Sterling v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

SHERRYL STERLING,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:24-cv-1029-PGB-LHP

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE

LLC,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on Defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC’s

(“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, III, and VIII of Plaintiff’s

Complaint. (Doc. 36 (the “Motion”)). Plaintiff Sherryl Sterling (“Plaintiff”) has

responded in opposition. (Doc. 39 (the “Response”)). Further, Plaintiff has filed

a Notice of Supplemental Authority. (Doc. 41). Upon consideration, the Motion is

due to be denied in part and found as moot in part.1

I. BACKGROUND2

Through this action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated the

statutory provisions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§

1 In the Response, Plaintiff states that she seeks to withdraw her claims in Count VIII against

Defendant. The Court therefore does not discuss Count VIII herein. Instead, the Court

dismisses the claims against Defendant in Count VIII without prejudice and finds Defendant’s

arguments as to this count to be moot.

2 This account of the facts comes from Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 1 (the “Complaint”)). The

Court accepts well-pled factual allegations as true when considering motions to dismiss.

Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007).

2601–2617 (“RESPA”), as well as its associated regulations, 21 C.F.R. §§ 1024.1–

1024.41 (“Regulation X”). (Doc. 1).

Plaintiff owns real property located in Orlando, Florida (the “Home”),

which serves as her primary place of residence. (Id. ¶¶ 1–2). Plaintiff acquired the

Home after its prior owner, Erasmue Brown (“Brown”), passed away in January

of 2020. (Id. ¶ 25). Brown had obtained the promissory note on the Home and the

mortgage that secured it (collectively, the “Loan”). (See id. ¶¶ 3, 24). Defendant

was the servicer on the Loan from March 1, 2019, to January 22, 2024. (Id. ¶ 5).

Former Defendant Selene Finance LP (“Selene”) has been the servicer on the

Loan since January 23, 2024.3 (Id. ¶ 7).

Upon Brown’s death, Plaintiff was named personal representative of

Brown’s estate. (Id. ¶ 26). Two months later, Plaintiff lost her job due to the

COVID-19 pandemic and thereafter accepted Defendant’s offer to place the Loan

in forbearance. (Id. ¶ 27). The Loan remained in forbearance until July 2021. (Id.

¶ 28). When Plaintiff secured a new job in April 2021, she contacted Defendant to

“enter into a permanent loan modification and to bring the Loan current.” (Id. ¶

29). Defendant confirmed Plaintiff was the successor in interest on the Loan and

permitted her to assume the payments for the Loan. (Id. ¶ 30). Moreover, “[o]n

multiple occasions, [Defendant] approved [Plaintiff] for an assumption of the Loan

along with a permanent modification.” (Id. ¶ 31). Defendant thus sent assumption

3 On December 5, 2024, the Court was notified that Plaintiff’s claims against Selene had been

resolved. (Doc. 42). Accordingly, the only operative counts of the Complaint are those

containing Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant as described herein.

and modification documents (the “Loan Modification Agreement(s)”) for

Plaintiff to execute on at least six different occasions.4 (Id. ¶ 32). On each such

occasion, Plaintiff executed the Loan Modification Agreement before a notary and

returned it to Defendant. (Id. ¶ 33).

However, on October 17, 2023, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter stating, in

relevant part:

You were previously offered a permanent Loan Modification.

The terms of the Loan Modification Agreement required that

you remit all copies of the agreement properly signed and

notarized, if required, by all borrowers within the time

allowed. Unfortunately, we must withdraw the

agreement offered because we did not receive the

properly executed copies as required. This means that

your loan terms will not be modified, and your loan may be in

default.

(Id. ¶ 55; Doc. 1-8 (the “Purported Withdrawal Letter”) (emphasis added)).5

Plaintiff thus avers that Defendant inexplicably “refused to implement an

assumption and permanent modification of the Loan.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 35). Further, in

the ensuing months, Defendant sent Plaintiff correspondence wrongfully claiming

that she was in default on the Loan and misrepresenting the amount of money that

she owed.6 (Id. ¶ 36).

4 Plaintiff alleges that, at a minimum, Defendant sent Plaintiff Loan Modification Agreements

to execute on April 28, 2022; May 25, 2022; July 28, 2023; August 7, 2023; August 21, 2023;

and September 5, 2023. (Doc. 1, ¶ 32).

5 After sending the Purported Withdrawal Letter, in January 2024, Defendant stated that it

would mail another Loan Modification Agreement for Plaintiff to execute, but Plaintiff never

received this document. (Id. ¶ 34).

6 Defendant sent such correspondence in November 2023, December 2023, and February

2024. (Id. ¶ 36).

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff retained counsel. (Id. ¶ 40). On January

18, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to Defendant (Doc. 1-3 (the “January

Letter”)), which Plaintiff avers contained a notice of error under 12 C.F.R. §

1024.35 and requests for information under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36. (Doc. 1-3; Doc. 1,

¶ 42). In Plaintiff’s notice of error (“NOE #1”), Plaintiff notified Defendant of its

errors in repeatedly failing to implement a permanent loan modification

agreement. (Doc. 1-3, pp. 2–4). In Plaintiff’s request for information (“RFI #1”),

Plaintiff asked Defendant to provide the following information:

1. Copies of all assumption and modification

agreements executed by [Plaintiff] and received by

[Defendant] since August 1, 2021;

2. A copy of any communications, recordings of

conversations, or communications logs concerning

communications between [Defendant] and [Plaintiff]

since August 1, 2021, specifically related to [Plaintiff’s]

attempts at executing any loss mitigation 7 or

assumption agreements and otherwise concerning

the Modification or disputes regarding the same;

3. Identify, in detail, any deficiencies in the execution of

acceptance of any assumption and modification

agreements executed by [Plaintiff] and received by

[Defendant] since August 1, 2021 and describe, in

detail, any attempts by [Defendant] to rectify such

delinquencies; and,

4. A copy of any correspondence between [Defendant]

and the Borrower and/or [Plaintiff] since August 1,

2021, specifically related to attempts at loss

mitigation and otherwise concerning loss

mitigation attempts or disputes regarding either of

the same concerning the Loan.

7 For clarity, a loss mitigation application is a request by the borrower to the mortgage loan

servicer for “an alternative to foreclosure.” 12 C.F.R. § 1024.31. Accordingly, a request to

modify a mortgage loan agreement can serve as a loss mitigation application. See id.

(Id. at p. 4 (emphases added)). Defendant sent two letters in response to Plaintiff’s

January Letter. (Docs. 1-4, 1-5 (collectively, the “January Responses”)).

However, Defendant’s January Responses “wholly failed to address” Plaintiff’s

NOE #1 regarding Defendant’s repeated failure to implement a permanent loan

modification. (Doc. 1, ¶ 48). Additionally, Defendant “failed to provide all of the

information requested” in RFI #1. (Id.).

Believing Defendant’s January Responses to be legally deficient, on April 11,

2024, Plaintiff sent a second letter to Defendant (Doc. 1-6 (the “April Letter”)),

which Plaintiff avers contained a new notice of error under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35. In

the notice of error (“NOE #2”), Plaintiff asserted Defendant had erred by failing

to properly respond to NOE #1 and RFI #1. (Doc. 1, ¶ 50). In the April Letter,

Plaintiff also resubmitted NOE #1 and RFI #1. (Id.). On May 16, 2024, Defendant

responded to the April Letter. (Id. ¶ 52; Doc. 1-7). Therein, Defendant admitted it

had received four Loan Modification Agreements executed by Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, ¶

53; Doc. 1-7, p. 2). However, Defendant “vaguely state[d]” that the Loan

Modification Agreements “were not properly executed,” resulting in Defendant

sending the Purported Withdrawal Letter. (Doc. 1, ¶ 53 (quoting Doc. 1-7, p. 2)).

Defendant also stated that the April Letter raised issues that were “duplicative” of

Plaintiff’s January Letter and thus enclosed a copy of Defendant’s January

Responses. (Doc. 1-7, p. 2).

Defendant never implemented a permanent modification of the Loan. (Doc.

1, ¶ 72). Ultimately, in the midst of the foregoing correspondence between the

parties, the owner of the Loan filed a foreclosure action as to the Home. (Id. ¶ 39).

Thus, on June 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant action. Relevant here are

three counts against Defendant, including for: (1) violations of 12 C.F.R. §

1024.41(d) and 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k) for providing improper denials of Plaintiff’s

requests for permanent loan modification (Count I); (2) violations of 12 C.F.R. §

1024.36(d) and 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k) for providing deficient responses to RFI #1

(Count II); and (3) violations of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(e) and 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k) for

failing to properly respond to Plaintiff’s NOE #1 and NOE #2 (Count III). (Doc. 1,

¶¶ 81–139). In the Motion, Defendant seeks to dismiss each of these counts

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).8 (Doc. 36).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, to survive a

motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the

complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

8 In the body of the Motion, Defendant additionally asks the Court to take judicial notice of an

exhibit to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 36, p. 4). However, as Defendant notes in the Motion,

the Court is already permitted to consider exhibits to a plaintiff’s complaint in ruling on a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Id. at p. 5 (citing Grossman v. Nationsbank,

N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000)). As a result, the additional step of judicially

noticing the exhibit is not necessary, and Defendant’s request that the Court do so is denied.

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A claim is plausible on its face when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Id. The court must view the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and must resolve any doubts as to the sufficiency of the

complaint in the plaintiff’s favor. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1484

(11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). However, though a complaint need not contain

detailed factual allegations, pleading mere legal conclusions, or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” is not enough to satisfy the

plausibility standard. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “While legal conclusions can

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual

allegations,” and the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

265, 286 (1986).

In sum, the court must: reject conclusory allegations, bald legal assertions,

and formulaic recitations of the elements of a claim; accept well-pled factual

allegations as true; and view well-pled allegations in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

B. RESPA and Regulation X

RESPA is a consumer protection statute that was enacted for the benefit of

mortgage borrowers (“borrower(s)”). Renfroe v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 822

F.3d 1241, 1242 (11th Cir. 2016). Given its consumer protection purpose, the

Eleventh Circuit has highlighted that RESPA’s provisions “should be construed

liberally in order to best serve Congress’s intent.” Id. at 1244 (citing Ellis v. Gen.

Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 707 (11th Cir. 1998)).

Importantly, § 2605(k)(1)(E) of RESPA “contains a delegating provision

mandating [a mortgage loan servicer’s (“servicer(s)”)] compliance with ‘any

other obligation found by the Bureau of Consumer Protection,9 by regulation, to

be appropriate to carry out the consumer protection purposes of this chapter.’”

Simmonds v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 5:23-cv-2-MW/MJF, 2024 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 187028, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2024) (first quoting § 2605(k)(1)(E); and

then citing Baez v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 709 F. App’x 979, 980 (11th

Cir. 2017) (“RESPA requires servicers to comply with the obligations specified in

12 U.S.C. § 2605 as well as any regulations issued to carry out the statute’s

purposes.”)).10 In 2014, the CFPB enacted Regulation X as RESPA’s “primary

implementing legislation.” Berene v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 800 F. App’x 756,

760 (11th Cir. 2020); Simmonds, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187028, at *6.

9 Because this body is more commonly known as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,

the Court will refer to this body as the “CFPB” herein.

10 “Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are persuasive only insofar as their

legal analysis warrants.” Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir.

2007).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Count I

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated § 1024.41(d) of

Regulation X and, consequently, has also violated § 2605(k) of RESPA. (Doc. 1, ¶¶

81–92). § 1024.41(d) governs a servicer’s denial of a borrower’s loan modification

application. It states:

(d) Denial of loan modification options. If a borrower’s

complete loss mitigation application is denied for any trial or

permanent loan modification option available to the borrower

pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section, a servicer shall state

in the notice sent to the borrower pursuant to paragraph

(c)(1)(ii) of this section the specific reason or reasons for

the servicer’s determination for each such trial or

permanent loan modification option and, if applicable, that

the borrower was not evaluated on other criteria.

§ 1024.41(d) (emphasis added). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s Purported

Withdrawal Letter was, in fact, a denial of Plaintiff’s loan modification application.

(Doc. 1, ¶ 85). Plaintiff also avers that “on information and belief, [Defendant] sent

additional denial letters” concerning the multiple Loan Modification Agreements

executed by Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff contends that each such denial was deficient

under § 1024.41(d), as, although Defendant has represented that it “did not receive

the properly executed copies” of the Loan Modification Agreements, Defendant

never provided the specific reasons for this determination. (Id. ¶ 86).

Defendant’s sole argument for the dismissal of Count I is that Defendant

never “denied” any permanent loan modification application by Plaintiff. (Doc. 36,

p. 12). Instead, Defendant posits that it offered Plaintiff a permanent loan

modification and then simply withdrew the offer. (Id.). The Court finds this to be

a distinction without a difference, particularly considering the circumstances here.

Accepting Defendant’s argument would empower mortgage servicers to

completely avoid the dictates of § 1024.41(d) by accepting every loan modification

application they receive from borrowers only to immediately withdraw such

acceptance. As such, Defendant’s proposed interpretation of § 1024.41(d) would

lead to absurd results. See Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1175 (11th Cir.

2003) (“[E]ven the most basic general principles of statutory construction must

yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent[; thus,] courts may reach

results inconsistent with the plain meaning of a statute if giving the words . . . their

plain and ordinary meaning produces a result that is . . . clearly absurd.” (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted)).11

In any event, Defendant fails to cite any legal authority to support its

interpretation of § 1024.41(d). Consequently, this argument has been waived. See

W. Sur. Co. v. Steuerwald, No. 16-61815-CV, 2017 WL 5248499, at *2 (S.D. Fla.

Jan. 17, 2017) (“It is axiomatic that arguments not supported and properly

developed are deemed waived.”); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 1272, 1287

n.13 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that the court need not consider “perfunctory and

underdeveloped” arguments and that such arguments are waived); Resolution Tr.

Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). As a result, Defendant’s

request that the Court dismiss Count I is denied.

11 “We apply the canons of statutory construction to regulations as well as to statutes.” Cremeens

v. City of Montgomery, 602 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Miami Heart Inst. v.

Sullivan, 868 F.2d 410, 413 (11th Cir. 1989)).

B. Counts II and III

Through Counts II and III, Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s responses to NOE

#1, NOE #2, and RFI #1 were legally deficient under Regulation X and,

correspondingly, under RESPA. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35 (governing notices of

error (“NOE(s)”)), 1024.36 (governing requests for information (“RFI(s)”)); 12

U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(E) (making a servicer’s failure to comply with regulations

promulgated by the CFPB “to carry out the consumer protection purposes of this

chapter” a violation of RESPA).

Of the arguments raised by Defendant for dismissal of Counts II and III, only

one such argument is worthy of discussion. Therein, Defendant asserts that

Plaintiff’s NOEs and RFI did not trigger its duties to respond because they did not

pertain to its “servicing” of Plaintiff’s Loan. (Doc. 36, pp. 7–11). Defendant points

to § 2605(e) of RESPA in support of this argument. (Id.). At the time that

Regulation X was implemented, § 2605(e) already contained a mechanism

enabling borrowers to send formal written requests for information called

qualified written requests (“QWR(s)”) to their servicers. (See Doc. 36, p. 6).

Importantly, QWRs enable a borrower to seek “information relating to the

servicing of” a borrower’s loan. § 2605(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). § 2605(i)(3)

provides the relevant definition of “servicing”:

The term “servicing” means receiving any scheduled periodic

payments from a borrower pursuant to the terms of any loan,

including amounts for escrow accounts described in section

2609 of this title, and making the payments of principal and

interest and such other payments with respect to the amounts

received from the borrower as may be required pursuant to

the terms of the loan.

Further, § 2605(e) imposes a duty upon servicers to respond to QWRs and

provides specific parameters for what constitutes a proper and timely response.

When Regulation X was implemented, it contained additional provisions

enabling borrowers to contact their servicers about their loans, including by

sending NOEs and RFIs. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35 (NOEs), 1024.36 (RFIs). As to RFI’s,

§ 1024.36 states, in relevant part:

(a) Information request. A servicer shall comply with

the requirements of this section for any written

request for information from a borrower that includes

the name of the borrower, information that enables the

servicer to identify the borrower’s mortgage loan account, and

states the information the borrower is requesting

with respect to the borrower’s mortgage loan. . . . A

qualified written request that requests information

relating to the servicing of the mortgage loan is a

request for information for purposes of this section,

and a servicer must comply with all requirements applicable

to a request for information with respect to such qualified

written request.

§ 1024.36(a) (emphasis added). As to NOEs, § 1024.35 states, in relevant part:

(a) Notice of error. A servicer shall comply with the

requirements of this section for any written notice from the

borrower that asserts an error and that includes the name of

the borrower, information that enables the servicer to identify

the borrower’s mortgage loan account, and the error the

borrower believes has occurred. . . . A qualified written

request that asserts an error relating to the servicing

of a mortgage loan is a notice of error for purposes of

this section, and a servicer must comply with all

requirements applicable to a notice of error with respect to

such qualified written request.

These provisions also provide detailed guidance regarding the proper time,

manner, and content of servicers’ responses to NOEs and RFIs. See §§ 1024.35(c)–

(i), 1024.36(b)–(i).

In essence, Defendant argues that NOEs and RFIs are two specific ways to

send QWRs, and they must therefore meet the requirements imposed upon QWRs

to trigger a servicer’s response duties. (Doc. 36, pp. 6–8). Thus, because Plaintiff’s

NOE #1, NOE #2, and RFI #1 pertained to loss mitigation rather than the

“servicing” of Plaintiff’s loan, Defendant asserts that they failed to trigger

Defendant’s response duties under RESPA and Regulation X. (Id.).

District courts in the Eleventh Circuit are divided on whether RFIs and

NOEs provide independent avenues for obtaining information from servicers or

are simply two types of QWRs. Compare Simmonds, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

187028, at *7 (collecting sources and finding that RFIs and NOEs are “two separate

and additional methods of borrower inquiry”), with Lopez v. Nationstar Mortg.

LLC, No. 1:20-cv-22496-KMM, 2021 WL 4990958, at *3–4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19,

2021) (holding that a NOE must meet the requirements imposed upon QWRs to

trigger a servicer’s response duties).

“The first rule in statutory construction is to determine whether the

‘language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the

particular dispute.’” Shotz, 344 F.3d at 1167 (quoting United States v. Fisher, 289

F.3d 1329, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1112 (2003)). When the

plain language is clear, the court does not proceed to consider the legislative

history, and simply applies the plain meaning of the provisions at issue. See id.

This Court agrees with those courts holding that the plain language of RESPA and

Regulation X supports a finding that NOEs and RFIs are separate and distinct from

QWRs. E.g., Simmonds, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187028, at *7; Pollock v. Seterus,

Inc., No. 17-60475-Civ-Scola, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202827, at *8–11 (S.D. Fla.

Dec. 11, 2017); Lynch v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 18-23560-CIV, 2019 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 244643, at *29–32 (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2019).

Under its plain language, § 1024.36(a) of Regulation X enables borrowers to

send RFIs “with respect to the borrower’s mortgage loan.” However, RESPA’s

provision confines QWRs to requests for information specifically pertaining to

servicing of the borrower’s loan. See § 2605(e)(1)(A). The plain language of these

provisions demonstrates that the CFBP intended to allow borrowers to seek a

broader range of information through RFIs than they were previously able to seek

using QWRs. See, e.g., Pollock, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202827, at *8–10;

Simmonds, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187028, at *10; Lynch, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

244643, at *31–32. Moreover, in the same provision wherein the CFPB defined the

broad scope of information that may be obtained through RFIs, the CFPB used

different language to describe the narrower scope of information that may be

obtained through QWRs. § 1024.36(a) (defining an RFI as requesting information

“with respect to the borrower’s mortgage loan,” then noting that a QWR “that

requests information relating to the servicing of the mortgage loan” is also

considered an RFI). The direct juxtaposition of the scope of RFIs with QWRs and

the use of different language to describe the scope of each supports the notion that

RFIs provide a distinct method of inquiry from QWRs.

Similarly, §§ 1024.35 and 1024.36 each clearly state that certain QWRs can

constitute RFIs or NOEs and note that servicers’ responses to such QWRs must

satisfy the dictates of §§ 1024.35 (for NOEs) and 1024.36 (for RFIs). Curiously

absent from these provisions, if the CFPB had intended it, is any indication that

the converse is true. See Lynch, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244643, at *32 (“[S]imply

put, all QWRs are RFIs but not all RFIs are QWRs.”).

The Court therefore finds that the plain language of Regulation X and

RESPA supports a finding that NOEs and RFIs need not comply with the

requirements imposed upon QWRs. The Court further notes that such a finding

supports RESPA’s consumer protection purpose and the Eleventh Circuit’s

instruction that RESPA’s provisions are to be liberally construed to protect

mortgage loan borrowers. See Renfroe, 822 F.3d at 1244.

As a result of the foregoing, Defendant’s request that the Court dismiss

Counts II and III are denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as

follows:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, III, and VIII of Plaintiff’s

Complaint (Doc. 36) is DENIED IN PART and FOUND AS MOOT

IN PART.

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC in

Count VIII of the Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Accordingly, Defendant’s request for the Court to

dismiss these claims is FOUND AS MOOT.

3. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, II, and VIII of Plaintiffs

Complaint (Doc. 36) is DENIED in all other respects.

DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on March 13, 2025.

<.

PAUL G.

UNITED STATES*DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties