The School Board of St. John's County, Florida v. C.L.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF ST.

JOHNS COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-864-MMH-LLL

C.L.,

Defendant.

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF ST.

JOHNS COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-1285-MMH-LLL

C.L., by and through C.L.’s

Parents, K.L. and M.L.,

Defendant.

O R D E R1

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation

(Doc. 37; Report), entered by the Honorable Laura Lothman Lambert, United

States Magistrate Judge, on January 30, 2025. In the Report, Judge Lambert

recommends that the parties’ cross motions for judgment on the administrative

record each be granted in part and denied in part. See generally Report;

Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. 26), filed

on May 6, 2024; Defendant’s Response to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment

on the Administrative Record and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the

Administrative Record (Doc. 30), filed on June 14, 2024. No party filed

objections to the Report, and the time to do so has expired. Accordingly, this

matter is ripe for review.

The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Under

Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court “must determine de novo

any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected

to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a party

waives the right to challenge on appeal any unobjected-to factual and legal

1 For readability and to avoid confusion, when citing to the administrative record, the

Court adopts the same document naming conventions in this Order as the Magistrate Judge

used in the Report. The Court does not redefine those conventions here. When citing to docket

entries, the Court refers to entries made in the lead case, Case No. 3:23-cv-864-MMH-LLL.

The plaintiff, St. Johns County School Board, is referred to as the “School Board.”

conclusions. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.2 As such, the Court reviews those portions of

the Magistrate Judge’s findings to which no objection was filed for plain error

and only if necessary, in the interests of justice. See id.; see also Thomas v.

Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to

require district court review of a magistrate [judge’s] factual or legal

conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects

to those findings.”); Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2013)

(recommending the adoption of what would become 11th Circuit Rule 3-1 so

that district courts do not have “to spend significant amounts of time and

resources reviewing every issue—whether objected to or not”).

Upon independent review of the file, the Court will accept and adopt the

Magistrate Judge’s recommended disposition of the Motions.3 Considering that

no objections were filed to the Magistrate Judge’s recommended factual and

legal conclusions, de novo review of those conclusions is unnecessary. See

Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150. Nevertheless, in the interests of clarity, the Court

offers the following comments.

2 The Magistrate Judge properly informed the parties of the time period for objecting

and the consequences of failing to do so. See Report at 49.

3 The Court reads the reference to “Kathryn Fini” on page 13 of the Report as referring

to “Kathlyn Fini.” See AR1 at 284. The Court reads the references to “Michael Curtin” and

“Amanda Ridel” on page 14 of the Report as referring to “Michele Curtin” and “Amanda

Riedl.” See id. at 285. The Court reads the reference to “G.C. v. Muscogee Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

668 F.3d 1258, 1270 (11th Cir. 2012)” on page 32 of the Report as referring to “G.J. v.

Muscogee Cnty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 1258, 1270 (11th Cir. 2012).”

First, as to the mootness of the 864 Action, all that the Board seeks in

the 864 Action is that the Court enter judgment “(a) reversing and/or vacating

the [April] Order; (b) declaring the School Board the prevailing party in [DOAH

II] and in this proceeding; (c) awarding the School Board attorneys’ fees and

costs; and (d) [awarding] any other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.” See Complaint (Doc. 1), filed on July 24, 2023, at 11. As to the

School Board’s request that the Court reverse or vacate the April Order, this

request was mooted by the entry of the July Order because, even if the Court

concluded the ALJ erred in denying the School Board expedited process, the

process could no longer be expedited because it was completed upon the entry

of the July Order. As to the School Board’s request that the Court declare the

School Board to be the prevailing party in DOAH II, this declaration would

have no discernable effect, particularly because the Court is vacating the ALJ’s

award of attorney’s fees. And last, the Court cannot provide the Board with its

third form of requested relief—attorney’s fees—because the Board has not

contended (nor could it, on this record) that C.L. engaged in litigation that was

“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” or brought for an improper

purpose. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i); Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.03311(9)(x).

The Board has articulated no other relief that, granted now, would be

appropriate to remedy any legal error in the April Order. Accordingly, the

claims in the 864 Action are moot.

Second, as to the attorney’s fees awarded by the ALJ, the Court

concludes that the IDEA does not permit state hearing officers to award these

fees. See Zipperer ex rel. Zipperer v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., 111 F.3d 847,

851 (11th Cir. 1997). While C.L. argues that Florida state law provides an

independent basis for an ALJ to award attorney’s fees, the Court agrees with

the thorough analysis undertaken by the district court for the Southern

District of Florida in School Board of Broward County v. C.B. and adopts that

reasoning here to conclude that Florida law does not permit an ALJ to award

attorney’s fees incurred in due process hearings under the IDEA. See Sch. Bd.

of Broward Cnty. v. C.B., 315 F. Supp. 3d. 1312, 1319–23 (S.D. Fla. 2018). As

such, the Court will vacate the ALJ’s award of attorney’s fees. For the same

reason, finding no authority under the IDEA or Florida law for the ALJ to

award fees for the services of Dr. Sisbarro and the non-attorney advocates, the

Court will vacate the ALJ’s award of those fees.

Last, as to attorney’s fees incurred by the prevailing party in this action,

the Court notes that awarding prevailing party attorney’s fees is within this

Court’s discretion under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The Court will consider any

request for such fees upon the filing of a proper motion in accordance with Rule

7.01 of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Florida (Local Rule(s)).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. The Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommended

disposition of the Motions.

2. As to the claims the School Board brings in Case No.

3:23-cv-864-MMH-LLL, those claims (Doc. 1) are DISMISSED

without prejudice.

3. As to the claims raised in Case No. 3:23-cv-1285-MMH-LLL:

A. The ALJ’s findings in the July Order that the School Board

violated the procedural requirements of the IDEA and that

C.L. was denied FAPE are AFFIRMED. Accordingly, on

these issues, the School Board’s Motion for Judgment on the

Administrative Record (Doc. 26) is DENIED and C.L.’s

Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record

(Doc. 30) is GRANTED.

B. The ALJ’s award of compensatory education in the July

Order is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, on this issue, the School

Board’s Motion (Doc. 26) is DENIED and C.L.’s

Cross-Motion (Doc. 30) is GRANTED.

C. The ALJ’s awards of compensation to C.L. for attorney’s fees,

fees for Dr. Sisbarro’s evaluation, and fees for non-attorney

services in the July Order are VACATED. Accordingly, on

these issues, the School Board’s Motion (Doc. 26) is

GRANTED and C.L.’s Cross-Motion (Doc. 30) is DENIED.

D. Any party wishing to seek an award of attorney’s fees and

costs under 20 U.S.C. § 14154)(8) may do so by filing

post-judgment motions in accordance with Local Rule 7.01.

4, The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter JUDGMENT in

conformity with this Order and close the cases.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 21st day of March,

2025.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

1c33

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

_7-