of the race of

the aggrieved party. Bobo v. ITT, Continental Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 342

(5th Cir. 1981). To establish a prima facie case under Section 1981, a plaintiff

must show that the alleged “discrimination concerned one or more of the

activities enumerated in the statute.” Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 118 F.3d

268, 274 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 358

(5th Cir. 2003) (“Section 1981 does not provide a general cause of action for

race discrimination. Rather it prohibits intentional race discrimination with

respect to certain enumerated activities.”). Those categories include the

“making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual

relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).

Plaintiffs cited Section 1981 in their complaint,59 but they did not allege

racial discrimination in connection with one of the enumerated aspects of his

contractual relationship with UHLA. Further, plaintiffs failed to point to any

evidence in support of a Section 1981 claim in response to defendant’s

motion for summary judgment. Because the record does not reflect racial

animus by UHLA, the Court grants defendant’s summary judgment motion

as to plaintiffs’ Section 1981 claim.

C. Remaining Claims

1. Negligence

Defendant moves for summary judgment for plaintiffs’ negligence

claim. There are five elements of a negligence claim under Louisiana law:

duty, breach, factual causation, legal causation, and damages. Jack v.

Evonik Corp., 79 F.4th 547, 556 (5th Cir. 2023); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315.

Plaintiffs’ negligence claim fails because plaintiffs fail to submit

evidence creating an issue of material fact that defendant breached a duty to

the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that UHLA “owed a duty to its clients and the

public to exercise reasonable care” and that it breached this duty in reporting

the vehicle as stolen and insisting that Stanislaus be arrested.60 Contrary to

59 R. Doc. 1-1 at 1.

60 R. Doc. 55 at 11.

plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion, the record reflects that defendant did not

report the vehicle as “stolen,”61 defendant’s report was not false when made,

and there is no evidence that defendant insisted to the Georgia police that

Stanislaus be arrested. Moreover, over the almost three-week period before

January 20, U-Haul repeatedly attempted to contact plaintiffs before it took

any action.62 Absent evidence creating an issue of fact as to the breach of a

duty, plaintiffs’ negligence claim must fail. The Court therefore grants

defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim.

2. Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligent

infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) and intentional infliction of

emotional distress (“IIED”) claims.63 Plaintiffs did not oppose defendant’s

motion as to these claims.

Louisiana law allows recovery for negligent infliction of emotional

distress under La. Civ. Code art. 2315. See Pelitire v. Rinker, 270 So.3d 817,

829 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2019). To recover for NIED, a plaintiff must establish

(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific

61 See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.

62 R. Doc. 31-6 at 4–5.

63 R. Doc. 31-3 at 20–22.

standard of care (the duty element); (2) the defendant failed to conform his

or her conduct to the appropriate standard (the breach of duty element); (3)

the defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's

injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant’s substandard

conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (the scope of liability or

scope of protection element); and, (5) actual damages (the damages

element). Spencer v. Valero Ref. Meraux, L.L.C., 356 So.3d 936, 949 (La.

2023). “A negative answer to any of those inquiries results in a

determination of no liability.” Id. For NIED claims without physical injury,

a plaintiff must establish “the especial likelihood of genuine and serious

mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a

guarantee that the claim is not spurious.” Id. at 950 (quoting Moresi v. State

Through Dep't of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So.2d 1081, 1096 (La. 1990)).

Defendant moves on the ground that plaintiffs failed to produce

evidence that it acted negligently.64 The record discussed at length in this

opinion lacks any evidence that the defendant failed to conform its conduct

to an appropriate standard of care in making the report to the St. John the

64 R. Doc. 31-3 at 21.

Baptist Parish Sheriff’s Office.65 The Court therefore grants defendant’s

motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ NIED claim.

For plaintiffs’ IIED claim, they must prove “(1) that the conduct of

defendant was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the emotional distress

suffered by plaintiff was severe; and (3) that defendant desired to inflict

severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would be

certain or substantially certain to result from its conduct.” Roberson v.

August, 820 So.2d 620, 629 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2002); White v. Monsanto Co.,

585 So.2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991). Conduct is considered “extreme and

outrageous” when it is “so atrocious as to pass the boundaries of decency and

to be utterly intolerable to civilized society.” Roberson, 820 So.2d at 620

(citing Johnson v. English, 779 So.2d 876 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2000)).

Defendant moves on the ground that plaintiffs failed to submit any

evidence that its actions were extreme, outrageous, or atrocious.66 Indeed,

plaintiffs present no evidence that defendant engaged in such extreme and

outrageous conduct, and plaintiffs make no explicit argument that defendant

did so. Defendant reported the incident to the police, and at the time the

incident was unresolved. Such conduct does not rise to the level of “extreme

65 See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.

66 Id.

and outrageous” conduct that is required for an IIED claim. Moreover, there

is no evidence that defendant intended to or knew it would cause plaintiffs

severe emotional distress. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate

a genuine issue of material fact in support of their claim for IIED. The Court

grants defendant’s motion as to this claim.

3. False Imprisonment

Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ wrongful arrest

or false imprisonment claim. Plaintiffs did not oppose defendant’s motion

on this claim. False imprisonment, also referred to as wrongful arrest, occurs

when “one arrests and restrains another against his will and without

statutory authority.” Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So.2d 669,

690 (La. 2006). This occurs when one “takes the law in his own hands and

acts without a warrant from a court,” Barfield v. Marron, 222 La. 210, 220

(1952), or when a person is detained under a warrant null and void upon its

face,” Hays v. Hansen, 692 So.2d 3, 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1997). But “if a person

is arrested pursuant to a valid warrant, there is no false imprisonment.” Id.

There are two essential elements of a false imprisonment claim: “(1)

detention of a person; and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention.” Id. A

“detention” requires the “total and unlawful restraint of a person’s freedom

of locomotion.” Rawls v. Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul, Inc.,

491 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Crossett v. Campbell, 48 So. 141 (La.

1909).

The Court assumes—because plaintiffs failed to so state—that

plaintiffs’ claim rests on Stanislaus’s arrest. While non-police actors may be

liable for false imprisonment, there are no facts in the record to demonstrate

that UHLA detained plaintiffs. The police officers in Georgia, not UHLA

employees, detained Stanislaus. Reporting a suspected crime does not make

UHLA liable for false imprisonment. See Kennedy, 935 So.2d at 687, 690

(When restaurant employees reported a suspected commission of a crime to

police, the record did not support that the restaurant employees falsely

imprisoned the plaintiff when the police arrested him). Additionally, there

is no evidence that the Georgia arresting officer executed a warrant that was

facially invalid. The St. John the Baptist Parish Sheriff’s Office entered a

warrant for Stanislaus’s arrest,67 and the Georgia arresting officer confirmed

the warrant through police channels.68 See Tillman v. Holsum Bakeries,

Inc., 244 So.2d 681, 682 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (dismissing a claim for false

imprisonment against a civil defendant when there was “no evidence to

suggest the arrest was made without proper legal process”); see also Hughes

67 R. Doc. 31-10 at 3–4.

68 R. Doc. 31-9 at 3–4.

v. Gulf Intl, 593 So.2d 776, 780 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 595 So.2d

658 (La. 1992) (dismissing a false imprisonment claim against a civil

defendant when plaintiff was detained by police when she was arrested, her

detention was lawful, and the arresting officer made the decision to arrest

her). Plaintiffs fail to submit any evidence that UHLA was liable for false

imprisonment. The Court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment

as to this claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion for

summary judgment and dismisses plaintiffs’ defamation, discrimination,

negligence, NIED, IIED, and false imprisonment claims.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this__25th_ day of March, 2025.

Sera Vive

SARAH S. VANCE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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