Douglas v. Judd

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

QUINTEISE DOUGLAS,

MARKISHA WILSON, and

J.R., a minor by his mother

and natural guardian,

MARKISHA WILSON,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2569-VMC-AAS

SHERIFF GRADY JUDD, in his

official capacity as Sheriff

of Polk County, Florida,

JESSICA WILLIAMS, individually,

and DIAMOND HAYNES,

individually,

Defendants.

______________________________/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of

Defendants’ Sheriff Grady Judd, Jessica Williams, and Diamond

Haynes’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. # 14), filed

on December 3, 2024. Plaintiffs Quinteise Douglas, Markisha

Wilson, and J.R. responded to Defendants’ Motion on December

19, 2024. (Doc. # 26). For the reasons that follow, the Motion

is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

According to the amended complaint, this case arises

from Plaintiffs’ arrest during the early morning hours of

April 24, 2022. (Doc. # 3 at ¶ 31). Plaintiffs were allegedly

arrested by Deputy Haynes without a warrant and without

probable cause. (Id.). The arrest occurred after an incident

involving Deputy Williams several hours earlier on April 23,

2022. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-30).

Specifically, all Plaintiffs were at Plaintiff Wilson’s

residence, which is near the residence of Deputy Williams.

(Id. at ¶¶ 23-24). A dog owned by Deputy Williams’ next-door

neighbor allegedly “ran loose and attacked a small child

related to the Plaintiffs in [Wilson’s] backyard.” (Id. at ¶

24). “After grabbing and biting the child, the dog then

attacked the Wilson family dog.” (Id.). It is alleged that

the family members at Wilson’s residence chased the dog, and

that Wilson stopped Deputy Williams in her police cruiser and

asked her for help. (Id. at ¶ 25). Plaintiffs further allege

that Deputy Williams proceeded to her own house, did not

render aid to the Wilson family, and instead acted to protect

her neighbor and her neighbor’s dog. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28).

According to Plaintiffs, Bartow Police Department

officers appeared at the scene and Deputy Williams confirmed

with them that Plaintiffs had not assaulted or touched her.

(Id. at ¶ 29). “None of the Plaintiffs illegally entered onto

[Deputy Williams’] property or into her house.” (Id.).

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs were allegedly arrested by Deputy

Haynes hours later and all charged with “burglary with

assault,” while Plaintiff Douglas was additionally charged

with “simple assault” and “corrupt by threat public servant.”

(Id. at ¶¶ 31-32, 35). All charges were subsequently

dismissed. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-38).

Plaintiffs initiated this action on November 4, 2024.

(Doc. # 1). The amended complaint asserts the following

claims: false arrest and false imprisonment claims against

Deputy Haynes under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); state law

false arrest and false imprisonment claims against Deputy

Haynes and Sheriff Judd (Counts II and III); malicious

prosecution claims under Section 1983 and state law against

Deputies Williams and Haynes (Counts IV and V); and defamation

and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims

against Deputy Williams (Counts VI and VII). (Doc. # 3).

Defendants now move to dismiss the amended complaint.

(Doc. # 14). The Motion is fully briefed (Doc. # 26), and

ripe for review.

II. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this

Court accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint

and construes them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, the Court favors the plaintiff

with all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the

complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901

F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). But,

[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide

the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal

citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true

a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan

v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Court must limit its

consideration to well-pleaded factual allegations, documents

central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters

judicially noticed. La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358

F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).

II. Analysis

Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ false arrest and

false imprisonment claims, malicious prosecution claims,

defamation claim, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim.

1. False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims

Defendants move to dismiss the false arrest and false

imprisonment claims brought under Section 1983 and state law.

(Doc. # 14 at 3-8). Defendants assert that Plaintiffs fail to

defeat qualified immunity because they have not plausibly

alleged that Deputy Haynes lacked probable cause to arrest

them. (Id. at 6). Defendants further contend that, because

there is no underlying false arrest by Deputy Haynes, there

is no basis for vicarious liability, and therefore the state

law claims against Sheriff Judd must also fail. (Id. at 8).

Qualified immunity is a complete defense to Section 1983

claims. Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th

Cir. 2010). “Police officers acting in their discretionary

authority are entitled to qualified immunity from suit unless

a plaintiff can establish that (1) the officer violated a

constitutional right, and (2) the right violated was clearly

established.” Alston v. Swarbrick, 954 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th

Cir. 2020).

“An arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause

violates the Constitution and can underpin a [Section] 1983

claim, but the existence of probable cause at the time of

arrest is an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional

challenge to the arrest.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608

F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010). Probable cause is also a

complete bar to a state law action for false arrest and false

imprisonment. Bolanos v. Metro. Dade Cty., 677 So. 2d 1005

(Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

“To receive qualified immunity, an officer need not have

actual probable cause, but only ‘arguable’ probable cause.”

Brown, 608 F.3d at 734 (citation omitted). “Arguable probable

cause exists where ‘reasonable officers in the same

circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the

[arresting officer] could have believed that probable cause

existed to arrest Plaintiff[s].’” Grider, 618 F.3d at 1257

(citation omitted); see also Andrews v. Scott, 729 F. App’x

804, 810 (11th Cir. 2018) (“We need not determine at this

stage whether ‘reasonable officers in the same circumstances

and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could

have believed that probable cause existed to arrest

Plaintiff.’”). The arguable probable cause inquiry in a false

arrest case is the same as the clearly established law inquiry

in any other qualified immunity case. Garcia v. Casey, 75

F.4th 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 2023).

Defendants argue that the amended complaint “does not

plausibly allege that Deputy Haynes did not have a reasonable

basis to believe that there was probable cause to arrest

Plaintiffs.” (Doc. # 14 at 6-7). The Court disagrees.

Plaintiffs allege that a family member was attacked by a dog

belonging to Deputy Williams’ neighbor, that Deputy Williams

arrived at her home, that Plaintiffs neither touched nor

assaulted Deputy Williams, and that Plaintiffs did not

illegally enter onto Deputy Williams’ property or into her

home. (Doc. # 3 at ¶¶ 24, 28-29). Accepting these allegations

as true, an officer could not have reasonably concluded that

there was a substantial chance Plaintiffs had engaged in

criminal activity – that is, committed burglary with assault,

simple assault, or corrupt by threat public servant. See Neira

v. Gualtieri, No. 8:22-CV-1720-CEH-UAM, 2023 WL 6255012, at

*9-10 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2023) (denying qualified immunity

on motion to dismiss because the alleged events leading up to

the arrest, including a bar fight, were insufficient to allow

a reasonable officer to conclude there was a substantial

chance that the plaintiff had engaged in criminal activity).

Plaintiffs have met their burden at this stage of

demonstrating that there was no arguable probable cause for

their arrests. Defendants’ argument that qualified immunity

bars Plaintiffs’ claims against Deputy Haynes thus fails. The

argument that the claims against Sheriff Judd should be

dismissed similarly fails. The Motion is therefore denied as

to Counts I, II, and III. Defendants may, of course, raise

the qualified immunity defense again on a motion for summary

judgment.

2. Malicious Prosecution Claims

Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ malicious

prosecution claims should be dismissed for failure to state

a claim. Defendants contend that, rather than alleging that

their arrest was a seizure pursuant to a legal process, as

required under Section 1983, the amended complaint instead

alleges that Plaintiffs were arrested without a warrant or

probable cause. (Doc. # 14 at 8-9). The Court agrees. Notably,

Plaintiffs’ response does not address this argument.

To establish a claim for malicious prosecution under

Section 1983, a plaintiff “must prove (1) the elements of the

common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation

of [their] Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable

seizures.” Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir.

2019) (quoting Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220,

1234 (11th Cir. 2004)). “But the illegal seizure cannot be

just any seizure: unlike the torts of false arrest and false

imprisonment, the tort of malicious prosecution requires a

seizure ‘pursuant to legal process.’” Black v. Wigington, 811

F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

Indeed, “a warrantless arrest cannot serve as the

predicate Fourth Amendment seizure for purposes of [a

Section] 1983 malicious prosecution claim.” Donley v. City of

Morrow, 601 F. App’x 805, 814 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam);

see also Sullenberger v. City of Coral Gables, No. 22-CV-

21830, 2025 WL 101703, at *23-28 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2025)

(granting motion to dismiss a Section 1983 malicious

prosecution claim because the plaintiff did not allege “that

he suffered a seizure that was pursuant to some legal

process”). As Defendants point out, the amended complaint

only references a warrantless arrest and does not allege that

Plaintiffs suffered a seizure pursuant to legal process.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim under

Section 1983 against Deputies Haynes and Williams must be

dismissed.

However, Defendants do not cite legal authority

establishing that the same standard regarding a seizure

pursuant to legal process applies to the state law malicious

prosecution claims. Defendants have thus failed to establish

that dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state law claims against

Deputies Haynes and Williams for malicious prosecution is

warranted.

Accordingly, the Motion is granted as to Count IV and

denied as to Count V.

3. Defamation Claim

Defendants also seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ defamation

claim for failing to state a claim. (Doc. # 14 at 9).

Defendants emphasize that the amended complaint does not

specify any allegedly defamatory statement, and instead

“leav[es] a blank space between [a] set of quotation marks in

paragraph 74.” (Id.). Plaintiffs acknowledge this drafting

error and request that the Court dismiss Count VI with leave

to amend so that it can be pled with the required specificity.

(Doc. # 26 at 2). Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs’

request. (Id.). Accordingly, the Motion is granted as to Count

VI. Plaintiffs may amend the complaint to add allegations

supporting the defamation claim, if possible.

4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim should be dismissed.

(Doc. # 14 at 9-10). Defendants submit that the cause of

action is sparingly recognized in Florida and that “Deputy

Williams’ alleged conduct is not such that it goes beyond all

possible bounds of decency.” (Id. at 10). However, at this

stage, Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim.

Under Florida Law, a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress requires that a plaintiff prove: “(1)

deliberate or reckless infliction of mental suffering; (2) by

outrageous conduct; (3) which conduct must have caused the

suffering; and (4) the suffering must have been severe.” Hart

v. United States, 894 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir. 1990); see

also Tillman v. Orange Cty., 519 F. App’x 632, 636 (11th Cir.

2013) (holding that “police officers falsif[ying] charging

documents in order to convict a man of a nonexistent crime .

. . is the type of extreme conduct considered to be

intolerable in a civilized society”). The amended complaint

alleges that Deputy Williams “fabricat[ed] a story” and

“falsely accused and initiated the arrest and prosecution” of

Plaintiffs without any evidence that they committed a crime.

(Doc. # 3 at ¶¶ 77, 78, 82).

Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to

Plaintiffs, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs’

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See

Barmapov-Segev v. City of Miami, No. 19-23742-CIV, 2019 WL

6170332, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2019) (declining to dismiss

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where a

safety officer “made false accusations against the Plaintiff

to ‘punish’ her, which led to her arrest and malicious

prosecution”). Therefore, the Motion is denied as to Count

VII.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. #

14) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth

herein.

(2) Count IV is dismissed with prejudice. Count VI is

dismissed with leave to amend.

(3) To amend the dismissed defamation claim, Plaintiffs must

file a second amended complaint by March 27, 2025.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

13th day of March, 2025.

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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