Sheeler v. Cherry

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DUSTIN SHEELER,

Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-00326

v. (MEHALCHICK, J.)

COUNSELOR CHERRY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Dustin Sheeler (“Sheeler”), an inmate housed at the State Correctional

Institution, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Huntingdon”), filed this pro se civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Named as Defendants are Medication Assisted

Treatment (“MAT”) Program Counselor Cherry, MAT Program Counselor Warholic,

Corrections Health Care Administrator (“CHCA”) McCorkle, and Superintendent Rivello.

On May 17, 2024, Defendants filed a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. (Doc. 15). On

January 13, 2025, the Court granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed the complaint with

leave to amend certain claims. (Doc. 22; Doc. 23). Specifically, the Court granted the motion

with prejudice and without leave to amend as to the Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendants Rivello and McCorkle. (Doc. 22; Doc. 23). The Court granted the motion without

prejudice and with leave to amend as to the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants

Cherry and Warholic, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim against

Defendants Rivello, McCorkle, Cherry, and Warholic. (Doc. 22; Doc. 23).

Presently before the Court is Sheeler’s proposed amended complaint. (Doc. 26). The

amended complaint identifies Cherry and Warholic as Defendants, as well as three newly

named Defendants—the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Secretary of

Corrections Laurel Harry, and Director of Healthcare Services Erica Smith. (Doc. 26). After

reviewing the amended complaint, the Court will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), as Sheeler has failed to cure the deficiencies listed in the January 13, 2025

Memorandum. The amended complaint asserts essentially identical claims against the

Defendants for the same underlying events that gave rise to the claims in the original

complaint. The Court will also dismiss the action against the DOC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

I. ALLEGATIONS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

The gravamen of Sheeler’s amended complaint is that he was denied medically

assisted treatment for opioid use disorder. (Doc. 26, at 4-6). Sheeler alleges that he was

previously enrolled in the MAT Program in Philadelphia County and that prison officials at

the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield informed him that he would be eligible for a

drug called Sublocade.1 (Doc. 26, at 5). However, Sheeler alleges that when he arrived at SCI-

Huntindgon, Defendants Cherry and Warholic refused to let him participate in the MAT

Program. (Doc. 26, at 5). He further alleges that the DOC, Harry, and Smith “are responsible

for creating and implementing the policy about who can get medication for opio[i]d disorder.”

(Doc. 26, at 5). Since his incarceration, Sheeler asserts that he “tried naltrexone…but still

struggled with cravings to use.”2 (Doc. 26, at 4).

1Sublocade is the brand name for a generic drug called buprenorphine. WebMD describes

buprenorphine as a drug used to treat opioid use disorder that “works by partially turning on

the same receptors in your body that opioids do...[which] helps ease withdrawal symptoms

and cravings in people with opioid use disorder.” https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-

170329/belbuca-buccal/details (visited March 6, 2025).

2Naltrexone is the generic name for the drug ReVia. WebMD describes Naltrexone as a

drug used to treat people with an opioid use disorder who have already stopped using opioids

Based on his opioid use disorder, Sheeler claims to be a qualified individual with a

disability under the terms of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). (Doc. 26, at 6). He alleges that

Defendants violated his constitutional rights, as well as his rights under Title II of the ADA.

(Doc. 26, at 6).

Sheeler claims mental, emotional, and physical injuries and seeks monetary damages,

and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Doc. 26, at 6).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (April 26,

1996), authorizes a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is

proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court is required to identify cognizable claims

and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). This initial screening is to be

done as soon as practicable and need not await service of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

In dismissing claims under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, district courts apply the standard

governing motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons, Civ. No. 15-01757, 2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa.

June 26, 2017) (stating “[t]he legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a

claim under § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or § 1997e(c)(1) is the same as that for

that “works by blocking the effects of opioids.” https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-

7399/naltrexone-oral/details (visited March 6, 2025).

dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”);

Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (explaining that when dismissing

a complaint pursuant to § 1915A, “a court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”); Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240

(3d Cir. 1999) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for

failure to state a claim under §1915(e)(2)(B)). In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss,

a court should not inquire “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant

is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974);

Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

Because Sheeler proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his amended

complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. CLAIMS AGAINST THE DOC

Sheeler has named the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections as a Defendant in this

action. (Doc. 26, at 5). However, the Department of Corrections is not amenable to suit

because it is not a person as required for purposes of § 1983, and it is entitled to immunity

under the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989) (holding that a state may not be sued in federal court pursuant to § 1983 and is not a

“person” for purposes of that provision). Eleventh Amendment immunity prevents Sheeler

from suing the Department of Corrections as a matter of law. “Because the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections is a part of the executive department of the

Commonwealth, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 61, it shares in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh

Amendment immunity.” Lavia v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000).

Pennsylvania has not waived this immunity. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b). Accordingly, the

Department of Corrections is not subject to suit and will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

B. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM AGAINST CHERRY AND WARHOLIC

In order to establish an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a plaintiff “must show (i)

a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate

indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d

Cir. 2003) (citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). A serious medical need

is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious

that a lay person would recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr.

Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). In addition, “if unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of

adequate medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature contemplated by the eighth

amendment.” Monmouth Cnty., 834 F.2d at 347 (citation omitted).

A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs

when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994). A mere difference of opinion between the prison’s medical staff and the inmate

regarding the diagnosis or treatment which the inmate receives does not support a claim of

cruel and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (M.D. Pa.

1988). Moreover, “[i]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts…a non-medical prison

official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill v.

Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, “absent a reason to believe (or actual

knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner,

a non-medical prison official…will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter

requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236.

Sheeler again alleges that Defendants Cherry and Warholic refused to let him

participate in the MAT Program to treat his opioid abuse disorder, in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights. (Doc. 26, at 5-6). The amended complaint contains sufficient factual

allegations to assert that Sheeler has a serious medical need of opioid use disorder. However,

Sheeler does not allege that he suffered any adverse health consequences as a result of the

denial of MAT. Nor does he allege that he advised Defendants Cherry and Warholic that he

was experiencing any unpleasant symptoms related to detoxification. Sheeler acknowledges

that he has been treated for his opioid use disorder with the medication Naltrexone, though

he continued to “struggle[] with cravings to use.” (Doc. 26, at 4). Smith alleges that treatment

with the medication Naltrexone is not appropriate for individuals with moderate or severe

opioid use disorder; rather, such individuals should be treated with Methadone or Suboxone.

(Doc. 26, at 5).

Sheeler’s amended complaint demonstrates his disagreement with being denied

placement in the MAT Program and disagreement with the medication he received to treat

his opioid use disorder. Though he may have wished to participate in the MAT Program and

obtain Sublocade, instead of Naltrexone, his disagreement with the course of action that

Defendants took is not enough to state a Section 1983 claim. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099,

1109 (3d Cir. 1989). This is particularly so in light of the fact that there are no allegations in

the amended complaint that Defendants Cherry and Warholic intentionally withheld medical

treatment from Sheeler in order to inflict pain or harm upon him. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837;

Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. The allegations amount to nothing more than Sheeler’s subjective

disagreement with the treatment decisions of Defendants Cherry and Warholic. See, e.g.,

Groppi v. Bosco, 208 F. App’x 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential) (finding that a prisoner

“does not have a constitutional right to participate in the drug treatment program”) (citing

Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976)). Courts have repeatedly held that when an

inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim entails nothing more than a disagreement concerning

which type of medication to prescribe for a particular ailment, prison officials are entitled to

a judgment in their favor as a matter of law. See, e.g., Gause v. Diguglielmo, 339 F. App’x 132

(3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential) (dispute over choice of medication does not rise to the level

of an Eighth Amendment violation); Innis v. Wilson, 334 F. App’x 454 (3d Cir. 2009)

(nonprecedential) (same); Whooten v. Bussanich, 248 F. App’x 324 (3d Cir. 2007)

(nonprecedential) (same); Ascenzi v. Diaz, 247 F. App’x 390 (3d Cir. 2007) (nonprecedential)

(same).

Sheeler failed to cure the deficient claims against Defendants Cherry and Warholic.

The Court will dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Cherry and

Warholic.

C. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM AGAINST HARRY AND SMITH

Sheeler seeks to hold the Supervisor Defendants—Harry and Smith—liable for

deliberate indifference to his serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment

because they allegedly created and implemented a policy regarding treatment for opioid use

disorder. (Doc. 26, at 5). “[V]icarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits,” and

therefore, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 676 (2009).

There are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for

unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d

307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. granted, judgment rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes,

575 U.S. 822 (2015). First, a plaintiff may allege a supervisor enacted a policy, practice or

custom, with deliberate indifference to the consequences, which directly caused the

constitutional harm. Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316. Failure to train or supervise allegations are

subcategories of policy or practice liability. Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316. Second, a plaintiff may

state a claim by alleging a supervisor “‘participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed

others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced’ in the

subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316 (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K.

v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)) (quoting Stoneking v.

Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)).

Sheeler’s sweeping and general allegation that Defendants Harry and Smith created

and implemented a policy regarding treatment for opioid use disorder is insufficient to state a

claim. (Doc. 26, at 5). For liability to attach to supervisors, their knowledge and acquiescence

in unconstitutional conduct must be contemporaneous to the misconduct. Banks v. Rozum,

639 F. App’x 778, 784 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (quoting Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp.,

132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)). The amended complaint is devoid of any allegations regarding

Harry and Smith’s knowledge and acquiescence in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. The

Court will therefore dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Harry and

Smith.

D. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT CLAIM

Sheeler again seeks to set forth a claim that Defendants violated the ADA. (Doc. 26,

at 6). Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any

such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132(1). Individual defendants, however, are not public entities

within the meaning of Title II of the ADA and, therefore, are not subject to suit. Emerson v.

Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002) (individuals are not subject to liability under

“Titles I or II of the ADA, which prohibit discrimination by employers and public entities

respectively.”); Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 779 F. App’x 938, 942 (3d Cir. 2019)

(nonprecedential) (concluding that plaintiff’s “claims for individual damages liability under

Title II of the ADA fail for the simple reason that there is no such liability”) (citations

omitted). Thus, Sheeler cannot maintain his ADA claim against the Defendants in their

individual capacities.

To the extent Sheeler is suing the Defendants in their official capacities, the claim is

viable as the Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA validly abrogates sovereign

immunity as to state conduct that violates the Constitution. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S.

151, 159 (2006); see also Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2023) (“state officers can

be sued for damages in their official capacities for purposes of the ADA and RA, unless barred

by the Eleventh Amendment”) (emphasis in original).

In order to determine whether a plaintiff may sue a State for damages under Title II,

courts must “(1) identify which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2)

identify to what extent such conduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar

as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,

determine whether Congress’ purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of

conduct is nevertheless valid.” Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524, 553 (3d Cir. 2007). Pursuant to

this standard, Sheeler must initially state a valid claim under Title II of the ADA, and to do

this he must demonstrate that: (1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; and (3) he

was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, or was otherwise subject to discrimination by that entity; (4) by

reason of his disability. Bowers, 475 F.3d at 553 n.32; 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

Although Sheeler broadly alleges in conclusory fashion that he was discriminated

against (see Doc. 26, at 6), he alleges no facts to suggest that he was discriminated against

because of a disability or denied accommodations for a disability with respect to any

programs, services, or activities. While Sheeler generally asserts that he has been denied

access to the MAT Program, he has not alleged a claim of discrimination relating to that

alleged exclusion and does not specifically elaborate how the Defendants discriminated

against him. Sheeler does not include factual allegations in his amended complaint describing

how any disability limits him in a major life activity, as required to state plausible ADA claim.

Additionally, the Court understands Sheeler to be basing his ADA claim on the denial of

placement in the MAT Program. However, decisions about a prisoner’s medical treatment

generally do not give rise to a claim under the ADA. See, e.g., Iseley v. Beard, 200 F. App’x

137, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential) (finding that Iseley had not claimed that he was

excluded from any program on the basis of his disability but rather alleged “that he was denied

medical treatment for his disabilities, which is not encompassed by the ADA’s prohibitions”)

(citing Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 248 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Kokinda, 663 F. App’x at

159 (“The District Court was also correct to conclude…that Kokinda’s ADA claims fail

because the ADA prohibits disability-based discrimination, not inadequate treatment for the

disability.” (footnotes and internal quotations omitted)). Sheeler has failed to cure the

deficiencies of the ADA claim, and the Court will dismiss the ADA claim against the

Defendants in their official capacities.

E. LEAVE TO AMEND

Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, the Court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint unless amendment

would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 114 (3d

Cir. 2002). Given the Court’s above determination that Sheeler failed to state a plausible claim

for relief against the Defendants, the amended complaint could not survive a renewed motion

to dismiss, and the proposed amendment is futile. See Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,

863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988) (an amendment to a complaint is futile if it does “not cure

the deficiency in the original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a

renewed motion to dismiss”). Moreover, the Court has afforded Sheeler the opportunity to

amend his complaint and he has failed to cure the specific deficiencies outlined by the Court.

See Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (where

an inmate plaintiff “has already had two chances to tell his story…giving him further leave to

amend would be futile.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Consistent with the foregoing, the Court will dismiss the amended complaint (Doc.

26) pursuant to the Court’s screening authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An

appropriate Order shall issue.

Dated: March 13, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge