“If judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error or was in excess of his authority.” (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12-13)
How later courts described this case
- “If judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error or was in excess of his authority.” (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12-13)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
DON NUNEZ, )
)
Plaintiff )
)
vs. ) Case No.: 5:25-cv-00192-LCB
)
CITY OF HUNTSVILLE, et al., )
)
Defendants )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On February 6, 2025, Plaintiff Don Nunez filed a pro se Complaint against
the City of Huntsville and the Judges of the Huntsville Municipal Court. (Doc. 1).
He also filed a motion for appointment of an attorney and for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). On February 10, 2025, the Court ordered Nunez to file an
Amended Complaint (Doc. 5), and on February 26, 2025, Nunez filed an Amended
Complaint. (Doc. 6).
The Court GRANTS Nunez’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis but
DENIES his motion for appointment of an attorney. For the reasons set out herein,
the Court DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE for failing to state a claim
on which relief can be granted.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides, in relevant part:
1
(e)(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that
may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that—
* * * * *
(B) the action or appeal--
(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; . . . .
In conducting its review of Nunez’s Complaint, the Court is mindful that
complaints by pro se litigants are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and subject to liberal construction. Taveras v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
89 F.4th 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d
1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)). However, the Court may not “act as de facto counsel
or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action.” Bilal v. Geo Care,
LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia,
132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
Nunez’s original Complaint alleged:
Two judges felt my judge wasn’t imposing enough sentencing.
So they validated [sic: violated] my rights by resentencing me, several
times after Circuit Court dismissed their judgments. [I] wasn’t even
able to go to Veteran’s Court.
. . . .
Their resentencing me over 4 yr period caused me to be violated
on this case I’m on now. Of which caused me to loose [sic: lose] job,
2
wife, car, and reputation ect [sic: etc.]. Then having medical issue’s
[sic] that wasn’t [sic] properly address[ed].
(Doc. 1 at 5).
When the Court ordered Nunez to amend his Complaint, it informed him that
[t]he Amended Complaint must set forth additional factual allegations
to support Plaintiff’s claims, including the case number(s) for the
municipal court case(s) about which Plaintiff complains, and the names
of the Huntsville Municipal Court Judges he sues. Plaintiff shall also
describe the claim he pursues against the City of Huntsville.
(Doc. 5 at 2).
Nunez’s Amended Complaint identifies by surname only some of the
Municipal Court Judges he sues, including Judge Grimes, Judge Cleveland, and
Judge Robinson. He also identifies Judge Smith, a “Circuit Court” Judge. (Doc.
6 at 5–6).1 Nunez did not include any municipal court case numbers, nor did he
describe the claim he pursues against the City of Huntsville. Rather, Nunez states:
Judge Grimes granted me appeal bonds on 7 seven cases without
no money down and if remind [sic: remand] back to do 30 day’s [sic].
Judge Cleveland & Judge Robinson had a vendetta against my sentence.
When I went to do 30 day’s [sic] I was resentence[d] by Judge
Cleveland to court cost[s], fines, time, and probation. Judge Smith
(Circuit Court) overturned the resentencing. They release[d] me but
illegally she still enforce[d] my probation and fee’s [sic]. A DUI that
was charged against me was dismiss[ed] because officers never
show[ed]-up three times. Judge Robinson took it upon himself to
accuse me of DUI.
1 The Court notes Alabama’s 23rd Judicial Circuit, which encompasses Huntsville,
Alabama, does not employ a Circuit Judge by the surname Smith. However, it does employ Ronald
Smith as a District Judge.
3
(Id. at 5). He also alleges:
The courts vindicated [sic: violated] me. I am justly due
compensation for incarceration, lost job, wife & children growing-up
experience’s [sic] and lost [sic] of financial obligations to family. Not
allowing me to provide the normal working American position of
income status, and stressing causing physical & emotional disorders.
Paying illegal court cost[s], fine[s], and probation (restitutions). For
their own personal ego putting it before law and civil rights.
After being dismiss [sic]. Put a commit order out on me of which
was served Sept. 1, 2023[,] 3 to 5 yrs later. Causing me to violated [sic]
on the charge I’m serving now. Both judges upon resentencing me
showed disrespect, animosity, and revengeance [sic]. In court stating
that Judge Grimes didn’t know how to sentence me. So they illegally
resentence[d] me.
(Id. at 5–6).
All of Nunez’s claims against the judges he names as Defendants cannot
proceed because his claims concern sentencing for offenses:
“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for
those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless
they acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Bolin v. Story, 225
F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). This immunity
applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in
excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Id. Whether a judge’s actions were
made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the
act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events
occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy
involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation
arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.
Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1983).
4
Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005). See also Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (per curiam), superseded on other grounds by statute as
recognized in Peters v. Noonan, 871 F. Supp. 2d 218, 226 (W.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“[Judicial] immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a judge
is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the
judge’s judicial capacity…. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though
judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” (citations
omitted)); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1305 (11th Cir. 2017)
(“If judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error or was in excess of his authority.”
(quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12-13)).
Sentencing falls within the functions normally performed by a judge and
exists clearly within a judge’s jurisdictional authority. Therefore, Nunez’s claims
against the individual judges he names are barred by absolute judicial immunity.
See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (“Like other forms of official immunity, judicial
immunity is immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.”
(citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). As such, those claims
warrant dismissal.
5
Nunez also names the City of Huntsville as a Defendant. As a municipality,
the City of Huntsville
may not be held liable for constitutional deprivations on the theory
of respondeat superior. Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cty., Fla., 218
F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000). Instead, “municipal liability is
limited to action for which the municipality is actually
responsible.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80, 106
S. Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986). A municipality therefore
may be held liable “only if such constitutional torts result from an
official government policy, the actions of an official fairly deemed to
represent government policy, or a custom or practice so pervasive and
well-settled that it assumes the force of law.” Denno, 218 F.3d at 1276.
Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 977 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694–95 (1978).
In addition, Nunez must allege the City of Huntsville acted “‘with the requisite
degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the
municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.’” Hill, 797 F.3d at 977
(quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404
(1997). Both factors present stringent standards. To demonstrate the requisite
degree of culpability, Nunez must allege that “‘a municipal actor disregarded a
known or obvious consequence of his [or her] action,’” or, in other words,
demonstrated deliberate indifference to those consequences. Id. (quoting Brown, 520
U.S. at 410). To demonstrate the requisite causal connection, Nunez must allege “the
6
deprivation of the constitutional right is a ‘plainly obvious consequence’ of the
municipal action.” Jd. (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 411).
Nunez alleges no facts to support a theory that any unconstitutional actions
resulted from an official government policy, custom, or practice. He also alleges no
facts bearing on a finding of deliberate indifference or demonstrating a causal
connection between the City’s action and the deprivation of his rights. In fact, neither
Nunez’s original Complaint nor his Amended Complaint asserts any facts at all
regarding the City’s liability, other than the actions of the Municipal Court Judges.
Accordingly, Nunez’s claim against the City of Huntsville also cannot proceed.
Because Nunez has asserted no viable basis for relief, the Court DISMISSES
this action WITH PREJUDICE. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court will
enter a separate Final Judgment. The Clerk is directed to close this action.
DONE and ORDERED Match 19, 2025.
Ko SZ Sh
LILES C. BURKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE