officer not present at arrest who received information from officers on the scene and instructed them to arrest plaintiff could be held liable for false arrest
How later courts described this case
- officer not present at arrest who received information from officers on the scene and instructed them to arrest plaintiff could be held liable for false arrest
- placement of suspect in the back of a cruiser constituted an arrest under circumstances presented
- “[A] subjective belief by the arresting officer cannot destroy probable cause where it exists.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
GREGORY KIMBLE, Case No. 1:23-cv-00350
Plaintiff, Bowman, M.J.
v.
BRETT GLECKLER, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
Plaintiff Gregory Kimble filed a complaint, amended on September 21, 2023, in
which he alleges that three individuals employed by the Cincinnati Police Department
violated his civil rights while executing an arrest warrant for another individual. All three
Defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’
motions will be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
I. Standard of Review
Pursuant to Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P., summary judgment will be granted if the
evidence submitted demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56;
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). If the moving party has carried
its initial burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party to present specific facts demonstrating a genuine
1Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and with the consent of all parties, this case is assigned to the undersigned
for all proceedings, including trial and the entry of judgment. (See Doc. 23).
106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986). “[A] court must view the facts and any inferences that can be
drawn from those facts ... in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Keweenaw
Bay Indian Comm. v. Rising, 477 F.3d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In order to survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must present
probative evidence that supports its complaint. Anderson., 477 U.S. at 249-50.
II. Findings of Fact
On June 7, 2022, a manager of a Little Caesar’s Pizza restaurant was shot in the
leg. Defendant Carl Blackwell was the lead detective assigned to investigate. The victim
identified a woman who previously worked there, Angel Kidd, as the shooter. During the
investigation, witnesses reported that Kidd was seen “getting into a blue SUV” and was
accompanied in the car by a black male wearing a red gator over his face. Doc. 31-1,
PageID 93. Based on his investigation, Detective Blackwell prepared and filed an arrest
warrant for Kidd, as well as a complaint and affidavit for felonious assault. He passed that
information along to the Fugitive Apprehension Squad (“FAS”), a unit that executes arrest
warrants. Doc. 42, PageID 289-290.
Police Officer Scott Bode was part of FAS on June 8, 2022, the date the warrant
was executed, and was assigned to “perimeter” duty. To prepare for the day, Bode
reviewed Blackwell’s Arrest and Investigation/Offense Report, as well as the Complaint,
Affidavit and Arrest Warrant. Doc. 31, PageID 88-89. As a result of his review, Bode
learned that Kidd was charged with felonious assault, and that she was alleged to have
fled the scene in a blue SUV. A summarized witness statement stated that the shooter
was accompanied in the vehicle by a “male black” wearing a red face gator described as
2
black male or of the make, model, or license plate of the “blue SUV” were provided on the
typed summary. Doc. 31-1, PageID 91-96. But Blackwell testified that the male was
reported to be a passenger who told the shooter “not to do it.” Doc. 35, PageID 168, 171.
Defendant Mark Longworth was among the officers who executed the arrest
warrant for Kidd on June 8. The arrest occurred at Kidd’s friend’s apartment, where Kidd
had been staying. Close in time to her arrest, Plaintiff Kimble, a black male who was 33
years of age, drove to the apartment complex in a dark green SUV. Doc. 44, PageID 381-
382. Observing the heavy police presence, Kimble parked his car and walked toward the
suspect’s friend’s apartment. As Kimble approached a hallway leading to several
apartments, his path was obstructed by police who were preparing to break down the
apartment door. The officers’ conversation with Kimble was recorded by Defendant
Longworth’s Body Worn Camera (“BWC”):
Officer: Hello, sir, how’s it going today? Which apartment are you in?
Kimble: I ain’t in none of these apartments.
Officer: Okay. You trespassing?
Kimble: Nah, you gotta be told you can’t be in a place to consider
trespassing.
Officer: If you don’t have any business here, you can go back out. Or else
uh…
Longworth: Or tell her to open the door cause we’re getting ready to break
it.
2The investigator’s affidavit and complaint against Kidd state that she “fled the scene in a blue SUV” without
reference to the black male. The witness statement provides a cursory reference to a male companion in
the SUV but is silent on whether he was a driver or a passenger.
3
Longworth: Yeah.
Officer: Alright, take it easy.
Longworth BWC4 25:00-25:30. Kimble retreated without further comment. After he left,
officers broke down the door and arrested Kidd.3
Kimble returned to his green SUV but drove only a short distance to a different
space in the same parking lot. Bode watched as Kimble then walked back toward the
building he had just left. Bode viewed Kimble’s action as suspicious4 and alerted his fellow
officers: “That guy in the SUV parked around the corner, he’s out of his car, walking in
that general direction. …I mean I know he’s not a suspect but if it’s in the report, it was
reported that she got into a blueish greenish [indecipherable] SUV with a guy.” Longworth
BWC4 38:00-38:20; Bode affidavit, Doc. 31, PageID 89.
At the time of Bode’s transmission, Longworth was trying to contact Detective
Blackwell to inform him of Kidd’s arrest. Longworth reached Defendant Brett Gleckler
instead. Gleckler had no personal knowledge of the case but was with Blackwell at the
time. Relevant portions of Longworth’s conversation, along with statements by Bode,
were recorded as follows:
Longworth: Okay and the other thing is, the dude that maybe was an
accomplice in the car has been showing up. He’s parked around the corner
now. So, we haven’t stopped him. He tried coming in here while we were at
the door, and read us some line of bullshit about why he should be here.
But um. We just sent him on his way not knowing he might be involved. But
apparently Bode remembers from the report maybe he’s in it too. I think
that’s why he came in. I think. Is that the blue SUV, Bode?
3Charges against Kidd were eventually dismissed when the victim failed to appear for trial.
4Kimble testified that he moved his car in order to avoid being blocked in. Doc. 44, PageID 387.
4
Longworth: OK, I think they’re going to want that. I’m on the phone with
them now. Okay um, so. I’ll see if we, we’re kind of committed to this
apartment, I don’t know if we can do it or not. But at least get a plate, if we
can get him stopped we will.
* * *
Longworth: District 4 wants the apartment. They’re going to dispatch a
uniform car to help with that. If we have a way to stop that uh gentleman in
the car, they want the car as well. I told them I wasn’t sure we had the people
to do it.
* * *
Bode: Yeah, he’s still standing out there….
Female officer: Just hang on a minute, what’s his name?
Bode: Yeah, not knowing any more than the report said, um, him being that
interested in that apartment, I’m gonna assume he was the getaway driver
in that.
* * *
Longworth: Yeah, I gave the facts to the detective and he indicated that,
that, that uh, he would like him stopped, so, I’m assuming based on that
they feel like there’s probable cause to stop this person.
Gleckler Depo. Doc. 33, PageID 109; Longworth BWC4 37:50-42:35.
Gleckler testified that he repeated the information from Longworth to Blackwell.
Blackwell ordered Kimble to be transported to District 4 so that Blackwell could speak to
him there. Blackwell Depo., Doc. 35, PageID 173-176, 188; see also Doc. 47, PageID
700 (“Blackwell ordered the officers on scene [to] transport Kimble to CPD District 4 to be
questioned by Blackwell.”).
After conversing with the detectives, Longworth exited the apartment building,
suggesting that officers come up with “a quick plan to try and grab that car I guess.”
Longworth BWC4 43:00- 43:07. An officer then observes Kimble walking toward the
5
greeting them as they drew near. An officer asks, “Do you know that person [referring to
the arrestee], to which Kimble responds, “I believe so.” Longworth BWC4 43:42 – 43:48.
An officer then asks, “Do you have any ID on you sir?” Id., 44:04. As Kimble answers,
Longworth approaches from behind and abruptly orders: “Place your hands behind your
back, you’re going in handcuffs right now, you’re being detained.” Id., 44:04-44:18.
Nonparty Officer Charles Knapp suggests detaining Kimble in his police cruiser, a plan
with which Longworth agrees. Id., 45:00 to 45:25. While handcuffed, Kimble continues to
respond to the question about his ID, directing officers to a wallet in his pocket. In addition
to removing his wallet, Longworth removes Kimble’s keys and walks in the direction of his
parked SUV.
In the meantime, Knapp escorts Kimble to his cruiser. Knapp’s motor vehicle
camera (“MVR”) provides an additional 53 minutes of recorded activity. Kimble repeatedly
asks why officers have detained him; they respond that it is because a detective wants to
speak with him. Kimble expresses his willingness to answer any investigatory questions
that officers may have5 but the officers state that they have none:
Kimble: Ok what would you like to know?
Officer: What’s up, sir?
Kimble: I said, ok now what would you like to know?
Officer: Um. I don’t really have ….
Kimble: So why am I being detained?
Officer: What - what are you asking?
5No Miranda warnings were given. See Kimble Depo., Doc. 44, PageID 428.
6
Kimble: Why am I being detained?
Officer: I don’t really have any questions for you.
Kimble: Ok. So why are you detaining me?
Officer: Uh, the detective wanted to.
Kimble: OK. Why did you choose to – why did the detective choose to detain
me?
Officer: Because he believes you’re somehow associated with the crime
that the, uh, the occupant of the apartment we were serving a warrant on.
Kimble: And why because I – and why does he believe that I’m associated
with the crime? I believe it’s one thing to be associated with the suspect…
Officer: yeah
Kimble: But how does he believe that I’m associated with the crime or how
does my vehicle have anything to do with that?
* * *
Kimble: ….Well all I’m doing, I’m just a person that’s here who y’all don’t
know so y’all chose to detain me for whatever reason.
Officer: So I told you a legitimate reason that you’re being detained…
Kimble: You actually didn’t tell me a legitimate reason I’m being detained.
Officer: …All I can do is try to communicate….perhaps the detective can
clear it up.
Knapp MVR 1:00-2:55.
When Longworth returns to Knapp’s cruiser, he and Kimble engage in the following
conversation:
Kimble: Now sir, I was told that you are the person that I should be talking
to ask why am I being detained and how do you figure that I’m associated
with the crime? I understand that you may believe that I’m associated with
the suspect but what does that have to do with the crime?
7
Longworth: You’re being detained because we have reason to believe that
you may have involvement in the original offense being investigated …
which is a felony assault.
Kimble: Exactly. Now how do you…
Longworth: We’re not going to do a thing where you ask me a bunch of
questions. I’m telling you why you’re detained out of courtesy but that’s
about all you’re going to get from me. Um. The detectives that are actually
investigating the case are going to come up here, What they do with you
or want done with you, I don’t know at this point. But they requested us to
detain you and that’s the reason. I don’t know what they know or what they
don’t know. Alright?
Kimble: Ok. So how long is this process going to take? And why do I have
to be arrested – I’m not resisting at all. Why do I have to be cuffed?
Officer: You’re cuffed as a safety precaution because the offense being
investigated is a violent offense with a firearm. So that’s how you have to
be for now. If they get here and they make another determination that’s on
them, ok? This way we know you’re safe.
Kimble: But I’m perfectly willing to- I actually said hey sir and confronted
you so why are you cuffing me in order…
Knapp MVR 3:23 - 4:42.
Over the next minute and a half, Kimble states that he willingly approached officers
and engaged them in conversation to determine whether Kidd, who he eventually
identifies as a distant cousin, had been arrested and to advise her “to wait ‘til she get a
lawyer before she opens her mouth.” Id., 5:48-5:55. An officer responds: “Well
unfortunately you didn’t get a chance to tell her that before she got arrested,” to which
Kimble replies, “Well, before I got arrested.” The officer corrects Kimble by stating that
“we arrested you after her, so…” Kimble responds with surprise, repeating his explanation
about waiting around to see if Kidd had been arrested:
Kimble: Oh so she was already in there arrested? What? I was just hanging
8
get a lawyer.”
Knapp MVR 5:55 to 6:15. A period of silence on the MVR suggests that officers briefly
left Kimble alone in the cruiser, during which time he retrieved his cellphone from his
pocket and speaks into it. Knapp MVR at approx. 6:45-9:00.
Approximately ten minutes after placing Kimble into the cruiser, an officer enters
the front seat to review his criminal history on the vehicle’s computer. Id., 9:45. A few
minutes after that officer departs, Kimble again speaks on his phone to someone, stating
that he had gone to Kidd’s apartment complex when he heard she had gotten herself in
legal trouble to “tell her to keep her mother f***in’ mouth shut.” Knapp MVR 24:24-25:00.6
This time, officers instruct him to hang up because he is “in custody.” Knapp MVR 27:20-
27:25. Longworth adds: “You’re not entitled to keep your property, give us the phone
now…..You’re under arrest.” Longworth BWC1 00:35-00.43; see also Knapp MVR 27:45-
27:55.
Plaintiff again questions his arrest and asks what he is charged with. Officer
Longworth responds: “You’re being transported to District 4 when a car gets here,” and
“you don’t have a charge.” Longworth BWC1 00:45-1:05. When Kimble questions why
officers first told him he was only being detained for questioning but now were telling him
that he was arrested, Longworth explains: “…I had another conversation with the
investigator, and he indicated that you’re going to District 4, which means that if we take
you somewhere, we’ve arrested you.” Knapp MVR 27-28:30; Longworth BWC1 1:05-1:30.
Over the next two minutes, Kimble and Longworth discuss Kimble’s status:
6 The undersigned prefers not to repeat the exact word in this opinion.
9
meaning of arrest is when we handcuff you and move you around, like
taking you to the police station, we have by law arrested you. Whether we
charge you with a crime or not, it’s an arrest and requires certain things of
us. So that’s why I’m telling you you’re under arrest. Because we’re taking
you somewhere in handcuffs, that’s depriving you of your rights. Ok?
Therefore, we have to have a reasons for that, and that means we have to
have enough reason to arrest you. We do …according to the detectives.
And that, as far as what that is, is between you and them, I don’t know what
they’ll tell you. I haven’t talked to them about what all their reasons are
because it doesn’t matter to me. Ok. But that’s the situation you’re in. That’s
why it changed, detained to arrest, because I didn’t know at the time that
they wanted you taken somewhere.
Kimble: Now am I a suspect or am I a person of interest?
Longworth: ….If we’re going to take you somewhere against your will, which
we are, ‘cause you’re not asking to go there, then you have to be a suspect.
Now whether or not you did it or not - why they think you’re a suspect - I
don’t know. You you might not be, and you might be able to clear up….
Kimble: I just want to know what I am a suspect of?
Longworth: Whatever this shooting is that she’s charged with….
* * *
Longworth: She’s alleged to have shot somebody. A shooting. And that’s
what she’s charged with. She has a warrant for that. She’s charged. So I
don’t know what happened. I don’t know why, I don’t know where. We’re
serving this warrant. But on the word of the detectives, that’s what we’re
doing, ok? No disrespect….
* * *
Longworth: ….I just don’t know anything else. All we are is the police that
come and get you. We’re not the police that investigate things.
Longworth BWC1 4:20-6:40; Knapp MVR 31:30 to 33:45.
After nearly an hour, Kimble is transferred, still handcuffed, to the back of another
cruiser for transport to the District 4 police station. At the station, Blackwell interviews him,
removing his handcuffs and stating that he will not be charged. See Kimble Interview
10:38 – 18:47. At the end of the interview, Blackwell instructs Kimble to “sit tight” while
10
the apartment complex, where an officer returns his car keys to him. Defendants allege
that Kimble was detained for only 90 minutes, but on summary judgment, the Court credits
Plaintiff’s account that he was detained for 110 minutes.7
After his release, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Internal Investigations Section
(“ISS”) of the Cincinnati Police Department. The ISS report contains summaries of
statements by the officers. See e.g., Doc. 49-2, PageID 761-762 (reporting Blackwell’s
admission that he asked for have Kimble to be transported to District 4 for an interview
without confirming Kimble’s consent to being transported). Plaintiff also filed a complaint
with the City of Cincinnati Citizen Complaint Authority (“CCA”), which report also includes
summaries of officers’ statements. See Doc. 49-1, PageID 743, (“When interviewed,
Specialist Longworth stated that his reason for detaining Mr. Kimble was based on
information provided by the detectives.”). On June 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed this federal
lawsuit. In his amended complaint, he alleges that Detective Blackwell, Detective
Gleckler, and Officer Mark Longworth are liable in their individual capacities for false
arrest, failure to intervene to prevent false arrest, and for civil conspiracy. See Doc. 13.
III. The False Arrest Claim
A. Plaintiff’s Seizure under the Fourth Amendment
Because Kimble’s failure-to-intervene and civil conspiracy claims rise or fall on his
7The time that elapsed from the moment that Kimble was handcuffed until he was placed in the back of
Knapp’s cruiser appears to have been approximately 5 minutes. Kimble spent approximately 53 minutes in
the back of Knapp’s cruiser before being moved to Robinson’s cruiser for transport to District 4. Based on
the video record, it appears that transport and walking through the station took approximately 18 minutes.
See Robinson MVR and Robinson BWC3. The video labeled as “Kimble interview” shows him sitting in a
room for approximately 30 minutes.
11
was seized without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Under settled
Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit case law, an encounter between police officers and a
citizen may be characterized in one of three ways under the Fourth Amendment:
“‘(1) the consensual encounter, which may be initiated without any objective
level of suspicion; (2) the investigative detention, which, if non-consensual,
must be supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity;
and (3) the arrest, valid only if supported by probable cause.’”
United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 602 (6th Cir. 2000) (additional quotation omitted)).
Defendants concede that their seizure of Plaintiff eventually became an arrest. But
they dispute the precise moment that the arrest occurred. In their memorandum in support
of summary judgment, Longworth and Gleckler initially assert that, based on their
collective knowledge, they had probable cause to arrest Kimble by the time that police
encountered him in the parking lot. “[B]elieving there was probable cause to arrest,
[Longworth] went outside, cuffed him [Kimble], and placed him in a cruiser.” Doc. 48 at
PageID 721; see also id., PageID 728 (“it is not contested that Kimble was arrested” when
he was placed in the back of a cruiser). Plaintiff’ agrees, maintaining that he was arrested
when he was handcuffed and placed in the back of Knapp’s cruiser.
But Defendant Blackwell’s separate motion does not concede that Plaintiff was
arrested at that moment. Instead, Blackwell suggests that for the first half hour after being
placed in the back of Knapp’s cruiser, Kimble was subject to what is commonly known as
an investigatory Terry stop. Only “articulable suspicion” for a Terry stop is required to
comport with the Fourth Amendment – far less than the “probable cause” standard
12
In a combined reply memorandum, Defendants Longworth and Gleckler reframe
their argument to join Blackwell. Thus, under Defendants’ construction of the facts, Kimble
was not arrested when he was first handcuffed but instead was arrested only after officers
had obtained additional facts on which to support probable cause. See Doc. 47, PageID
704, (asserting that only after Kimble stated that he wanted to tell Kidd to “keep her mouth
shut” was Kimble arrested). Accordingly, the first order of business is to determine when
Kimble was subject to arrest.
Nearly all relevant facts are undisputed due to the existence of contemporaneously
recorded video evidence. See, generally, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct.
1769 (2007). Having reviewed the video records, the Court concludes as a matter of law
that Kimble was subjected to an arrest, and not merely a Terry stop, when he was
handcuffed and placed in the back of Knapp’s cruiser. In addition, when the historical
facts are undisputed, the Court determines whether articulable suspicion or probable
cause existed as a matter of law. See Gerics v. Trevino, 974 F.3d 798, 805 (6th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657 (1996)). Here, the
Court finds that police lacked probable cause to arrest Kimble at the moment of arrest.
No one disputes that Kimble’s first interaction with police, in the hallway near where
the arrest took place, was consensual. Police observed Kimble walking toward them and
questioned why he was there. The video record confirms that Kimble did not admit
knowing any resident or occupant of any apartment in the corridor, nor did he state his
purpose in being there. He quickly complied with instructions to leave.
Kimble’s second encounter with police began as consensual but quickly escalated
13
parking lot before exiting and walking back toward where the arrest was taking place had
aroused Bode’s suspicion. The video shows Kimble waiting in the parking lot while officers
approach, greeting them as they draw near. An officer asks if he knows Kidd; Kimble
responds “I believe so.” Longworth BWC4 43:42–43:48. Kimble is next asked for ID.
Without fully awaiting his response, Longworth handcuffs him and officers forcibly detain
him in the back of Knapp’s patrol car to await transport to District 4 for questioning.
Plaintiff was subject to a de facto arrest at that moment, because his seizure
exceeded the boundaries of a Terry stop. “Terry and its progeny … created only limited
exceptions to the general rule that seizures of the person require probable cause to
arrest.” Florida v. Royer, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983). “In the name
of investigating a person who is no more than suspected of criminal activity, the police
may not …seek to verify their suspicions by means that approach the conditions of arrest.”
Id. During a Terry stop,
the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to
determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling
the officer's suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to respond. And,
unless the detainee's answers provide the officer with probable cause to
arrest him, he must then be released.
United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851, 856 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984)).
The uncontroverted video record flatly refutes Defendants’ argument that they
seized Kimble as part of a limited Terry stop. Defendants rely heavily on Houston v. Clark
Cnty. Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1999), a case in which the
Sixth Circuit upheld a lengthy investigatory stop of a vehicle under Terry despite the fact
14
cruisers for questioning. But Houston is easily distinguished. There, police stopped a
vehicle immediately after an alleged shooting in a bar parking lot. The officer who stopped
the vehicle had been at the scene and reasonably believed he was stopping suspects in
flight despite the limited vehicle description provided by his partner. Two officers who
arrived to assist pulled their guns to force the initially reluctant occupants to exit their
vehicle. But at the time, those officers reasonably believed that the occupants were armed
and dangerous and had just shot a police officer. Ultimately, the plaintiffs were detained
and questioned for at least 35 minutes before being released.
In holding that the investigatory stop was permissible under Terry and did not
become an arrest despite the significant restraints on plaintiffs’ freedom, the Sixth Circuit
emphasized the exigent nature of the circumstances. Pursuing officers had to quickly act
upon a reasonable suspicion that moments earlier, the occupants of the car had fled a
crime scene in which a shooting victim had been seriously injured or killed:
[The deputy] observed and was assaulted in an uprising at Chuck's, heard
a sound that resembled gunfire, heard a voice exclaim, “He's been shot,”
observed a victim bleeding profusely from the head, noticed a passenger
enter a car next to the victim, watched the same car speeding away from
the bar's parking lot, and identified the vehicle as best he could under
hurried and otherwise difficult circumstances. These “specific and
articulable facts,” along with rational inferences therefrom, linked the crime
at Chuck's to the vehicle that Deputy Schutte identified. Police officers are
“regularly forced to make critical decisions under extreme pressure,” Pray
v. City of Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154, 1159 (6th Cir.1995) (citation omitted).
Had Deputy Schutte conducted a more prolonged investigation in the bar's
parking lot - rather than sending a radio message to his partner that the
suspects were driving away - the most promising lead in the investigation
of a serious felony could have quickly evaporated.
15
suspicion that the occupants of Houston's car were involved in a shooting
at Chuck's. Deputy Hopper witnessed the uprising outside Chuck's that
night, heard a sound that he believed was gunfire, and heard a shout that
someone had been shot. He reasonably believed his partner's radio
message to the effect that suspects in the crime were driving away from
Chuck's toward Burnett Road.
Houston, 174 F.3d at 813-14.
In Houston, the use of force did not transform the Terry stop into an arrest because
of the facts presented. “[W]hen police officers reasonably fear that suspects are armed
and dangerous, they may order the suspects out of a car and may draw their weapons
when those steps are ‘reasonably necessary for the protection of the officers.’” Houston,
174 F.3d at 814-15 (additional citation omitted). Houston further held that the use of
handcuffs and placement of suspects into cruisers for questioning did not automatically
transform the Terry stop into an arrest, but is dependent on a fact-specific inquiry. See id.
at 815 (holding that handcuffs and detention in the cruisers “were both reasonably
necessary to protect the officers' safety during the investigation.”). While the length of the
stop presented “a closer question,” the court reasoned that the time period did not exceed
Terry limits given the number of “necessary” but time-consuming steps that were taken,
including those required to ensure officer safety as well as the subsequent active field
investigation.
It is not surprising or disturbing that these steps would together last thirty-
five minutes (as the defendants claim) or even an hour (as Houston and
Perkins maintain). In either case, we conclude that the officers' inquiries and
safety precautions were reasonably related to the initial basis for stopping
the car.
Houston, 174 F.3d at 815.
16
This case is nothing like Houston. For starters, it does not involve the hot pursuit
of a suspected shooter fleeing a violent crime scene where there was a high likelihood of
the only lead “evaporating” if police did not stop the suspect’s car. Here, police were
executing a warrant for Kidd, who was accused of felonious assault more than 24 hours
earlier. Enough time had elapsed for Blackwell to interview witnesses and file a complaint
and an investigatory report. To the extent that police had any articulable suspicion that
Kimble’s dark green SUV might be the “blue SUV” in which Kidd had fled,8 Kimble’s
vehicle was parked. Investigating officers easily could and did take the time to confirm the
make, model, color and license plate number of Kimble’s SUV.
Although Bode assumed that Kimble might be the “male black” alluded to in the
investigatory report, the report itself contained almost no information about that individual
other than that he was age 33, 200 pounds, and approximately 5’10’. Notably, the report
did not identify the male as an accomplice or getaway driver or as a suspect in any way,
nor did Blackwell so state. As Bode described Kimble’s movements, he prefaced his
remarks with the statement: “I know he’s not a suspect….” In fact, Detective Blackwell
was aware of exculpatory evidence that the referenced male was reportedly a passenger
who had encouraged the shooter not to shoot.
In response to Bode’s mistaken description of the color of Kimble’s car as a match
to the color of the SUV in the report and his articulated suspicion that Kimble might be
involved in some undetermined way based on his car color and actions in the parking lot,
8Bode mistakenly stated that the report referenced a “blue or greenish SUV,” and then reported that Kimble
was driving a “blue or greenish SUV.” Longworth BWC approx. or 37:02-38:20; Bode affidavit, Doc. 31,
PageID 89.
17
BWC4 39:30-39:35 (“[T]he dude who maybe was an accomplice in the car has been
showing up. He’s parked around the corner.”) (emphasis added). When Longworth asks
Bode to clarify9 that Kimble drove a “blue SUV,” Bode (mistakenly) confirms that it is
“blueish greenish.” Longworth then states that “they’re going to want that [car].”
Longworth BWC4 40:00-40:30. Longworth verbalizes doubts about having sufficient
manpower to seize the car but suggests that police can “at least get a plate,” and adds,
”if we can get him stopped we will.” Id.. Bode confirms that Kimble is nearby and
speculates: “’I’m gonna assume he was the getaway driver….” Longworth BWC4 41:30-
42:25.
In sum, despite Bode’s initial statement that Kimble is “not a suspect,” Longworth
first suggests to Gleckler that he “maybe” is an “accomplice.” Bode adds to that
hypothesis by speculating that a cursory reference to a male in a “blue SUV” might refer
to a ”getaway driver.” Although Longworth suggests that investigators initially have more
interest in the SUV, after hearing Bode’s additional “getaway driver” hypothesis and
Blackwell’s instruction to stop Kimble, Longworth further “assumes” that Blackwell has
probable cause to arrest Kimble:
Yeah, I gave the facts to the detective and he indicated that, that, that uh,
he would like him stopped, so, I’m assuming based on that they feel like
there’s probable cause to stop this person.
Longworth BWC4 42:25-42:35.
9Longworth’s BWC does not capture Gleckler’s portion of the conversation. Because Longworth had no
personal knowledge of the report, the Court infers that his question about Kimble’s car being a “blue SUV”
originated from the detectives.
18
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.’” Illinois v. Wardlow,
(2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 (2000) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
Significantly more is required to support probable cause for arrest. Here, contrary to
Longworth’s assumption, no one had probable cause for Kimble’s warrantless arrest. At
the time Kimble was taken into custody, police collectively knew: (1) Kimble had briefly
appeared in a hallway near Kidd’s apartment, denied living in any adjacent apartments,
and complied with a directive to depart; (2) Bode reported that Kimble’s “blueish green”
SUV matched the color of the SUV in which Kidd had reportedly fled; (3) a black male
(known not to be the shooter and whose description did not match Kimble but for age)
was seen in an SUV with Kidd10 (4) Kimble’s repositioning his SUV in the parking lot
aroused suspicion that he was trying to conceal it; and (5) seconds before being
handcuffed, Kimble admitted that he “probably” knew Kidd. While the articulated facts
give rise to an inference that Kimble knew Kidd, they provide little to suggest that he was
culpable in – or even connected to - the crime alleged to have been committed by Kidd
the previous day.
In their motions for summary judgment, Defendants assert that officers had more
to go on. In support, they quote from deposition testimony offered by Officer Knapp more
than two years after the incident. In his deposition, Knapp testified to his recollection that:
10The video record does not indicate that Bode or anyone else related the summary witness description to
Longworth or to other officers. But the description identifies a black male age 33, with a relatively stocky
build at 5’ 10” in height and 200 pounds and wearing a red “gator” face covering. On the video and by
Defendants’ admission, Kimble appears to be of a relatively tall, thin build. He is wearing a white t-shirt and
shorts, and has no red gator. See Doc. 47, PageID 711, (describing Kimble as a “tall black male”).
19
was a family member who was concerned about what was going on; (2) that Kimble left
in a vehicle and later returned (rather than simply moving parking spots); (3) that “the
vehicle description was a blue or green Ford Escape,” precisely matching the color, make
and model of Kimble’s SUV; (4) that a “thin-male black” drove the referenced Ford Escape
to and from the shooting; and that (5) based on the foregoing, police reasonably
concluded that Kimble was the “wheelman.” Needless to say, Kimble disputes Knapp’s
recollection, and this Court must construe disputed facts in favor of the Plaintiff. Here, the
contemporaneous video evidence also flatly contradicts Knapp’s 2024 recollection.
With respect to the handful of facts that the video record supports as collectively
known by police prior to Kimble’s detention and arrest, Plaintiff highlights Bode’s mistake
in equating the color of Kimble’s dark green Ford Escape with a witness reference to a
“blue SUV.” The lack of make or model in the witness description of the “blue SUV” is
certainly relevant to the probable cause inquiry; since there are many types of SUVs. As
Defendants put it, “being a black male who drives a SUV … describes a large swath of
the population.” Doc. 48, PageID 735. On that issue, the Court notes that Longworth’s
BWC footage as he walks toward Kimble’s car after the arrest shows a crowded parking
lot with multiple parked SUVs of various makes, models, and colors. Longworth
repeatedly presses Kimble’s electronic key to locate the correct SUV, and takes direction
from other officers about its location, color, and license plate number. Police eventually
confirm that Kimble’s vehicle is a “green Ford Escape,” not blue. Id., 45:15 – 48:50.
Still, the Court is not overly troubled by Bode’s mistake in reporting that the “blueish
greenish” color of Kimble’s SUV matched the witness’s vague description of the SUV in
20
(Doc. 31, ¶ 15). “To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment
allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54,
60-61, 135 S.Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176,
69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949)). On the record presented, Longworth was permitted to rely on
Bode’s mistaken report that the color of Kimble’s SUV matched the color of the unknown
make-and-model SUV observed at the crime scene.
On the other hand, it was not reasonable under a probable cause analysis for
Longworth to leap to the conclusion that Kimble was an accomplice or (per Bode’s
hypothesis) a getaway driver rather than merely (at most) a possible witness. Bode’s
statements made clear that he was expressing a “hunch” that was not based on any
known facts or reasonable inferences. Reliance on a series of speculative hunches does
not satisfy probable cause. At most, officers collectively had grounds to briefly stop and
question Kimble in connection with their articulated suspicion that Kimble might be the
stocky black male who reportedly had accompanied the female shooter in a blue SUV,
and to further investigate whether he was a witness or a type of “accomplice.” Even if a
reviewing court were to conclude (contrary to this Court) that it was reasonable to rely on
Bode’s inference that Kimble might be a getaway driver in addition to relying on Bode’s
mistake about the SUV color, the officers’ collective knowledge still amounted to no more
than reasonable articulable suspicion for a Terry stop.
Moving on, and accepting that Defendants had sufficient (collective) information to
conduct a Terry stop, that is not what they did. “[T]he investigative methods employed
21
suspicion in a short period of time.” Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 836 (6th
Cir. 2005). Here, nothing gave police cause to handcuff Kimble under the pretense that
he was armed or dangerous, or to confine him to Knapp’s cruiser. The significant
restraints on Kimble’s liberty without reasonable justification confirms his seizure was a
de facto arrest. “When actions by police exceed the bounds permitted by reasonable
suspicion, the seizure becomes an arrest and must be supported by probable cause.”
U.S. v. Richardson, 949 F.2d at 856 (placement of suspect in the back of a cruiser
constituted an arrest under circumstances presented); see also Brown v. Lewis, 779 F.3d
401, 416 (6th Cir. 2015)..“Although there is no bright line that distinguishes an
investigative stop from a de facto arrest, the length and manner of an investigative stop
should be reasonably related to the basis for the initial intrusion.” Houston, 174 F.3d at
814 (internal citations omitted).
“To determine whether an investigative detention has crossed the line and become
an arrest, this court considers factors such as ‘the transportation of the detainee to
another location, significant restraints on the detainee's freedom of movement involving
physical confinement or other coercion preventing the detainee from leaving police
custody, and the use of weapons or bodily force.’” United States v. Lopez-Arias, 344 F.3d
623, 627 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added, quoting Richardson, 949 F.2d at 857).
“Intrusive measures are warranted to secure a detainee only where specific facts lead to
an inference that the detainee poses a risk of flight or of violence to the officers.” Brown
v. Lewis, 779 F.3d at 415 (emphasis added); see also, Houston, supra (holding that
officers reasonably believed that the fleeing individuals were armed and dangerous, with
22
Here, the felonious assault by a female shooter had taken place more than 24
hours earlier. At the time they handcuffed Kimble, police had the suspected shooter in
custody and expected to find the gun in her apartment.11 Nothing about Kimble’s
appearance or behavior suggested either that he posed any threat or that he might flee.12
To the contrary, he was calm and unassuming as he walked toward officers. He paused
in the parking lot and waited for them to draw near before greeting them and voluntarily
responding to their initial questions. His clothing did not give rise to any reasonable
suspicion that he harbored a concealed weapon, nor did any officer testify to that
suspicion. Last, while criminal history can support the use of handcuffs during a Terry
stop under some circumstances, Kimble’s criminal history was unknown when officers
handcuffed him and placed him into Knapp’s cruiser. On the facts presented, the
significant restraints on Kimble’s freedom without probable cause violated the Fourth
Amendment.
The officers’ actions following the point at which they handcuffed Plaintiff and
placed him in the back of a cruiser also undermine their contention that this was an
investigatory stop to determine whether Kimble might be a witness or somehow
associated with the crime for which Kidd had been arrested Officers on the scene made
no effort at all to question Kimble in order to confirm or dispel their suspicions even though
11Longworth stated to Gleckler and Blackwell prior to handcuffing Kimble that officers expected to find the
gun inside the apartment because they had observed ammunition and a holster there, and because Kidd
could not have gotten rid of the gun while she was surrounded. Longworth BWC4 38:37 – 39:15.
12Kimble’s car was some distance away. In addition, immediately after being handcuffed, Kimble informed
officers of recent foot surgery that precluded his ability to run.
23
had any questions and told Kimble he was to be detained until one or more off-site
detectives questioned him. Contrast Houston, supra (where on-site officers actively
questioned the suspects and continually conferred with investigators to ascertain the facts
throughout the detention).
In a last ditch effort to establish probable cause under the Fourth Amendment,
Defendants point out that after placing Kimble in Knapp’s cruiser, they discovered his
criminal history and were privy to Kimble’s voluntary statements that he was there to tell
Kidd to keep quiet until she spoke to a lawyer. See e.g., Doc. 48, PageID 731, citing
Knapp MVR 10:00- 10:45 (wherein Plaintiff admitted to the officer reviewing his criminal
history that “any person with logic” would want to “see what this guy’s about.”). But such
post-arrest information cannot be used to retroactively justify a Fourth Amendment
violation. See United States v. Haynes, 301 F.3d 669, 678 (6th Cir. 2002).
B. Defendants are Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity for False Arrest
Defendants alternatively seek summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (U.S. 2009) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982)). Qualified immunity “‘gives ample
room for mistaken judgments by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (quoting Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341 (1986)); see also Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 394
24
mistake of law or a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and
fact. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
“To overcome a defendant's assertion of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show
both (1) that the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly
established at the time of the violation.” Downard for Estate of Downard v. Martin, 968
F.3d 594, 599-600 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32
(2009)). Plaintiff must make this showing as to each Defendant.
Blackwell argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest claim
because “if his instruction was a mistake, it was a reasonable mistake.” (Doc. 47, PageID
708). Similarly, Longworth and Gleckler argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity,
because they reasonably believed that probable cause existed to arrest Kimble for being
“the person who drove Kidd …to and from the scene of the felonious assault.” (Doc. 48,
PageID 730). This Court disagrees, and concludes that none of the Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s false arrest claim.
1. Defendant Blackwell
The Court finds no evidence to support Blackwell’s position that his mistake (in fact
or in law) was reasonable. In the ISS investigation, Blackwell admitted that he ordered
Kimble to be transported to District 4 without confirming Kimble’s consent to being
transported. Doc. 49-2, PageID 761-62. The close-in-time CCA report and Blackwell’s
deposition testimony more than two years later include similar admissions:
In his interview with CCA, when asked whether Mr. Kimble was a suspect,
Officer Blackwell replied, "My goal was to locate the female I charged. I had
no description, no identification from the witnesses of the victim or who the
25
he could have been anybody.” The only information I have was a black male
with a face mask. That could have been me.” He made clear that based on
the information he had, he considered Mr. Kimble to be a witness not a
suspect.
See Doc. 49-1, PageID 744 (italics and quotation marks original).
Blackwell also testified at deposition that he did not suspect Kimble of having
conducted any crime when he directed officers to transport him to the police station. After
all, he knew that the black male in the witness report was merely a passenger who
allegedly told the shooter not to shoot, Doc. 35, PageID 168, 171. He thought Kimble
“could be the passenger” and directed officers to transport him to “see if he was the
passenger…[and] if he had any knowledge of this case.” Doc. 35, PageID 169; see also
id., PageID 175, (testifying he “just wanted to speak to him…to see if he was a part of this
case”); id., PageID 185, (testifying that it was “possible he could have been the witness
… in this case.”). Blackwell did not ask officers on the scene to question Kimble because
he “wanted to talk to him about the case for myself.” Id., PageID 176. Blackwell admitted
that at the time he asked for Kimble to be brought in for questioning, he lacked either
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain him.13 Id , PageID 175.
Blackwell is not entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable officer could
have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Kimble, or to forcibly stop and detain
him and to transport him to a police station for questioning, at the time Blackwell gave
13Blackwell protests that his admitted subjective belief that he lacked articulable suspicion or probable
cause does not preclude granting qualified immunity. See United States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 457
(6th Cir. 1991) (“[A] subjective belief by the arresting officer cannot destroy probable cause where it exists.”).
It is true that “[a]n objective, not subjective, standard applies” to probable cause determinations. Barera v.
City of Mt. Pleasure, 12 F.4th 617, 620 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004));
Here, however, the application of the requisite objective standard confirms the clear constitutional violation.
26
established Fourth Amendment rights.
Blackwell points out that he quickly released Kimble after questioning him at
District 4. Blackwell’s quick action to release Kimble may impact the calculation of
damages. But releasing a plaintiff after first subjecting him to a false arrest is not grounds
for an award of qualified immunity.
2. Longworth and Gleckler
Longworth and Gleckler also are not entitled to qualified immunity on the false
arrest claim. Unlike Blackwell, both Longworth and Gleckler testified in September 2024
to their belief that there was probable cause to arrest Kimble if he was complicit with
Kimble in the shooting, consistent with Ohio’s law on “aiding and abetting.” See
Longworth Depo., Doc. 42, PageID 287-89 (“[I]t was my understanding and belief …[that
Kimble was] to be arrested and taken to District 4 … [b]ecause I believed and… Blackwell
believed that Mr. Kimble was involved in to the point where he had criminal liability for the
offense being investigated”); see also Gleckler Depo., Doc. 33, PageID 114 & 119) (“He
could be complicit to felonious assault” and “we’re looking at him as co-conspirator to
…assault.”). Relying on the “collective knowledge” doctrine discussed in United States v.
Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 765-66 (6th Cir. 2012), both officers also cite to Knapp’s deposition
testimony recalling what he and others knew at the scene. See e.g., Knapp Depo. Doc.
37, PageID 207-08; Cotton Depo., Doc. 39, PageID 236-37.
As explained above, however, the Court cannot credit Knapp’s disputed deposition
testimony over contemporaneous video records that refute key details in that testimony.
Defendants’ own deposition testimony is also undermined by the same video record, as
27
For example, the CCA report states:
Detective Gleckler told CCA, " ... we figured that, with all the circumstances
around this, that he could definitely be the driver of the car and that he was
going to be brought back to District' 4 for interview by Blackwell. He could
be the suspect, or he could be the witness." Specialist Gleckler further
stated with the information available, the aim was for Mr. Kimble to be
detained not arrested. However, he also stated that Mr. Kimble was not free
to leave police custody prior to his interview with Officer Blackwell at District
4.
Id. (quotation marks original). The CCA report also states: “In interviews with Specialist
Gleckler and Officer Blackwell, neither could state what offense Mr. Kimble may have
committed.” Id.
Gleckler was not assigned to the shooting case for which Kidd was being arrested
and became involved only after he answered Longworth’s call. He actively consulted with
Blackwell, and relayed information about the case back and forth. Because he directed
the officers on site to detain Kimble at a point in time when the officers’ collective
information did not support probable cause, he is not entitled to qualified immunity. See
Bunkley v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 902 F.3d 552, 563 (6th Cir. 2018) (officer not present
at arrest who received information from officers on the scene and instructed them to arrest
plaintiff could be held liable for false arrest).
Longworth, as the officer on the scene who physically made the arrest by
handcuffing Kimble and directing him to be place in Knapp’s cruiser to await questioning
14Defendants argue that the entire CCA report should be excluded as hearsay. The Court agrees that the
CCA’s legal findings are inadmissible on summary judgment. However, any statements made by
Defendants that appear in the CCA report (none of which Defendants deny) may be considered. See Fed.
R. Evid. 801(d). Even if the CCA statements were excluded, the uncontroverted contemporaneous video
record still refutes Defendants’ subsequent recollection, at their respective depositions, of the facts known
by or related to them at the time of arrest.
28
knowledge doctrine does not insulate him from liability because the directive to detain
Kimble was not plausible based on the collective facts known at the time. Accord Bunkley,
902 F.3d at 558 and 562 (upholding denial of qualified immunity for false arrest, rejecting
claim of arresting officers that they were “simply following orders” where they made
unsupported assumptions that plaintiff and his father had participated in a shooting based
on a description that could describe “thousands” of black men, and did not investigate or
question plaintiff before the arrest).
IV. The Failure-to-Intervene Claim
In response to Defendant Blackwell’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff
“abandons his failure to intervene claim against defendant Blackwell and consents to its
dismissal with prejudice by the Court,” on the basis that “Blackwell cannot be liable for
failure to intervene in his own unlawful conduct.” Doc. 50, PageID 794. Therefore, the
Court grants judgment to Blackwell on Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim.
In contrast, the Court will deny summary judgment to Defendants Gleckler and
Longworth. Defendants cite to White v. Goforth, No. 22-5409, 2023 WL 3546527 (6th Cir.
May 18, 2023), an unpublished case in which the court noted that “[s]uccessful failure-to-
intervene claims are rare and largely limited to one context - the excessive use of force.”
But seven years ago in the published Bunkley case, the Sixth Circuit upheld the denial of
qualified immunity for failure-to-intervene claims brought against officers who failed to
prevent a false arrest. The arresting officers in Bunkley were not the investigators of the
shooting in question, knew that the arrestees did not “reasonably match the descriptions”
of the suspected shooters, did not actually question the plaintiff Bunkley before arresting
29
false. Id., 902 F.3d at 566. In affirming the denial of qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit
held that under the facts as construed on summary judgment, all of the officers “had time
to stop, intervene, and prevent this arrest-without-probable-cause.” Id.
The defense offered by Gleckler and Longworth is similar to that asserted by the
officers in Bunkley. Gleckler testified that he had no reason to question “exactly what Carl
[Blackwell] said, that Carl said, I want him brought back to District 4 for questioning.”
Gleckler Depo. Doc 33, PageID 116. Longworth similarly “assumed” that the detectives
had probable cause for arrest, despite knowing that his collective knowledge supported
no more than a reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. “Plausible instructions from
a superior or fellow officer support qualified immunity where, viewed in light of the
surrounding circumstances, they could lead a reasonable officer to conclude that the
necessary legal justification for his actions exists (e.g. a warrant, probable cause, exigent
circumstances).” Bunkley, 902 F.3d at 562 (quoting Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166, 174-
75 (1st Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original)). Gleckler and Longworth cannot escape liability
based on Blackwell’s directive because they could not reasonably have concluded that
probable cause existed, and both had ample time to stop, intervene, and prevent the
unlawful arrest that occurred.
V. The Civil Conspiracy Claim
A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is “an agreement between two or more persons to
injure another by unlawful action. Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d. 273, 290 (6th Cir. 2007).
It requires proof that “‘(1) a single plan exists, (2) the conspirators shared a conspiratorial
objective to deprive the plaintiff[] of [his] constitutional rights, and (3) an overt act was
30
753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Revis, 489 F.3d at 290). Plaintiff explains his
civil conspiracy claim against the defendants as follows:
Blackwell knowingly commanded the wrongful arrest of the plaintiff.
Gleckler was well aware of what was happening and willingly passed along
Blackwell's unlawful command. And Longworth committed the overt act of
wrongfully arresting and causing the transport of the[] plaintiff.
Doc. 50, PageID 794.
All three Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s civil
conspiracy claim because he fails to point to any evidence that the three Defendants
actively conspired together, or that they had a single planned objective to arrest Kimble
without probable cause. Rather than suggesting any sort of “plan” or shared conspiratorial
objective to violate Kimble’s rights, the record suggests that independently, the
Defendants committed a combination of cumulative errors akin to a game of telephone
gone awry. Thus, even though a reasonable jury could hold each Defendant liable for his
part in arresting Kimble without probable cause, there is absolutely no evidence of any
Defendant’s intent to act in concert to commit constitutional violations. Accordingly, all
three Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
VI. Conclusion and Order
For the reasons discussed, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment (Docs. 47, 48) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part:
1. Summary judgment on the false arrest claim is DENIED for all Defendants;
2. Summary judgment on the failure-to-intervene claim is GRANTED to
Defendant Blackwell but is DENIED to Defendants Gleckler and Longworth;
31
Defendants;
4. Consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff’s remaining
claims shall proceed to trial on May 5, 2025.
s/Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge
32