Miles v. Williams

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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No 23-CV-5490 (RER) (MMH)

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GREGORY MILES

VERSUS

DEPUTY WILLIAMS, ET AL.

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MEMORANDUM & ORDER

March 15, 2025

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RAMÓN E. REYES, JR., United States District Judge:

Pro se plaintiff Gregory Miles (“Plaintiff” or “Miles”) alleges that certain conditions

of his confinement at the hands of defendants Captain Regina Williams, Correction Officer

Danielle O’Neal, Captain Katrina Davis, and Legal Coordinator Antonio Frazier (“Frazier”)

(collectively, “Defendants”) violated his constitutional rights. Before the Court is Frazier’s

motion to dismiss.1 After carefully reviewing the record, and for the reasons set forth

herein, Frazier’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Attica Correctional Facility. (See

Incarcerated Lookup, https://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/, BOP No. 24B1236 (last

1 Defendants Captain Regina Williams, Captain Katrina Davis, and Correction Officer Danielle O’Neal have

not been served with process. (ECF No. 30 at n.1). Nevertheless, the Court will construe Frazier’s motion

as applicable to all Defendants.

visited 2/26/2025)). Before being transferred to Attica, Miles was assigned to Mental

Health Housing at the New York City Department of Correction’s (“DOC”) Otis Bantum

Correctional Center (“OBCC”) on Rikers Island. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 2, 3).

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on July 5, 2023, alleging violations of his

constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 due to the conditions of his confinement at

OBCC in June and July of 2023. (Compl. at 4). On August 10, 2023, United States District

Judge Rachel P. Kovner dismissed the Complaint without prejudice for failure to “plead

sufficient factual content to allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (Order dated 8/10/2023).

Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on August 7, 2023, alleging constitutional

violations that allegedly occurred between July 30 and August 6, 2023. (ECF No. 11

(“FAC”) at 7). Miles filed a second amended on September 22, 2023, alleging violations

that presumably occurred sometime between the date of his FAC and September 22,

2023. (ECF No. 12 (“SAC”)). On October 25, 2023, Plaintiff sought leave to include

additional factual allegations concerning his previously filed amendments. (ECF No. 13).

Subsequently, Judge Kovner granted Miles’s two motions for an extension of time to

amend his complaint, nunc pro tunc, and construed Miles’s second amended complaint

and October 25th letter “as supplementing the first amended complaint.” (Order dated

12/20/2023).2 On January 11, 2024, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. (Order

Dated 1/11/2024).

Considering his various amendments and factual supplementations, Plaintiff

claims that he: (1) did not receive lunch until about 3:10 P.M. on August 6, 2023; (2) had

2 Miles subsequently submitted two additional letters which the Court does not construe as attempts to

amend his claims. (ECF Nos. 16 and No. 32).

no access to bathroom or water facilities while in the prison yard; (3) experienced a delay

in payment for a “SPA” (suicide watch) task he completed; (4) was served a cold meal on

August 7, 2023; (5) did not receive responses to his prior grievances; (6) experienced a

delay in transmission of funds from his prison account to his family; (7) was deprived of

fresh air and sunlight; and (8) waited more than two weeks for information from the law

library. (FAC at 4, 7, 10; SAC at 3).

On June 14, 2024, Frazier moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 30). Frazier argues that

Miles did not fully exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, and that none of

his factual allegations, even if true, rise to the level of an objectively serious deprivation

of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. To date, Plaintiff has not filed a response to Frazier’s

motion, despite being ordered to do so. (Order dated 9/9/2024).

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint “must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Even where a motion to dismiss is unopposed, the “sufficiency

of a complaint” is a legal question the court may resolve on the pleadings. Johnson v.

Santiago, 624 F. Supp. 3d 295, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting James v. John Jay Coll. of

Crim. Justice, 776 F. App’x 723, 724 (2d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted)). All inferences are

drawn in favor of the non-movant, and pro se papers are afforded a liberal construction

to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

(2d Cir. 2007); Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006);

Felder v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 27 F.4th 834, 841 (2d Cir. 2022). The court cannot

assume the existence of facts not pleaded or accept the truth of speculations. Id.

DISCUSSION

Miles’s claims are dismissed because (1) he did not fully exhaust his administrative

remedies prior to filing suit and there are no exceptions that would excuse him from doing

so, and (2) the incidents alleged do not rise to the level of an objectively serious

deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.3

I. Plaintiff Did Not Exhaust His Administrative Remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a prisoner to exhaust available

administrative remedies before pursuing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section

1983 ... or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”);

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 532 (2002) (applying this requirement to “all inmate

suits about prison life”). To properly exhaust administrative remedies, an inmate must

complete the administrative process in accordance with the facility’s rules. Jones v. Bock,

549 U.S. 199, 218-19 (2007) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006); Burgos v.

Craig, 307 F. App'x 469, 470 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[exhaustion] must be completed before suit

is filed.”); Williams v. City of New York, No. 03–CV–5342 (RWS), 2005 WL 2862007, at

*10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.1, 2005). The DOC has established a multi-step administrative

3 Miles complains that the conditions of his confinement violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free

from cruel and unusual punishment. A pretrial detainee's claims of unconstitutional conditions of

confinement, however, are governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather

than the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eight Amendment. Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d

35, 49 (2d Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 2009);

see also City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). A pretrial detainee's rights are “at

least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.” Id. at 244.

remedies process–Inmate Grievance Resolution Program (“IGRP”)–that inmates must

complete to satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement.4 The IGRP process requires that

the inmate submit a grievance in writing or by phone, and then if not satisfied with the

resolution, go through several levels of appeals to the facility’s commanding officer, the

Central Office Review Committee, and then the Board of Correction. See, e.g., Pierre-

Louis v. Martinez, No. 12-cv-2240 (NGG) (LB), 2014 WL 4161960 at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.

18, 2014).

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally an affirmative defense that the

defendant bears the burden of proving. E.g., Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; McCoy v. Goord,

255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Inmates are “not required to specially plead

or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. However,

dismissal may be appropriate “where [the] failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the

complaint.” Brinson v. Kirby Forensic Psych. Ctr., No. 16-CV-1625 (VSB), 2018 WL

4680021, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018) (citations omitted). Here, Frazier argues that

Miles did not fully exhaust the IGRP process prior to filing his claims in federal court, and

such failure is clear on the face of the various pleadings and supplements. (ECF No. 30

at 5-11). The Court agrees.

Plaintiff filed his initial grievance on July 5, 2023. (Compl. at 4). He filed his initial

complaint in federal court that same day. (Compl. at 6). Miles filed another grievance on

August 6, 2023, concerning alleged unlawful conditions of confinement that occurred on

July 30, 2023, and August 6, 2023. ((ECF No. 11 at 7). Miles’s FAC, however, is dated

4 The Court takes judicial notice of the IGRP procedures, which have been described in numerous judicial

opinions. See, e.g., Mamon v. N.Y. City Dep't of Corr., No. 10–CV–8055 (NRB), 2012 WL 260287, at *3 n.

4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2012); Swanston v. Dep't of Corr., No. 11–CV–1219 (CM), 2011 WL 5105489, at *2

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2011).

August 7, 2023, only one day after he filed the related grievance. (Id.). Plaintiff’s SAC

was filed on September 22, 2023, and involved grievance he filed only a few weeks

earlier. (ECF No. 12). Where an inmate files a federal action within mere days or a few

weeks of an alleged incident, it is evident from the face of the complaint that the inmate

has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. E.g., Amaker v. Bradt, 745 F. App'x

412, 413 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiff could not have exhausted where “he filed

the complaint at issue here 11 days after filing the grievance”); Gayot v. Perez, No. 16-

CV-8871, 2018 WL 6725331, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2018) (holding that plaintiff could

not have exhausted all administrative remedies that where his appeal occurred seven

days after filing of the initial complaint); Lopez v. Cipolini, 136 F. Supp. 3d 570, 581-82

(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (dismissing complaint when action commenced ten days after incident);

Perez v. City of N.Y., No. 14 Civ. 07502 (LGS), 2015 WL 3652511, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June

11, 2015) (dismissing complaint because only six days had elapsed between date of

alleged incident and filing of complaint); Pierre-Louis, 2014 WL 4161960, at *4 (dismissing

complaint where three weeks elapsed between date of alleged incident and filing of

complaint); Price v. City of New York, No. 11–CV–6170 (TPG), 2012 WL 3798227, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2012) (same). Clearly, Miles did not fully exhaust his administrative

remedies prior to filing suit in this Court.

Exceptions to the administrative exhaustion requirement exist where: (1) “it would

be futile, either because agency decisionmakers are biased or because the agency has

already determined the issue”; (2) “the administrative process would be incapable of

granting relief”; or (3) “pursuing agency review would subject plaintiffs to undue

prejudice.” Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts that allow the Court to find exhaustion would be futile.

While Miles claims he did not receive responses to his grievances, and that an officer

responded to his complaints with, “OH WELL!” (FAC at 7), these allegations are not

enough to show futility. See Myers v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 8525 (PAE), 2012 WL

3776707, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012) (being told “that filing a grievance was a waste

of his time [is] insufficient to excuse him from having to file a grievance.”); Barlow v. Mayor

of New York City, No. 19-CV-6786 (KAM) (JO), 2021 WL 3793773, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.

26, 2021) (failure to respond is not enough without significant delay). There is no

indication here that exhaustion would be futile either because of bias or predetermination,

that the nature of Miles’s claims could not be addressed by the grievance process, and

Miles has not pleaded any facts that show agency review would subject him to undue

prejudice. The recognized exceptions to the administrative exhaustion requirement do not

exist here.

II. Miles’s Factual Allegations Do Not Rise to the Level of a Constitutional Violation

To properly state a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on unlawful conditions of

confinement, a pretrial detainee must allege that: (1) objectively, the deprivation he

suffered was “sufficiently serious that he was denied the minimal civilized measure of

life's necessities,” and (2) subjectively, the defendant official acted with “a sufficiently

culpable state of mind ..., such as deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.”

Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To meet the objective prong, a

plaintiff must show that the conditions of confinement . . . pose an unreasonable risk of

serious damage to his physical or mental health. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d

Cir. 2013).5

The Court will not tarry long on Miles specific allegations but suffice it to say that

he does not allege conditions of confinement that satisfy the objective prong of the

Fourteenth Amendment standard. The short delay in receiving lunch on August 6, 2023,

or receiving a cold meal on August 7, 2023, are hardly the stuff of a Fourteenth

Amendment violation. The lack of access to bathroom facilities and water while engaging

in a short period of recreation in the prison yard, or deprivation of one hour or sunlight, is

similarly constitutionally deficient. The slight delay in receiving payment for prison work,

the delay in transmission of funds from his prison account to his family, and the two-week

delay in receiving information from the law library, the same. None of these things, when

viewed objectively, rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Frazier’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

As Plaintiff has twice been given leave to amend, further amendment will be denied

as it could not reasonably be expected to cure the defects that warrant dismissal. See

Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Chavis v.

Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010)). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3), that any appeal would not be taken in good faith, and therefore, in forma

5 “[C]onditions of confinement may be aggregated to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, but ‘only

when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human

need such as food, warmth, or exercise.’” Walker, 717 F.3d at 125 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,

304 (1991)). Here, Miles alleges disparate conditions of confinement that do not have “a mutually enforcing

effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need.” Walker, 717 F.3d at 125.

Accordingly, the Court will not aggregate Miles’s alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement in its

analysis of whether Miles’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.

pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369

U.S.438, 444–45 (1962).

The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to close the case, mail a copy of this

Memorandum and Order to Plaintiff, and note the mailing on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

Hon. Ramó n E. Reyes , Jr. D igitally si gned by Hon. Ramón E. Reyes, Jr.

Date: 2025.03.15 17:00:16 -04'00'

RAMÓN E. REYES, JR.

United States District Judge

Dated: March 15, 2025

Brooklyn, NY