Mejia v. Lafayette Consolidated Government

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

LILLIAN LYNETTE MEJIA ET AL CASE NO. 6:23-CV-00307

VERSUS JUDGE ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS

LAFAYETTE CONSOLIDATED MAGISTRATE JUDGE CAROL B.

GOVERNMENT ET AL WHITEHURST

RULING

The present matter before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant

Robert Judge [ECF No. 55]. Plaintiffs have filed an opposition to the Motion [ECF No. 134] and

Judge filed a reply [ECF No. 137]. After considering the parties’ briefs, the summary judgment

record, and the relevant authorities, the Court DENIES the motion as follows.

I.

BACKGROUND

In this Section 1983 case, plaintiffs Lillian Lynette Mejia and Melanie Brevis allege that

the Lafayette Parish Library Board of Control (the “Library Board” or “Board”) and the Board’s

President, Robert Judge, violated the First Amendment by engaging in viewpoint discrimination

during the Board’s public comment sessions by silencing critics of the Board’s actions and

policies. Mejia and Brevis are frequent attendees of Library Board meetings and frequently sign-

up to speak during the Board’s public comment sessions.! Both have been critics of Judge and the

Library Board, and often challenge the Board’s actions with respect to the re-classification and

removal of books and other library system materials that the Board deems offensive or

inappropriate for children and young adults.” They also allege that Judge and certain members of

1 ECF No. 134-1 at 99 4-5.

2 Td. at J 6, 14-15.

the Library Board have disparaged and attacked the LGBTQ community in the course of debates

over whether to remove or restrict certain library materials.

On the other side of the debate, Judge and certain public speakers at Board meetings argue

that the Public Library System collection includes books and videos in the children’s and young

adults’ section of the library that they claim contain inappropriate sexual content, and that those

materials should be removed from the library or restricted to the adult sections of the library. Mejia

and Brevis contend that Judge wields purportedly neutral procedural rules and Louisiana’s

“disturbing the peace” statute to silence opposing viewpoints.*

During its regular meetings, the Library Board allows members of the public to speak on

matters that are posted in the Board’s meeting agenda as well as matters that are not on the agenda.

In this regard, the Library Board adopted a written “Procedure for Interested Persons Wishing to

be Heard on Matters related to the Lafayette Public Library Board of Control.”> Among the

relevant regulations contained in the Board’s public comment procedures include the requirement

Pp P

that “[p]ersons wishing to address the Board must complete [a] speaker’s request form and submit

to the Library Director\Board Secretary, or his\her designee....” ° The Board’s public comment

procedures further provide a three-minute time limit for speaker comments and require that

comments made on agenda items “be restricted to the subject matter described on the agenda.”

The Board’s procedures, however, also provide a period for additional public comments after the

Board completes its agenda items.® Public comments during this period can address “matters that

are not on the agenda.”? The Board’s public comment procedures limit the subject matter of the

3 Td.

4 ECF No. 50 at 99 47, 53.

5 ECF No. 55-2 at 6.

Id.

8 Id.

9 Id.

public comments during this period to matters “related only to Lafayette Public Library System

business, but that do not appear specifically as agenda items.”!°

As far as rules governing decorum during these public comment sessions, the Board’s

public comment procedure prohibits “debate or confrontation with the Board,” and directs speakers

not to “make any derogatory comments about any person, but to simply state factually what that

speaker’s concerns are.”!! Judge also runs the Board’s meetings under Robert’s Rules of Order

which, inter alia, requires that speakers “be courteous in their language and deportment, and avoid

all personalities, never alluding to the officers or other members by name, where possible to avoid

it, nor to the motives of members.”!* The Library Board also posts a copy of Louisiana Rev. Stat.

14:103, which imposes criminal sanctions for “disturbing the peace.” Section 14:103 defines

“disturbing the peace” as “the doing of any of the following in such manner as would foreseeably

disturb or alarm the public,” including “[a]ddressing any offensive, derisive, or annoying words to

any other person who is lawfully in any street, or other public place; or call him by any offensive

or derisive name, or make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with the intent to

deride, offend, or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business, occupation, or

duty,” or the “[iJnterruption of any lawful assembly of people.” Judge refers to Section 14:103

when outlining the rules that members of the public must follow when addressing the Library

Board.!3

Both Mejia and Brevis signed up to speak during the general public comment session of

the Board’s January 9, 2023 meeting.'* Per the Board’s public comment procedures, Brevis was

10 Td.

Td.

2 ECF No. 55-3 at 5.

3 See, e.g., ECF No. 134-10 at 00:13:50.

14 ECF No. 134-1 at § 13; ECF No. 134-2 at 9.

allotted three minutes to address the board on matters “related only to Lafayette Public Library

System business, but that do not appear specifically as agenda items.”!> Brevis’ comments came

after the Library Board had completed its scheduled agenda items.!° During Brevis’ statement to

the Board, Judge ruled Brevis “out of order” three times.!’ Judge allowed Brevis to continue her

remarks after his first ruling.!® After ruling Brevis out of order for the second and third time, Judge

ordered that her microphone be silenced and requested that the Lafayette Parish Sherif’s Office

deputies providing security for the meeting escort Brevis from the speakers’ podium. Audio and

video recordings in the record reflect Brevis’ remarks to the Board as follows:

Melanie Brevis, Lafayette Parish. November’s meeting seemed to be superficial

attempts to show that board members are just like us. That maybe if we get to know

some of you better, we’ll forget about your hateful and prejudicial actions ...

[Judge rules comments out of order and Brevis continues] ... That maybe if you

gave a gift card to a librarian, we’d forget how you tried to illegally fire another.

Some even suggested that we get to know board members better so we can see what

fine people they are. But we don’t need more information. We don’t need a ten-

minute rundown of someone’s resume. We don’t need to know how many kids or

grandkids they have, or how long they’ve lived in Lafayette, as if that somehow

makes them better people. We know all we need to know. We know a certain trio

of parish council members have a clear type when selecting board of control

members, and that type is a simple checklist: conservative, Christian, willing to toe

the false narrative that there is a leftist takeover and that children are in danger,

willing to segregate certain materials due solely to personal beliefs. We know that

people who speak about parental rights and community standards are just recycling

old arguments from twentieth century’s White Citizen Council, who were alarmed

over a “communist takeover” called civil rights and desegregation. We know that

these speakers are the true groomers, passing along their prejudices and outdated

science to their children and grandchildren. We know the evils of board members

themselves. We know Ms. Armbruster stood on a street corner outside the library

protesting Drag Queen Story Time, grooming her children and others by her

message ... [Judge rules comments out of order and Brevis continues] ... that

5 ECF No. 134-1 at J{ 13, 14, 16 (Brevis Declaration).

16 ECF No. 134-7 at 0:41:22 — 0:43:10 (January 9, 2023 Board meeting).

17 Id.

18 Id.

there is something pathologically wrong with certain gender and sexual identities,

even as she claims to love everyone [Judge rules comments out of order and

Brevis’ microphone is silenced] ... We know Stephanie, Robert Judge, and

groomers in the community have called, pushed false narratives—about LGBTQ+

community, linking them with pedophilia, AIDS, and high rates of suicide—

someday pictures like this, will be next in history books to pictures like this ...

[Judge orders that Brevis “be removed” and Sheriff's Office deputies

approach Brevis and ultimately escort her from the podium] ....!”

In her Declaration, Brevis’ explains that her remarks addressed “the events of the previous [Library

Board] meeting, in which Defendant Judge devoted the beginning of the meeting to introducing

each of the board members individually, by speaking about their biography and background.’””°

She also explains that her comments addressed what she “observed to be the politicization of the

[Library Board], where members were acting intentionally to suppress disfavored viewpoints from

being present in the library.” She further explains that “Judge and members of the public use[d]

the term ‘grooming’ to talk in reference to members of the LGBQT+ community and books with

LGBQT+ themes, without any admonishment or interruption,” and that her use of the word

“grooming” in her remarks “was to say that they were preparing children to discriminate against

certain groups of people.” 7”

Mejia and Brevis subsequently filed the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “based upon

the continuing violations of the Plaintiffs’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution.”*? They name as defendants Robert Judge personally and in his

official capacity; Daniel Kelley—who succeeded Judge as President of the Library Board—in his

official capacity; Mark Garber, in his official capacity as Lafayette Parish Sheriff; Deputy Rusty

19 Td.; ECF No. 134-1 at 13, 14, 16 (Brevis Declaration).

20 ECF No. 134-1 at J 14 (Brevis Declaration).

21 Td. at] 15.

22 Td. at J 11, 22.

23 ECF No. 50 at J 2 (Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint).

Santiny, in his individual and official capacities; and Deputy Sara Orgeron, in her individual and

official capacities.”* Plaintiffs also named as a defendant the Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated

Government (“LCG”).”> Plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ “policies governing the [Library

Board] are unconstitutional facially and as applied.””° They allege that these policies “are overly

broad, vague, viewpoint and content-based restrictions on free speech in plain violation of the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution.””’

Although Mejia was not silenced during her public comment session, both plaintiffs allege

that the actions of Judge and the Library Board restricted and chilled their exercise of free speech

during the public comment portions of the Library Board’s meetings.”® Specifically, they point to

the posting of Louisiana Rev. Stat. 14:103 (disturbing the peace), Judge’s statements that the

Board’s policies on public speakers would be enforced and speakers who violate those policies

would be removed, Judge’s use of Sheriffs deputies to allegedly intimidate speakers, and Judge’s

actions in silencing Brevis during the January 9, 2023 Library Board meeting.”

Defendants Garber, Santiny, and Orgeron filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.*° The Court entered a judgment adopting the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the motion be granted in part

and denied in part.>! Specifically, the Court dismissed Brevis’ and Mejia’s federal constitutional

claims against the moving defendants but denied the motion with respect to the state law claims

4 Td. at

atf

26 Td.

27 Td. at | 48.

28 ECF No. 134-1 at Jf 9, 13 (Brevis Declaration); ECF No. 134-2 at J 9, 13 (Mejia Declaration)

29 ECF No. 134-1 at 74 9, 12, 17 ; ECF No. 134-2 at J 10, 13, 16, 17; ECF No. 50 at 4 10, 22, 27, 46 (Plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint).

3° ECF No. 53.

31 ECF No. 132.

asserted against those defendants.*? Defendant Daniel Kelly also filed a Motion to Dismiss and the

Court entered a judgment adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the motion be

granted in part and denied in part. ?? The Court ordered that the state law claims asserted against

Kelly be dismissed but denied the motion with respect to the federal constitutional claims asserted

against Kelly.** Judge then filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that qualified

immunity bars the claims asserted against him in his personal capacity.

Judge subsequently filed a Motion to Stay Scheduling Order Deadlines and Discovery,”

and Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Defer Consideration on Judge’s Motion for Summary Judgment.*®

The Court referred these motions to the Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge subsequently

issued a memorandum order granting Judge’s motion with respect to discovery but denying it with

respect to other deadlines in the scheduling order.*’ The Magistrate Judge’s order also bifurcated

the question of qualified immunity from the other grounds for relief urged in Judge’s Motion for

Summary Judgment.*®

Il.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the movant shows “that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.”°? The party moving for summary judgment is initially responsible for identifying portions

32 Id.

33 ECF No. 133.

34 Id.

35 ECF No. 64.

36 ECF. No. 75.

37 ECF. No. 130.

38 Td.

3° Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact.*° The court must

deny the motion for summary judgment if the movant fails to meet this burden.*! If the movant

makes this showing, however, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’4* This requires more than mere allegations or

denials of the adverse party’s pleadings. Instead, the nonmovant must submit “significant

probative evidence” in support of his claim.*? “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.’”“4 A court may not make credibility

determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. The court is

also required to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.*© Under this standard, a genuine issue of material fact

exists if a reasonable trier of fact could render a verdict for the nonmoving party.*”

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity “alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof.”“*® Qualified

immunity is “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.*? The doctrine

operates to shield government officials “acting within their discretionary authority from liability

when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional law of which a

reasonable person would have known.”°? Stated differently, qualified immunity protects

4 Tubacex, Inc. v. W/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).

41 Td.

“2 Anderson vy. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (quotations omitted).

8 State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990).

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted).

45 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).

46 Clift y. Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000).

“7 Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

48 Roy, 950 F.3d at 254 (quoting Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (Sth Cir. 2016)); see also Rogers v. Jarrett, 63

F.4th 971, 975 (5th Cir. 2023) (“plaintiffs bear the ‘burden’ to ‘demonstrate the inapplicability of the [qualified

immunity] defense.’”) (quoting McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (Sth Cir. 2002)).

Td. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

Wallace v. County of Comal, 400 F.3d 284, 289 (Sth Cir. 2005) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)).

government officials from civil liability only “when their actions could reasonably have been

believed to be legal.’”*! Because the doctrine operates as immunity from suit rather than a mere

defense to liability, it alters the normal burden on summary judgment. When a defendant raises

qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

overcome qualified immunity. To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the right violated was “clearly

established” such that a reasonable person would have fair warning that his or her conduct violates

a constitutional right.°? Although the plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming qualified immunity,

all inferences must be drawn in the plaintiffs favor.** If the plaintiff satisfies this burden, the

defendant will not be shielded from liability on the basis of qualified immunity.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Did Judge’s Actions Violate the First Amendment?

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the government from

making laws that abridge “the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people

peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The First

Amendment is applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

“The scope of [a plaintiff's] First Amendment rights depends on the nature of the forum in which

he seeks access.”°> The nature of forum impacts the level of scrutiny applied to restrictions on

protected speech occurring within that forum. Courts have identified three primary types of

51 King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (Sth Cir.

a v. Anderson Cnty., Texas, 102 F.4th 292, 307 (Sth Cir. 2024).

33 Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010); Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d 594, 599 (Sth Cir. 2020).

54 Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.A4th 969, 981 (5th Cir. 2022).

Imani v. City of Baton Rouge, No. 17-439, 2022 WL 2760799 at *17 (M.D. La. July 14, 2022) (quoting Estiverne v.

Louisiana State Bar Ass’n, 863 F.2d 371, 376 (Sth Cir. 1989)).

9 □

forums: “the traditional public forum, the designated public forum, and the non-public forum.”*°

Courts have also identified a fourth, intermediate category, the “limited public forum.”°’ A “non-

public forum” is publicly-owned property that is not by tradition or government designation a

forum for public communication.** A “public forum, on the other hand,” are those places “which

by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.”*? A

“designated public forum,” is a forum the government designates as “a place or channel of

communication for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers,

or for the discussion of certain subjects.”°° First Amendment protections are broadest for speech

in traditional public forums and designated public forums.°! In either forum, the government

restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny.”

The First Amendment protections for limited public forums differ. Limited public forums

are “forums opened for public expression of particular kinds or by particular groups.”®? A public

body may restrict speech in a limited public forum as long as the restrictions do not “discriminate

against speech on the basis of viewpoint” and are “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the

forum.”** Viewpoint discrimination restricts speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.

Viewpoint discrimination exists “when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or

perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”® It is an “egregious form of content

discrimination” and is “presumptively unconstitutional.”° For example, in Jancu v. Brunetti, the

56 Chiu v. Plano Ind. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 346 (Sth Cir. 2001).

57 Td.

38 Id.

°° Perry Educ. Ass’n. y. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).

6° Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).

61 Imani, 2022 WL 2760799 at *17-18.

82 Chiu, 260 F.3d at 346.

8 Chiu, 260 F.3d at 346.

64 Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).

6 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-830 (1995).

66 Id.

10

Supreme Court addressed whether a provision in the Lanham Act prohibiting “immoral” or

“scandalous” trademarks violated the First Amendment.°’ The Court held that this provision of the

statute was unconstitutional because it discriminated against speech based on viewpoint—in the

words of the Court, it “disfavors certain ideas.”°

This proscription of viewpoint discrimination does not, however, eliminate a public body’s

ability to impose reasonable viewpoint-neutral rules on speech in a limited public forum. A public

body may restrict the subject matter of speech in a limited public forum by, for example, limiting

public comments during a meeting of the public body to agenda items or specific topics. Such

content-based restrictions are not subject to strict scrutiny and do not violate the First Amendment

as long as they are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”? Public bodies may also require public

speakers to register, impose time limits on public comments, and regulate the manner and mode in

which public comments are presented to avoid disruptions to meetings as long as the regulations

are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.’! For example, in Tyler v. City of Kingston, the court

addressed a rule adopted by a city council banning the public from bringing signs into city council

meetings.’” The court concluded that the sign restriction was viewpoint neutral and reasonably

related “to maintaining the environment the government intended to create in that forum.””

The parties in the present case appear to agree that the public comment period of the Library

Board’s meeting is a limited public forum. In Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist, the Fifth Circuit

67 588 U.S. 388, 390 (2019).

88 Yd. In his concurring opinion in Jancu, Justice Alito flatly stated that “[v]iewpoint discrimination is poison to a free

society.” Id. at 399.

69 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014); Chiu, 260 F.3d at 346; see also Ison v. Madison Local Sch. Dist.

Bd. of Educ., 3 F.4" 887, 893 (6% Cir. 2021).

Chiu, 260 F.3d at 346.

1 Tyler v. City of Kingston, 74 F.4" 57, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2023) (“[I]n limited public fora such as City Council meetings,

government entities are permitted to restrict the form or manner of speech offered by members of the public ....”).

72 Td.

73 Id.

11

held that a public comment session during a public school board meeting “fits the hornbook

definition of a limited—not designated—public forum, in which ‘the State is not required to and

does not allow persons to engage in every type of speech.’””4 Here, the Library Board’s public

comment session similarly best fits the definition of a limited public forum because it is a forum

“opened for public expression of particular kinds or by particular groups” that is analogous to the

school board meeting at issue in Fairchild.” Accordingly, the First Amendment standards for

speech in a limited public forum apply. These standards allow Judge and the Library Board to

regulate the subject matter and manner of delivery of public comments during Board meetings, but

they cannot discriminate in how they apply these rules based on a speaker’s viewpoint.

Mejia and Brevis allege that the policies implemented by Judge and the Library Board

during public meetings are facially unconstitutional as well as unconstitutional as applied to them.

Judge’s qualified immunity claim, however, focuses on his actions during the public comment

period of the January 9, 2023 Library Board meeting when Brevis was silenced. Judge contends

that he was applying the Library Board’s viewpoint-neutral rules when he ruled Brevis out of

order, silenced her microphone, and had her escorted from the podium. Specifically, Judge points

to the Library Board’s rules governing public comments (which prohibit “debate or confrontation”

or “derogatory comments about any person,”); Louisiana Rev. Stat. 14:103 (prohibiting conduct

that amounts to “disturbing the peace”); and Robert’s Rules of Order (which require speakers at

meetings to “be courteous in their language”).’® In his affidavit, Judge characterizes Brevis’

comments during the January 9" meeting as “rude, discourteous and disruptive personal attacks

towards the” members of the Library Board.”’ Moreover, in his statement of undisputed facts,

74 597 F.3d 747, 759 (5 Cir. 2010) (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106).

® Chiu, 260 F.3d at 346.

7 ECF No. 55-3.

77 ECF No. 55-3

12

Judge asserts that Brevis’ reference to another Board member, Stephanie Ambruster, “failed to

pertain to any item being voted on by the Board or any [Library Board] business.””® Judge also

specifically cites Brevis’ use of the term “groomers” and “grooming” in reference to Judge,

Armbruster, and members of the public supporting the Library Board’s actions as violating the

Board’s procedural rules.”

Plaintiffs, however, argue that Judge’s reliance on the Library Board’s rules of procedure

and decorum (including Robert’s Rules of Order) was pretextual and that Judge silenced Brevis

and other speakers because they opposed the Library Board’s policies. They argue that Brevis’

remarks were made during the general public comment session at the end of the January 9" Library

Board meeting and that, under the Board’s procedural rules, Brevis’ remarks were not limited to

meeting agenda items.®° Instead, the permissible subject matter of Brevis’ comments was limited

only to matters involving “Lafayette Public Library System business.”*! Brevis contends that her

remarks addressed Library System business in that they opposed the Board’s actions and policies

with respect to efforts by Judge and other members of the Board to remove books and other

materials from the library with which they do not agree, statements by Judge and others during

Board meetings about the LGTBQ community, and Plaintiffs’ concern over “politicization of the

[Library Board], where members were acting intentionally to suppress disfavored viewpoints from

being present in the library.”®* They contend that public speakers who voiced viewpoints favorable

to the Board’s actions and Judge’s viewpoint were not prevented from speaking. With respect to

criticisms of the Board, they argue that speakers who favored the Board’s actions were allowed to

78 ECF No. 55-5 at $f 9, 11.

” Td.

80 ECF No. 134 at 18.

81

82 ECF 134-2 at 12, 15 (Mejia Declaration); ECF No. 134-1 at 11, 15 (Brevis Declaration).

13

single out Judge and other Board members by name and voice support for their actions.®? With

respect to Brevis’ use of the term terms “groomer” and “grooming’—terms that Judge

characterized as personal attacks—Plaintiffs point to instances in the record where Judge and other

speakers used the terms “grooming” and “groomers” in challenging books and other materials that

they found offensive.** Plaintiffs argue that Brevis was using the same terms to criticize these

actions by the Board, which she contends amounts to censorship and intolerance.®°

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as

to whether Judge’s motivation for silencing Brevis was based on impermissible viewpoint

discrimination.*° The record reflects that Brevis registered to speak as required by the Board’s

procedural rules and her remarks did not exceed her three-minute time limit.®” Her remarks also

do not appear to have disrupted the Library Board meeting in that they occurred after the Board

had completed its business.** Moreover, based on the audio recording of Brevis’ remarks, it does

not appear that Brevis was shouting, yelling, or otherwise disrupting the Board’s public comment

session.*

With respect to Judge’s argument that Brevis’ remarks were not relevant to the business

before the Library Board, the Board’s content restrictions on the public comment sessions at the

end of Board meetings permit speakers to address a broader array of issues than the specific agenda

items considered by the Board—speakers were allowed to address any matters relevant to

“Lafayette Public Library System business.”°? Turning to the subject matter of Brevis’ comments,

83 ECF No. 134 at 21; ECF No. 134-1 at 10 (Brevis Declaration).

84 ECF No. 134 at 20-21 (citing ECF No. 134-5, 134-6, 134-7,134-8, and 134-10) (Audio Recordings of Library Board

Meetings)).

85 Id.

86 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-830.

87 ECF No. 134-7 at 0:41:22 — 0:43:10 (January 9, 2023 Board meeting).

88 Id.

89 Id.

°° ECF No. 55-2 at 6.

14

a reasonable trier of fact could conclude her remarks were relevant to the actions of the Library

Board and statements by Board members with respect to the removal or re-classification of library

materials. Moreover, Brevis’ reference to protests over the library’s “Drag Queen Story Time”

program for children involved a proposed Library System program that was ultimately cancelled.

The audio recordings of prior Library Board meetings also support Brevis’ contention that

other public speakers addressed similar topics during public comment sessions but, unlike, Brevis

were not silenced. For example, during the April 18, 2022 Library Board meeting, a speaker

supporting the Library Board’s policies, urged the Board not to change course because of LGBTQ

advocacy groups and suggested that certain materials in the Library System collection amounted

to “grooming” and “normalizing” pedophilia.*! Plaintiffs also cite other examples in the audio

recordings where speakers addressed similar topics but were not silenced.” Other speakers

referenced Judge and Library Board members by name and voiced support for their actions.”?

Judge’s primary argument for silencing Brevis was her alleged personal attacks on Board

members. Judge’s arguments rely on the Board’s public comment procedures, which prohibit

“debate or confrontation” with the Board.* Judge’s reliance on these prohibitions is

constitutionally suspect in at least two respects. First, the prohibition of “debate or confrontation”

with the Board is arguably a restriction that discriminates based on viewpoint. In other words, it

prohibits viewpoints opposing the Board’s actions and policies—which could be considered

“debate or confrontation” with the Board—yet allows speaker viewpoints supporting the Board’s

actions. Second, even if this rule could be deemed viewpoint neutral, Judge’s use of the rule in

Brevis’ case creates a triable issue as to whether Judge was using the rule to discriminate on the

ECF No. 134-5 at 2:16:00 (Recording of April 18, 2022 Board meeting).

°2 ECF No. 134 at 20-21.

93 ECF No. 134-4 at 9; 134-10 at 00:58:40-01:00:50 (Recording of October 17, 2022 Board meeting)..

°4 ECF No. 55-2.

15

basis of viewpoint because “[t]he recitation of viewpoint-neutral grounds may be a mere pretext

for an invidious motive.”®? The meeting recordings in the record reflect a number of instances

where speakers supported the Board’s positions or even argued that the Board should take stronger

positions—such as the speaker who implored the Board not to “give in” to special interest groups

supporting library materials with LGBTQ themes. ”° Another speaker criticized the Library System

for maintaining a book in the children’s section of the library that the speaker deemed offensive.””

Yet, these speakers were not silenced by Judge even though some of their comments could be

deemed critical of the Library System.

Judge also justifies his actions with respect to Brevis on the grounds that her comments

were offensive—specifically that they were “vile” and “disgusting, derogatory and

confrontational.””’ Public bodies can proscribe “personal attacks” in a limited public forum on the

ground that they are irrelevant and violate permissible, viewpoint-neutral content restrictions.”

Here, however, Brevis’ references to Judge and other Board members were tied to their policies

(and public statements) in connection with Library System business and expressed (albeit

stridently) Brevis’ opposition to their statements and policies. Accordingly, they were not

irrelevant to Library System business. With respect to her comments being offensive or even

“vile,” a reasonable trier of fact might agree with Judge’s characterization. However, “[g]iving

offense is a viewpoint,”!”° so “ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves

Ridley v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 86 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def.

& Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985)).

°° ECF No. 134-5 at 2:16:00 (Recording of April 18, 2022 Board meeting).

97 Td. at 3:15:37.

°8 ECF No. 55-1 at 6.

» Steinberg v. Chesterfield Cty. Planning Comm’n, 527 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2008).

100 Moms for Liberty-Brevard Cty., Fla. v. Brevard Public Schools, 118 F.4% 1324, 1334 (11" Cir. 2024) (quoting

Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 243 (2017).

16

offensive to some of their hearers.”!°! Judge’s justification for silencing Brevis’ remarks on the

ground that they were offensive does not pass constitutional muster.

Finally, the Court turns to Brevis’ use of the terms “groomer” and “grooming” and Judge’s

argument that these terms “had nothing to do with Lafayette Parish Library System business and

were derogatory, confrontational and violated Robert’s Rules of Order.”!°? As explained above,

the fact that the statements were offensive does not support Judge’s actions in silencing Brevis’

microphone and ordering Sheriff's deputies to remove her from the speakers’ podium.!™

Moreover, the audio recordings of Library Board meetings reveals other instances where members

of the public used the term “grooming” in supporting the Board’s policies with respect to removing

or re-classifying books and other library materials.' Yet, the recordings do not reflect that Judge

silenced these speakers.

Mejia’s claims against Judge present a more complex question. Judge’s qualified immunity

arguments center on his actions silencing Brevis during the January 9, 2023 Library Board

meeting. Mejia, however, was not silenced in this meeting, nor does she allege that she was

silenced or personally threatened with arrest during any other Library Board meeting. Rather,

Mejia alleges that she observed Judge’s use of Sheriff's Department deputies to silence Brevis and

that she “personally witnessed [Judge] interrupt and silent speakers who expressed criticisms of

his viewpoint and policies.”!° She states that she “routinely self-censor[s] during public

comment|s] to avoid running afoul of [Judge’s] confusing meeting rules” and that she fears “being

arrested, silenced, or removed from the meetings.”!°° The minutes of the November 21, 2022

101 Td. (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).

102 ECF No. 137 at 9.

103 Td. (quoting Street, 394 U.S. at 592).

104 ECF No. 134-5 at 2:16:00 (Recording of April 18, 2022 Board meeting).

105 ECF No. 134-2 at Jf 10, 17 (Mejia Declaration).

106 Tq.

17

Library Board meeting further reflect statements by Mejia to the Board objecting to the presence

of security at the front of the meeting room and to the posting of Louisiana Rev. Stat. 14:103.!°7

Mejia’s claim is thus based on her allegations that Judge’s actions and application of the Library

Board’s procedural rules over multiple meetings chilled her exercise of free speech in violation of

the First Amendment. This claim is broader than a claim based solely on Judge’s actions during

the J anuary 9, 2023 Library Board meeting, which is the focus of Judge’s motion.

Courts have held that where “the use of coercive power is threatened, First Amendment

rights may be violated by the chilling effect of government action that falls short of a direct

prohibition against speech.”!°8 In NAACP vy. Button, the Supreme Court noted that “the threat of

sanctions may deter [the exercise of First Amendment rights] almost as potently as the actual

application of sanctions.”!°? “[C]hilling a plaintiff's speech ... is a constitutional harm adequate to

satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.”!'° To state a claim under this doctrine, a plaintiff must show

(1) he or she intends to engage in constitutionally protected conduct that is arguably proscribed by

the statute at issue, and (2) there is a “credible threat” of prosecution if the plaintiff engages in that

constitutionally protected activity.!"!

Here, it is unclear whether Judge’s Motion reaches this aspect of Mejia’s claims. The sole

reference in Judge’s motion to Mejia’s self-censorship allegations is a brief argument that her

allegations of self-censorship were conclusory and that she had not come forward with evidence

that she faced a viable threat of prosecution. Assuming the Judge is asserting qualified immunity

with respect to Mejia’s First Amendment “chilling” claims, the Court concludes that Mejia has

107 ECF No. 134-4 at 9.

108 4ebisher v. Ryan, 622 F.2d 651, 655 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing NAACP y. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).

109 Button, 371 U.S. at 433.

110 Pool v. City of Houston, 978 F.3d. 307, 313 (Sth Cir. 2020).

‘ll White Hat v. Landry, No. 6:20-CV-00983, 2023 WL 3854717, at *6 (W.D. La. June 5, 2023) (quoting Pool, 978

F.3d. at 311).

18

demonstrated a triable issue as to whether Judge’s policies and actions in moderating Library

Board meetings chilled her exercise of free speech in violation of First Amendment. Specifically,

the record reflects that Judge posted the text of the Louisiana Rev. Stat. 14:103, which imposes

criminal penalties. The recordings of the Library Board meetings reveal that during the course of

the meetings, Judge refers to that statute during Board meetings.''* The presence of Sheriff's

deputies and, at least in the case of Brevis, the use of those deputies to remove public speakers

from the podium could lead Mejia to fear a viable threat of prosecution if she did not self-censor

her remarks during the public comment session of the Board meeting. Accordingly, a reasonable

trier of fact could conclude that Judge’s actions violated Mejia’s right to free speech under the

First Amendment.

In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Brevis and Mejia, a reasonable

trier of fact could find that Judge crossed the line from permissible moderation of public comments

in a limited public forum to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. This does not mean that

Brevis and Mejia will ultimately prevail on the merits of their claims. However, they have

overcome the first prong of Judge’s qualified immunity claim by coming forward with evidence

that creates a genuine question of fact as to whether Judge’s actions in moderating the Library

Board meetings violated the First Amendment.

B. Was Judge’s Conduct Objectively Unreasonable in Light of Clearly Established

Law?

Judge next contends that his actions were not objectively unreasonable in light of “clearly

established” law. According to Judge, he was merely maintaining order and applying the Library

Board’s neutral rules of procedure and decorum when he silenced Brevis’ microphone and had her

11 See, e.g, ECF No. 134-10 at 00:13:50.

19

escorted from the podium. Judge also points out that he is not a trained lawyer and has not received

any training with respect to the First Amendment.!"

The “clearly established” law prong of qualified immunity requires that “existing precedent

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate” and must “squarely

govern[ |” the specific facts at issue.'!* “When deciding whether the right allegedly violated was

‘clearly established,’ the court asks whether the law so clearly and unambiguously prohibited the

conduct that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the law.”!°

Citing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Morgan v. Swanson,!'° Judge argues that the prohibition

against “viewpoint discrimination does not inform an official as to what, precisely, constitutes a

viewpoint discrimination” and, accordingly, viewpoint discrimination is “far too general” to be

clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity.!

Judge’s reliance on Morgan is misplaced. Morgan involved First Amendment claims

asserted against two elementary school principals for prohibiting the distribution of written

religious materials by students on school premises during school activities.!'® The case, according

to the majority, raised complex questions of whether the Tinker or Hazlewood standard applied to

the plaintiffs’ claims.'!? The court further noted that “further complicating our inquiry is the fact

that Tinker’s application in the elementary-school context has never been clearly established.”!”°

Finally, the court noted “Establishment Clause concerns add still another layer of complexity to

13 Td at 24.

4 White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78 (2017); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 14 (2015).

15 Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 2013)(emphasis in original).

16 755 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2014). The Court notes that the Morgan opinion quoted by Judge is an abbreviated

panel ruling on remand issued after the en banc court’s full decision in 659 F.3d 359 (2011) (en banc). This later

panel decision does not fully address the en banc court’s reasoning and considerations in concluding that the

defendants in that case did not violate clearly established law.

117 ECF No. 55-1 at 9.

118 Vorgan, 659 F.3d at 364-70.

119 Td. at 375-76.

120 Td. at 377.

20

our legal analysis.”!*! In light of the unique legal and factual issues presented by the case, the court

concluded that there was no “controlling authority” nor a “robust consensus of persuasive

authority” to conclude that the defendants’ actions violated clearly established law.!”? Simply put,

Morgan is not factually—or legally—analogous to the present case.

In contrast, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Heaney v. Roberts provides a factually analogous

case involving viewpoint discrimination in the context of a limited public forum.’ In that case,

Heaney registered to speak during the time allowed for public comment during a Jefferson Parish

Council meeting in Gretna, Louisiana.'”* He was allotted five minutes to address the Council.!*°

Before his allotted time expired, Heaney was cut off by the council’s presiding officer, Christopher

Roberts, who accused Heaney of attempting to contradict and “to berate” the parish attorney.!7°

Roberts ultimately had Heaney removed from the meeting, stating “I’m going to ask that you be

removed because you’re being hostile so if you would please exit.”!°” The court noted that Heaney

was speaking within his allotted time and his comments addressed an approved topic.!*8 The court

concluded that the record revealed a factual dispute as to whether Roberts’ refusal to allow Heaney

to continue with his comments was viewpoint-based or whether it was based on a reasonable

viewpoint-neutral restriction. According to the court, “if Roberts acted with improper motive, he

violated Heaney’s clearly established First Amendment right to be free from viewpoint

discrimination in a limited public forum.”!”’ Similarly, here, if the trier of fact determines that

Judge’s decision to silence Brevis was motivated by viewpoint-based discrimination, he violated

21 Td at 380.

122 Td. at 382.

123 846 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2017).

124 Td. at 798.

125 Td.

126 Td. at 799.

127 Id.

128 Tq. at 802.

129 Td.

21

her clearly established First Amendment right to address the Library Board free of viewpoint

discrimination. °°

Other cases cited by Judge are similarly distinguishable. For example, Judge cites cases

involving subject matter restrictions on public comments in limited public forums but not

viewpoint-based restrictions.'*! Here, as the court previously concluded, Brevis’ comments during

the public comment session fell within the subject matter restrictions imposed by the Library

Board’s meeting—‘“‘comments related only to Lafayette Public Library System business, but that

do not appear specifically as agenda items.”!°? The question in the present case, therefore, is not

whether Judge imposed permissible content restrictions, but whether he was motivated by “the

specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker” in silencing Brevis at

the January 9, 2023 Library Board meeting.

Judge’s reliance on the district court’s opinion in Biggers v. Massingill is also misplaced.'*°

In that case, the plaintiff signed up to speak at multiple public meetings of the Hood County, Texas

Commissioners’ Court. The Commissioners Court allowed members of the public to register and

address non-agenda topics during its first meeting of each month subject to rules of procedure and

decorum adopted by the Commissioners’ Court. The plaintiff in Biggers was repeatedly silenced

by the presiding officer and ultimately ejected from several Commissioners’ Court meetings when

he attempted to criticize the policies of the Commissioners’ Court and criticized county officials

130 Judge argues that Heaney is distinguishable because there was no evidence that Heaney “spoke about issues that

were off topic, lodged personal attacks against any of the council members, or violated any rules or decorum policies

of the council.” ECF No. 137 at 5. As the Court previously concluded, however, Brevis’ comments fell within the

subject matter restrictions of the Library Board’s public comment procedures. With respect to personal attacks and

violations of rules of decorum, the Court has also concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Judge’s reliance on these rules was pretextual. In short, Judge’s arguments do not distinguish Heaney for purposes of

the present motion.

131 See, e.g, Jones v. Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328 (11" Cir. 1989); Steinberg, 527 F.3d 377; Wenthold v. City of Farmers

Branch, Tex., 2012 WL 467325, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2012).

182 ECF No. 55-2 at 6.

133 23-CV-0359, 2023 WL 58206971 (N.D. Tex. September 8, 2023).

22

by name.!*4 The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on

qualified immunity, holding that “where a speaker is removed for running afoul of a public body’s

codified decorum rules and its stated intent behind its public comment period, it is not sufficiently

clear that his removal violates a constitutional right.”!3° However, after Judge filed his Motion for

Summary Judgment, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

Biggers in an unpublished decision.'*° Citing Heaney, the court held that “Biggers squarely alleges

that Massingill’s invocation of the decorum rule was a mere pretext to silence his views” and that

“if proved, that would clearly violate the First Amendment.”!3’ Accordingly, the circuit held that

the district court erred in sustaining Massingill’s qualified immunity claim.!**

Judge’s argument that he does not have legal training and could not subjectively draw the

line between permissive regulation of public speech in a limited public forum and impermissible

and unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination does not change this result. As Mejia and Brevis

point out, the second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry is an objective standard.!*? In other

words, was Judge’s conduct objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.'4° Here, if

Mejia and Brevis prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Judge’s true motive was to

discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, his actions in silencing Brevis were objectively

unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Brevis’ comments occurred after the Library

Board had completed its agenda items and thus did not disrupt an ongoing meeting. Her comments

34 Id at *1-2. :

185 Id. at *3,

16 Biggers v. Massingill, 2025 WL 429974 at*2 (Sth Cir. February 7, 2025) (unpublished).

137 Id.

138 Id.

8° Kokesh v. Curlee, 14 F.4th 382, 391 (Sth Cir. 2021) (“To make this determination, the court applies an objective

standard based on the viewpoint of a reasonable official in light of the information then available to the defendant and

the law that was clearly established at the time of the defendant's actions.”) (quoting Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404,

410 (Sth Cir. 2007)).

140 Id.

23

were also within the three-minute time period allotted to her and pertained to the general business

of the Lafayette Public Library System—specifically, her opposition to certain policies of the

Board as well as public comments by Judge and other members of the Board. Similarly, to the

extent that the trier of fact determines that Judge’s actions chilled Mejia’s exercise of her First

Amendment rights during Library Board meetings, his actions were objectively unreasonable in

light of clearly established law.

Given that Mejia and Brevis have overcome both prongs of Judge’s qualified immunity

claim, the Court DENIES his Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to qualified immunity.

C. Remaining Claims.

In addition to qualified immunity, Judge also moves for summary judgment with respect

to Plaintiffs’ claims against him in his official capacity, Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief, and

Plaintiffs’ Open Meetings Act claims. The Magistrate Judge previously entered an order

bifurcating Judge’s qualified immunity claims from the other grounds for summary judgment

stated in his motion, and deferred consideration of these other grounds pending a ruling on

qualified immunity.!*! The Magistrate Judge also stayed discovery pending a ruling on qualified

immunity.!"? In light of the current stage of the case, the Court concludes that Judge’s Motion for

Summary Judgment with respect to these other grounds for summary judgment should be denied

without prejudice to re-urging these additional grounds after discovery.

41 ECF No. 130.

M42 Td.

24

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 55] filed by

Robert Judge is DENIED.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers this 20" day of March, 2025.

ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

25