Brown-Austin v. Chambers-Smith

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI

YUSUF BROWN-AUSTIN, : Case No. 1:24-cv-397

Plaintiff, Judge Matthew W. McFarland

v :

ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, et al., 2

Defendants.

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction

(Doc. 3). All named Defendants have filed responses in opposition (Docs. 21, 26). Plaintiff

has not replied in support, and the time to do so has passed. Additionally, while Plaintiff

requests oral argument, the Court does not find oral argument “essential to the fair

resolution” of the motion. S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.1(b)(2). Thus, this matter is ripe for the

Court's review. For the reasons below, Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc.

3) is DENIED.

ALLEGED FACTS

Plaintiff was initially incarcerated at the Northeastern Ohio Correctional Center

(“NEOCC”). (Second Am. Compl., Doc. 8, § 1, 2.) Defendant CoreCivic Inc. operates the

NEOCC pursuant to a contract with the State of Ohio. (Id. at § 2.) During Plaintiff's

incarceration, CoreCivic failed to sufficiently staff the NEOCC. (Id. at J 9.) To remedy

this, the staff negotiated with the prison’s gang leaders, agreeing that if the gangs reduced

prison violence, the NEOCC would allow the gang leaders to “control the prison.” (Id. at

{ 20.)

At first, Plaintiff willingly participated in this agreement. (Second Am. Compl.,

Doc. 8, 9] 24-29.) In June 2022, however, a guard brought a loaded firearm into the

NEOCC, which an inmate retrieved. (Id. at § 30.) The NEOCC administration ordered

Plaintiff to take the firearm from the inmate, but Plaintiff refused. (Id.) Later, Plaintiff's

brother alerted the Ohio State Highway Patrol that the NEOCC ordered Plaintiff to seize

a firearm from inside the prison. (Id. at { 33.) This angered Defendants, who began to

question whether they could trust Plaintiff. (Id. at 34.) Around the same time, Plaintiff

was placed under heightened security after another inmate was attacked. (Id. at § 31.)

On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff was transferred to the Ohio State Penitentiary. (Second

Am. Compl., Doc. 8, { 36.) On August 1, 2022, Plaintiff attended a hearing concerning the

attack at the NEOCC. (Id. at § 38.) At the hearing, Plaintiff was “found guilty,” despite

“the officer say[ing] they had no evidence from the case.” (Id.) Later that month, a security

review was held, and Plaintiff was again placed under heightened security. (Id. at { 39.)

Plaintiff, however, was not present at the security review. (Id.) Plaintiff was then

transferred to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (“SOCF”). (Id. at { 44.) Since his

transfer, Plaintiff has experienced threats and mistreatment from corrections officers. (Id.

at 46-49.)

On October 27, 2023, an SOCF inspector interviewed Plaintiff. (Second Am.

Compl., Doc. 8, § 50.) During the interview, Plaintiff explained the threats and

intimidation he received from the SOCF’s corrections officers. (Id.) Afterward, Defendant

no longer received heat to his cell. (Id. at § 51.) Defendants Warden Cynthia Davis

(“Davis”) and Unit Manager Oppy (“Oppy”) told Plaintiff that if he were to “drop his

lawsuit” that he filed against them, his heat would be restored. (Id.) As a result of this

treatment, Plaintiff requested to be transferred to a different prison. (Id. at J 53.)

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on July 29, 2024, bringing Retaliation and

Procedural Due Process claims against numerous Defendants. (See Compl., Doc. 1.) On

August 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 3). Plaintiff then

filed two amended complaints: the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 5), added a claim for

Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 8), included

additional facts. Defendants Assistant Investigator Wyman, Deputy Warden Richard

Phiffer, Doug Fender, David Bobby, CoreCivic Inc., and Unit Manager Douglass

(“CoreCivic Defendants”) responded to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction on

November 27, 2024 (Doc. 20). Defendants Annette Chambers-Smith, Chief Inspector

Christopher Lambert (“Lambert”), Davis, and Oppy (“State Defendants”) responded on

January 15, 2025 (Doc. 26).

LAW & ANALYSIS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) allows the Court to issue a preliminary

injunction against an adverse party. “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary

remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “The

purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the

parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390,

395 (1981). “Given this limited purpose, and given the haste that is often necessary if those

positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis

of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the

merits.” Id. This does not mean, though, “that preliminary injunctions should be granted

lightly.” Southern Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio, LCC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844,

849 (6th Cir. 2017).

In determining whether to impose a preliminary injunction, this Court must

consider four factors: “(1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether

the movant will suffer irreparable injury without a preliminary injunction; (3) whether

issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4)

whether the public interest would be served by issuance of a preliminary injunction.”

MeNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 2012). Courts balance these factors rather than

treat them as “prerequisites that must be satisfied.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The party

seeking the preliminary injunction bears the burden of justifying such relief,” and it

should “only be awarded upon a clear showing that the [party] is entitled to such relief.”

Id.; Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.

I Plaintiff's Requested Relief

Plaintiff seeks to enjoin “Defendants from retaliating against Plaintiff” and an

order to transfer him from the SOCF. (Motion, Doc. 3, Pg. ID 29.) Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65(d)(1), however, requires an injunctive order to “describe in reasonable

detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts

restrained or required.” This requirement serves two important functions: “(1) [to]

prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders, and

thus avoid . . . a contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood; and (2) [to]

enable an appellate tribunal to know precisely what it is reviewing.” Union Home Mortg.

Corp. v. Cromer, 31 F. 4th 356, 362 (6th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Accordingly, “an injunction

must be couched in specific and unambiguous terms, such that an ordinary person

reading the court’s order is able to ascertain from the document itself exactly what

conduct is proscribed.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks

is too vague. An order enjoining Defendants from “retaliating against Plaintiff” would

provide little clarity on what conduct is proscribed. See, e.g., Bates v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab.,

1:22-CV-337, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24485, at *16 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2023) (finding that a

proposed injunction prohibiting the defendants from harassing, assaulting, and

retaliating against the plaintiff was too vague). After all, “it is not this Court’s role to sua

sponte attempt to fashion a proper injunction” for Plaintiff. HealthCall of Detroit, Inc. v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 22-10797, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140562, at *26 (E.D.

Mich. Aug. 8, 2022).

Moreover, Plaintiff's requested relief raises an additional concern. The purpose of

a preliminary injunction “is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until

a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Texas., 451 U.S. at 395. “Motions seeking to

obtain affirmative preliminary injunctive relief must be more closely scrutinized than the

already-disfavored motion for preliminary [injunction] which seeks to maintain the

status quo.” Julick v. Jordan, 5:23-CV-51, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78858, at *7 (W.D. Ky. May

5, 2023) (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiff seeks, in part, an affirmative preliminary

injunction ordering his removal from the SOCF. (Motion, Doc. 3, Pg. ID 29.) Plaintiff's

motion will therefore fall under even greater scrutiny. Notwithstanding these initial

concerns, the Court will proceed to the merits of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary

Injunction.

II. Injunctive Relief Against the CoreCivic Defendants

Plaintiff argues for injunctive relief against all Defendants. Yet, “a prisoner’s claim

for declaratory and injunctive relief against certain prison officials [becomes] moot once

the prisoner [is] transferred from the prison of which he complained to a different

facility.” Henderson v. Martin, 73 F. App’x 115, 117 (6th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff is no longer

incarcerated at the NEOCC, which is operated by CoreCivic. (Second Am. Compl., Doc.

3, 36.) Specifically, Plaintiff was transferred from the NEOCC to the Ohio State

Penitentiary on July 29, 2022. (Id. at § 36.) Thus, Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief

against the CoreCivic Defendants are moot and the Court will only consider the four

factors for Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants.

III. Injunctive Relief Against the State Defendants

a. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The first prong of the analysis requires Plaintiff to show a likelihood of success on

the merits. McNeilly, 684 F.3d at 615. Plaintiff need only show a likelihood of success on

one claim. McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 603 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court acknowledges

that Plaintiff has moved for leave to file his Third Amended Complaint. (Motion for

Leave, Doc 33.) Since the Court has not yet ruled on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave, it will

analyze the likelihood of success of Plaintiff's claims included in his presently operative

Second Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff brings claims for Retaliation, Procedural Due Process, and Cruel and

Unusual Punishment against every Defendant. (Second Am. Compl., Doc. 8.) The State

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success because his claims

against Defendants Chambers-Smith and Lambert are barred by res judicata. (State

Defendants’ Response, Doc. 26, Pg. ID 240-41; State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc.

25, Pg. ID 222.) “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by

parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” Montana v. United States, 440

US. 147, 153 (1979). For a claim to be barred, the following elements must be present:

(1) a final decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a

subsequent action between the same parties or their “ privies”; (3) an issue

in the subsequent action which was litigated or which should have been

litigated in the prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of action.

Bittinger v. Tecumseh Products Co., 123 F.3d 877, 880 (6th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff filed an earlier complaint before this Court in the case styled Yusuf Brown-

Austin v. Annette Chambers-Smith, et al., No. 1:23-CV-478 (“the Prior Action”). There,

Plaintiff alleged Retaliation and Procedural Due Process violations by Defendants

Chambers-Smith and Lambert. Brown-Austin v. Chambers-Smith, No: 1:23-CV-478, 2024

US. Dist. LEXIS 151849, at *5-6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2024). This Court summarily

dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims. Id. at *20. Although the order did not plainly state

whether the dismissal was with prejudice, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) dictates

that “unless a dismissal states otherwise, a dismissal . . . operates as an adjudication on

the merits.” Since this Court’s Order did not state otherwise, the Prior Action was a final

decision adjudicated on the merits. Turning to the remaining res judicata elements, the

Prior Action included Defendants Chambers-Smith and Lambert. Id. at *4. Next, any

claim Plaintiff now brings was or could have been litigated in the Prior Action. Finally,

the Prior Action involved the same series of events for which Plaintiff brings his current

claims. See id. at *2-6. Thus, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Chambers-Smith and

Lambert are precluded and cannot succeed on the merits.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's only claims which may still have a likelihood of success

are against the remaining State Defendants, Davis and Oppy. Plaintiff, however, has

failed to point to any evidence showing that he has a substantial likelihood of success on

any of his claims. “Plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint and motion do not constitute

evidence supporting injunctive relief.” Smith v. Wilkinson, 1:05-CV-411, 2005 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 15564, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2005). Where no evidence supports Plaintiff's

motion, it must be denied. Id.; see also Foster v. Ohio, No. 1:16-CV-920, 2017 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 200944, at *15 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 200814 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 2017); Brooks v. Potter, No. 2:13-CV-507, 2013 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 134255, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154949 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2013). Plaintiff has therefore not shown a

likelihood of success on the merits.

b. Irreparable Harm

The next prong of the analysis looks to whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable

harm. The Court must weigh the strength of all the factors together, but “even the

strongest showing on the other three factors cannot ‘eliminate the irreparable harm

requirement.” D.T. v. Summer Cty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324, 326-37 (6th Cir. 2019); Cretor Constr.

Equip. LLC v. Gibson, No. 1:24-CV-322, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115526, *13 (S.D. Ohio July

1, 2024) (“[FJailure to show an irreparable injury is always fatal.”) For the plaintiff to

satisfy this burden, “the harm alleged must be both certain and immediate, rather than

speculative or theoretical.” Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v.

Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir. 1991). Additionally, a harm must not be “fully

compensable by monetary damages.” Overstreet v. Lexington—Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 305

F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff argues that he faces irreparable harm from corrections officers retaliating

against him for filing grievances and civil complaints. (Motion, Doc. 3, Pg ID 36.) As

Plaintiff notes, “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for minimal periods of

time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373

(1976). The Court, however, has already determined that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed

on his First Amendment claim. Thus, Plaintiff's reliance on a presumption of irreparable

harm based on alleged First Amendment violations is not compelling. Overstreet, 305 F.3d

at 578. Since Plaintiff articulates no other argument as to irreparable harm, this factor

weighs against granting an injunction.

c. Substantial Harm to Others

The third factor asks, “whether issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause

substantial harm to others.” McNeilly, 684 F.3d at 615. Plaintiff only provides a conclusory

argument that Defendants cannot argue that they would be harmed if this Court grants

a preliminary injunction. (Motion, Doc. 3, Pg. ID 37.) The Court, however, “must be

mindful of the cautions that apply when issuing an injunction that affects the operation

of the prison system.” Stone v. Ohio Parole Bd., 2:21-CV-884, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63442,

at *10 (S.D, Ohio Mar. 31, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

211210 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2021). Moreover, courts should proceed with the utmost care

and grant deference to prison authorities when a prisoner seeks to enjoin prison officials.

See Frazer v. Mullins, 5:23-CV-193, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227038, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 26,

2024); Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 438, n.3 (6th Cir. 1984). In light of these

considerations, this factor also weighs against Plaintiff.

d. The Public Interest

The last factor concerns whether “the public’s interest will be served if the court

grants a preliminary injunction.” McNeilly, 684 F.3d at 615. Plaintiff argues that

Defendants have locked his JPAY account, preventing him from filing grievances.

(Motion, Doc. 3, Pg. ID 38.) Prisoners, however, do not have a constitutional right to the

unfettered access of prison grievance procedures. Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F.

App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, as the State Defendants noted, Ohio

correctional institutions no longer utilize JPAY. (Response, Doc. 26, Pg. ID 241.) Instead,

they use a program called ViaPath, which Plaintiff has not claimed to be barred from

using. (Id.) Thus, this last factor weighs against Plaintiff.

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CONCLUSION

Considering the vagueness of Plaintiff's requested injunction, and his inability to

demonstrate that any factor weighs in his favor, Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary

Injunction (Doc. 3) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

€

eM Maley

JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND

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