stating proper respondent in federal habeas petition is petitioner’s 27 immediate custodian
How later courts described this case
- stating proper respondent in federal habeas petition is petitioner’s 27 immediate custodian
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 REYES JAMES CARRILLO Case No. 1:22-cv-01095-KES-CDB (HC)
12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF
13 v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINE TO
ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF
14 UNKNOWN,1 APPEALABILITY2
15 Respondent. 14-DAY DEADLINE
16 (Doc. 1)
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18 On August 22, 2022, Petitioner Reyes James Carrillo (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner
19 proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging two grounds for relief
20 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1). On October 28, 2022, Respondent filed an answer (Doc. 16), arguing
21 Petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief, and lodged the state court record in support (Docs. 14,
22 14-1 through 14-11). Petitioner did not file a traverse or any other response and the time to do so
23 has expired. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the district court
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25 1 Counsel for Respondent notes that Petitioner is incarcerated at High Desert State Prison, where Rob St. Andre is the
warden, and requests the Court substitute Rob St. Andre as Respondent in this matter. (Doc. 16 at 1 n.1). The Court
26 will grant the request and direct the Clerk of Court to substitute Rob St. Andre as Respondent. Brittingham v. United
States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating proper respondent in federal habeas petition is petitioner’s
27 immediate custodian).
2 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(c)(17) (E.D.
1 deny the Petition and decline to issue a certificate of appealability.
2 I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3 A jury in the Merced County Superior Court convicted Petitioner of first-degree murder in
4 violation of Penal Code § 187(a). (Doc. 14-1 at 61; see Doc. 14-9 at 2).3 The court sentenced
5 defendant to 55 years to life in prison. (Doc. 14-1 at 80; Doc. 14-9 at 2).
6 On appeal, the Fifth Appellate District Court of Appeal summarized the pertinent facts of
7 the underlying offense:4
8 The incident in this case was captured on a jail surveillance camera.
The video depicts several inmates in a cell. About one minute into
9 the video, Carrillo enters the sleeping quarters. Fifteen seconds
later, the victim emerges from atop a bunkbed, glances back toward
10 Carrillo, and exits the room while Carrillo follows behind. The
victim sits a [sic] table and Carrillo begins to sit on the opposite
11 side. Within three seconds, as the victim and Carrillo are face to
face, Rincon attacks the victim from behind. Carrillo, before fully
12 sitting, leaps over the table and joins in an attack that lasts nearly 12
minutes. The victim “died several days later.”
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A forensic pathologist testified “blunt-impact head injuries” caused
14 death. Those injuries included a broken nose, broken bones near the
eyes, “lacerations and impacts to [the] face and … scalp,” and
15 blood clogging “the airways into the back of [the] throat” resulting
in “irreversible brain injury.”
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(Doc. 14-9 at 2). The appellate court instructed the trial court to correct a clerical error in the
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abstract of judgment but otherwise affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. (Id. at 5). On December 22,
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2021, the California Supreme Court summarily denied review. (Doc. 14-11).
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Petitioner now presents two grounds for relief, arguing that there was insufficient
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evidence to (1) support premeditation and deliberation, and (2) support lying in wait. (Doc. 1 at
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4-9).
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II. STANDARD FOR FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF
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A federal court’s statutory authority to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state
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custody is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
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Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to
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27 3 Record citations herein are to the CM/ECF-assigned pages.
4 These facts are entitled to a presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Crittenden v. Chappell, 804
1 first “exhaust[t] the remedies available in the courts of the State.”5 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
2 Where the state court adjudicates the claim on the merits, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas
3 relief unless the adjudication (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
4 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
5 of the United States,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
6 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
7 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
8 “Deciding whether a state court’s decision ‘involved’ an unreasonable application of
9 federal law or was ‘based on’ an unreasonable determination of the facts requires the federal
10 habeas court to ‘train its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and factual—why state
11 courts rejected a state prisoner’s federal claims.” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018).
12 When the state court’s decision “does not come accompanied with [its] reasons” for the decision,
13 a federal court “should ‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court
14 decision that does provide a relevant rationale.” Id. However, when there is no reasoned decision
15 to “look through,” it may be presumed—in “the absence of any indication or state-law procedural
16 principles to the contrary”—that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits and the
17 petitioner must show “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”
18 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-99 (2011).
19 Under 2254(d)(1), a decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state
20 court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case
21 law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially
22 indistinguishable facts. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003). A state court decision
23 involves an “unreasonable application” of the Supreme Court’s precedents if the state court
24 correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies the facts of the petitioner’s case in an
25 objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005), or “if the state
26 court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new
27 context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new
1 context where it should apply.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). “A state court’s
2 determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fair-minded
3 jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington, 62 U.S. at
4 101. The petitioner must show that the state court decision “was so lacking in justification that
5 there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
6 fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.
7 Under § 2254(d)(2), “a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely
8 because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”
9 Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). “State courts are accorded substantial deference. If
10 reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question, on habeas
11 review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s determination.” Marks v. Davis, 106
12 F.4th 941, 949 (9th Cir. 2024) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brumfield v.
13 Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015)).
14 III. ANALYSIS
15 Petitioner exhausted his sufficiency of the evidence claims by presenting them to the state
16 courts on direct review and Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner has exhausted these
17 claims. Accordingly, the claims must be evaluated under the deferential AEDPA standard.
18 Because the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s request for review, this
19 Court looks to the opinion of the Fifth Appellate District as the last reasoned decision. See
20 Wilson, 584 U.S. at 125.
21 A. Background
22 On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support either a
23 theory of premeditation and deliberation or a theory of lying in wait. (See Doc. 14-6 at 11-25).
24 The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s arguments, explaining:
25 To prove first degree murder, the prosecutor argued two theories.
First, the murder was willfully committed with premeditation and
26 deliberation. Second, the murder was committed by lying-in-wait.
Carrillo argues the evidence insufficiently proved both theories. We
27 find the evidence sufficient to prove the former theory and need not
address the latter.
1 “Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for a jury finding,
we ‘ “ ‘ “review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
2 judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence — that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
3 solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v.
4 Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 323.) In general, evidence “ ‘sufficient
to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation falls into three
5 basic categories’: (1) facts about planning activity ‘prior to the
actual killing which show[s] that the defendant was engaged in
6 activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the
killing’; (2) ‘facts about the defendant’s prior relationship and/or
7 conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer
a “motive” to kill the victim’; and (3) ‘facts about the nature of the
8 killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing
was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have
9 intentionally killed according to a “preconceived design.” ’ ” (Id. at
p. 324.) These categories “ ‘are descriptive and neither normative
10 nor exhaustive ….’ ” (Ibid.)
11 “ ‘A first degree murder verdict will be upheld if there is sufficient
evidence as to at least one of the theories on which the jury is
12 instructed, “absent an affirmative indication in the record that the
verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground.” ’ ” (People v.
13 Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 170.) The evidence in this case is
sufficient to prove premeditation and deliberation.
14
The video evidence depicts a coordinated, planned attack by
15 Carrillo and Rincon. The victim is not visible on video for more
than a minute. He emerges from a bed about 15 seconds after
16 Carrillo enters the room. The victim walks straight to a table in the
other room as Carrillo follows closely behind. The jury could
17 reasonably infer Carrillo summoned the victim to get out of bed and
sit at the table.
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Next, within three seconds of sitting, Rincon attacks the victim
19 from behind; Carrillo, not yet fully seated, instantly leaps over the
table and joins the attack. In fact, Carrillo is so quick to attack the
20 victim he reaches the floor faster than the victim falls off his seat.
21 The haste with which Carrillo attacks the victim is conclusive. His
lack of hesitation readily connotes coordination. Coordination
22 implies planning. Planning signifies premeditation.
23 The attack’s lengthy duration and brutality leaves no room to doubt
Carrillo’s intention: “The systematic and prolonged assault with
24 manifestly deadly force on the helpless victim is consistent only
with an intent to kill.” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 630.)
25 Combined, Carrillo’s unrelenting intent to kill and the fact he
helped orchestrate the attack by leading the victim to the table
26 amply prove deliberation. (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th
983, 1020 [“prolonged” nature of homicidal act “affords ample time
27 for the offender to consider the nature of his deadly act.”].)
Accordingly, the evidence sufficiently proved first degree murder.
1 (Doc. 14-9 at 3-4 (footnote omitted)). The appellate court clarified that it did not separately
2 address the “lying-in-wait theory because there [was] no indication the jury relied on that theory.”
3 (Id. at 4 n.3).
4 B. Law and Analysis
5 “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
6 beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
7 charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
8 (1979), which sets forth the federal standard for determining a sufficiency of the evidence claim,
9 such a claim “can only succeed when, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
10 prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
11 a reasonable doubt.” Johnson v. Montgomery, 899 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2018). Federal
12 courts look to state law for the elements of the specific offense at issue. Maquiz v. Hedgpeth, 907
13 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2018). When a federal habeas court reviews an insufficiency claim
14 previously rejected on the merits by the state court, “a second level of deference applies under
15 AEDPA” such that, to prevail, a petitioner must show that the “state court’s determination that a
16 rational jury could have found each required element proven beyond a reasonable doubt was not
17 just wrong but was objectively unreasonable.” Johnson, 899 F.3d at 1056-57.
18 In California, murder is statutorily defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being, or a
19 fetus, with malice aforethought.” Cal. Pen. Code § 187(a). Murder “that is perpetrated by means
20 of … lying in wait … or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing” is
21 considered first-degree murder. Cal. Pen. Code § 189(a). “In this context, premeditated means
22 considered beforehand, and deliberate means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result
23 of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.”
24 In re Lopez, 14 Cal. 5th 562, 580 (2023) (quotation marks omitted). “An intentional killing is
25 premedicated and deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather
26 than unconsidered or rash impulse.” Id. Lying in wait “is a means of proving first degree
27 murder.” People v. Sandoval, 62 Cal. 4th 394, 416 (2015); see People v. Russell, 50 Cal. 4th
1 simply different means of committing the same crime”).
2 Petitioner “contends a finding he intended to kill with premeditation and deliberation, or
3 that he killed by means of lying in wait, could not be gleaned solely from the video.” (Doc. 1 at
4 4). As an initial matter, while Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
5 both a premeditation and deliberation theory and a lying in wait theory, he was convicted of a
6 single count of murder without any indication of which theory the jury relied on. Because both
7 these theories “are simply different means of committing the same crime,” see Russell, 50 Cal.
8 4th at 1257, Petitioner’s grounds present a single issue—whether sufficient evidence supports his
9 first-degree murder conviction.
10 The state appellate court rejected Petitioner’s argument that there was insufficient
11 evidence to support his conviction, and Petitioner fails to explain how that decision was wrong or
12 objectively unreasonable as required to show habeas relief warranted. Further, a review of the
13 video in question reveals that sufficient evidence supported Petitioner’s conviction. The video
14 shows Petitioner and his codefendant, Steven Rincon, conversing in one room of the cell with two
15 other inmates present. The two other inmates and Petitioner move to the bedroom of the cell
16 while Rincon moves to the back toilet area of the cell. Petitioner approaches Bonilla in the
17 bedroom and follows Bonilla to the other room. Bonilla sits down at a table in the position
18 closest to Rincon and Petitioner moves to sit across from Bonilla. Before Petitioner is fully
19 seated, Rincon rushes Bonilla and strikes him. Petitioner immediately jumps over the table and
20 Petitioner and Rincon beat Bonilla continuously for approximately two minutes and intermittently
21 over the following eight minutes.6
22 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact
23 could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner acted with premeditation and
24 deliberation as required to support a first-degree murder conviction. As such, the state court’s
25 rejection of Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable
26 application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable
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1 determination of the facts. The undersigned recommends that the Petition be denied.
2 IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
3 “[A] state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a
4 district court’s denial of his application.” Miller-El v. Cockell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). Rule
5 11 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires a court to “issue or deny a certificate of
6 appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability
7 will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
8 right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this showing for claims rejected on procedural grounds,
9 a movant must demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
10 states a valid claim of denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
11 debatable whether the district was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
12 473, 484 (2000). When a claim is rejected on the merits, the petitioner “must demonstrate that
13 reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
14 or wrong” to warrant a certificate of appealability.
15 Because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
16 right, the undersigned recommends that the court decline to issue a certificate of appealability.
17 V. RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
18 For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to substitute
19 Rob St. Andre as Respondent in the case caption of the docket. Further, it is
20 RECOMMENDED:
21 1. Petitioner be DENIED all relief on his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1);
22 and
23 2. Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability.
24 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this
25 action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the
26 United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 14 days of service of this
27 recommendation, any party may file written objections to these findings and recommendations
1 | to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without
2 | leave of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the
3 | Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the
4 | exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise
5 | reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be
6 | disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28
7 | U.S.C. § 636(b)C)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified
8 | time may waive the right to appeal the district judge’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d
9 | 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
10 | IT IS SO ORDERED.
| Dated: _Mareh 18, 2025 | hr
12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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