Opinion

Starnes v. Lincoln County, Oregon

Court
District Court, D. Oregon
Filed
Mar 24, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.5%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

DOUGLAS D. STARNES, Civ. No. 6:24-cv-1913-AA

Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER

vs.

LINCOLN COUNTY BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS;

ANN ALLARD-ROBINETT;

KENNETH LIPP; JEFFREY C. PRIDGEON,

Defendants.

_______________________________________

AIKEN, District Judge:

Self-represented Plaintiff Douglas D. Starnes seeks leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) in this action. For the reasons explained below, the IFP Petition,

ECF No. 1, is GRANTED; the Motion for Appointment of Counsel, ECF No. 3, is

DENIED; and Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 2, is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

Plaintiff shall have thirty days from the date of this order to file an amended

complaint.

LEGAL STANDARD

Generally, any party that initiates a civil action in a United States District

Court must pay a statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). But the federal IFP

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), provides indigent litigants an opportunity for

meaningful access to federal courts despite their inability to pay the costs and fees

associated with that access. To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make

two determinations. First, a court must determine whether the litigant is unable to

pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, it must assess

whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

As to the second determination, a district court has the power under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before service of the complaint on the

defendants and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim. To determine

whether a complaint states a claim, Courts apply the same standard under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive

a motion to dismiss, the complaint must include a short and plain statement of the

claim and “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To state a plausible claim, a

plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility

standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. Further, the court need not accept legal conclusions, unsupported

by alleged facts, as true. Id.

Self-represented (pro se) pleadings are held to less stringent standards than

pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). A court should

construe the pleadings of self-represented plaintiffs liberally and give self-

represented plaintiffs the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police

Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Additionally, a self-represented litigant is

entitled to notice of a complaint’s deficiencies and provided the opportunity to amend,

unless the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Id.

DISCUSSION

When assessing an IFP petition, the Court first must determine whether the

plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of indigency. Here, the Court is satisfied by

Plaintiff’s showing. Plaintiff’s IFP Petition is GRANTED.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims under 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18

U.S.C. § 242 against the Lincoln County Board of Commissioners; Ann Allard-

Robinett, Primary Care Division Director of the Lincoln County Public Health and

VA Clinic; Kenneth Lipp, Lincoln County Public Information Officer; and Judge

Jeffrey C. Pridgeon of the Newport Municipal Court.

Plaintiff alleges that, on November 29, 2023, Defendants conspired to violate

his First Amendment rights when they prohibited him from filming in the lobby of

the Lincoln County Public Health/VA Clinic. Plaintiff brings his claims under two

federal criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18 U.S.C.§ 242.

Plaintiff’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 to establish federal

subject matter jurisdiction is not proper because these statutes are criminal statutes.

Generally, private individuals have no authority to bring claims under criminal

statutes. Schwettmann v. Starns, 2:23-cv-02442 DJC AC PS, 2023 WL 8284064, *2

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2023) (explaining that “[a] citizen does not have authority to bring

criminal charges, either under state or federal law”). Only the state or federal

government can bring criminal charges unless the statute provides what is called a

“private right of action” that permits a private individual to sue under that statute.

Wormley v. Hemphill, 1:19-cv-00747 (CJN), 2021 WL 11670848, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar.

22, 2021) (dismissing the self-represented plaintiff's claims brought “pursuant to

various sections of Chapter 18 of the U.S. Code [because] none of those criminal

statutes includes an express private right of action”).

Neither 18 U.S.C. § 241, which proscribes conspiracy against an individual’s

rights, nor 18 U.S.C. § 242, which proscribes the deprivation of rights under color of

law, provide a private right of action. Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044,

1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980));

see also Hart v. Granado, CV-22-02067-PHX-JAT (JFM), 2023 WL 7301872, at *2-3

(D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2023) (dismissing the self-represented plaintiff's claims under

18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 with prejudice and explaining that “[t]hese criminal

provisions provide no basis for civil liability”).

Under federal question jurisdiction, a district court has jurisdiction over “civil

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 1331. Here, Plaintiff fails to provide any federal basis for his claims

because private individuals cannot bring a civil action under either 18 U.S.C. § 241

or 18 U.S.C. § 242. Because Plaintiff cannot bring suit under these statutes, his claim

is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff shall have thirty days from the date

of this Order in which to file an amended complaint.

Finally, the Court denies the Motion for Appointment of Counsel. There is no

constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land,

795 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1986). But under § 1915, this Court has discretion to

request volunteer counsel for indigent parties in exceptional circumstances. Wood v.

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990). In this case, the Court declines to

request volunteer counsel at this time.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s IFP petition, ECF No. 1, is

GRANTED; the Motion for Appointment of Counsel, ECF No. 3, is DENIED; and the

Complaint, ECF No. 2, is DISMISSED. Plaintiff shall have thirty days from the date

of this Order to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file an

amended complaint within the allotted time will result in entry of a judgment of

dismissal without further notice.

It is so ORDERED and DATED this _2__4_th__ day of March 2025.

/s/Ann Aiken

ANN AIKEN

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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