interpreting Section 1983 false imprisonment claim as grounded in Fourth Amendment rights
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- interpreting Section 1983 false imprisonment claim as grounded in Fourth Amendment rights
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The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VINCENT ANTHONY VINCE, : No. 3:24cv902
Plaintiff :
: (Judge Munley)
V. :
MATTHEW GODLEWSKI, in his :
individual capacity; JONATHAN :
KASKEY, in his individual capacity; :
JOSEPH WOZNIAK, in his individual :
capacity; JOHN CARLOS :
RODRIGUEZ, JR., in his individual :
capacity; ROBERT CAPPARELL, :
in his individual capacity; JOHN :
DOE No. 1, in his individual :
capacity; and JOHN DOE No. 2, in :
his individual capacity, :
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Vincent Anthony Vince contends that officers from the Wilkes-Barre
Township Police Department violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights in this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983”). On June 2, 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint naming the officers in their
individual capacities. (Doc. 1). Before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by
those officers, Defendants Robert Capparell, Matthew Godlewski, Jonathan
Kaskey, John Carlos Rodriguez, and Joseph Wozniak, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 11). Having been fully briefed, this motion is
ripe for disposition.
Background
This action arises out of previous court proceedings pursuant to
Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6101-6122.
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that, on June 3, 2022, the defendant officers
approached him at ACT Towing in Wilkes-Barre Township, Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania while plaintiff attempted to retrieve his vehicle.’ (Doc. 1, 13).
Defendants advised plaintiff that they were arresting him for an active arrest
warrant for an alleged violation of a Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) Order. □□□□□
Plaintiff advised the defendants that the arrest warrant had been dismissed
by a judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. (id. J 14).
Defendants informed plaintiff that they verified and confirmed the arrest warrant.
(Id. | 15). At no time did the defendants show plaintiff the warrant. (Id. J] 25).
Plaintiff then contacted his counsel. (Id. 16). Plaintiff's counsel notified
defendants that the arrest warrant had been lifted by the trial court and that he
could provide proof later that day. (Id. ] 17). Plaintiff's counsel advised the
‘At this stage of the proceedings, the court must accept all factual allegations in the plaintiffs
pleadings as true. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)(citations
omitted). The court makes no determination, however, as to the ultimate veracity of these
assertions.
defendants that, in the meantime, they should contact the Luzerne County
Prothonotary’s Office and/or plaintiff's wife to confirm. (Id. {] 18).
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants refused to confirm those details. (ia. □□
19). Instead, the defendants arrested the plaintiff, placed him in handcuffs, and
advised him of his rights. (Id. | 20). Per the complaint, defendants held the
plaintiff in a “hot, unairconditioned vehicle” for 3-4 hours at the tow yard. (Id. {]
23). Plaintiff's wife thereafter secured copies of court orders “lifting the capias
and stating that the active arrest warrant was null and void.”* (Id. 21). After
plaintiff's wife appeared with these documents, defendants continued to hold the
plaintiff for some time while they made telephone calls. (Id. | 22). Defendants
eventually released plaintiff from their custody. ({d. J 23).
Plaintiff alleges that the above events occurred in view of other individuals
at ACT Towing. (Id. {| 23). As such, plaintiff avers that he experienced trauma
and suffered severe emotional distress that requires ongoing treatment with a
mental health practitioner. (Id. {| 27)
Based on the above allegations, plaintiffs complaint contains four (4)
causes of action against all defendants: Count | — Section 1983 claims for false
arrest, excessive force, and due process violations; Count II — false arrest; Count
A capias warrant is Pennsylvania’s equivalent to a bench warrant. See Commonwealth v.
Proctor, 585 A.2d 454, 457 (Pa. 1991).
Ill — false imprisonment; and Count IV — intentional infliction of emotional
distress. (Id. J] 28-67). In response to plaintiff's complaint, defendants filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to all counts.
Jurisdiction
Because this case is brought pursuant to Section 1983, the court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.”). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state
law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). (“In any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplementa
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).
Legal Standard
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The court tests the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations when considering a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
| Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 55(
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). □ claim has facial plausibility when factual content is plec
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233
(citations omitted).
Analysis
Defendants raise several arguments in support of dismissal, including that
they are entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff's Section 1983 claims. Prior
to addressing qualified immunity, the court must resolve several preliminary
matters.
1. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims are Limited to Alleged Violations of His
Fourth Amendment Rights by False Arrest
First, the complaint alleges violations of the plaintiff's Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by municipal police officers. The Fifth
Amendment, however, only restricts the actions of federal officials. Nguyen v.
U.S. Catholic Conf,, 719 F.2d 52, 54-55 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Pub. Util. Comm'n
v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952). Municipal police officers are not federal
officials. Thus, plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claims are subject to dismissal.
As for any Fourteenth Amendment claim, that amendment states, in
relevant part: “No State shall. . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court
of the United States has held that “[W]here a particular Amendment provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of
government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright
v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Put another way, “when government behavior is governed by a specific
constitutional amendment, due process analysis is inappropriate.” Berg v. Cnty.
of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff's complaint alleges Fourth Amendment violations for false arrest
and excessive force. “Although not all actions by police officers are governed by
the Fourth Amendment. . .the constitutionality of arrests by state officials is
governed by the Fourth Amendment rather than due process analysis.” Id. at
268-69; see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979) (interpreting
Section 1983 false imprisonment claim as grounded in Fourth Amendment
rights). The right to be free from the use of excessive force has been
recognized under the Fourth Amendment. Anglemeyer, 92 F.4th at 188.
Accordingly, plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims are subject to dismissal
and only plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claims need be analyzed in this matter.
Additionally, plaintiff's excessive force allegations are threadbare. He does
not allege much more than being physically restrained by handcuffs. (Doc. 1,
Compl. 20). He does not allege facts implicating that such handcuffing was
unreasonable, unnecessary, or excessive. He does not allege that they were
applied too tightly or that officers refused to loosen the cuffs after request.
Plaintiff also does not allege which of the five defendant officers used excessive
force. Consequently, the complaint does not allege a facially plausible claim
against the defendants and the qualified immunity analysis in this case will be
limited to plaintiff's Section 1983 claim for false arrest.
2. Qualified Immunity
“The purpose of [Section] 1983 is to deter state actors from using the
badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights
and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.
158, 161 (1992). “Police officers, embodying the authority of the state, are liable
under § 1983 when they violate someone's constitutional rights, unless they are
protected by qualified immunity.” Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.
2007). The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performin
discretionary functions “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunit
is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation[.]”
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
“The qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken
judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.’ ” Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 343 (1986)). Qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability[.]” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (emphasis in original). Thus
the defendant officers bear the burden of establishing that they are entitled to
qualified immunity. Burns y. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir.
2011)(citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819).
The two-part qualified immunity test is well settled. Montemuro v. Jim
Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 99 F.4th 639, 642 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing Anglemeyer v.
Ammons, 92 F.4th 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2024)). Under the first prong, a court must
decide whether the facts aleged make out a violation of a constitutional tight.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)(citation omitted). Under the
second prong, “the court must decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. (citation omitted).
In considering qualified immunity, the court may address the prongs of this
test in any order. Id. at 236. Defendants assert that there are no allegations
supporting violation of the plaintiff's rights, focusing on admissions in the
complaint that the defendant officers had validated the warrant and released the
plaintiff after learning of the error or mistake. The court thus considers whether
the allegations in the complaint plausibly make out a violation of plaintiff's Fourth
Amendment rights.
Since the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons. . .against unreasonable searches and seizures[,]’ [a]n
arrest. . .qualifies as a ‘seizure’ of a ‘person’. . .and so must be reasonable under
the circumstances.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736 (2011)(citations
omitted). To determine Fourth Amendment “reasonableness,” courts ask
whether, when objectively viewed, the circumstances justify the challenged
action. See id. (citations omitted). If so, that action is reasonable regardless of
the subjective intent motivating the relevant officials. Id. (citation omitted). Under
this reasonableness standard, a seizure “may be permissible even though the
justification includes a reasonable factual mistake.” Heien v. North Carolina, 574
U.S. 54, 57 (2014).
Plaintiff's complaint is not a model of clarity. What is clear, however, is that
plaintiff's arrest occurred against the backdrop of previous proceedings pursuant
to Pennsylvania’s PFA Act. At first, plaintiff's allegations posit that the defendant
officers arrested based upon an active arrest warrant for an alleged violation of a
PFA Order. (Doc. 1, Compl. J 13). Plaintiff alleges that he then called his
counsel, who was present when the state court judge dismissed or lifted that
arrest warrant. (Id. {| 16). Plaintiff's counsel advised that he would bring proof
later that day. (Id. 1 17). Plaintiff's allegations thus implicate facts that he had
violated a PFA order and that there were court proceedings involving that
violation. (Id. {Jf} 16-17).
Probable cause for an arrest exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy
information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to
warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been
committed by the person being arrested.” United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251,
255 (3d Cir. 2002). To the extent that plaintiff alleges that he was arrested for
violating a PFA order, the PFA Act expressly mandates arrests for violations of
PFA orders. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6113(a).
Plaintiff's other allegations muddy the waters as to the actual type of
warrant that was issued. He alleges that his wife retrieved copies of court orders
“lifting the capias and stating that the active arrest warrant was null and void.”
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(Doc. 1, Compl. 21). This allegation implicates that plaintiff had been charged
with indirect criminal contempt of a PFA order and failed to appear at a hearing,
which then prompted a judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas to
issue a bench warrant (or capias warrant). See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6114.
“The simple fact of nonappearance provide{[s] the government with
probable cause to apply for a bench warrant.... The authority of a court to issue
bench warrants to arrest [persons] who fail to appear is, in fact, unquestioned.” Ir
re Grand Jury Proceedings Harrisburg Grand Jury 79-1, 658 F.2d 211, 214 (3d
Cir. 1981). “Because [the plaintiff] was named in a bench warrant, probable
cause for his arrest exists, and his Fourth Amendment argument fails even if the
bench warrant later turns out to be invalid.” Tucker v. City of Philadelphia, 679 F.
Supp. 3d 127, 138 (D.N.J. 2023)(citing U.S. v. Smith, 468 F.2d 381 (3d Cir.
1972); U.S. v. Spencer, 684 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1982); Carter y. Baltimore
County, 95 Fed. App'x. 471, 479 (4th Cir. 2004) (non-precedential opinion)).
Per plaintiff, the defendant officers arrested him with representations that
there was an active capias, bench warrant, or arrest warrant and that they had
confirmed it was still active. (Id. Jf] 13, 15). The defendant officers also made
additional phone calls after plaintiff's wife arrived at the tow yard with copies of
contrary court orders before releasing the plaintiff. (Id. ff] 22-23).
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“The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the
government official's error is ‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake
based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004)(Kennedy J., dissenting)(further
citation and explanatory parenthetical omitted). Consequently, for his part,
plaintiff has only averred facts positing that the defendant officers had reasonabl\
trustworthy information to arrest the plaintiff. As alleged, after reasonable
diligence following plaintiff's arrest, which included confirming contrary
information provided by plaintiff's wife, the officers determined that they did not
have probable cause to the arrest the plaintiff. Plaintiff has thus averred
reasonably mistaken probable cause on the part of the officers. In light of the
facts pled in the complaint, they enjoy qualified immunity from plaintiff's Section
1983 claim for false arrest.
3. Leave to Amend
As noted above, plaintiff's Section 1983 excessive force claim is subject to
dismissal. Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend, unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citing
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff is
represented by the same counsel in this action as who communicated with the
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officers on scene. As alleged, plaintiffs counsel also intervened by getting
plaintiffs wife to retrieve documents from the Luzerne County Courthouse.
Accordingly, due to this involvement, if plaintiff had facts plausibly stating that the
defendant officers used excessive physical force, he would have placed those
allegations in the initial complaint. Leave to amend in this instance would thus be
futile.
4. State Law Claims
Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims for false arrest,
false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress. The law provides
that federal courts should not entertain pendent state law claims when federal
causes of action are dismissed. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)(“The district courts may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction...if — ...the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”). The court will decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction in this matter. The plaintiff's state law claims will
therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be
granted as to plaintiff's Section 1983 claims in Count | without leave to amend.
The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law
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claims in Counts II-IV. Thus, plaintiff's state law claims will be dismissed without
prejudice. The Clerk of Court will be directed to close this case. An appropriate
order follows.
Date: □□ Al J -
| JUD K. MUNLEY
United States District Court
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