Opinion

Vince v. Godlewski

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Mar 21, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.5%

interpreting Section 1983 false imprisonment claim as grounded in Fourth Amendment rights

How later courts described this case

  • interpreting Section 1983 false imprisonment claim as grounded in Fourth Amendment rights

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The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

VINCENT ANTHONY VINCE, : No. 3:24cv902

Plaintiff :

: (Judge Munley)

V. :

MATTHEW GODLEWSKI, in his :

individual capacity; JONATHAN :

KASKEY, in his individual capacity; :

JOSEPH WOZNIAK, in his individual :

capacity; JOHN CARLOS :

RODRIGUEZ, JR., in his individual :

capacity; ROBERT CAPPARELL, :

in his individual capacity; JOHN :

DOE No. 1, in his individual :

capacity; and JOHN DOE No. 2, in :

his individual capacity, :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Vincent Anthony Vince contends that officers from the Wilkes-Barre

Township Police Department violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights in this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section

1983”). On June 2, 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint naming the officers in their

individual capacities. (Doc. 1). Before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by

those officers, Defendants Robert Capparell, Matthew Godlewski, Jonathan

Kaskey, John Carlos Rodriguez, and Joseph Wozniak, pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 11). Having been fully briefed, this motion is

ripe for disposition.

Background

This action arises out of previous court proceedings pursuant to

Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6101-6122.

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that, on June 3, 2022, the defendant officers

approached him at ACT Towing in Wilkes-Barre Township, Luzerne County,

Pennsylvania while plaintiff attempted to retrieve his vehicle.’ (Doc. 1, 13).

Defendants advised plaintiff that they were arresting him for an active arrest

warrant for an alleged violation of a Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) Order. □□□□□

Plaintiff advised the defendants that the arrest warrant had been dismissed

by a judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. (id. J 14).

Defendants informed plaintiff that they verified and confirmed the arrest warrant.

(Id. | 15). At no time did the defendants show plaintiff the warrant. (Id. J] 25).

Plaintiff then contacted his counsel. (Id. 16). Plaintiff's counsel notified

defendants that the arrest warrant had been lifted by the trial court and that he

could provide proof later that day. (Id. ] 17). Plaintiff's counsel advised the

‘At this stage of the proceedings, the court must accept all factual allegations in the plaintiffs

pleadings as true. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)(citations

omitted). The court makes no determination, however, as to the ultimate veracity of these

assertions.

defendants that, in the meantime, they should contact the Luzerne County

Prothonotary’s Office and/or plaintiff's wife to confirm. (Id. {] 18).

Plaintiff alleges that the defendants refused to confirm those details. (ia. □□

19). Instead, the defendants arrested the plaintiff, placed him in handcuffs, and

advised him of his rights. (Id. | 20). Per the complaint, defendants held the

plaintiff in a “hot, unairconditioned vehicle” for 3-4 hours at the tow yard. (Id. {]

23). Plaintiff's wife thereafter secured copies of court orders “lifting the capias

and stating that the active arrest warrant was null and void.”* (Id. 21). After

plaintiff's wife appeared with these documents, defendants continued to hold the

plaintiff for some time while they made telephone calls. (Id. | 22). Defendants

eventually released plaintiff from their custody. ({d. J 23).

Plaintiff alleges that the above events occurred in view of other individuals

at ACT Towing. (Id. {| 23). As such, plaintiff avers that he experienced trauma

and suffered severe emotional distress that requires ongoing treatment with a

mental health practitioner. (Id. {| 27)

Based on the above allegations, plaintiffs complaint contains four (4)

causes of action against all defendants: Count | — Section 1983 claims for false

arrest, excessive force, and due process violations; Count II — false arrest; Count

A capias warrant is Pennsylvania’s equivalent to a bench warrant. See Commonwealth v.

Proctor, 585 A.2d 454, 457 (Pa. 1991).

Ill — false imprisonment; and Count IV — intentional infliction of emotional

distress. (Id. J] 28-67). In response to plaintiff's complaint, defendants filed a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to all counts.

Jurisdiction

Because this case is brought pursuant to Section 1983, the court has

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (“The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States.”). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state

law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). (“In any civil action of which the

district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplementa

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within

such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy

under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).

Legal Standard

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The court tests the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations when considering a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

| Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 55(

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). □ claim has facial plausibility when factual content is plec

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts accept all

factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the

complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233

(citations omitted).

Analysis

Defendants raise several arguments in support of dismissal, including that

they are entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff's Section 1983 claims. Prior

to addressing qualified immunity, the court must resolve several preliminary

matters.

1. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims are Limited to Alleged Violations of His

Fourth Amendment Rights by False Arrest

First, the complaint alleges violations of the plaintiff's Fourth, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by municipal police officers. The Fifth

Amendment, however, only restricts the actions of federal officials. Nguyen v.

U.S. Catholic Conf,, 719 F.2d 52, 54-55 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Pub. Util. Comm'n

v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952). Municipal police officers are not federal

officials. Thus, plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claims are subject to dismissal.

As for any Fourteenth Amendment claim, that amendment states, in

relevant part: “No State shall. . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court

of the United States has held that “[W]here a particular Amendment provides an

explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of

government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of

substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright

v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Put another way, “when government behavior is governed by a specific

constitutional amendment, due process analysis is inappropriate.” Berg v. Cnty.

of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff's complaint alleges Fourth Amendment violations for false arrest

and excessive force. “Although not all actions by police officers are governed by

the Fourth Amendment. . .the constitutionality of arrests by state officials is

governed by the Fourth Amendment rather than due process analysis.” Id. at

268-69; see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979) (interpreting

Section 1983 false imprisonment claim as grounded in Fourth Amendment

rights). The right to be free from the use of excessive force has been

recognized under the Fourth Amendment. Anglemeyer, 92 F.4th at 188.

Accordingly, plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims are subject to dismissal

and only plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claims need be analyzed in this matter.

Additionally, plaintiff's excessive force allegations are threadbare. He does

not allege much more than being physically restrained by handcuffs. (Doc. 1,

Compl. 20). He does not allege facts implicating that such handcuffing was

unreasonable, unnecessary, or excessive. He does not allege that they were

applied too tightly or that officers refused to loosen the cuffs after request.

Plaintiff also does not allege which of the five defendant officers used excessive

force. Consequently, the complaint does not allege a facially plausible claim

against the defendants and the qualified immunity analysis in this case will be

limited to plaintiff's Section 1983 claim for false arrest.

2. Qualified Immunity

“The purpose of [Section] 1983 is to deter state actors from using the

badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights

and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.

158, 161 (1992). “Police officers, embodying the authority of the state, are liable

under § 1983 when they violate someone's constitutional rights, unless they are

protected by qualified immunity.” Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.

2007). The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performin

discretionary functions “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunit

is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation[.]”

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

“The qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken

judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.’ ” Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 343 (1986)). Qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a

mere defense to liability[.]” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (emphasis in original). Thus

the defendant officers bear the burden of establishing that they are entitled to

qualified immunity. Burns y. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir.

2011)(citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819).

The two-part qualified immunity test is well settled. Montemuro v. Jim

Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 99 F.4th 639, 642 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing Anglemeyer v.

Ammons, 92 F.4th 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2024)). Under the first prong, a court must

decide whether the facts aleged make out a violation of a constitutional tight.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)(citation omitted). Under the

second prong, “the court must decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. (citation omitted).

In considering qualified immunity, the court may address the prongs of this

test in any order. Id. at 236. Defendants assert that there are no allegations

supporting violation of the plaintiff's rights, focusing on admissions in the

complaint that the defendant officers had validated the warrant and released the

plaintiff after learning of the error or mistake. The court thus considers whether

the allegations in the complaint plausibly make out a violation of plaintiff's Fourth

Amendment rights.

Since the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be

secure in their persons. . .against unreasonable searches and seizures[,]’ [a]n

arrest. . .qualifies as a ‘seizure’ of a ‘person’. . .and so must be reasonable under

the circumstances.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736 (2011)(citations

omitted). To determine Fourth Amendment “reasonableness,” courts ask

whether, when objectively viewed, the circumstances justify the challenged

action. See id. (citations omitted). If so, that action is reasonable regardless of

the subjective intent motivating the relevant officials. Id. (citation omitted). Under

this reasonableness standard, a seizure “may be permissible even though the

justification includes a reasonable factual mistake.” Heien v. North Carolina, 574

U.S. 54, 57 (2014).

Plaintiff's complaint is not a model of clarity. What is clear, however, is that

plaintiff's arrest occurred against the backdrop of previous proceedings pursuant

to Pennsylvania’s PFA Act. At first, plaintiff's allegations posit that the defendant

officers arrested based upon an active arrest warrant for an alleged violation of a

PFA Order. (Doc. 1, Compl. J 13). Plaintiff alleges that he then called his

counsel, who was present when the state court judge dismissed or lifted that

arrest warrant. (Id. {| 16). Plaintiff's counsel advised that he would bring proof

later that day. (Id. 1 17). Plaintiff's allegations thus implicate facts that he had

violated a PFA order and that there were court proceedings involving that

violation. (Id. {Jf} 16-17).

Probable cause for an arrest exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy

information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to

warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been

committed by the person being arrested.” United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251,

255 (3d Cir. 2002). To the extent that plaintiff alleges that he was arrested for

violating a PFA order, the PFA Act expressly mandates arrests for violations of

PFA orders. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6113(a).

Plaintiff's other allegations muddy the waters as to the actual type of

warrant that was issued. He alleges that his wife retrieved copies of court orders

“lifting the capias and stating that the active arrest warrant was null and void.”

10

(Doc. 1, Compl. 21). This allegation implicates that plaintiff had been charged

with indirect criminal contempt of a PFA order and failed to appear at a hearing,

which then prompted a judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas to

issue a bench warrant (or capias warrant). See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6114.

“The simple fact of nonappearance provide{[s] the government with

probable cause to apply for a bench warrant.... The authority of a court to issue

bench warrants to arrest [persons] who fail to appear is, in fact, unquestioned.” Ir

re Grand Jury Proceedings Harrisburg Grand Jury 79-1, 658 F.2d 211, 214 (3d

Cir. 1981). “Because [the plaintiff] was named in a bench warrant, probable

cause for his arrest exists, and his Fourth Amendment argument fails even if the

bench warrant later turns out to be invalid.” Tucker v. City of Philadelphia, 679 F.

Supp. 3d 127, 138 (D.N.J. 2023)(citing U.S. v. Smith, 468 F.2d 381 (3d Cir.

1972); U.S. v. Spencer, 684 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1982); Carter y. Baltimore

County, 95 Fed. App'x. 471, 479 (4th Cir. 2004) (non-precedential opinion)).

Per plaintiff, the defendant officers arrested him with representations that

there was an active capias, bench warrant, or arrest warrant and that they had

confirmed it was still active. (Id. Jf] 13, 15). The defendant officers also made

additional phone calls after plaintiff's wife arrived at the tow yard with copies of

contrary court orders before releasing the plaintiff. (Id. ff] 22-23).

11

“The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the

government official's error is ‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake

based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting

Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004)(Kennedy J., dissenting)(further

citation and explanatory parenthetical omitted). Consequently, for his part,

plaintiff has only averred facts positing that the defendant officers had reasonabl\

trustworthy information to arrest the plaintiff. As alleged, after reasonable

diligence following plaintiff's arrest, which included confirming contrary

information provided by plaintiff's wife, the officers determined that they did not

have probable cause to the arrest the plaintiff. Plaintiff has thus averred

reasonably mistaken probable cause on the part of the officers. In light of the

facts pled in the complaint, they enjoy qualified immunity from plaintiff's Section

1983 claim for false arrest.

3. Leave to Amend

As noted above, plaintiff's Section 1983 excessive force claim is subject to

dismissal. Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend, unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citing

Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff is

represented by the same counsel in this action as who communicated with the

12

officers on scene. As alleged, plaintiffs counsel also intervened by getting

plaintiffs wife to retrieve documents from the Luzerne County Courthouse.

Accordingly, due to this involvement, if plaintiff had facts plausibly stating that the

defendant officers used excessive physical force, he would have placed those

allegations in the initial complaint. Leave to amend in this instance would thus be

futile.

4. State Law Claims

Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims for false arrest,

false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress. The law provides

that federal courts should not entertain pendent state law claims when federal

causes of action are dismissed. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,

726 (1966); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)(“The district courts may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction...if — ...the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”). The court will decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction in this matter. The plaintiff's state law claims will

therefore be dismissed without prejudice.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be

granted as to plaintiff's Section 1983 claims in Count | without leave to amend.

The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law

13

claims in Counts II-IV. Thus, plaintiff's state law claims will be dismissed without

prejudice. The Clerk of Court will be directed to close this case. An appropriate

order follows.

Date: □□ Al J -

| JUD K. MUNLEY

United States District Court

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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