Kopaddy v. Pottawatomie County Public Safety Center

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

EVA GIVEN KOPADDY, )

as Administrator for the Estate )

of Ronald Givens, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-20-1280-G

)

POTTAWATOMIE COUNTY )

PUBLIC SAFETY CENTER TRUST, )

an Oklahoma Title 60 authority, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Now before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 58) filed by Defendant

Pottawatomie County Public Safety Center Trust (the “Trust”). Plaintiff Eva Given

Kopaddy has filed a Response (Doc. No. 59), and the matter is now at issue.

I. Background and Summary of the Pleadings

Plaintiff is the court-appointed Administrator of the Estate of Ronald Given, Am.

Compl. ¶ 6 (Doc. No. 18), and in that capacity asserts claims stemming from Mr. Given’s

death.1 The Trust was established in 2002 for the use and benefit of Pottawatomie County

and is responsible for the operation of Pottawatomie County Public Safety Center. See id.

¶¶ 7-8.

Plaintiff alleges that on January 8, 2019, the Shawnee Police Department (“SPD”)

responded to a call at Tractor Supply concerning Mr. Given, who appeared to be suffering

1 Although the pleading identifies the deceased as “Ronald Givens,” it is undisputed that

his surname is properly spelled “Given.”

from a mental health crisis. See id. ¶¶ 19-20. Police transported Mr. Given to the

emergency department of SSM Health St. Anthony Hospital (“St. Anthony Shawnee”) in

Shawnee, Oklahoma. Id. ¶ 21. There, medical staff evaluated Mr. Given and determined

that he should be placed in a behavioral health center, but there were no beds available in

the state. Id. Mr. Given was therefore admitted to St. Anthony Shawnee with an

Emergency Order of Detention. Id. The transporting officers advised SPD headquarters

of the situation and were instructed to “sit on” Mr. Given until he could be transported to

a behavioral center. Id.

On January 9, 2019, SPD Officer Jake Duggan arrived at St. Anthony to relieve

Officer Korbin Williams, who was previously assigned to watch Mr. Given. Id. ¶ 22.

Plaintiff alleges that after Officer Duggan’s arrival, Mr. Given continued to exhibit

symptoms of a mental health crisis. See id. Officer Duggan ultimately placed Mr. Given

under arrest and transported him by patrol car to the Pottawatomie County Public Safety

Center (“PCPSC”). Id.

After Officer Duggan and Officer Williams delivered Mr. Given to the PCPSC,

Plaintiff alleges that PCPSC personnel exceeded ordinary and reasonable force in

attempting to subdue Mr. Given, causing him to suffer cardiac arrest. See id. ¶¶ 27-32.

Mr. Given, unconscious, was then taken by ambulance back to St. Anthony Shawnee. Id.

¶ 30. He was thereafter transferred to St. Anthony Hospital in Oklahoma City. Id. ¶ 33.

He arrived at the Oklahoma City facility comatose and intubated, and he died on January

16, 2019. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Given’s death was the result of the altercation at

the PCPSC. See id. ¶ 37.

On March 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against the Trust and

various Pottawatomie County and City of Shawnee officials, bringing federal

constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. See id. ¶ 1. The Trust seeks dismissal

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting that all claims against the

Trust are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

II. Standard of Decision

Plaintiff brings her claims against the Trust pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a

“remedial vehicle for raising claims based on the violation of [federal] constitutional

rights.” Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016). To succeed on a

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show “the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States,” and that the violation “was committed by a

person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

In analyzing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court “accept[s] as true

all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view[s] them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231,

1235 (10th Cir. 2013). A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted

when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful

in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citation

omitted); see also Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]o

withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Bare

legal conclusions in a complaint are not entitled to the assumption of truth; “they must be

supported by factual allegations” to state a claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 679 (2009).

III. Discussion

The Trust argues that Plaintiff is precluded from pursuing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims because they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. As noted in the

Motion, a two-year limitations period governs Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. See McCarty v.

Gilchrist, 646 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3));

Def.’s Mot. at 4-5. “Federal law governs when the action accrues.” Id. Under federal law,

“claims accrue and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has

reason to know of the existence and cause of the injury which is the basis of his action.”

Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (alteration and internal

quotation marks omitted). Because the “injury” in a § 1983 action “is the violation of a

constitutional right,” a § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or should know that

his or her constitutional rights have been violated.” Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City

Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord

Alexander, 382 F.3d at 1215.

Here, the parties agree that Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on or about January

16, 2019, with the death of Mr. Given. Plaintiff then filed the initial Complaint (Doc. No.

1) in this action on December 22, 2020, within the two-year limitation period. The

Complaint identified PCPSC as a defendant rather than the Trust. See id. at 1. Defendant

represents that its current counsel, as counsel for PCPSC, at that time contacted Plaintiff’s

then-counsel to advise that PCPSC, as a jail facility, was not subject to suit and that the

proper party defendant was the Trust. See Def.’s Mot. at 1-2. “Plaintiff’s former counsel

advised that he intended to file an amended complaint,” and on March 16, 2021, the

Amended Complaint was filed with the Court. Id. at 2.

The Trust contends that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against it are untimely because the

Trust was not named as a defendant until the March 16, 2021 filing of the Amended

Complaint—about two months after the two-year limitations period expired. See Def.’s

Mot. at 5-7. The Motion nominally argues that because the Trust is a separate entity from

the prior defendant, PCPSC, the claims of the Amended Complaint do not “relate back” to

the date of the filing of the initial Complaint. See id. Plaintiff does not dispute that the

Trust and PCPSC are separate entities but asserts that relation back is proper under Rule

15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pl.’s Resp. 2-6.

Rule 15(c) functions in “limited circumstances” to “save[] an otherwise untimely

amendment by deeming it to ‘relate back’ to the conduct alleged in the timely original

complaint.” Hernandez v. Valley View Hosp. Ass’n, 684 F.3d 950, 961 (10th Cir. 2012).

The Rule provides:

(c) Relation Back of Amendments.

(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading

relates back to the date of the original pleading when:

(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows

relation back;

(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set

out—in the original pleading; or

(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party

against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and

if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons

and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:

(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced

in defending on the merits; and

(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been

brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s

identity.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the relation-

back doctrine is “to balance the interests of the defendant protected by the statute of

limitations with the preference expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in

general, and Rule 15 in particular, for resolving disputes on their merits.” Krupski v. Costa

Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 550 (2010).

The Trust’s sole objection—that it is not the same party as PCPSC—implicates Rule

15(c)(1)(C), so the Court considers each requirement in turn.

First, it is indisputable that “Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied,” as the Amended

Complaint asserts claims that arose out of the same conduct as alleged in the Complaint.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C); see id. R. 15(c)(1)(B). Compare Compl. ¶¶ 22-38, with Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 19-39.

Second, pursuant to the Court’s Order, Plaintiff was required to serve the Trust with

summons and the Amended Complaint no later than June 2, 2024. See Order of May 3,

2024 (Doc. No. 54). The Trust was served on or about May 13, 2024. See Doc. No. 56;

Def.’s Mot. at 2. It is evident from the Trust’s own motion that long before this date the

Trust “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it” but

for Plaintiff's mistake concerning the proper party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii); see

Def.’s Mot. at 1-2 (describing conversations on this topic shortly after the lawsuit was filed

in December 2020).

Finally, the Trust does not attempt to show that it “will . . . be prejudiced” by the

notice received in defending itself in this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)@). Nor is any

such prejudice reasonably reflected in the record before the Court. Cf Pl.’s Resp. at 5

(“[T]he .. . attorney who was defending [PCPSC] and advised Plaintiff's counsel of the

appropriate party’s name is the same attorney who is defending [the] Trust.”).

“The rationale of Rule 15(c) is that a party who has been notified of litigation

concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes of limitations

were intended to provide.” Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149 n.3

(1984). For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the Trust has received

due notice and that relation back of the claims raised against the Trust in the Amended

Complaint is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). These claims therefore

are not subject to dismissal as time barred.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 58) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of March, 2025.

(Barba B. Kadota

United States District Judge