Johnson v. Laporte County Sherriffs Dept

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DARNELL ANTWON JOHNSON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-770-TLS-AZ

LAPORTE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPT.

and QUALITY CARE NURSING AGENCY,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Darnell Antwon Johnson, Jr., a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended complaint

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 15. The Court screened his original complaint and determined

that it did not state a claim for relief. ECF No. 7. He was afforded an opportunity to file an

amended complaint before the case was dismissed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Id. He

responded with the present pleading.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must screen the amended complaint and dismiss it if

it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. To

proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009). Because Johnson is proceeding without counsel, the Court must give his

allegations liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Johnson is currently incarcerated at Indiana State Prison. His claims stem from events

occurring at the LaPorte County Jail in 2024. He has an amputated leg, and he claims that on or

about July 23, 2024, he slipped and fell in the shower. He claims that the handicap-accessible

shower was out of order on that date, and the shower he used did not have grab bars. He further

claims that unnamed nursing staff at the jail would not give him a medication prescribed by his

doctor prior to his incarceration. He sues the LaPorte County Sheriff’s Department and Quality

Care Nursing Agency (Quality Care) for monetary damages totaling $500,000.

Although Johnson was at a jail, he states that the incident occurred after he was convicted

and sentenced. ECF No. 15 at 10. Therefore, his rights arise under the Eighth Amendment. See

Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015).

The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to “take reasonable measures

to guarantee the safety of inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citation

omitted). To state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must allege that a

defendant was deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk to his health or safety. Sinn v.

Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2018). This encompasses two elements: “(1) the harm to

which the prisoner was exposed must be an objectively serious one; and (2) judged subjectively,

the prison official must have actual, and not merely constructive, knowledge of the risk.” Id.

(cleaned up). “[N]egligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness as the term is used in tort

cases is not enough” to state a Constitutional claim. Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 425–26

(7th Cir. 2020). Instead, the inmate must allege “a culpability standard akin to criminal

recklessness.” Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 722 (7th Cir. 2021).

It is unfortunate that Johnson fell in the shower, but a fall caused by exposure to slippery

floors generally does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d

403, 410 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[S]lippery surfaces and shower floors in prisons, without more, cannot

constitute a hazardous condition of confinement.”); Perkins v. Atrisco, No. 3:22-CV-1052, 2023

WL 2346275, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 2, 2023) (“Federal courts are consistent in holding that slip-

and-fall incidents, whether on ice, water, or slippery floors, do not meet the deliberate

indifference standard of Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims.”). There was an

extenuating circumstance in that Johnson has an amputated leg, but it is evident from his

allegations that there was a handicap-accessible shower at the jail; it simply was not working on

the date of this incident. He does not allege factual content from which the court can plausibly

infer that a jail staff member was subjectively aware of an excessive risk to Johnson’s safety and

deliberately turned a blind eye to the risk. To the extent he is claiming jail staff were negligent in

failing to maintain the handicap-accessible shower, this cannot support an Eighth Amendment

claim. See Hildreth, 960 F.3d at 425–26.

Inmates are also entitled to adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To assert an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must

allege (1) he had an objectively serious medical need and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to that medical need. Id. A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a physician has

diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious even a lay person would recognize

as needing medical attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Inmates are

“not entitled to demand specific care,” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954,

965 (7th Cir. 2019), nor are they entitled to “the best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d

262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). Rather, they are entitled to “reasonable measures to meet a substantial

risk of serious harm.” Id. Negligence or medical malpractice does not establish an Eighth

Amendment violation. Walker, 940 F.3d at 965. Instead, courts “defer to medical professionals’

treatment decisions unless there is evidence that no minimally competent professional would

have so responded under those circumstances.” Id. (cleaned up).

Here, Johnson asserts that he has an amputated leg, but he does not link this condition to

the medication or provide other details about why this medication was prescribed by his

physician. Instead, his claim appears to be that he should not have been denied the medication

prescribed by a “duly licensed physician” prior to his incarceration. However, the Eighth

Amendment does not entitle him to the medication of his choice, or even to the best possible

treatment. Walker, 940 F.3d at 965; Forbes, 112 F.3d at 267. He also does not explain how he

was injured when he fell in the shower or describe any actions or inaction by a member of the

jail medical staff for the Court to plausibly infer that he was provided “grossly inadequate

medical care” after he fell. Gabb v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 945 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir.

2019). Merely “putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might

suggest that something has happened . . . that might be redressed by the law” is not enough to

state a claim under federal pleading standards. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th

Cir. 2010).

He sues the Sheriff’s Department and Quality Care, but there is no general respondeat

superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and these entities cannot be held liable for a

constitutional violation solely because they employ staff at the jail. J.K.J. v. Polk Cty., 960 F.3d

367, 377 (7th Cir. 2020). A government entity or private company performing a public function

can be sued for constitutional violations under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, they “cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of

their employees unless those acts were carried out pursuant to an official custom or policy.”

Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The purpose of

this requirement is to “distinguish between the isolated wrongdoing of one or a few rogue

employees and other, more widespread practices.” Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987

F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2021). To allege a viable Monell claim, the plaintiff must describe an

official policy that caused him injury. Grieveson, 538 F.3d at 771. A plaintiff pursuing a custom

theory “must allege facts that permit the reasonable inference that the practice is so widespread

so as to constitute a governmental custom.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th

Cir. 2017).

Johnson includes boilerplate language indicating that he wishes to pursue a Monell claim,

but he does not identify an official policy of the Sheriff’s Department or Quality Care that caused

him injury. Nor does he allege facts permitting a reasonable inference that either entity has a

widespread practice or custom of unconstitutional conduct. The isolated incident he describes

does not support a Monell claim. Howell, 987 F.3d at 654.

He states that he is also pursuing a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), which “prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals[.]” Radaszweski ex rel.

Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 2004). Title II of the ADA provides that

qualified individuals with disabilities may not “be excluded from participation in or be denied

the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

“Disability” in this context means: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits

one or more major life activity; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as

having such an impairment. Steffen v. Donahoe, 680 F.3d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 2012). Correctional

facilities qualify as public entities, and officials can be sued under the ADA for declaratory and

injunctive relief. Radaszweski, 383 F.3d at 606.

As an amputee, Johnson qualifies as an individual with a disability. Banks v. Patton, 743

F. App’x 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2018). Incarceration itself is not a program or activity, but showers

made available to inmates are considered a “program or activity.” Id.; Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr.,

684 F.3d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2012). However, Johnson is no longer at the jail, and he cannot

seek injunctive relief related to the conditions there. Kifer v. Ellsworth, 346 F.3d 1155, 1157 (7th

Cir. 2003) (explaining that a claim for injunctive relief was moot after inmate’s transfer because

an inmate “cannot benefit from an order to improve conditions in a jail in which he is no longer

being held”).

To recover damages under the ADA, he “must identify intentional conduct (and not mere

negligence) by a named defendant.” Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2022). He has

not plausibly alleged that jail officials intentionally discriminated against him in connection with

this incident. Instead, he describes an unusual situation in which he had to use a shower without

grab bars because the jail’s handicap-accessible shower was out of order. This might constitute

negligence, but the Court cannot plausibly infer that he was the victim of intentional

discrimination. Id.; see Strominger v. Brock, 592 F. App’x 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining

that jail officials’ transfer of wheelchair-bound inmate to area where he did not have access to

handicap shower due to temporary need to separate him from his cellmate did not amount to

intentional discrimination). Thus, he has not plausibly alleged a claim for disability

discrimination.

Johnson has therefore failed to state a federal claim.1 He has already been granted an

opportunity to amend, and his amended complaint suffers from many of the same problems as

1 Johnson filed a separate motion asking that the court compel the Sheriff’s Department to provide

information about the identity of certain jail staff. ECF No. 16. His motion is worded quite broadly and it

is not clear exactly whom he is trying to identify. Regardless, the problem with his amended complaint is

the original. The Court finds no basis to conclude that if given another opportunity, he could

state a plausible constitutional claim based on this incident, consistent with what he has already

alleged under penalty of perjury. Johnson indicates a desire to pursue state law tort claims, as

well as claims for alleged violations of state accessibility laws. Because he has not stated a

plausible federal claim, such claims cannot proceed in federal court. See Doe-2 v. McLean Cnty.

Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 593 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Ordinarily, when a district

court dismisses the federal claims conferring original jurisdiction prior to trial, it relinquishes

supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).”). Any state law

claims contained in the amended complaint will be dismissed without prejudice to his right to

pursue them in state court.

For these reasons, Court DISMISSES this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court DISMISSES without prejudice any

state law claims contained in the amended complaint. The Court DENIES the motion to compel

[ECF No. 16]. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the case.

SO ORDERED on March 19, 2025.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann

JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

not related to the failure to identify a party; rather, he has not alleged a plausible constitutional claim

under governing standards. Thus, his motion will be denied.