Robles v. Quirch Foods LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEX ROBLES CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-251

QUIRCH FOODS LLC, ET AL. SECTION “O”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court in this dispute arising from pro se Plaintiff Alex Robles’s

former employment by Quirch Foods LLC are assorted motions1 filed by Robles and

motions2 to dismiss filed by Quirch, 21st Judicial District Attorney Scott Perrilloux,

and the State of Louisiana. Liberally construing Robles’s pro se complaints, see

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and holding them to “less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), the Court holds that Robles fails to state any claims

against Quirch and Perrilloux, and that any claims Robles intends to assert against

the State are barred by sovereign immunity. What is more, Robles’s assorted pro se

motions—including his motions to strike certain briefs, his motions for “joinder” and

“transfer,” his motion for a default judgment, and his motion “to submit additional

evidence”—lack merit. Accordingly, for those reasons and the reasons that follow,

Robles’s assorted motions are DENIED; Quirch’s, Perrilloux’s, and the State’s

motions to dismiss are GRANTED; and Robles must show cause within 14 days

why the Court should not dismiss his remaining claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

1 ECF No. 3; ECF No. 14; ECF No. 16; ECF No. 32; ECF No. 33; ECF No. 34.

2 ECF No. 10; ECF No. 22; ECF No. 27.

I. BACKGROUND

Liberally construed, Robles’s pro se complaints attempt to assert claims arising

from the allegedly retaliatory termination of his employment as a driver for Quirch

and from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)

whistleblower-retaliation proceedings that Robles later initiated against Quirch

before a United States Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).3

Robles worked as a driver for Quirch in Hammond, Louisiana.4 After Quirch

fired him for poor performance,5 Robles brought an OSHA whistleblower-retaliation

complaint against Quirch.6 He alleged that Quirch violated the Surface

Transportation Assistance Act by firing him in retaliation for “report[ing] an illness

to his supervisor that left him impaired and unable to operate his assigned

commercial motor vehicle.”7 But OSHA dismissed his complaint and found “no

reasonable cause to believe” that Quirch violated the Surface Transportation

Assistance Act.8 Robles deems OSHA’s “determination” “procedurally deficient.”9

Robles accordingly appealed OSHA’s dismissal of his whistleblower-retaliation

complaint to an ALJ.10 But the ALJ ultimately dismissed his appeal. Among other

3 See generally ECF No. 4 (original complaint); ECF No. 7 (supplemental complaint); ECF No.

25 (motion-to-dismiss opposition that provides “clarification” of Robles’s claims).

4 ECF No. 4 at 2–3; ECF No. 7 at 2–3.

5 ECF No. 4-2 at 38. The Court may consider the United States Department of Labor letter

notifying Robles of dismissal of his OSHA whistleblower-retaliation complaint because Robles attaches

that letter to his original complaint. See, e.g., Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735

(5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a court may properly consider “documents attached to the complaint”

in its Rule 12(b)(6) analysis (citations omitted)).

6 ECF No. 4 at 3; ECF No. 7 at 3.

7 ECF No. 4-2 at 37.

8 Id. at 37–38.

9 ECF No. 4 at 3; ECF No. 7 at 3.

10 ECF No. 4 at 3; ECF No. 7 at 3.

complaints about the proceedings before the ALJ, Robles alleges that the ALJ

“work[ed] on behalf of Quirch,”11 “lied about being an impartial adjudicator,”12 and

wrongly compelled him “to produce evidence already in [Quirch’s] possession.”13

Robles adds that “the ALJ” and unspecified “State actors” “aided” “a retaliation

scheme” “instituted” by Quirch’s counsel in the proceedings before the ALJ.14

For reasons that are not altogether clear, Robles apparently associates that

alleged “retaliation scheme” involving Quirch’s counsel and the ALJ with “[t]he

murder of [his] significant other,” a state criminal case in which he is named as a

defendant, and a Hammond City Court case in which he is also named as a

defendant.15 Robles alleges that unspecified “State actors” “participat[ed] in a scheme

to deprive [him] [of] his [c]onstitutional [r]ights to life, liberty, and property at the

direction of local judiciaries in Louisiana[.]”16 He adds that he “was subjected to a

criminal investigation that involved harassment and [a] campaign to arrest [him]

after State actors learned of [his] behavior pattern.”17 Robles says the “circumstances”

of that “campaign” “were carried out” through the City of Hammond Water

Department, which “force[d] [him] out of his home” for failing to pay his water bill.18

Robles alleges the “egregious conduct” of “Defense counsels” has led to “two

losses of consortiums, [h]omelessness, incarceration, and emotional distress.”19 He

11 ECF No. 4 at 3; ECF No. 7 at 3.

12 ECF No. 4 at 3–4; ECF No. 7 at 3–4.

13 ECF No. 4 at 8; ECF No. 7 at 8.

14 ECF No. 4 at 4; ECF No. 7 at 4.

15 ECF No. 4 at 6; ECF No. 7 at 6.

16 ECF No. 4 at 6; ECF No. 7 at 6.

17 ECF No. 4 at 7; ECF No. 7 at 7.

18 ECF No. 4 at 7; ECF No. 7 at 7.

19 ECF No. 4 at 9; ECF No. 7 at 9.

seeks “[d]amages arising from” both unspecified breaches of an unspecified

employment contract and from unarticulated violations of the anti-retaliation

provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).20 He wants “the max award

amount of $250,000 for damages inflicted by Defendants, State Actors, and judiciaries

whose egregious behavior violated [his] [c]onstitutional and [s]tatutory [r]ights under

the United States Constitution,” the FLSA, and the “Whistle Blower Act.”21

Even with the benefit of liberal construction, Robles’s pro se complaints are

unclear on whom, exactly, he intends to sue and what claims he intends to assert.

According to the captions of his liberally construed pro se complaints, however, Robles

apparently intends to sue (1) Quirch; (2) the United States Department of Labor; (3)

OSHA; (4) the Office of Administrative Law Judges; (5) the State of Louisiana; (6) the

City Court of Hammond; and (7) CT Corporation Systems, Quirch’s registered agent

for service of process.22 But Robles apparently also intends to sue 21st Judicial

District Attorney Scott Perrilloux, because a summons issued to Perrilloux.23

Now, Quirch, Perrilloux, and the State move to dismiss Robles’s claims against

them under Rule 12(b)(6).24 The State and Perrilloux separately contend that the

Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over some or all of Robles’s claims under Rule

12(b)(1).25 Robles also filed assorted pro se motions, which the Court takes in turn.

20 ECF No. 4 at 2; ECF No. 7 at 2.

21 ECF No. 4 at 9; ECF No. 7 at 9.

22 ECF No. 4 at 1; ECF No. 7 at 1.

23 ECF No. 23.

24 ECF No. 10 (Quirch’s motion to dismiss); ECF No. 22 (Perrilloux’s motion to dismiss); ECF

No. 27 (the State’s motion to dismiss).

25 ECF No. 22; ECF No. 27.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Robles’s Motions

Robles moves the Court (1) for “Joinder of Parties and Transfer” in connection

with his pending Hammond City Court case and a state criminal case in which he is

named as a defendant;26 (2) for a default judgment against Quirch;27 (3) to submit

“additional [r]elevant evidence” in support of his opposition to Quirch’s motion to

dismiss;28 (4) to strike the State’s motion to dismiss;29 and (5) for “Joinder of

Parties.”30 The Court considers each of Robles’s liberally construed pro se motions

before turning to the motions to dismiss filed by Quirch, Perrilloux, and the State.

1. Motion for Joinder of Parties and Transfer31

First, Robles moves the Court “for a Joinder of Parties and Transfer of matters

in” connection with two cases: a Hammond City Court case in which he is named as

a defendant and a state criminal case in which he is named as a defendant.32 Robles

asserts that these “legal proceedings are ancillary acts arising from” the

whistleblower-retaliation proceedings before the ALJ.33 He adds that “transfer is

ripe,” and he cites 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 3235.34

The Court liberally construes Robles’s motion as seeking to transfer this case

and denies the motion because Robles has not shown that transfer is appropriate

26 ECF No. 3.

27 ECF No. 14.

28 ECF No. 16.

29 ECF No. 32; ECF No. 33.

30 ECF No. 34.

31 ECF No. 3.

32 Id. at 1.

33 Id.

34 Id.

under any of the cited provisions. Transfer is not appropriate under Sections 1404(a)

or 1406(a). First, those statutes only allow transfer of cases to “district[s] or

division[s]” within the federal-court system, and the two cases Robles has identified

involve courts outside the federal-court system. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (authorizing

transfer “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses” “to any other district or

division” where a civil action “might have been brought or to any district or division

to which all parties have consented”); 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (authorizing transfer of a

case filed “in the wrong division or district” “to any district or division in which it

could have been brought” if transfer is “in the interest of justice”); see also Atl. Marine

Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 59–61 (2013) (explaining

that Section 1404(a) authorizes transfers within the federal-court system only).

Second, even if transfer were available in theory under Sections 1404(a) or

1406(a), the Court would still deny transfer: Robles has not met his burden to show

that the prerequisites for transfer are met. As for Section 1404(a), Robles has not

shown “good cause” for transfer. See In re Clarke, 94 F.4th 502, 514–16 (5th Cir.

2024). And as for Section 1406(a), Robles has not shown that venue is improper in the

Eastern District of Louisiana. See Atl. Marine Const. Co., 571 U.S. at 55 (explaining

that Section 1406(a) “condition[s] transfer on the initial forum’s being ‘wrong’”).

Nor is transfer available under 18 U.S.C. § 3235. Section 3235 governs venue

in capital cases and states “[t]he trial of offenses punishable with death shall be had

in the county where the offense was committed, where that can be done without great

inconvenience.” 18 U.S.C. § 3235. That provision has no application to this civil case.

In sum, Robles fails to carry his burden to show that the Court should transfer

this case. So the Court denies his motion35 for joinder of parties and transfer.

2. Motion for a Default Judgment36

Next, Robles moves the Court to enter a default judgment against Quirch,

apparently on the grounds that Quirch’s counsel in this case differs from Quirch’s

counsel in the OSHA whistleblower-retaliation proceedings before the ALJ.37 Robles

offers no authority supporting the proposition that Quirch’s decision to retain

different counsel in this case is grounds for entry of a default judgment against it. In

any event, Robles is not entitled to a default judgment against Quirch because, among

other reasons, Quirch has timely responded to Robles’s complaints by way of its

motion to dismiss,38 and the Clerk’s Office has not entered a Rule 55(a) default

against Quirch. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a)–(b); see also N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown,

84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996) (securing a default judgment is a three-step process

that requires a default and an entry of default before a plaintiff may apply for a

default judgment). So the Court denies Robles’s motion39 for a default judgment.

3. Motion to Submit Additional Evidence40

Robles next moves the Court to “submit additional [r]elevant evidence” in

support of his opposition41 to Quirch’s motion to dismiss. The proposed additional

35 ECF No. 3.

36 ECF No. 14.

37 Id. at 1.

38 ECF No. 10.

39 ECF No. 14.

40 ECF No. 16.

41 ECF No. 15. The document is labelled a “Special Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss,” but the Court liberally construes it as Robles’s opposition to Quirch’s motion to dismiss.

evidence consists of (1) copies of summonses issued in this case;42 (2) a notice of the

United States Department of Labor Administrative Review Board’s acceptance of

Robles’s appeal from the ALJ’s dismissal of his OSHA whistleblower-retaliation

complaint;43 (3) the ALJ’s order dismissing Robles’s OSHA whistleblower-retaliation

complaint;44 (4) a notice of appearance entered by a lawyer representing Quirch in

the OSHA whistleblower-retaliation proceedings before the ALJ;45 and (5) a notice of

change of firm affiliation and address entered by lawyers representing Quirch in the

OSHA whistleblower-retaliation proceedings before the ALJ.46

The Court denies Robles’s motion for two independent reasons. First and most

fundamentally, Robles has not shown that any of his proposed additional evidence

has any bearing on any issue raised in Quirch’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

Second, Robles has not shown that the Court may properly consider his proposed

evidence at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. “[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion typically cannot rely on

evidence outside the complaint.” C&C Inv. Props., L.L.C. v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank,

838 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir. 2016). That general rule is subject to two exceptions: The

Court “may rely on evidence outside the complaint, without converting a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion into a motion for summary judgment, if that evidence is either (a) a document

attached to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, referred to in the complaint, and central to the

plaintiff’s claim; or (b) a matter subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of

42 ECF No. 16-3.

43 ECF No. 16-4.

44 ECF No. 16-5.

45 ECF No. 16-6.

46 ECF No. 16-7.

Evidence 201.” George v. SI Grp., Inc., 36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Walker

v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019)). “But going beyond

the pleadings is otherwise error.” Id. (citing Brand Coupon Network, L.L.C. v.

Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014)). Robles has not shown that

either of those two exceptions applies here. So, for each of the independent reasons

outlined above, the Court denies Robles’s motion47 to submit additional evidence.

4. Motions to Strike the State’s Motion to Dismiss48

Across two substantively identical motions, Robles asks the Court to strike the

State’s motion to dismiss.49 Liberally construed, Robles’s pro se motions appear to

argue that the Court should strike the State’s motion to dismiss because it is untimely

and “an attempt to evade legal responsibility” in this case and in a case pending in

the 22nd Judicial District Court in which Robles is named as a defendant.50

Robles has not carried his burden to show that the Court should strike the

State’s motion to dismiss. First, Robles has not shown that the State’s motion is

untimely. To show that the State’s motion is untimely, Robles would need to show

that he properly served the State—which he has not done. The record reflects that

Robles tried to serve the State with a summons issued to “J. Collin Sims,” the District

Attorney for the 22nd Judicial District.51 But Robles fails to show that Sims is

authorized to accept service for the State, and the State persuasively explains that

47 ECF No. 16.

48 ECF No. 32; ECF No. 33.

49 ECF No. 32; ECF No. 33.

50 ECF No. 32 at 1; ECF No. 33 at 1.

51 ECF No. 24 at 1–2.

Sims is not, in fact, authorized to accept service for the State.52 Second, even if the

State’s motion to dismiss were untimely, the Court would still deny Robles’s motion

to strike because the State’s motion and supporting brief are not “pleading[s]” that

may be stricken under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Rule 12(f) governs

motions to strike; it permits the Court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(f) (emphasis added). “But Rule 12(f) only applies to pleadings, and [Rule]

7(a) provides a list of permitted pleadings that determines what constitutes a

pleading that is subject to being stricken under Rule 12(f).” Caliber Home Loans, Inc.

v. Cove, 346 F.R.D. 65, 70 (N.D. Tex. 2024) (emphasis added) (citation and quotation

omitted). Neither a motion nor a brief supporting or opposing a motion is included in

Rule 7(a)’s list of “pleadings.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a). So the State’s motion to

dismiss and supporting brief are “not subject to a motion to strike under Rule 12(f).”

Caliber Home Loans, Inc., 346 F.R.D. at 70 (citation and quotation omitted). For each

of these independent reasons, the Court denies Robles’s motions53 to strike.

5. Motion for Joinder of Parties54

Robles next moves the Court for “[j]oinder of [p]arties,” citing Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 20.55 He “moves to join” (1) two attorneys who represented Quirch in

the whistleblower-retaliation proceedings before the ALJ; (2) the ALJ who presided

over those proceedings; (3) the Tangipahoa Parish District Attorney; (4) a City of

52 ECF No. 27-1 at 9.

53 ECF No. 32; ECF No. 33.

54 ECF No. 34.

55 Id. at 1.

Hammond assistant district attorney; (5) a Hammond City Court judge; (6) the Mayor

of the Town of Madisonville; (7) an attorney for the Town of Madisonville; (8) the

Madisonville Chief of Police; and (9) the arbitrator who presided over the American

Arbitration Association arbitration that Robles initiated against Quirch.56 The Court

liberally construes Robles’s pro se motion for “[j]oinder of [p]arties” as a motion for

leave to amend his complaint to name the listed individuals as Defendants.

The Court denies Robles’s liberally construed motion for leave to amend

because his proposed amendment is futile. The Court “should freely give leave [to

amend] when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). To be sure, “leave to

amend should be liberally granted[ ] when the [pro se] plaintiff might be able to state

a claim based on the underlying facts and circumstances.” Hernandez v. W. Tex.

Treasures Est. Sales, L.L.C., 79 F.4th 464, 468 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Brewster v.

Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767–688 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). But the Court need not

“grant a futile motion to amend[.]” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). “An

amendment is futile if it would fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Marucci Sports,

L.L.C. v. NCAA, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Robles’s

proposed amendment is futile: Robles fails to attach a proposed amended complaint

to his motion and therefore fails to offer any factual allegations to support any cause

of action on any theory against any of the individuals he seeks to add as Defendants.

Nor is there any indication that Robles “might be able to state a claim” against any

of the individuals he seeks to name “based on the underlying facts and

56 ECF No. 34 at 1; ECF No. 34-1 at 1–2.

circumstances.” Hernandez, 79 F.4th at 468 (citing Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767–68). For

each of those independent reasons, the Court denies Robles’s motion.57

B. The State’s Motion to Dismiss58

The State moves to dismiss Robles’s claims for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity.59 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).

On the State’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court may assess subject-matter

jurisdiction based on “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by

undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts

plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d

158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Because Robles is “the party asserting

jurisdiction,” Robles has the burden of proving it here. See id. (citations omitted).

Robles has not met his Rule 12(b)(1) burden to show that the Court has subject-

matter jurisdiction over any claims he intends to assert against the State for a simple

reason: The State has sovereign immunity. “Federal courts are without jurisdiction

over suits against a state[ ]. . . unless that state has waived its sovereign immunity

or Congress has clearly abrogated it.” NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389,

393–94 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation and citation omitted). The State has not consented

to this suit, and Robles has not pointed to any congressional act that “clearly

abrogate[s]” the State’s sovereign immunity here. Id. (quotation and citation

57 ECF No. 34.

58 ECF No. 27.

59 Id. at 1–2; ECF No. 27-1 at 5–8. Because the Court dismisses Robles’s claims against the

State for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court does not reach the State’s

alternative arguments for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See ECF No. 27-1 at 8–10.

omitted). True, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908), carves out a “narrow

exception” to sovereign immunity. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39

(2021). But Robles may not avail himself of Ex parte Young’s “narrow exception” here,

id., because Robles has not (1) properly named an individual official of the State as a

Defendant in his or her official capacity; (2) plausibly alleged an “ongoing violation of

federal law”; or (3) sought relief that is “properly characterized as prospective.” Mi

Familia Vota v. Ogg, 105 F.4th 313, 325 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotation and citation

omitted). In sum, the State enjoys sovereign immunity, and the Court lacks subject-

matter jurisdiction over any claims Robles asserts against it. So the Court grants the

State’s motion60 to dismiss Robles’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.61

C. Quirch’s Motion to Dismiss62

Quirch moves to dismiss Robles’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6), contending

Robles fails to state any claims against it on any theory.63 The Court agrees.

To survive Quirch’s motion to dismiss, Robles’s liberally construed complaints

“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell.

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

60 ECF No. 27.

61 Robles’s memoranda in support of his motions to strike, ECF No. 32-1; ECF No. 33-1;—which

the Court liberally construes as Robles’s briefs in opposition to the State’s motion to dismiss—fail to

show that the State is not entitled to sovereign immunity or that the requirements for Ex parte Young’s

“narrow exception” to sovereign immunity are met. Whole Woman’s Health, 595 U.S. at 39.

62 ECF No. 10.

63 Id. at 1; ECF No. 10-1 at 1–9.

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556). “Although ‘[courts] accept all well-pled facts as true, construing all

reasonable inferences in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions are not

accepted as true.’” Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840, 843 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting

Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023)). “The filings of a pro se litigant are

to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Tucker v.

Gaddis, 40 F.4th 289, 292 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation and quotation omitted). But “pro

se plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above the

speculative level.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016).

Robles’s liberally construed pro se complaints fail to state any claims against

Quirch on any potentially applicable theory. Robles’s complaints vaguely reference

“[b]reach of [an] [e]mployment [c]ontract” and “violation of [the] [F]air [L]abor

[S]tandards [A]ct for retaliation against employee,” suggesting that Robles might

intend to assert breach-of-contract and FLSA retaliation claims against Quirch.64 But

Robles fails to plead facts plausibly entitling him to relief on either theory.

Robles fails to state a breach-of-contract claim against Quirch. To state a

breach-of-contract claim against Quirch under Louisiana law,65 Robles must plead

64 ECF No. 4 at 2; ECF No. 7 at 2.

65 The Court assumes—without deciding—that Louisiana law governs the requirements of any

breach-of-contract claim that Robles asserts against Quirch because Robles invokes the Court’s

diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, ECF No. 4 at 2. See Wisznia Co. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co.,

759 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (the substantive law of the forum applies in diversity cases).

facts—not mere legal conclusions—plausibly establishing that (1) Quirch

“undert[ook] an obligation to perform”; (2) Quirch “failed to perform the obligation

(the breach)”; and (3) Quirch’s “failure to perform resulted in damages to [Robles].”

IberiaBank v. Broussard, 907 F.3d 826, 835 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation and citation

omitted). Robles fails to do so. He does not identify his alleged employment contract

with Quirch or the provision of that contract Quirch allegedly breached. Nor does he

allege any facts allowing the Court to reasonably infer that Quirch breached that

contract. Robles therefore fails to state a breach-of-contract claim against Quirch.

Robles also fails to state an FLSA retaliation claim against Quirch. The FLSA

features an anti-retaliation provision that “prohibits employers from retaliating

against employees for filing complaints about violations of the FLSA.” Aldridge v.

Miss. Dep’t of Corrs., 990 F.3d 868, 872 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)).

To state an FLSA retaliation claim against Quirch, Robles must plead facts plausibly

establishing that (1) he “participat[ed] in protected activity” under the FLSA; (2) he

suffered “an adverse employment action”; and (3) there is “a causal link between the

[protected] activity and the adverse action.” Potter v. Cardinal Health 200, LLC, 381

F. Supp. 3d 729, 739 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (citing Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 529

F.3d 617, 624 (5th Cir. 2008)). Robles fails to do so. Among other deficiencies, Robles’s

liberally construed pro se complaints lack factual allegations allowing the Court to

reasonably infer that there is “a causal link” between Quirch’s termination of Robles’s

employment for his poor performance and any “protected activity” under the FLSA

that Robles may have “participat[ed] in.” Id. (citing Hagan, 529 F.3d at 624). So

Robles fails to state any FLSA retaliation claims against Quirch.

The Court’s conclusion that Robles fails to state any claims against Quirch does

not end the analysis. The Court must decide if dismissal should be with or without

prejudice—that is, whether Robles should be allowed an opportunity to amend his

complaint yet again to try to state plausible claims. “Generally, . . . a pro se litigant

should be offered an opportunity to amend his complaint before it is dismissed.”

Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767–68 (citing Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.

1998) (per curiam)). And “leave to amend should be liberally granted” if a pro se

plaintiff “might be able to state a claim based on the underlying facts and

circumstances.” Hernandez, 79 F.4th at 468 (citing Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767–68).

But a district court need not “grant a futile motion to amend, for instance, when ‘the

plaintiff has already pleaded his best case.’” Id. (quoting Brewster, 587 F.3d at 768).

Robles “has already pleaded his best case,” and amendment would be futile. Id.

(quotation and citation omitted). Most fundamentally, there is no reliable indication

that Robles “might be able to state a claim” against Quirch “based on the underlying

facts and circumstances.” Id. (citing Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767–68). That Robles

unsuccessfully sought leave to amend his complaint to add futile, unarticulated

claims against putative Defendants with no direct connection to Robles’s employment

with Quirch underscores his inability to state any claim against Quirch, his lack of

interest in attempting to do so, or both.66 What is more, Robles does not “explain what

66 See ECF No. 34 (“Motion for Joinder,” which the Court has liberally construed as a motion

for leave to amend).

facts he would . . . add[ ]” if the Court permitted him to file a third amended complaint

or “how he would . . . overcome” the deficiencies identified in this opinion and in

Quirch’s motion to dismiss. Pitts v. Waffle House, Inc., No. 23-60436, 2024 WL

1904556, at *3 (5th Cir. May 1, 2024) (per curiam). Finally, Robles has “already had

a considerable opportunity to present his best case” against Quirch. Weeks v. Collier,

No. 22-10126, 2023 WL 7703823, at *8 (5th Cir. Nov. 15, 2023) (per curiam). Indeed,

Robles “has presented [his] arguments several times” in his original complaint,67 his

supplemental complaint,68 his opposition69 to Quirch’s motion to dismiss, and his

liberally construed motion70 for leave to amend. Dougherty v. United States Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., No. 22-40665, 2023 WL 6123106, at *6 (5th Cir. Sept. 19, 2023) (per

curiam). “Despite these opportunities, [Robles] remains unable to state plausible”

claims against Quirch. Id. The Court therefore dismisses all of Robles’s claims against

Quirch under Rule 12(b)(6) with prejudice and without leave to amend.

D. Perrilloux’s Motion to Dismiss71

Perrilloux moves the Court to dismiss Robles’s claims for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).72

As for Rule 12(b)(1), Perrilloux contends that the Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction over Robles’s claims to the extent that Robles asks the Court for an order

67 ECF No. 4.

68 ECF No. 7.

69 ECF No. 15.

70 ECF No. 34.

71 ECF No. 22.

72 ECF No. 22 at 1; ECF No. 22-1 at 1–5.

dismissing the state criminal case against Robles.73 The Court agrees. Consistent

with the abstention doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–47

(1971), “a federal court may enjoin a pending state-court criminal proceeding only if:

(1) the state-court proceeding was brought in bad faith or to harass the federal

plaintiff; (2) the federal plaintiff seeks to challenge a state statute that is flagrantly

and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence,

and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be

made to apply it, or (3) where other extraordinary circumstances threaten irreparable

loss [that] is both great and immediate.” Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir.

2018) (citation and quotation omitted). Robles has not shown that any of these “three

narrow exceptions applies.” Id. at 881. So the Court must decline jurisdiction over

any request to interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings involving Robles.

As for Rule 12(b)(6), Perrilloux contends that Robles fails to state any claims

against him because Robles’s complaints do not even mention him.74 Perrilloux is

correct. Even with the benefit of liberal construction, Robles’s pro se complaints lack

any factual allegations allowing the Court to reasonably infer that Perrilloux is liable

to Robles on any theory. As Perrilloux correctly observes, Robles’s complaints do not

even mention him. So, because Robles’s complaints do not allege any conduct by

Perrilloux, Robles necessarily fails to state any claims against Perrilloux.75

73 ECF No. 22-2 at 3–4.

74 ECF No. 22-2 at 2–3.

75 Robles’s liberally construed opposition does not persuade the Court that Robles could state

any claim against Perrilloux or any theory. See ECF No. 25.

The Court finds that Robles “has already pleaded his best case” against

Perrilloux, and that amendment would be futile. Hernandez, 79 F.4th at 468

(quotation and citation omitted). There is no indication that Robles “might be able to

state a claim” against Perrilloux “based on the underlying facts and circumstances.”

Id. (citing Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767–68). Perrilloux would enjoy absolute

prosecutorial immunity from any claims arising from Perrilloux’s initiation of a

prosecution against Robles. See Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2003)

(per curiam) (explaining that prosecutors are “absolutely immune from liability under

42 U.S.C.§ 1983 for [their] conduct in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the

State’s case, insofar as that conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase

of the criminal process” (quotation and citation omitted)). And Perriloux would enjoy

qualified immunity from any claim arising from his performance of “investigative

functions.” Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 281 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation and

quotation omitted). What is more, Robles does not “explain what facts he would

. . . add[ ]” if the Court permitted him to file a third amended complaint or “how he

would . . . overcome” the deficiencies identified in this opinion and in Perrilloux’s

motion. Pitts, 2024 WL 1904556, at *3. Finally, Robles has “already had a

considerable opportunity to present his best case.” Weeks, 2023 WL 7703823, at *8.

Indeed, Robles “has presented [his] arguments several times” in his original

complaint,76 his supplemental complaint,77 his opposition78 to Perrilloux’s motion to

76 ECF No. 4.

77 ECF No. 7.

78 ECF No. 25.

dismiss, and his liberally construed motion79 for leave to amend. Dougherty, 2023 WL

6123106, at *6. “Despite these opportunities, [Robles] remains unable to state

plausible” claims against Perrilloux. Id. The Court therefore dismisses Robles’s

remaining claims against Perrilloux with prejudice and without leave to amend.

E. Robles’s Claims Against the Remaining Defendants

The Court has dismissed Robles’s claims against the State, Quirch, and

Perrilloux. The remaining Defendants are the United States Department of Labor,

the Office of Administrative Law Judges, OSHA, Hammond City Court, and CT

Corporation Systems. Liberally construed, Robles’s pro se complaints fail to allege

facts allowing a reasonable inference that any of those Defendants is liable to Robles

on any theory conceivably related to the alleged facts underlying Robles’s complaints.

The Court may dismiss Robles’s claims against the remaining Defendants for

failure to state a claim sua sponte, “as long as the procedure employed is fair to the

parties.” Century Sur. Co. v. Blevins, 799 F.3d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation and

citation omitted). Fairness requires that the Court notify Robles of its intention to

dismiss any claims he asserts against the remaining Defendants and give Robles an

“opportunity to respond.” Id. at 373 (quotation and citations omitted). The Court does

just that here: Robles is specifically notified that the Court intends to dismiss his

remaining claims with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), and Robles is granted 14 days

to file a response explaining why the Court should not dismiss his remaining claims.

79 ECF No. 34.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Robles’s motions®® are DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motions®! to dismiss are

GRANTED. Robles’s claims against Quirch are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim. Robles’s claims against the State are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Robles’s claims against Perrilloux are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to the extent Robles requests that the Court

interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings; Robles’s claims against Perrilloux

are otherwise DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Robles shall show cause in writing

within 14 days why his remaining claims should not be dismissed with prejudice

under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court cautions Robles that, if he fails to timely file a

response, the Court will dismiss the remainder of this action with prejudice and

without further notice and then enter judgment against him.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 20th day of March, 2025.

is S

BRANDON 8. LONG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

BCF No. 3: ECF No. 14: ECF No. 16; ECF No. 32; ECF No. 33; ECF No. 34.

81 ECF No. 10; ECF No, 22; ECF No. 27.

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