The opinion
2025 IL App (2d) 240772-U
No. 2-24-0772
Order filed March 20, 2025
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 24-CF-2433
)
ETHAN J. DOMINGUEZ., ) Honorable
) Julia Yetter,
) D.J. Tegeler
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judges, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McLaren and Jorgenson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in ordering defendant detained pretrial where the State
proved by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof was evident and the
presumption great that defendant committed the offenses as charged; (2)
defendant’s pretrial release would pose a threat to the community at large and; (3)
that no condition or combination of conditions would mitigate the threat posed by
defendant . Affirmed.
¶2 At issue here is whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s petition to deny
defendant pretrial release pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024) and subsequently denying
2025 IL App (2d) 240772-U
defendant’s motion for relief under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2). Ill. Sup. Ct. R.
604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On November 10, 2024, the State charged defendant via complaint with one count of
unlawful possession of weapons by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2024)), a Class 2 felony;
one count of possession of a firearm by a street gang member in a vehicle (720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(2)
(West 2024)), a Class 2 felony; three counts of aggravated unlawful possession of a weapon (720
ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)-(2) (West 2024)), a Class 2 felony; one count of possession of a firearm while
ineligible for a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 2024)), a
Class 3 felony; one count of possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number (720 ILCS 5/24-
5(b) (West 2024)), a C lass 3 felony; and one count of possession of an open container of alcohol
by a passenger (625 ILCS 5/11-502(b) (West 2024)), a petty offense.
¶5 The same day, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release, alleging
that (1) the firearm offenses constituted detainable offenses under 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West
2024); (2) defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the
community, and; (3) no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that threat. The
matter proceeded to pretrial detention hearing.
¶6 The State offered into evidence the sworn synopsis from the Aurora Police Department as
People’s Exhibit No. 1. It was entered without objection. The synopsis relayed that at
approximately 12:24 A.M. on November 10, 2024, Aurora police officer conducted a traffic stop
on a 2014 Toyota Camry for multiple moving violations. The officer approached the vehicle with
his flashlight and observed defendant to be the sole occupant in the rear of the vehicle. As the
officer was approaching, he observed defendant reach over from the far right side of the vehicle
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where he was seated to the floor beneath the driver’s side seat. The officer then came closer to the
vehicle and observed the end of a firearm magazine jutting out from under the driver’s side seat.
¶7 Defendant was placed under arrest. During a search incident to arrest, officers discovered
a water bottle containing a dark liquid on defendant’s person. Defendant admitted the liquid was
alcohol. He was uncooperative with further questioning. A LEADS report showed defendant did
not have a valid FOID card and was an active Latin Kings street gang member.
¶8 The officer spoke with the driver of the vehicle, who advised he was driving for Uber at
the time officers conducted their traffic stop. He allowed the officer to search his vehicle. The
search revealed a loaded black and silver Glock 48, 9 mm firearm with a defaced serial number on
the floor beneath the driver’s seat of the vehicle. The driver denied ownership of the firearm,
though he did have a valid FOID card. He also relayed that as he was pulling over for the traffic
stop, he heard the sound of something being thrown under his driver seat.
¶9 The State also offered the sworn synopsis in case no. 23-CF-2805, which was entered into
evidence over defendant’s objection. The synopsis relayed that defendant admitted to possessing
a firearm without a valid FOID card.
¶ 10 Lastly, the State proffered defendant’s criminal history. Specifically noting that, at the time
of the instant offenses, defendant was on probation in case no. 23-CF-2805, 22-JD-116, and 22-
JD-152.
¶ 11 Defense counsel then proffered that defendant is a 20-year-old high school graduate, is
working full time as an electrician apprentice, and has a child on the way.
¶ 12 The trial court granted the State’s petition and ordered defendant detained. Defense counsel
filed a motion for relief under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2), which proceeded to hearing
on December 12, 2024.
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¶ 13 Defense counsel first argued that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that defendant committed the offenses as charged. The firearm was found underneath the driver’s
seat, not on defendant’s person. Defense counsel posited that the firearm could have been placed
there by a prior passenger or the Uber driver. Without DNA evidence or an admission of guilt, the
State could not show by clear and convincing evidence that defendant possessed the firearm.
¶ 14 Next, defense counsel argued that certain conditions would ensure the safety of the
community. He emphasized that defendant has only one prior adult criminal case and would be
living in a stable home if released. A stay-home order would mitigate any threat posed by
defendant.
¶ 15 The State responded, arguing that the trial court’s decision to detain defendant was correct.
The trial court agreed with the State and denied defendant’s motion for relief.
¶ 16 Defense counsel then presented new evidence to the trial court and requested that the trial
court determine that continued detention was not necessary to mitigate the threat posed by
defendant. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024). Counsel presented the trial court with a letter
from defendant’s step-mother which indicated that defendant would be living with her if he was
released and that she would personally be monitoring him to ensure he stays out of trouble. Counsel
also proffered that defendant would be working as an electrician if released and that he recently
had a two-month old child pass away.
¶ 17 The State countered, proffering that defendant is an active Latin King street gang member.
If released, he would be residing in Cook County, which is where the Latin Kings are
headquartered. Further, the Kane County Sheriff’s Office cannot place individuals on EHM in
Cook County. His juvenile and adult criminal history show that monitoring by his family alone is
not enough to stop him from committing further crimes. Finally, the State proffered that it had
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viewed a video on an officer’s cell phone showing defendant showing off a firearm and
encouraging rival gang members to “find him.” Given all that, continued detention was necessary
to mitigate the threat posed by defendant.
¶ 18 The trial court agreed with the State and ordered continued detention. Defendant filed his
timely notice of appeal on December 16, 2024.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 In his motion for relief, defendant argues that the State failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed the
offenses charged because: (1) the sworn synopsis “leaves open the possibility for a motion to
suppress *** arrest; (2) the driver of the vehicle had a FOID card, but no valid CCL, which makes
the driver’s denial of ownership of the firearm less credible; and (3) the State did not present any
photos, videos, fingerprints, DNA, or additional evidence showing who owned the firearm. He
also argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a
real and present threat to the community because defendant is a young adult who just graduated
high school, only has one prior adult conviction, and has no violations of probation in case no. 23-
CF-2805. Finally, defendant argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the threat posed by defendant because
the fact that defendant was on probation at the time of the alleged offense is insufficient. The State
failed to show how conditions, such as EHM, would not mitigate the threat posed by defendant.
Defendant did not file a supporting memorandum, instead filing a notice in lieu of Rule 604(h)(7)
memorandum.
¶ 21 The State responds by arguing that it did meet its burden, and that the trial court did not err
in detaining defendant. For the following reasons, we affirm.
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¶ 22 Where parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer, a reviewing court
is not bound by the trial court’s findings and our review is de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL
130626, ¶ 51. As parties here proceeded solely by proffer, our review is accordingly de novo.
¶ 23 Under Article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (hereinafter, “Code”), all
defendants are presumed to be entitled to pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2024). Upon
verified petition by the State, the trial court shall hold a hearing under 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1. In
order to be denied pretrial release, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1)
the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense;
(2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the
community; and (3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present
threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1)-(3) (West
2024).
¶ 24 In determining dangerousness, the trial court may consider the following factors: (1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense or offenses charged; (2) the history and characteristic of
the defendant; (3) the identity of any person or persons to whose safety the defendant is believed
to pose a threat; (4) any statements made by defendant, together with the circumstances
surrounding them; (5) the age and physical condition of the defendant; (6) the age and physical
condition of any victim or complaining witness; (7) whether the defendant is known to possess or
have access to any weapon or weapons; (8) whether, at the time of the current offense, the
defendant was on probation; and (9) any other factors deemed by the court to have a reasonable
bearing upon defendant’s propensity or reputation for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior, or
lack of such behavior. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1)-(9) (West 2024).
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¶ 25 In determining which conditions of pretrial release, if any, will ensure the safety of any
person or persons or the community, the trial court may consider the following: (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the evidence; (3) the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (4) the nature and seriousness of the real and present
threat that would be posed by defendant’s release; (5) the nature and seriousness of the risk of
obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process that would be posed by the
defendant’s release. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(1)-(5) (West 2024). No one factor is dispositive. People
v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 12.
¶ 26 Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed the offenses charged because: (1)
the sworn synopsis “leaves open the possibility for a motion to suppress *** arrest; (2) the driver
of the vehicle had a FOID card, but no valid CCL, which makes the driver’s denial of ownership
of the firearm less credible; and (3) the State did not present any photos, videos, fingerprints, DNA,
or additional evidence showing who owned the firearm.
¶ 27 Defendant has forfeited his first contention, as it is unsupported by any pertinent authority.
“A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and
cohesive argument presented [citation], and it is not a repository into which an appellant may foist
the burden of argument and research [citation][.]” Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682
(1993). At the detention hearing, defense counsel stated “I don’t think that this was a proper arrest.
The officer notes seeing a, what I will call a furtive movement. However, your Honor, there is case
law that furtive movements in and of themselves are not enough for the officer to effectuate an
arrest.” Counsel did not provide a case citation at the detention hearing, the motion for relief
hearing, nor the motion for relief itself. Although under the Code, evidence that proof of the
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charged crime may have been the result of an unlawful search or seizure is relevant in assessing
the weight of the evidence against the defendant, there needs to be more evidence than a bare
allegation of an unlawful search or seizure. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(6) (West 2024).
¶ 28 Regarding defendant’s second contention— that the driver of the vehicle had a FOID card,
but no valid CCL, which makes the driver’s denial of ownership of the firearm less credible. We
disagree. Even if we were to disregard the statements made by the driver, the evidence was still
sufficient to show that the proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed the offenses
as charged. Although the firearm was not found on defendant’s person, the officer observed
defendant, the only passenger in the backseat of the vehicle, reach across the vehicle to beneath
the driver’s seat. The officer then observed the magazine of a firearm jutting out from beneath the
driver’s seat, the area defendant had just reached to.
¶ 29 At this stage, that is sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the proof
is evident or the presumption great that defendant possessed the firearm. Clear and convincing
evidence is defined as “that quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the
fact finder about the truth of the proposition in question.” In re Tiffany W., 2021 IL App (1st)
102492-B, ¶ 12. It is more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than is required to convict
an individual of a criminal offense. Id. Here, the officer observed the magazine of a firearm in the
area where defendant had just reached moments before. Although more evidence may be necessary
to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence presented thus far is sufficient to show
that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant constructively possessed the
firearm. See Henderson v. U.S., 575 U.S. 622, 626 (2015) (“Constructive possession is established
when a person, though lacking such physical custody, still has the power and intent to exercise
control over the object.”)
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¶ 30 We also reject defendant’s third contention. This court has time and time again found that
police report synopses, if reliable, are sufficient to show that the proof is evident or the presumption
great that the defendant committed the offenses as charged. People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d)
230382, ¶ 24. Trial counsel recognizes this at the detention hearing, stating: “I realize that there
are cases where a synopsis is enough to find the presumption great or the proof is evident that a
defendant committed a crime; however, in this case, it is not, especially given where the firearm
was found being not on Mr. Dominguez’s person.” Although the firearm was not found on
defendant’s person, the officer observed defendant, the only passenger in the backseat of the
vehicle, reach across the vehicle to beneath the driver’s seat. The officer then observed the
magazine of a firearm jutting out from beneath the driver’s seat, the area defendant had just reached
to. This is sufficient to establish constructive possession of the firearm, and at this stage, DNA or
other evidence is not required.
¶ 31 Defendant next argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
he poses a real and present threat to the community because defendant is a young adult who just
graduated high school, only has one prior adult conviction, and has no violations of probation in
case no. 23-CF-2805. We disagree.
¶ 32 The history and characteristics of the defendant is just one factor of many to be considered
in determining dangerousness. Additionally, despite being young, he does have a prior conviction
for a similar firearm offense. Defense counsel places significant emphasis on the fact that
defendant only has one prior adult conviction and no violation of probation in case no. 23-CF-
2805, prior to the instant case. However, counsel fails to recognize that defendant pled guilty in
case no. 23-CF-2805 on March 22, 2024. Meaning defendant was on probation for less than a year
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when he was charged in the instant case. Defendant’s lack of a more extensive adult criminal
history is not compelling under these facts.
¶ 33 We find that defendant’s pretrial release would pose a real and present threat to the
community, given the dangerous nature of firearm offenses; defendant’s history; defendant’s
braggadocious statements proffered by the State, wherein defendant was showing off a firearm
and encouraging rival gang members to “find him”; defendant’s apparent ability to obtain firearms
illegally as evidenced by the fact he has been charged in two separate instances involving firearms
in a relatively short span of time; and the fact defendant was on probation at the time of the instant
offense. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1)-(9) (West 2024).
¶ 34 Finally, regarding defendant’s third argument—that the State failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the threat posed
by defendant because (1) the fact that defendant was on probation at the time of the alleged offense
is insufficient and; (2) the State failed to show how conditions, such as EHM, would not mitigate
the threat posed by defendant. We disagree. The fact that defendant was on probation was not the
sole reason that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat posed by
defendant. Rather, it was one factor of many that could be considered under the Code. See 725
ILCS 5/110-5(a)(1)-(5) (West 2024). The State did show that conditions would not mitigate the
threat posed by defendant. At the motion for relief hearing, it specifically considered EHM, noting
that the Kane County Sheriff’s Office cannot place individuals on EHM in Cook County, where
defendant would be residing. Even if he could be placed on EHM, he would still have the ability
to leave his house at least two days a week. Given defendant’s demonstrated willingness to
disregard court orders and access firearms illegally, no conditions would mitigate the threat posed
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by defendant. We agree and find that the State did prove by clear and convincing evidence that no
condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the threat posed by defendant.
¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 37 Affirmed.
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