Chubboy v. Chubboy

UMNIITDEDDL ES TDAITSTERS IDCITS TORFI FCLTO CROIUDRAT

TAMPA DIVISION

BRIAN C. CHUBBOY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-586-TPB-LSG

NONA C. CHUBBOY, et al.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

This matter is before the Court sua sponte on Plaintiff Brian C. Chubboy’s

complaint, filed pro se on March 11, 2025. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff filed this suit against two

state court judges, an attorney, and an individual person, essentially alleging violations

of his constitutional rights in state court proceedings against him. In his complaint,

Plaintiff requests an “emergency injunction” to prevent the enforcement of the Sixth

Judicial Circuit’s final judgment.1 Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court more

liberally construes the pleadings. See Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.

2018).

Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of defects. Most critically, Plaintiff’s

allegations show nothing more than his disagreement with decisions judges have made in

his cases while acting in their judicial capacities. As the Eleventh Circuit explained:

1 Based on the court records, it appears the state court entered a final judgment against Plaintiff

that included an injunction for protection against the exploitation of a vulnerable adult, Nona

Chubboy. See Chubboy v. Chubboy, No. 24-002817-GD (Fla. 6th Jud. Cir.). The state court

judgment was per curium affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal on January 3, 2025,

and the mandate issued on February 6, 2025. See Chubboy v. Chubboy, No. 2D2024-1002 (Fla.

“foJru tdhgoesse a arcet se nttaiktleend wtoh ailbes tohlueyte a jrued aiccitainl gim inm tuhneiitry j ufrdoimci adla mages

capacity unless they acted in the ‘clear absence of all

jurisdiction.’ ” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir.

2000) (citations omitted). Judges are also generally immune

from injunctive and declaratory relief unless (1) a declaratory

decree was violated or (2) declaratory relief is unavailable.

Id. at 1242. “A judge enjoys immunity for judicial acts regardless

of whether he made a mistake, acted maliciously, or exceeded

his authority.” McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th

Cir. 2018).

McCree v. Griffin, No. 19-14646-A, 2020 WL 2632329, at *1 (11th Cir. May 20, 2020).

Importantly, “judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate

assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citing Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

Considering the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds that Judge Campbell

and Judge Crane are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See, e.g., McCree, 2020 WL

2632329, at *1-2 (holding that judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity from

injunctive relief and money damages where plaintiff alleged that judge violated his

constitutional rights by arbitrarily denying motion); Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239-40 (holding

that federal judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from injunctive relief and

money damages for acts taken in their judicial capacity unless jurisdiction is clearly

absent); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (explaining that judge will not

be deprived of immunity even if action was in error, done maliciously, or in excess of his

authority, and he is only subject to liability in the clear absence of all jurisdiction);

Austin v. McCann, No. 22-12157, 2023 WL 3335312, at *2-3 (11th Cir. May 10, 2023)

(holding that hearing officer appointed by the chief judge of the judicial circuit was

entitled to absolute judicial immunity); Hutcheson v. Campbell, No. 8:23-cv-105-TPB-

SPF, 2023 WL 2352845, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2023) (holding that state court child

support hearing officer was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity), report and

recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2351691, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2023) (dismissing

case). Because Plaintiff’s allegations emanate from actions taken by these judges in their

official judicial capacities during proceedings over which they had jurisdiction, the judges

are absolutely immune from civil liability.

As to the remaining Defendants, the Court still does not possess jurisdiction to

hear this dispute. “By federal statute, established constitutional case law, and

longstanding federal policy, federal courts will enjoin state court proceedings only in

narrowly defined and strictly limited instances.” Claughton v. Donner, 771 F. Supp.

1200, 1203 (S.D. Fla. 1991). Indeed, “[u]nder the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,

‘[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State

court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its

jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.’” Id. at 1203 (quoting Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40 (1971)). Here, Plaintiff effectively asks this Court to stay a state

court injunction entered against him. But this is exactly what the Anti-Injunction Act

precludes, and none of the exceptions to it otherwise apply. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

claims are barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.

Next, the complaint appears to take issue with state court rulings, orders, and

judgments. Plaintiff’s claims are therefore likely barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

because he essentially seeks review of state court proceedings and rulings by a federal

court. Federal courts are not the appropriate court for the appeal of state court decisions.

“It is well-settled that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review, reverse, or

invalidate a final state court decision.” Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997)

(citations omitted). This jurisdictional bar “extends not only to constitutional claims

presented or adjudicated by a state court, but also to claims that are ‘inextricably

intertwined’ with a state court judgment.” Incorvaia v. Incorvaia, 154 F. App’x 127, 128

(11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Goodman ex. rel Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F. 3d 1327, 1332 (11th

Cir. 2001)).

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff is asking the Court to intervene in any ongoing

state court proceeding, the Court would abstain from doing so under the Younger

abstention doctrine. Under the Younger abstention doctrine, “federal courts ordinarily

must refrain from deciding the merits of a case when (1) there is a pending state judicial

proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; and (3) the parties

have an adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional claims in the state proceeding.”

See Newsome v. Broward Cty. Pub. Defenders, 304 F. App’x 814, 816 (11th Cir. 2008)

(citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).

Upon consideration of these factors, the Court finds that abstention is warranted to the

extent that any of the state court proceedings referenced in the complaint remain active

and pending.

For these reasons, this action is dismissed. Courts possess authority to sua sponte

dismiss an action but are generally required to provide a plaintiff with notice of the

intent to dismiss and give them an opportunity to respond. See Quire v. Smith, No. 21-

10473, 2021 WL 3238806, at *1 (11th Cir. July 30, 2021) (citing Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S.,

631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th Cir. 2011)). “An exception to this requirement exists, however,

when amending the complaint would be futile, or when the complaint is patently

frivolous.” Id. (citing Tazoe, 631 F.3d at 1336). Because amendment would be futile, the

case is dismissed without leave to amend.

Simply put, if Plaintiffis unhappy with decisions made by the judge in his cases,

his remedy is to file an appeal, not to sue the judges and others associated with his

case(s). Plaintiff is warned that if he files frivolous cases in this Court, he may be

subject to sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c), including

monetary sanctions or injunctive relief directing the Clerk to not accept future filings

by Plaintiff without first obtaining prior leave of the Court.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

(2) The Clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and

thereafter close this case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 18th day of March,

2025.

VAP. GA.

TOMBARBER =———(‘“‘C;;*~*~™

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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