Opinion

Brown v. Angie

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Mar 21, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.5%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DELVON BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:24-cv-00477-GCS

)

ANGELA AHRING, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Delvon Brown, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who

is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this civil

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. On July 26,

2024, the Court completed its preliminary review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (Doc. 35). Plaintiff was permitted to proceed on the

following counts: Count 1 - against Defendants Angie, Morgan, Ahring, Edinger, Maue,

and Wills for denying Plaintiff medical care for his ongoing injuries and illness; and

Count 2 - against Defendants Edinger and Angie for conspiring to violate Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care.

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order filed on

March 14, 2025. (Doc. 66). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he has been assaulted by

Corrections Officer Barnes and John Doe for filing this lawsuit. Plaintiff seeks a prison

transfer. For the reasons delineated below, the Court denies the motion.1

A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” for which there

must be a “clear showing” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520

U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R MILLER, & MARY KAY

KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (5th ed. 1995)). The purpose of such an

injunction is “to minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate resolution of

the lawsuit.” Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has the burden

of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) no adequate

remedy at law; and (3) irreparable harm absent the injunction. See Planned Parenthood of

Indiana, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept. Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012).

Regarding the first element, the Court must determine whether “plaintiff has any

likelihood of success – in other words, a greater than negligible chance of winning.” AM

General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). If Plaintiff meets

this burden, the Court must then weigh “the balance of harm to the parties if the

injunction is granted or denied and also evaluate the effect of an injunction on the public

interest.” Id. In addition, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that a

preliminary injunction must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to

correct the harm . . . , and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Finally, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), a

1 No hearing on the motion is necessary because it is apparent from the face of Plaintiff’s

motion that he is not entitled to the relief requested in this matter.

preliminary injunction would bind only the parties, their officers or agents, or persons in

active concert with the parties or their agents.

Here, Plaintiff, in his motion, raises allegations against new individuals

(Corrections Officer Brown and John Doe) that occurred after Plaintiff filed the instant

lawsuit. The claims in Plaintiff’s motion are separate and distinct from the claims in this

case. The Court “only possesses the power to afford preliminary injunctive relief that is

related to the claims at issue in the litigation.” (Doc. 12, p. 4) (quoting Bird v. Barr, No. 19-

cv-1581 (KBJ), 2020 WL 4219784, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2020)). The main purpose of a

preliminary injunction is “to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on

the merits can be held.” University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). It is not

meant to be used as a vehicle to air new allegations and claims.

Further, to demonstrate entitlement to preliminary relief, Plaintiff would need to

establish that irreparable harm will result if injunctive relief does not issue. Because he

does not allege harm specific to the allegations in this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish

entitlement to preliminary relief, and the undersigned need not address permanent relief.

Lastly, to the extent that the allegations contained in the motion relate to new incidents

not currently being pursued in any action in this Court, Plaintiff should file a new action

stating those claims and file a motion for injunctive relief in that new action.

For the above-stated reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order

(Doc. 66) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Digitally signed by

DATED: March 21, 2025. thee Bn ¥ege Sison

vt ©. Donn Date: 2025.03.21

14:38:35 -05'00'

GILBERT C. SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

Page 4 of 4

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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