Woodson v. Nassau County

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

----------------------------------------------------------------------X

AJAB M. WOODSON,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

24-CV-7580(JMA)(LGD)

FILED

-against- CLERK

3/13/2025 12:52 pm

NASSAU COUNTY and SGT. DONNERY,

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Defendants. EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

----------------------------------------------------------------------X LONG ISLAND OFFICE

AZRACK, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is the civil rights complaint filed by incarcerated pro se plaintiff Ajab M.

Woodson (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against Nassau County and

Sgt. Donnery, who is alleged to be a supervisor of the law library at the Nassau County

Correctional Center. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) and the required Prisoner Litigation Authorization form. (ECF Nos. 7, 11.) For

the reasons that follow, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP application and sua sponte dismisses the

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff’s brief, handwritten complaint is brought pursuant to Section 1983 and alleges the

following facts:2

On October 9th I received a determination from the inmate grievance board that

they sustained the action of Sgt. Donnery and Nassau County to tamper with and

mis-direct my legal mail. They have tampered with discovery items such as medical

records, medical X-ray discs and outgoing and incomming mail from lawyers,

government agencies, and medical facilities. They have violated my right to privacy

in attorney client privilidge. Also they have taken medical records and stored them

in public areas in the jail not maintained by medical staff. This also violates my

right to doctor-patient privacy in my medical care and records. This tampering is

1 All material allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of this Order. See, e.g.,

Rogers v. City of Troy, New York, 148 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (in reviewing a pro se complaint for sua sponte

dismissal, a court is required to accept the material allegations in the complaint as true).

2 Excerpts from the complaint are reproduced herein exactly as they appear in the original. Errors in spelling,

staff. (See CV-06647(JMA)(LGS) I have been ridiculed, harassed, and violated as

per my inmate rights to due process and protection from retaliation from

Government agencies for litigation.

(Compl. ¶ II.) In the space that calls for a description of any injuries sustained and any medical

treatment required and/or provided, Plaintiff wrote: “I am supposed to be treated for injuries

sustained during my arrest. However, I am not able to correspond with the doctors at the hospital

and my physical injuries are exalabled.” (Id. ¶ II.A.) For relief, Plaintiff is “seeking 10,000 $ U.S.

dollars. Also I am seeking the policies of “Legal” mail be overseen by the U.S. Post Office or a

civilian agency. I am seeking all medical and discovery information be given to me in a timely

manner.” (Id. ¶ III.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Leave to Proceed IFP

To qualify for IFP status, the Supreme Court has long held that “an affidavit is sufficient

which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs [inherent in

litigation] and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins

v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The purpose of the statute permitting litigants to proceed IFP is to ensure that indigent persons

have equal access to the judicial system. Davis v. NYC Dep’t of Educ., 10-CV-3812, 2010 WL

3419671, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. August 27, 2010) (citing Gregory v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., 07-

CV-1531, 2007 WL 1199010, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2007)). The determination of whether an

applicant qualifies for IFP status is within the discretion of the district court. DiGianni v. Pearson

Educ., 10-CV-0206, 2010 WL 1741373, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2010) (citing Choi v. Chemical

Bank, 939 F. Supp. 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).

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The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a district court to screen a civil complaint

brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or its agents and dismiss the complaint, or any

portion of the complaint, if the complaint is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Similarly, the IFP statute requires a court

to dismiss an action upon determination that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must dismiss the action as

soon as it makes such a determination. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

C. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that:

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and

federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see Thomas

v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

two elements: (1) ‘the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United

States,’ and (2) ‘the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state

law.’” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting

Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004)); see Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 78

(2d Cir. 2023); see also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (“[T]he

under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no

matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

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Pro se submissions are afforded wide interpretational latitude and should be held “to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). In

addition, the Court is required to read a plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as

raising the strongest arguments it suggests. United States v. Akinrosotu, 637 F.3d 165, 167 (2d

Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).

The Supreme Court has held that pro se complaints need not even plead specific facts;

rather the complainant “need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do

justice.”). However, a pro se plaintiff must still plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. While “‘detailed factual

allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s IFP Application is Granted

Upon review of Plaintiff’s declarations in support of his application to proceed IFP, the

Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee.

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GRANTED.

B. Sgt. Donnery is Dismissed for Lack of Personal Involvement

To “establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff

must show . . . the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.”

Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). To do so, “a plaintiff must plead

and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions,

has violated the Constitution.’” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676). A Section 1983 claim that fails to allege the personal involvement of

the defendant fails as a matter of law. See, e.g., id. at 619-20; Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 129

(2d Cir. 2023); Murphy v. Hughson, 82 F.4th 177, 183 n.5 (2d Cir. 2023).

Here, although Plaintiff named Sgt. Donnery as a defendant, there are no allegations against

him in the body of the complaint. Wholly absent from the complaint are any allegations of conduct

or inaction attributable to Sgt. Donnery. (See generally, ECF No. 1.) Simply naming the defendants

against whom relief is sought is insufficient because “bald assertions and conclusions of law” do

not establish personal involvement. Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996). “Dismissal is

appropriate where a defendant is listed in the caption, but the body of the complaint fails to indicate

what the defendant did to the plaintiff.” Dean v. Annucci, No. 22-CV-0746, 2023 WL 2325074, at

*6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Hickman v. City of New

York Dep’t of Corr., No. 24-CV-1754, 2024 WL 2784641, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2024)

(dismissing Section 1983 claims against defendants because they “are not mentioned in the body

of the complaint, and no facts are alleged showing what [they] did or failed to do that violated

Plaintiff’s rights.”)

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alleged the personal involvement of Sgt. Donnery. Indeed, as the Second Circuit made clear in

Tangreti v. Bachmann, “there is no special rule for supervisory liability. Instead, a plaintiff must

plead and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.’” 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 676). Thus, Plaintiff’s claim against Sgt. Donnery is implausible and is dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) (B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

C. Municipal Liability is Not Properly Pled

Plaintiff’s claim against Nassau County seeking municipal liability is deficient. A claim

for municipal liability under Section 1983 must comply with Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and its progeny. “Monell expressly prohibits respondeat

superior liability for municipalities . . . meaning that a plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘through its

deliberate conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged.’” Agosto

v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan

Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). This requires Plaintiff to “show that he suffered the

denial of a constitutional right that was caused by an official municipal policy or custom.” Frost

v. New York City Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 257 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). A

policy or custom may be established by any of the following:

(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by

government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that

caused the particular constitutional deprivation in question; (3) a practice so

consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a

custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or

(4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to

subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights

of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.

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omitted); see Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F. Supp. 3d 578, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (similar).

“[A] single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell,

unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional

municipal policy that can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.” Mitchell v. City of N.Y., 841

F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)

(plurality)) (brackets omitted); see DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] single

incident in a complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policy-making level, does

not suffice to show a municipal policy.”).

Here, even affording the pro se complaint a liberal construction, there are no factual

allegations from which the Court may reasonably infer that the conduct or inaction of which

Plaintiff complains was caused by a policy or custom of Nassau County. See Mitchell, 841 F.3d

at 80 (dismissing Monell claim for lack of a municipal policy or custom underlying the challenged

conduct); see also Santos v. New York City, 847 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[A]

plaintiff must allege facts tending to support, at least circumstantially, an inference that such a

municipal policy or custom exists.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Nassau

County is implausible because Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a relevant municipal policy

or custom. Thus, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Nassau County is dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) (B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

D. Leave to Amend

“[A] pro se complaint should not be dismissed without the Court granting leave to amend

at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might

be stated.” Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and

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when amendment would be futile. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).

The Court has carefully considered whether to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.

Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants him leave to amend the complaint consistent with

this Order. Plaintiff’s amended complaint must (1) be labeled as an “amended complaint,”

(2) include a caption naming the defendants and link each defendant so named to factual

allegations of conduct or inaction within the body of the amended complaint, (3) bear the same

docket number as this Order, 24-CV-7580(JMA)(LGD), and (4) be filed on or before April 14,

2025. If Plaintiff does not know the identity of a defendant, he may name that defendant as “John

Doe” or “Jane Doe” and must then include sufficient factual allegations to ascertain that

defendant’s identity. Plaintiff is advised that “an amended complaint . . . supersedes the original,

and renders it of no legal effect.” Harris v. City of N.Y., 186 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Thus, any amended complaint Plaintiff files should include all

allegations he wishes to pursue against each defendant he names.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP is granted. The

Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-

(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim and with leave to amend as set forth above. Plaintiff

is granted leave to file an amended complaint consistent with this Order on or before April 14,

2025.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order

would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose

of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

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address of record in an enveloped marked “Legal Mail” and shall note such mailing on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2025

Central Islip, New York

/s/ (JMA)

JOAN M. AZRACK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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