The opinion
[Cite as Bd. of Trustees Wood Cty. Property Trust Agreement, UAD June 4, 2008 John F. Nixon, Chairman v.
Melcher, 2025-Ohio-1000.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY
Board of Trustees of the Wood Court of Appeals No. WD-24-006
County Property Trust Agreement,
UAD June 4, 2008 John F. Nixon, Trial Court No. 2022 CV 0425
Chairman
Appellee
v.
Denis McAnally, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellees Decided: March 21, 2025
[Michael R. Melcher – Appellant]
*****
J. Douglas Ruck for appellee, Board of Trustees of
the Wood County Property Trust Agreement, UAD
June 4, 2008 John F. Nixon, Chairman
Marjan Neceski, for appellant, Michael R. Melcher
*****
SULEK, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant Michael R. Melcher appeals the judgment of the Wood County
Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Board of
Trustees of the Wood County Property Trust Agreement, UAD June 4, 2008 John F.
Nixon, Chairman (“Trustees”), on the parties’ competing claims for a declaratory
judgment interpreting the trust agreement. For the following reasons, the trial court’s
judgment is affirmed.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Rodney and Laura Nixon created a trust to hold a 48-acre parcel of property
located at 0 Webster Road in Wood County, Ohio, which was to be used as a youth
camping facility. Article IV of the trust agreement provided, however, that if “it is no
longer practical” to use the land as a youth camping facility, it shall be sold in the
following manner:
A. Dennis McAnally and Michael Melcher shall have a joint option
to purchase said property (as joint owners) at 75% of the then fair market
value as determined by an appraiser selected by a majority of the Ultimate
Beneficiaries over the age of 21. Closing costs and expenses from such a
sale are to be paid and allocated as customary for standard real estate
transactions in the area. If either of them is no longer living at the time of
the disposition of said property, the survivor may exercise this option alone.
This option does not pass to the heirs of either or both of them.
B. Should Dennis McAnally and Michael Melcher be both
unwilling or unable to exercise this option, and said property is being
farmed or operated as an orchard by another party, an option shall be
extended to said party allowing them to purchase said property under the
same terms and conditions covered in “A” above.
C. Should there be no option exercised under paragraphs A and B
above, said property is to be sold for the fair market value at its highest and
best use.
{¶ 3} Dennis McAnally lives in the residence directly adjacent and has served as
an informal caretaker of the property for many years. He also presently sits on the board
of trustees for the trust. Melcher previously operated an apple orchard on the premises
but abandoned it several years before the events giving rise to this case.
2.
{¶ 4} At the annual meeting on December 1, 2021, the Trustees decided that it was
no longer practical to use the property as a youth camping facility. In response to an
inquiry, McAnally informed the Trustees that he did not intend to jointly purchase the
property with Melcher. The Trustees then offered to sell the property to Dean Ameling,
who is currently farming the property, and who was also present at the meeting. A
purchase contract was drafted and signed to sell the property to Ameling for $286,912.50,
which is 75% of the appraised value.
{¶ 5} On the eve of the closing of the sale, the title company required a “release”
from all parties named in the trust agreement, including Melcher. The release was
drafted by the attorney for the trust, and stated that the signer,
hereby releases the Right of First Refusal to Purchase granted to him by
Rodney Nixon and Laura Nixon, Grantors, of the Wood County Property
Trust Agreement dated June 4, 2008, in Article IV – Liquidation of Trust
Real Property relating to the real estate located in Webster Township,
Wood County, Ohio, and more fully described as:
See EXHIBIT A attached hereto and incorporated herein
I hereby release and forever discharge any Right of First Refusal to
Purchase granted to me under said Trust Agreement.
(Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 6} McAnally signed the release, but stated in his affidavit that
At that time, I understood Defendant Melcher would be executing a similar
release due to the fact that it was a joint purchase option. I do not have a
copy of said release document, but I have never delivered or sent the
release document to [the chairman of the Trustees]; nor have I authorized
its recording except contemporaneously with that of Defendant Melcher
upon sale to Defendant Ameling. I did not and do not intend the release to
serve as a release of any of my rights except the right to exercise a joint
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tenancy with Defendant Melcher, which is the sole right which I, and the
other Trustees, believe and understand the Trust language to grant.
(Emphasis sic.) Melcher refused to sign the release and indicated his desire to purchase
the property on his own.
{¶ 7} Considering Melcher’s refusal, the Trustees initiated the present matter by
filing a complaint for declaratory judgment against McAnally, Melcher, and Ameling,
seeking an order from the trial court that the joint option granted by the trust to McAnally
and Melcher may only be exercised by them jointly. Melcher answered and filed a
counterclaim against the trust and crossclaims against McAnally and Ameling, seeking a
declaratory judgment and specific performance that the trust must sell the property to
him.
{¶ 8} Ultimately, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The
Trustees argued that the trust created only a joint option to purchase the property, and not
an individual option that Melcher could exercise by himself. Thus, since McAnally did
not want to purchase the property jointly with Melcher, the trust should be allowed to sell
the property to Ameling.
{¶ 9} Melcher responded that McAnally disclaimed his interest in the trust
property, and consequently under R.C. 5815.36 he is treated as predeceasing Melcher.
Melcher argued, therefore, that as the “survivor,” he may execute the purchase option
alone. Further, he argued that even if McAnally did not disclaim his interest, the property
could not be sold to Ameling because both McAnally and Melcher were not unwilling or
unable to exercise the option.
4.
{¶ 10} The trial court granted the Trustees’ motion for summary judgment, denied
Melcher’s motion for summary judgment, and entered a declaratory judgment that the
trust agreement provides only a joint purchase option, which forecloses Melcher from
purchasing the property alone.1 It concluded that R.C. 5815.36 did not apply because
McAnally’s release was not delivered to the Trustees and was not filed with the county
recorder. As a result, because McAnally was unwilling, Melcher was unable to jointly
purchase the property.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 11} Melcher timely appeals the trial court’s judgment, asserting four
assignments of error for review:
1. The trial court erred when it found that the McAnally release was
not effective or binding under Ohio Revised Code Section 5815.36(M), as
“not delivered or recorded.”
2. The trial court erred when it failed to find that through the
McAnally release of his interest in the trust agreement, he was to be treated
as having died under the trust agreement and Ohio Revised Code
5815.36(G)(3), and, as a result, the option to purchase should have been
given to Melcher under Article IV of the trust agreement.
1
The trial court specified that Melcher could purchase the property alone under Article
IV, Section C of the trust agreement if Ameling was unwilling or unable to purchase the
property under Section B.
5.
3. The trial court erred when it found that Article IV of the trust
agreement allowed the trust to offer the property to Ameling to purchase
before being offered to Melcher.
4. The trial court erred when it failed to declare that Melcher could
exercise his option to purchase the property under the trust agreement.
III. Analysis
{¶ 12} Melcher’s assignments of error all relate to the trial court’s award of
summary judgment and will be addressed together.
{¶ 13} An appellate court reviews the grant of summary judgment under a de novo
standard of review. Koler v. Grand Harbour Condo. Owners Assn., 2014-Ohio-1299, ¶ 5
(6th Dist.), citing Doe v. Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390 (2000). Summary judgment
should be upheld when there is no issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can only come to one conclusion that
is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Id.,
quoting Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66 (1978).
{¶ 14} At issue in this case is the interpretation of the trust agreement and the
application of R.C. 5815.36. “A court’s purpose in interpreting a trust is to effectuate,
within the legal parameters established by a court or by statute, the settlor’s intent.”
Arnott v. Arnott, 2012-Ohio-3208, ¶ 14, quoting Domo v. McCarthy, 66 Ohio St.3d 312
(1993), paragraph one of the syllabus; Wyper v. DuFour, 2019-Ohio-1035, ¶ 14 (6th
Dist.). The construction of a written trust is a matter of law that is reviewed de novo. Id.
6.
Similarly, “[t]he interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law subject to
de novo review.” Kerger & Hartman, L.L.C. v. Ajami, 2015-Ohio-5157, ¶ 39 (6th Dist.).
The paramount concern in statutory construction is the legislative intent. Sullivan-White
v. Aukland, 2023-Ohio-141, ¶ 58 (6th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey,
2004-Ohio-4960, ¶ 21. “‘The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the
words they employ.’” State v. Fork, 2024-Ohio-1016, ¶ 13, quoting United States v.
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820).
{¶ 15} In his brief, Melcher argues that he has an option to purchase the property
alone under Section A of Article IV of the trust agreement because McAnally is treated
as predeceased pursuant to R.C. 5815.36(G)(3), and that the trial court erred when it
determined that R.C. 5815.36 did not apply. Specifically, he argues that McAnally’s
“release” was delivered, and that it did not need to be recorded for purposes of R.C.
5815.36. In response, the Trustees contend, inter alia, that McAnally’s “release” was not
a disclaimer as contemplated under R.C. 5815.36, and thus the statute is not implicated at
all.
{¶ 16} Upon de novo review, the Trustees are correct, and it is evident that
Melcher’s arguments are merely an attempt to misapply the disclaimer statute to achieve
a result that frustrates the settlors’ clear intent.
{¶ 17} R.C. 5815.36 allows a beneficiary under a nontestamentary instrument to
“disclaim, in whole or in part, the succession to any property by executing and by
delivering, filing, or recording a written disclaimer instrument in the manner provided in
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this section.” R.C. 5815.36(B)(1). “Disclaim” is not defined in the statute, but its
common meaning in this context is “[t]o renounce or disavow a legal claim to.”
DISCLAIM, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). “Renounce” likewise means “[t]o
give up or abandon formally (a right or interest); to disclaim <renounce an inheritance>.”
RENOUNCE, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
{¶ 18} The property interest in this case is “a joint option to purchase [the]
property (as joint owners) at 75% of the then fair market value.” Importantly, the option
itself is the property interest. At no point did McAnally state that he renounced,
disavowed, gave up, or formally abandoned possessing that option. Instead, as recounted
by the chairman of the board of trustees, McAnally stated at the December 1, 2021
annual meeting, that “he was not interested in purchasing the property” and that “he was
not interested in exercising the option in Article IV.”.
{¶ 19} A distinction exists between disclaiming the option and declining to
exercise the option. Under the former, McAnally would renounce, or give up, the
property interest of the option to choose whether to purchase the property jointly with
Melcher. Under the latter, McAnally would accept the property interest of the option and
decline to exercise it by choosing not to purchase the property. The facts in this case
demonstrate that McAnally accepted the option and then declined to exercise it, as
evidenced by his statements to the Trustees that he was not interested in purchasing the
property and was not interested in exercising the option. If he had disclaimed the option,
he would have abandoned his right to make any choice at all about whether he wanted to
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exercise it. Since he made a choice, there was no disclaimer, and R.C. 5815.36,
therefore, does not apply.
{¶ 20} Moreover, McAnally’s subsequent “release” did not, and could not,
retroactively disclaim the option. R.C. 5815.36(D) provides that “[t]he disclaimant shall
deliver, file, or record the disclaimer, or cause the same to be done, prior to accepting
any benefits of the disclaimed interest . . ..” (Emphasis added.). See also generally Ohio
Natl. Bank of Columbus v. Miller, 57 N.E.2d 717, 718 (2d Dist. 1943) (“‘[A] beneficiary
under a will is not bound to accept a legacy or devise therein provided for, but may
disclaim or renounce his right under the will… provided he has not already accepted
it.’”); Clark v. Beyoglides, 2021-Ohio-4588, ¶ 39 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 21} The critical fact here is that the release occurred after McAnally had
already articulated his decision to not exercise the option. Indeed, the release was only
necessary because the title company requested it after the trust moved forward under
Section B of Article IV to sell the property to Ameling, which it did after McAnally
verbally expressed his unwillingness to purchase the property jointly with Melcher.
Consistent with this, he explained that he “[did] not intend the release to serve as a
release of any of my rights except the right to exercise a joint tenancy with Defendant
Melcher.” McAnally’s pro forma release, therefore, is ineffective to disclaim under R.C.
5815.36 a property interest that he had already accepted and chose not to exercise.
{¶ 22} Turning to the application of Article IV of the trust agreement, Section A
provides that McAnally and Melcher have “a joint option to purchase [the] property (as
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joint owners) at 75% of the then fair market value.” If, however, “either of them is no
longer living at the time of the disposition of said property, the survivor may exercise this
option alone.” The intent of the settlors from this language is that McAnally and Melcher
could only purchase the property as joint owners, unless one of them was no longer living
at the time of disposition. Because they are both still living, and because Melcher cannot
rely on the legal fiction that McAnally predeceased him under R.C. 5815.36, they can
only purchase the property as joint owners; Melcher does not have a right to purchase the
property individually.
{¶ 23} Finally, Section B of Article IV provides that “[s]hould Dennis McAnally
and Michael Melcher be both unwilling or unable to exercise this option,” an option shall
be extended to a party that is farming or operating an orchard on the property to purchase
the property under the same terms. “Both” as used in Section B modifies “Dennis
McAnally and Michael Melcher,” meaning that Section B applies where McAnally and
Melcher are each unwilling or unable to exercise the joint option to purchase the property
as joint owners. Here, McAnally is indisputably unwilling to exercise the joint option to
purchase the property jointly with Melcher. Necessarily then, Melcher is unable to
purchase the property jointly with McAnally. Consequently, Section B requires that an
option to purchase the property be given to Ameling because he is farming on the
property.
{¶ 24} Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it granted the Trustees’ motion
for summary judgment, denied Melcher’s motion for summary judgment, and entered a
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declaratory judgment that the trust agreement provides only a joint purchase option,
which forecloses Melcher from purchasing the property alone. Melcher’s assignments of
error are not-well taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Wood County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed. Melcher is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Myron C. Duhart, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, P.J.
CONCUR. _____________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ______________________________
ONLY. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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