Herring v. Shelby County Government Health Service

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

JANICE F. HERRING, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 2:24-cv-02010-TLP-atc

v. )

)

SHELBY COUNTY GOVERNMENT )

HEALTH SERVICE, LORRIE BROOKS, )

Administrator, GREG MATHEWS, )

Manager, and VICKIE LEWIS, Supervisor, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff sued Defendants Lorrie Brooks, Greg Mathews, and Vickie Lewis (“Individual

Defendants”) and Shelby County Government Health Service (“County”) for employment

discrimination and defamation. (ECF No. 1.) And Defendants moved to dismiss. (ECF No. 15.)

Plaintiff opposed the motion, except as to the disability discrimination claims against the

Individual Defendants, which she agreed should be dismissed. (ECF No. 16.)

Magistrate Judge Annie T. Christoff then entered a Report and Recommendation and

Proposed Findings of Fact (“R&R”) recommending that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of

discrimination against the Individual Defendants and deny dismissal as to the remaining claims.

(ECF No. 48.) Defendants timely objected. (ECF No. 49.) And Plaintiff did not object but

timely responded to Defendants’ objection.1 (ECF No. 50.) For the reasons explained below,

1 Defendants filed their objections to the R&R on February 7, 2025, meaning Plaintiff had

through February 21, 2025, to respond. (See ECF Nos. 49, 50.) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)

(authorizing a party to respond to objections within fourteen days of service). Plaintiff

the Court ADOPTS the R&R, DISMISSES the disability discrimination claims against the

Individual Defendants, and DENIES the motion to dismiss as to the remaining claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

A magistrate judge may submit to a district court judge proposed findings of fact and a

recommended ruling on certain dispositive pretrial matters, including motions to dismiss. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). And the district court can “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Before the district court adopts or rejects the proposed findings or recommendations, a party may

object to them “[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended

disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If neither party objects,

the district court reviews the R&R for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee’s

note. But if there is an objection, the district court reviews the objected-to portions of the R&R

de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

An objecting party cannot raise new arguments or issues in objections that it did not

present to the magistrate court, unless the party has a compelling reason for failing to raise the

issue before. Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000). And any objections

must “be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and

contentious.” Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Howard v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). In fact, “[o]verly general

responded on February 21, but the Clerk did not enter the filing on the docket until February 24.

(See ECF No. 50.) Defendants thus contend that Plaintiff’s filing was untimely, should be

construed as a motion to extend the filing deadline, and should be denied because Plaintiff did

not provide good cause for missing the filing deadline. (ECF No. 51.) But, as stated, Plaintiff

did not miss the filing deadline—even though the Clerk did not update the docket until three

days after receiving the response. (See ECF No. 50.) And so, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to respond and will consider her response to the objections.

objections do not satisfy the objection requirement.” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725

(6th Cir. 2006) (citing Miller, 50 F.3d at 380), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549

U.S. 199 (2007); see also Slater v. Potter, 28 F. App’x 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The filing of

vague, general, or conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections

and is tantamount to a complete failure to object.” (citing Miller, 50 F.3d at 380)). And so, when

a party submits only vague, general, or conclusory objections, the district court may review the

R&R for clear error, rather than de novo. See id. In any case, the district court need not

articulate all its reasons for rejecting a party’s objection. See Tuggle v. Seabold, 806 F.2d 87, 92

(6th Cir. 1986).

Neither party objected to dismissing the disability discrimination claims against the

Individual Defendants, so the Court reviews that recommendation for clear error. But

Defendants timely objected to other recommendations (ECF No. 49), and the Court reviews

those portions of the R&R de novo.

DISPOSITION

Having reviewed the record, the Court finds no error with Judge Christoff’s conclusions

in the R&R. The Court therefore ADOPTS the R&R and GRANTS Defendant’s motion in part

and DENIES the motion in part.

I. Background

Plaintiff worked for the County as a clerical specialist under the supervision of Brooks,

Mathews, and Lewis. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4; ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 9.) In February 2023,

Plaintiff was diagnosed with hypokalemia, a low-potassium condition that caused her to suffer

from vomiting and leg, arm, and stomach cramps. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4; ECF No. 1-7 at

PageID 23.) In fact, on two days in February, she told her supervisors about symptoms she was

experiencing. (ECF No. 1-7 at PageID 23.) And on top of those physical symptoms, Plaintiff

went for bloodwork every two weeks, clearing her work absences for these doctor’s

appointments through Mathews. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.)

A month later, on March 17, 2023, Lewis told Plaintiff that she needed to move to a

different office that was smaller, cluttered, and windowless. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4; ECF No.

1-7 at PageID 24.) Plaintiff states that she then “advised” Lewis of her “illness” and that she

“needed to be close to the bathroom” for throwing up. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4; see also ECF

No. 1-7 at PageID 24.) And a few days later, on March 22, 2023, Plaintiff and her supervisors

had a meeting where she informed them about her claustrophobia,2 which Brooks “kept throwing

. . . around the room as if it was funny” and speaking “as if the fear wasn’t real.” (Id. at PageID

4–5; ECF No. 1-7 at PageID 24.) Finally, on March 31, 2023, Plaintiff received separation

papers from the County. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.)

She then brought a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which

issued a right to sue letter, before suing here. (ECF No. 1-1.) Defendants have now moved to

dismiss her claims. (ECF No. 15.)

II. Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege enough facts to “state a plausible

claim to relief.” Bryant v. McDonough, 72 F.4th 149 (6th Cir. 2023); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009). Courts must “construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the

plaintiff, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and decide whether there is enough

factual content to allow ‘the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

2 Because of her claustrophobia, Plaintiff explained that confined, small, and cluttered spaces can

trigger panic attacks. (ECF No. 1-5 at PageID 21.) During these panic attacks, she experiences

confusion and becomes disoriented. (Id.)

the misconduct alleged.’” Mich. First Credit Union v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 108 F.4th 421, 425

(6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). What is more, courts “liberally construe[]”

pro se pleadings and hold them “to less stringent standards than a pleading filed by counsel.”

Kondaur Cap. Corp. v. Smith, 802 F. App’x 938, 945 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Of course, this “lenient treatment . . . has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield,

92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); see also Orlowski v. Bates, 146 F. Supp. 3d

908, 921 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (“Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt from the basic pleading

requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (citing Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594

(6th Cir. 1989))).

III. Analysis

A. Disability Discrimination

Plaintiff asserts multiple types of disability discrimination claims under the ADA,

including claims for her termination, failure to accommodate, unequal terms of employment,

retaliation, and a hostile work environment. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3; ECF No. 1-4; see also

ECF No. 48 at PageID 173–174, 174 n.2 (summarizing Plaintiff’s claims).) The motion to

dismiss challenges every claim against the Individual Defendants. (ECF No. 15-1 at PageID 80–

81.) But as to the County, it moves to dismiss only Plaintiff’s termination and retaliation claims,

so the Court only addresses those arguments here. (See ECF No. 15-1 at PageID 85–87.) See

also Murr, 200 F.3d at 902 n.1 (explaining that parties cannot “raise at the district court stage

new arguments or issues that were not presented to the magistrate”).

For the claims against the Individual Defendants, both parties agree that the Court should

dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claims against Brooks, Mathews, and Lewis because the ADA does not

recognize claims against individual supervisors. (ECF No. 15-1 at PageID 80–81; ECF No. 16 at

PageID 89.) Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 808 n.1 (6th Cir. 1999)

(“Individual supervisors who do not independently qualify under the statutory definition of

employers may not be held personally liable in ADA cases.”). And so, neither party objected to

the R&R recommending dismissal of these claims. (ECF Nos. 48, 49, 50.) The Court therefore

agrees under clear error review that dismissal is appropriate and ADOPTS the R&R on this issue

and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s ADA claims against Brooks, Mathews, and Lewis.

As to Plaintiff’s claims against the County, the County argues that Plaintiff did not plead

a plausible claim to relief for two reasons. First, for any ADA claim, a plaintiff must allege that

he or she has a disability.3 See Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 444–45 (6th Cir. 2020)

(explaining that the ADA prohibits “discriminating against a qualified individual because of a

disability”). And the County contends here that Plaintiff did not plead a covered disability under

the ADA. (ECF No. 15-1 at PageID 82–85.) But the R&R correctly explains why Plaintiff has

met her burden on this point (ECF No. 48 at PageID 177–79), and the County did not object to

this proposed finding with specificity (see ECF No. 49).4 Thus, under clear error review, the

3 Under the ADA, a plaintiff does not have to plead that he or she actually has a disability.

Rather, “[a] person is disabled under the ADA when the person has ‘a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,’ has ‘a record of such

impairment,’ or is ‘regarded as having such an impairment.’ 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).” Thompson

v. Fresh Prods., LLC, 985 F.3d 509, 522 (6th Cir. 2021). But Plaintiff here claims to have an

actual disability and does not rely on these other theories of proving her case, so the Court does

not address them here.

4 The County states that it “object[s]” to the R&R’s finding that Plaintiff alleged a disability “for

the reasons previously set forth in their Motion to Dismiss and Supporting Memorandum.” (ECF

No. 49 at PageID 184.) But this generic, blanket objection does not explain how the magistrate

court erred and therefore “do[es] not satisfy the objection requirement.” Spencer, 449 F.3d at

725 (citing Miller, 50 F.3d at 380), abrogated on other grounds by Jones, 549 U.S. 199; see also

Slater, 28 F. App’x 512, 513 (“The filing of vague, general, or conclusory objections does not

meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a complete failure to object.”

(citing Miller, 50 F.3d at 380)). And in any case, given the broad interpretation of a “disability”

under the ADA and the non-demanding pleading standard for a motion to dismiss, especially for

pro se plaintiffs, the Court would agree with the R&R even under de novo review. See 42 U.S.C.

Court agrees with the R&R that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged hypokalemia and claustrophobia

and that those disabilities substantially limit her in major life activities like walking, speaking,

thinking, and interacting with others. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4–5; ECF No. 1-5 at PageID 21;

ECF No. 1-7 at PageID 23–25.) See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); Darby, 964 F.3d at 444–45

(summarizing and defining the requirements for an ADA claim).

Second, to plausibly plead a prima facie retaliation claim and survive dismissal, a

plaintiff must allege that “there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the

adverse employment action or harassment.” Wyatt v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 999 F.3d 400, 419 (6th

Cir. 2021) (retaliation); Darby, 964 F.3d at 444 (explaining that a plaintiff alleging disability

discrimination must show “she would not have been discharged but for the disability”). And the

County argued in its original motion and in its objections that Plaintiff failed to allege this

causation element for her retaliation and discrimination claims. (ECF No. 15-1 at PageID 85–87;

ECF No. 49 at PageID 184–85.) The County emphasizes that it did not learn about Plaintiff’s

disabilities until after it tried to make her change offices, meaning that the move “could not have

been motivated by discriminatory animus.” (See ECF No. 49 at PageID 184; see also ECF No. 1

at PageID 4 (Plaintiff stating that she was asked to move offices on March 17, 2023, and that she

advised the County of her claustrophobia on March 22, 2023).)

On the other hand, Plaintiff’s frequent vomiting, doctor’s appointments, and

conversations with County employees about her health in February could have put the County on

notice of her disabilities before it moved her into a different office in March. (See generally ECF

§ 12102(4)(A) (instructing courts to construe “disability” “to the maximum extent permitted by

the terms” of the ADA); Mich. First Credit, 108 F.4th at 425 (requiring plaintiff to state only a

“plausible” claim to relief); Kondaur, 802 F. App’x at 945 (“[A] pleading filed pro se is to be

liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than a pleading filed by counsel.”)

No. 1.) But the Court need not focus on the timing of the County’s request that Plaintiff move

offices because the County certainly knew about her disabilities before firing her. In fact, as

Judge Christoff points out in the R&R, the County gave Plaintiff separation papers nine days

after an express conversation about her alleged disabilities. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4–5 (Plaintiff

stating that she informed the County of her claustrophobia on March 22, 2023, and that she

received separation papers on March 31, 2023); see generally ECF No. 49.) Accepting

Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the County knew about her alleged disabilities when they fired her,

and the close timing between these events is enough for Plaintiff to allege the causal element for

her ADA claims.5 And so, under de novo review, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES

the County’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claims.

B. Defamation

Defendants did not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation claims against them. (ECF

No. 15; see also ECF No. 49 at PageID 185 (“It is true that Defendants did not address a

purported defamation claim in their Motion to Dismiss”).) And so, the R&R recommended that

those claims proceed. (ECF No. 48 at PageID 175, 177 n.3.) Defendants then objected, arguing

that Plaintiff merely stated “Defamation of Character” in her Complaint without adding any

5 The County argues that “the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff’s termination occurred due

to Plaintiff’s engagement in a protected activity. Instead, Plaintiff provides documentation

which shows that her disciplinary action and work misconduct was the reason for her

termination.” (ECF No. 15-1 at PageID 87.) The County is touching on an argument about a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. But as Judge Christoff pointed out—

and as the County agrees—a Plaintiff need not plead a case under the McDonnell Douglas

framework to state a “plausible” right to relief and avoid dismissal. (ECF No. 48 At PageID

181; ECF No. 49 at PageID 185.) See also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510

(2002) (“The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, however, is an evidentiary standard,

not a pleading requirement.”); Mich. First Credit, 108 F.4th at 425 (requiring a “plausible” right

to relief). And, as discussed above, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the County learned about

her disabilities and retaliated or discriminated against her for those disabilities by terminating her

just after it found out. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 4–5.)

factual support for it. (ECF No. 49 at PageID 185–87.) As a result, Defendants contend that

they did not know the claim existed and that “[t]he single appearance of [those] three words”

“cannot be a basis for putting a party on notice of a cause of action.” (ECF No. 49 at PageID

186.)

The Court disagrees. “Defamation of Character” is a concise statement of Plaintiff’s

intent to sue for defamation. Given this language, no party could reasonably claim that it did not

receive notice that Plaintiff intended to pursue a claim for defamation. And though Plaintiff’s

factual allegations may be insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief on those grounds,

Defendants should have raised the issue before the magistrate court in their motion to dismiss.

Because they did not do so, the Court does not address those arguments now.6 See Murr, 200

F.3d at 902 n.1 (explaining that the Magistrate Judge Act “does not allow parties to raise at the

district court stage new arguments or issues that were not presented to the magistrate”). And so,

the Court ADOPTS the R&R with respect to Plaintiff’s defamation claims.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained, the Court ADOPTS the R&R, GRANTS the motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Defendants, and DENIES the motion to dismiss

the remaining claims.

SO ORDERED, this 18th day of March, 2025.

s/Thomas L. Parker

THOMAS L. PARKER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6 Defendants alternatively argue that they should be allowed to file a second motion to dismiss.

But because there was no barrier to the County seeking the relief it wanted in its initial motion,

the Court is not inclined to allow the second motion. The Court therefore DENIES that request.